RAN carrier program and earlier RAAF expansion

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While you may be able to build boats locally, high speed light weight hulls are a bit of an art form if you expect them to last very long (like a few weeks) sourcing the engines is a much bigger problem.
The engines in this
640px-ML-Q054.jpg

Were a pair Hall-Scott Defenders of about 650hp at 2100rpm, They weighed about 3650lbs each.
Three supercharged versions were used in the Fairmile C gun boats but even at around 850hp these engines could only drive the 110ft "C" at about 26-27kts.

Getting even 400hp engines for small torpedo boats that would last for several hundred hours was going to be a problem in most countries.

Britain, once Merlins were prioritized for aircraft, had to rely on US engines.

These highspeed marine engines also competed with aircraft engines for raw materials.

Thornycroft managed to build about 390 12 cylinder engines of about 650hp similar in size to the Hall-Scotts during WW II, These were developed from the engines used in the 55 ft boats at the end of WW I. Most of these engines were used in air-sea recue craft.
 
Jeune Ecole, n'est'ce pas?
C'est important à retenir. L'amour n'est pas comme la tarte. Vous n'avez pas besoin de le partager entre tous vos amis et vos proches. Peu importe combien d'amour vous donnez, vous pouvez toujours en donner plus. Il ne s'épuise pas, alors n'essayez pas de vous retenir de le donner comme s'il pouvait un jour s'épuiser. Donnez-le librement et autant que vous le souhaitez.

C'était une égratignure qu'il remarqua à peine. Bien sûr, il y avait un peu de sang mais c'était mineur comparé à la plupart des autres coupures et contusions qu'il avait contractées au cours de ses aventures. Il n'y avait aucun moyen qu'il puisse savoir que la roche qui a produit la coupe contenait du matériel génétique extraterrestre qui circulait maintenant dans sa circulation sanguine. Il se sentait parfaitement normal et continua son aventure sans savoir ce qui allait lui arriver.
 
Gallipoli was a result of the Australian officers and other ranks ignoring their orders to make sure the secured the high ground immediately after landing. Instead they stayed on the beach until the Turks had time to move hundreds of troops and secure the high ground thus enabling them to successfully defend themselves.
...Following cock-ups by Hamilton in leaving Alexandria with the ships poorly loaded with all the useful stuff required at the bottom, which meant they had to return to Alex to be repacked, which gave the Turks time to fortify the positions when they figured out what was going on, which before then had been sparsely defended. The Turks knew the Brits were using (Greek held) Mudros as a naval base. The campaign was just badly run all round.
 
Therer is plenty of blame to go round . The idea of forcing the straights by naval power alone was an extremely poor. The history of ships vs forts has generally ended in the forts favor. All it did was give the Turks time to prepare for the land assault. A combined assault at the very beginning would likely have succeeded.
Absolutely. The naval power alone angle, however badly conceived almost worked though as the forts thsat lined the Dardanelles were running desperately short of shells and resupply was almost impossible, not to mention the efforts by the task force in damaging their guns (in some ways the endeavour was actually well planned) and it was the naval commander Sackville Carden losing his nerve after three ships were sunk by a field laid by a small auxiliary vessel that was missed during the minesweeping searches, for which they sometimes used aeroplanes from the seaplane tender Ark Royal, which caused the whole thing to be called off. Carden's 2IC urged him to keep going, but he didn't. Carden was a sick man at the time.

I know this is thread drift, but it's fascinating... the folly of taking out naval forts using ship-based guns was regarded as problematic beforehand because in naval warfare the distance of the splashes made from the shells entering the water enabled range to target to be calculated, and against land targets that couldn't be relied on as a sufficient means of plotting the fall of shot. The answer? Aeroplanes and the Dardanelles was the first extensive use of aeroplanes to plot the fall of naval shot against land targets, hence the presense of the Ark Royal, as well as monitors that had the capacity to carry aeroplanes.

