RAF vs Luftwaffe pilot training 1940.

[Freebird]

From an earlier post of Glider's

Its worth starting out with some numbers that show how difficult it was to deliver the training that was needed. In 1935 the RAF trained about 300 pilots a year, by the second revise in August 1940 this had increased to 7,000 pilots a year once the second revise was in place. With this kind of expansion you were going to have some problems along the way.

There's been quite a few threads about RAF vs Luftwaffe losses in the BoB, but I'm wondering how well equipped the LW was to replace losses?
How many fighter pilots per month could they train?

 

[stona]

I will look for some numbers when I get a chance in a few days, but I can say for sure that both air force's struggled to replace their losses. Neither had anticipated the level of losses sustained in the campaigns of 1940 and neither had training programmes in place to meet the level of losses sustained.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

Only one side in the BoB suffered a shortage of equipment, everything from spares to aircraft in various units' establishments and that was the Luftwaffe. This is an often overlooked factor in the Battle, looking at the 'bottom lines' only tells part of the story.
A shortage of pilots, particularly combat ready pilots (inexperienced RAF units or pilots were typically lost at a rate between 5 and 6 times that of their experienced comrades) afflicted both sides.
Between 27th August and 4th September 1940, just when Park and Dowding were becoming seriously concerned about the numbers of experienced pilots available to them, Milch made a tour of inspection of Luftwaffe units involved in the Battle. A typical Luftwaffe Gruppe (three Staffeln at this time) had an establishment of 35-40 aircraft. Milch discovered that the average for bomber Gruppen was just 20, for Bf 109 Gruppen just 18, Bf 110s even less. This was compounded by low serviceability rates, often due to a lack of spare parts.
Dowding had no such concerns, but on 2nd September Evill produced a document showing pilot losses running at 125 per week, with only 150 replacements due to be trained (but not operationally ready) by 21st September. Replacing the 375 projected losses with 150 newly trained pilots was obviously not going to work, and it is one of the factors that precipitated the introduction of the stabilisation system.
The Luftwaffe too was running out of aircrew. As of 14th September Bf 109 Staffeln possessed, on average, just 67% of operational crews against authorised aircraft (though they didn't have the aircraft either). For Bf 110 Staffeln this number was just 49%, and for bomber Staffeln 59%. This was the result not just of losses in the BoB, though these were high in August, but a culmination of losses that started with the Polish campaign.
The stabilisation system adopted by Fighter Command was a fairly desperate solution to a problem, but it did work. 11 Group's squadrons always had enough pilots and enough aircraft. It was was not a solution available to the Luftwaffe which did not have the luxury of substantial forces, if not in reserve, then at least in a 'second line'. The lack of aircraft and spares for the Luftwaffe is simply a reflection of the fundamental differences in attitude to the conflict of the British and German governments. These were diametrically opposed. The British knew that their only chance was a long haul, long enough to hopefully get the Americans directly involved, but otherwise to survive long enough for the projection of American industrial might across the Atlantic to make a difference. Some Germans were aware that a short haul to victory was the only way they could win. It's why some of them would later acknowledge the significance of the Battle.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

How many fighter pilots per month could they train?

Fighter Command's three OTU's produced 280 pilots in the four weeks up to September 2nd 1940. To do this the OTU course had been halved from four weeks to two and some pilots graduating had only ten hours on operational fighter types and had never fired their guns in anger. These men were not combat ready pilots, but would complete their training at their squadrons, though not usually within 11 Group. Incidentally, these 280 pilots represented a net loss of 68 pilots, casualties amounting to 348 in the same period, ignoring those caused by accidents or illness. This again was a major factor in the adoption of the stabilisation system. Park's view was that it was better to have 23 squadrons in 11 Group with no fewer than 21 pilots than to have more under strength squadrons. It was another correct call, and it is decisions like this that win battles.
Sholto-Douglas, who failed anyway to understand the distinction between a pilot fresh from an OTU and an experienced one who had a chance of survival, also failed to grasp that creating another OTU would simply place an additional strain on Fighter Command's resources, which is why he suggested such a 'solution' on several occasions and why both Dowding and Park must have felt like banging their heads on the table.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Glider]

The Luftwaffe were worse off in my view regarding repacement pilots. The RAF at least had sufficient pilots to fill all the gaps in the squadrons.Certainly a number of these were not combat ready but at least a percentage of them could go to quieter sectors to have a chance of getting their skills up.
The Luftewaffe had a much reduced pilot strengh at the end of the battle and there is good evidence that their newly trained pilots were no better than the newly trained RAF pilots.