Interesting wee factoid, the very first ships designed and launched for naval use with aeroplanes written into their design from the drawing board were the Abercrombie Class monitors, which were rushed into service and sent to the Dardanelles, devoid of aeroplanes, oddly, but the ships received them from the Ark and the naval aviation squadrons dotted about the place.

Carry on...
 
Actually they had them in 1916-17 and used them to some effect against the Russians in 1919.
By the end of the Great War the Royal Navy had hundreds of CMBs and MLs, in 1919, some 200 were disposed of, either by scrapping or selling to interested parties. Here's one that was built in 1921 and is preserved in the UK. CMB103, a fast torpedo boat built by Thorneycroft, torpedoes were stored on the stern. A total of 117 of these were built.

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2107 Chatham Historic Dockyard M103
 
By the end of the Great War the Royal Navy had hundreds of CMBs and MLs, in 1919, some 200 were disposed of, either by scrapping or selling to interested parties. Here's one that was built in 1921 and is preserved in the UK. CMB103, a fast torpedo boat built by Thorneycroft, torpedoes were stored on the stern. A total of 117 of these were built.

View attachment 6402622107 Chatham Historic Dockyard M103
That's what we need in Malaya.
 
Given the defences of Thailand and Java it would not take the Japanese much effort to bypass a well defended southern Malaya and Singapore, setting up airbases to interdict resupply convoys, rather like Bataan.

In April 1938 the British presented Australia with a total cost of ownership of warships, that is running cost, replacement and modernisation cost, and showed it as an annual cost, Battleship 706,800 pounds (Nelson class), large cruiser 323,600 pounds, small cruiser 225,400 pounds, Aircraft carrier with 36 aircraft, 894,000 pounds, with 15 aircraft 514,500 pounds, destroyer 66,000 pounds, 1,000 ton submarine 65,500 pounds. They were pushing the idea of an RAN battleship, annual cost of aircraft set at 11,500 pounds. Australian Archives A5954 1024/10.

So the build cost of 1 battleship gives you 3.6 large or 5.9 small cruisers, or 2 larger or 2.5 smaller carriers, 16 destroyers or 22.2 submarines. However lifetime costs mean running 1 large carrier will give you, 1.25 battleships, 2.75 large or 4 small cruisers or 1.75 small carriers, or 13.5 destroyers or 13.6 submarines.

P-36, 3 Y1P-36, 1 each March, April and June 1937, 3 P-36A accepted in May 1938, production pause while Chinese order for 30 built, then USAAF production from September 1938 on.

XF2A-1,-2 prototype first flight December 1937, officially accepted December 1937, F2A-1 17 in 1939, 38 in 1940. F2A-2 production began in April 1940, batch of 40 to July, then another 213 September 1940 to May 1941, 72 F2A March to June 1941, 108 F2A-3 July to December 1941, 20 F2A January to April 1942.

Australian aircraft and aero engine production 1939 to 1945 inclusive,
364 Beaufighter (1 in 1946)
700 Beaufort
250 Boomerang
87 DH.84
147 Mosquito (production continued until 1948)
45 Mustang (production continued until July 1951, then 1 more in April 1952)
1,070 Tiger Moth
200 Wackett trainer
733 Wirraway (22 more in 1946)
1,300 Gipsy major
680 Single Row Wasp
870 Twin Row Wasp

In 1935 a proposal was put to build aircraft and their engines in Australia, the Commonwealth Government convened conferences as well as industry undertaking discussions, this resulted in the formation of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation on 17 October 1936, taking over the Tugan company along with its personnel and building a new factory in Melbourne on Victorian Government land. Essington Lewis was Chairman of the company and Lawrence Wackett was appointed Manager. The authorised capital was £1,000,000 paid up to £600,000. The shareholders were

Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd £200,000
Broken Hill Associated Smelters Pty Ltd £150,000
Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand £90,000
General Motors-Holden's Ltd £60,000
The Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Pty Ltd £50,000
Orient Steam Navigation Company Ltd £50,000

The long term aim was complete manufacture of aircraft by Australia using mostly Australian raw materials. In February 1936 Wing Commander L.J. Wackett, Squadron Leader H.C. Harrison (technical man) and Squadron Leader Murphy, RAAF Chief Workshop Operator were sent on a 5 month tour to visit overseas aircraft industries to determine what design to manufacture. Italy, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Britain and the United States were visited.

The framework being it was expected it would take 5 years from industry initiation before manufacture of a first line defence aircraft could be made (under peacetime conditions), so it was best to start with a simpler design that would a) use Australian raw materials, b) establish manufacture that would be applicable to other aircraft types, c) achieve being able to manufacture a range of aircraft types as quickly as possible, d) introducing designs that would lend themselves to good jigging and tooling so in an emergency production of larger quantities could be carried out by semi skilled labour. A radial engine was preferred as easier to build.

The first design should use as much steel as possible given 1936 Australia had plenty of steel but lacked reliable supply of non ferrous alloys, aluminium and magnesium. The design should be made by regular workshop personnel given the wartime need to significantly increase output. The design should incorporate features likely to be standard practice for some time, a) stressed skin wing and construction, b) all metal construction, c) low wing monoplane type, d) retractable undercarriage, e) variable pitch propeller.

The result was the choice of the North American design, British types of better performance in terms of defence capabilities had not been successfully and easily produced in quantities. The British offered the Fairey Battle light bomber (production started in May 1937) and the Westland Lysander Army Co-operation aircraft (production began in May 1938). The North American design first production, as the BT-9, was in July 1936. The single row Wasp engine it used of around 500 HP could be turned into a 1,000 HP twin Wasp with some redesign but built using the same machine tools and fixtures.

In January 1937 the government indicated it would order the North American design as the Wirraway, subject to the usual contract negotiations being successful. Construction of the Melbourne factory began in April 1937 and the initial buildings were ready for occupation in September, further expansions occurred pre war, a near doubling of the floor space. An example of the fixed undercarriage version of the design arrived in Australia in August 1937, one with retractable undercarriage in September. An order for 40 Wirraway including engines was approved in January 1938 and the contract signed in April 1938, the Wirraway name made public on 6 April 1938, the first engine was built in January 1939, the first Wirraway flight on 27 March 1939, official delivery in July, by end July 8 engines had been officially produced, by the end of 1939, 33 Wirraway and 36 engines. By March 1940 a hundred engines had been ordered from the US to supplement local production, the first of these arriving in mid June 1940, the last 20 in September 1941, by which stage 317 engines had been produced locally. Wirraway orders had increased to 232 by end January 1940 then to 481 on October 1940, further orders were made after 1941.

So from arrival of the pattern aircraft to first flight of the modified design as the Wirraway was around 18 months.

In January 1939 an Australian aluminium casting foundry began production, moving onto magnesium and bronze castings.

In November 1936 the RAAF informed its liaison officer in London of a plan to place an order for 40 Bristol Type 149, the 4 place General Reconnaissance development of the Type 142M Blenheim mark I to RAF specification 11/36. The formal order came in March 1937 with serial numbers A9-1 to A9-40 allotted, in November 1937 another 10 were ordered bringing the total to 50 by which time the name Bolingbroke had been decided. They were to equip numbers 2 and 4 squadrons which were planned to form on 1 April 1937. After the Bolingbroke was cancelled in December 1937 Bristol used the longer nose developed for it and the Type 149 designation for the Blenheim mark IV.

In February 1938 the RAAF Bolingbroke order was changed to the Bristol Type 152 Beaufort. On 31 August 1938 approval was given to raise the total on order to 90, with a plan to order another 47 when funds were available, all from Britain, RAAF serials A9-1 to A9-90.