 

[parsifal]

Don't forget that a higher proportion of RAF assets were recoverable, because many of the combats were lost over friendly territory. A LW pilot that successfully bailed over England was still a total loss, a British pilot was not necessarily so. He might be wounded, but he had a chance of recovery at least.

 

[stona]

British pilots, including some well known, could be shot down and survive a forced landing or adventure by parachute, only to be back at their squadron the next day, and on duty. Sometimes the squadron would arrange transport, sometimes a train journey might be required. If uninjured (at least physically) there was no time off, just straight back to the fray.
Luftwaffe air crew were more likely to become PoWs, or drown in the Channel attempting a return. After some bodies were recovered with self inflicted fatal wounds it was officially not allowed for aircrew to carry personal side arms on cross Channel flights

 

[buffnut453]

The point about pushing new pilots to squadrons in Groups outside of 11 Gp is incredibly significant. Despite the RAF being inferior in terms of both absolute numbers and in terms of local tactical numerical comparisons, at the operational level, the RAF had one key advantage - Fighter Command had "rear areas" that were seldom attacked and hence providing locations where new pilots could be brought up to speed within squadrons, and to where squadrons could rotated for a rest from the high-intensity operations undertaken in 11 Gp. By comparison, the Luftwaffe HAD to put all its available force against south and southeast England with no opportunity for "rest" deployments. Most, if not all, Luftwaffe units were considerably lacking in aircrew, gaps that could never be made up. Essentially, the Battle of Britain was a microcosm of the differing approaches to front line aircrew by the RAF and Luftwaffe. The RAF was willing to rest pilots from operations while the Luftwaffe either wasn't willing or wasn't able to do likewise.

 

[pbehn]

There is always a discussion about the LW change to massed raids on London. Theories about revenge for raids on Berlin, tactical strategies to finally have a full blown conflict with the RAF or political strategies to force a political solution by bombarding the UK capital into surrender. In fact the LW were suffering as much if not more than the RAF and it was becoming the only tactic left. Squadrons of both fighters and bombers were lacking experienced pilots and planes, in the absence of new pilots and planes they had to be amalgamated and the obvious place to do it was at the Pas de Calais or any future attacks would be more dispersed than those mounted which the RAF had handled adequately.

 

[Jenisch]

Don't forget that a higher proportion of RAF assets were recoverable, because many of the combats were lost over friendly territory. A LW pilot that successfully bailed over England was still a total loss, a British pilot was not necessarily so. He might be wounded, but he had a chance of recovery at least.

I wonder if this had the impact often proclaimed, because this is often mentioned about the BoB, but not so in regard to the Luftwaffe in the Allied bombing of Germany.

 

[pbehn]

[QUOTE="buffnut453, post: 1341165, member: 11447" By comparison, the Luftwaffe HAD to put all its available force against south and southeast England with no opportunity for "rest" deployments. [/QUOTE]

This cannot be correct, RAF bomber command raids on Germany in daylight were always met by LW fighters, they had the scope to rotate but never did, possibly because Goering was being fitted for a new range of uniforms with batons.

 

[pbehn]

I wonder if this had the impact often proclaimed, because this is often mentioned about the BoB, but not so in regard to the Luftwaffe in the Allied bombing of Germany.

The situation was geographically and tactically the same but in terms of resources completely different. When the P51 replaced the PP47 in bomber escort the P47s and thir pilots switched to attacking Northern France. In what could be seen as a war of attrition USA forces in Europe were getting bigger by the week with pilots given 200 hrs training on fighters. By the same token bomber crews did a tour of duty and went home, German crews never had that luxury.

 

[parsifal]

I wonder if this had the impact often proclaimed, because this is often mentioned about the BoB, but not so in regard to the Luftwaffe in the Allied bombing of Germany.

I think that all losses over friendly territory favour that combatant. The problem facing the LW in 1944 however was made complicated by the lopsided exchange rates that were occurring

The relentless rate of losses from the beginning of the Russian campaign, made demands which the flying training organization found almost impossible to meet: during the first six months of the offensive. LW casualties in aircrew, of all categories from all causes in all theatres, amounted to some 2,200 men; during the second six months an almost exactly equal number of men was lost. This was not a critical loss, but it was the beginning of a process of attrition that was to bleed the LW white for experience.

The campaign in Russia also brought more direct forms of pressure on the flying training organization. Early in 1942 many Ju-52aircraft, together with their instructor pilots, were removed from the C, blind-flying and bomber schools and sent to Russia to supplement the fleet of air transports engaged in flying supplies to the German troops cut off at demyansk and Kholm, and later still at Stalingrad.. Owing to actual losses and shortages at the front line units, many of the instructors and aircraft were never returned to the training organization. Later in the year the pace of air operations in the east led to a shortage of aviation fuel throughout the Luftwaffe; again it was the flying training schools that suffered.

The shortages of instructors, suitable aircraft and fuel threw out of gear the training programme for bomber and reconnaissance crews; in the short term there was a surplus of partially-trained pilots from the A/B Schools, but at the same time a lack of trained crews available at the Ergaenzungseinheiten. In July 1942 General Kuehl, the Director of Training, brought to Goering's notice the fact that the shortages were leading to an impossible situation at the C Schools. As was so often the case, the Reichsmarschall had a glib answer: he ordered that the C Schools should be disbanded, and their functions taken over by the Ergaenzungseinheiten. This proved to be beyond the capacity of the latter, however, for they had insufficient aircraft or instructors to cope with this sudden influx of pupils; so, in their turn, the Ergaenzungseinheiten farmed out many of them to the operational Gruppen (groups) for training. The net result of this confused situation was that the general standard of training of new crews for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance units fell so low that operational efficiency began to suffer.

During 1943 the new Director of Training, Generalleutnant Kreipe, was able to slow the rate of deterioration of his organization. But simple expedients, like the introduction of short glider courses to provide initial flying experience for pilots, could not make up for the perennial shortages of good instructors, modern aircraft and, above all, fuel.

It has to be stated that the fighter arm never quite suffered the same crisis as the bomber arm of the LW, however its ability to train was severely curtailed as the war proceeded.

By the beginning of 1944 German fighter pilots were joining their operational units with only about 160 hours flying training; this compared with more than double that figure for their counterparts in the RAF and the USAAF.

During the first half of 1944 the Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots. During this period the home-defence units lost some 2,000 pilots killed, missing or wounded. A further 1500 (approximately) were lost in the army commands in that period. In that period LW returns show that 7200 S/E fighter airframes were shot down, abandoned, written off, or captured. It got even worse in the second half of 1944

When the Luftwaffe training organization tried to make good these heavy casualties with similar numbers of new pilots, the result was a vicious circle: the ill-trained replacement fighter pilots were no match for their opponents and suffered heavy losses, and their places in the front line were taken by new pilots who had had a more hurried training and were even less of a match for their opponents.

During the late spring standards fell yet further, when the B flying schools were disbanded. Fighter pilots were now sent into action with only about 112 hours flying, made up as follows: A School, two hours glider flying and 50 hours powered flying on elementary types; Fighter School, 40 hours; Replacement Fighter Groupe, 20 hours.
Moreover, the so-called Windhund programme, which provided for the hasty conversion of ex-bomber pilots by giving them 20 hours flying in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy.

In September 1944 the Luftwaffe flying training organization received its death blow. With the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers, aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements that operations had to be curtailed. In such a climate the training schools, always the poor relation, could not survive long. First the elementary and many of the specialist schools were closed then, as the last of the trainees passed through, the specialist fighter schools were also disbanded and their instructors sent to the front. By February 1945 the Luftwaffe aircrew training organization had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist.

In the period June 1944 to the end of the year the LW suffered a further 10500 lost SE fighters. Numbers of pilots lost are not precisely known, but with a total force structure for all fronts not exceeding 2000 (until very late), and losses representing 80% of the manpower poured into the fighter arm at that time, there is little doubt that loss rates were heavy. My gues for such heavy losses compared to what happened in 1940, has to do with numbers, the fact there were no safe places left for the LW, the crisis in training, the poor quality of replacement fillers all of which are at least plausible explanations for an elevated mortality rate for the LW in 1944. Perhaps also the weaponary being used. Not a lot of difference in the levels of protection between a 1940 LW fighter and and a 1944 fighter, but a hell of an increase in the amount of lead being sent its way.

 

[gumbyk]

Don't forget that under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, training for many allied pilots was carried out well outside the theatre of war, so there wasn't the same pressure to rush pilots through basic training. Pilots were pretty much ready for conversion and OTU on arrival. They didn't really arrive until 1941, but the knowledge that there was a large cadre of pilots on their way would surely have influenced decisions by the British.

 

[stona]

I wonder if this had the impact often proclaimed, because this is often mentioned about the BoB, but not so in regard to the Luftwaffe in the Allied bombing of Germany.

The numbers imply it did have a significant impact.
The importantly different circumstance was the number of replacement aircrew available to Bomber Command once the offensive got underway in a meaningful way. Bomber Command was training men from all over the Commonwealth as well as the UK and training them at schools in several Commonwealth countries, in safety and without any restrictions imposed by the enemy, fuel shortages etc. At the end of the war the western Allies had an estimated 50,000 aircrew having recently completed or nearing completion of training!
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

The Luftwaffe were worse off in my view regarding repacement pilots. .

The much vaunted pre-war/early war training programmes of the Luftwaffe were not quite all they were supposed to be. Most pilots at operational units were very well trained and capable, but this was a result of their continued training at their squadrons, not a product of the training schools. It is not just the pilots that need to be trained. No air force can function without it's support staff, the fitters, riggers armourers, etc., who keep the aircraft flying, and here the Germans made a serious misjudgement.
A US post war analysis of Luftwaffe training noted:

"Shortly after the beginning of the war, the Chief of Training Command, in concurrence with the Technical Office, established an 'aircraft' group as part of his staff. This group was made responsible for the distribution of training aircraft to all schools and training installations under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Training.
An eminently logical request of the Chief of Training, however, that he be given a number of the most modern front line aircraft for the air armament and aerotechnical schools encountered apparently insurmountable difficulties. The distribution of these aircraft was in the hands of the General Staff itself. Despite repeated requests, some of them directed to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, himself, the Chief of Training never succeeded in obtaining the latest aircraft models in use at the front, although training in their operation was of the utmost importance. Germany's top-level command was interested in having large well equipped front units (presumably for political reasons) and did not stop to think that its policy was bound to result in inadequate training.
Obviously this policy was a very short sighted one. Statistical data from that period indicate tremendous losses in front aircraft clearly attributable to errors in their operation - the result of inadequate training of pilots and aerotechnical personnel."

The Germans interviewed conceded that these losses in training exceeded their estimates, but do not give a figure in this document. Given that anticipated losses at training schools were expected to be 15%-17% one shudders to think what the actual losses were.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

I have already read that the Luftwaffe lacked standardization procedures for it's pilot's during WWII. Pilots did not used checklists for instance. Britain appears to have been in a half term in regard to this, whereas the Americans appear to have been the best ones in regard to standardization. However I don't know how the things were specifically from the late 1930s until the BoB.

 

[Freebird]

Fighter Command's three OTU's produced 280 pilots in the four weeks up to September 2nd 1940. To do this the OTU course had been halved from four weeks to two and some pilots graduating had only ten hours on operational fighter types and had never fired their guns in anger. These men were not combat ready pilots, but would complete their training at their squadrons, though not usually within 11 Group. Incidentally, these 280 pilots represented a net loss of 68 pilots, casualties amounting to 348 in the same period, ignoring those caused by accidents or illness.

Does that figure of 348 include wounded pilots as well, or just those killed?
The British also had the first batch of pilots from the CATP complete training in September, would these pilots be equivalent to those from the OTU's, or would new pilots from the CATP go into further training at the OTU's?

Also, do we have any data from the equivalent German training programs, was it also about 250 pilots/month in the autumn of 1940?

 

[stona]

348 casualties, killed and wounded on operations and lost, be it permanently or temporarily to Fighter Command.

As far as I know no pilots from the BCATP reached the UK before 1941. I believe some Canadian observers arrived in late 1940 but would need to check the date. The BCATP was an evolving scheme, but usually pilots assigned to Fighter Command would continue their training at an OTU, as would those assigned to other Commands.

By 1939 the Luftwaffe ran just two fighter pilot schools (very roughly equivalent to a British OTU) to finish pilots from the 21 A-B category and 14 C category schools then running. The outbreak of war seriously disrupted training, the Chief of Training being forced to acquire an order from the Commander in Chief forbidding interference by Air Fleet Commanders in training programmes. They had been quick to requisition training aircraft, maintenance and instructional personnel for operational service, just another example of the short sighted way in which Germany embarked upon the war. Numbers of pilots produced initially suffered as a result.
I have no figures for the number of pilots trained monthly in 1940, in fact I'm not sure they exist. The Luftwaffe produced 10,527 single engine fighter pilots between 1940 and 1944. According to Boog there was an average 17% shortage in the ratio one pilot per available aircraft throughout the war, so that number was not enough.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Freebird]

I have no figures for the number of pilots trained monthly in 1940, in fact I'm not sure they exist. The Luftwaffe produced 10,527 single engine fighter pilots between 1940 and 1944. According to Boog there was an average 17% shortage in the ratio one pilot per available aircraft throughout the war, so that number was not enough.

Cheers

Steve

What reference do you have for that number?

So I assume you mean 10,527 in 60 months from Jan 1940 to Dec 1944, so about 175 per month