In early 1939 a British mission to Australia, consisting of Sir S. Hardman Lever as leader, Colonel Sir D. Banks, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Air, Air Marshall Sir A.L. Longmore, and 4 technical experts, L.C. Ord, A.C. Boddis, C. Howarth and E.S. Jackson, arrived for an inspection, submitting their report on 18 March 1939, with the British Government confirming general agreement with it on the 24th, the same day as the Australian government announced the decision to produce Beauforts in Australia. Bristol had actually received an instruction to proceed on 26 January. The proposed plan was to build 180 Beauforts in Australia, firstly 90 for the RAF then 90 for the RAAF, costs to be equally divided, first machines delivered in 1940, production rising to 20 per month in September 1941 under peace time single shift conditions. Assembly plants to be set up in Melbourne and Sydney. Spare parts were to be supplied to the equivalent of 20 complete aircraft per 100 aircraft delivered with 1 spare engine and propeller per around 6 installed in the aircraft. 250 Taurus engines were to be ordered from Britain for 875,000 pounds Sterling to bridge the gap until locally supplied Taurus engines were produced. The 90 locally built Beauforts for the RAAF were to be in addition to the 90 ordered from Britain.

Australia launched its production organisation to build the Beaufort on 1 July 1939, the Aircraft Production Branch of the Department of Supply and Development. An 80 man team went to Bristol to be trained, the Chief Engineer and Chief Inspector for the Beaufort project were loaned to the Australian project. The State Railway Workshops of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia would build sub-assemblies and components. This was a major undertaking for Australia and the project was subsequently delayed by inexperience and the crisis of mid 1940 which resulted in a temporary export ban of required material from Britain.

A Bristol built pattern aircraft (RAF serial L4448) was shipped in October 1939 on the SS Port Campbell, arriving in Melbourne on 25 December 1939, permission from the Air Ministry to assemble and fly it was given on 14 May 1940 and it was first test flown with Twin Wasp engines on 5 May 1941. It was re-serialled A9-1001 in February 1943. The Bristol Twin Wasp prototype N1110 initially used the Twin Wasp version Australia was going to build when first flown on 23 November 1940, and after these test flights were completed switched to the version the RAF was going to use. The engines used for the Australian version tests are reported to have been shipped to Australia.

Britain ultimately supplied drawings and manufacturing data, jigs and tools, ten sets of fabricated detail parts, including proprietary bought out parts with certain exceptions and ten sets of unfabricated detail parts.

The decision to build the Pratt and Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp in Australia by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) was taken on 31 October 1939. Ideas for fitting it to the Beaufort date from the March 1939 proposal to build Beauforts in Australia given reports from Britain of problems with the Taurus engine. The October decision assumed the first 50 Beauforts would have Taurus engines, the remaining 130 Twin Wasp but on 16 July 1940 the RAF agreed to accept all 90 with Twin Wasps, the formal RAAF order was made on 20 July 1940 under Demand Aircraft Production Commission number 55 for 90 Beaufort mark III with Twin Wasp engines. At that stage the mark I was for Beauforts with Taurus 2 engines, mark II for Taurus 3. In December 1941 the designations were mark II for RAF Beauforts fitted with S3C4G Twin Wasp engines and mark V for RAAF Beauforts fitted with SC3G Twin Wasps.

The RAF order number for the 90 later 180 Australian built Beauforts has not been traced, it was requisition 11/E1/39, additions to the summary card give the date as November 1939 and the version as mark II, also "Decided that the engines for these aircraft will be obtained from the USA as Australian built engines are not suitable, Points of Interest 27 June 1941." Contract No. B.978309/39 was with Bristol for supplying the pattern aircraft, Jigs, Tools and Materials etc. for Beaufort production in Australia, the first date mentioned is 26 January 1939, which was an instruction to proceed with the contact, two other dates mentioned are 9 May and 2 June 1939. There was also contract B.999922/39 dated 19 May 1939 which seems to be about the services Bristol was to supply.

The RAF issued 90 serials, T9540 to T9569, T9583 to T9608 and T9624 to T9657 and although only 7 were delivered to the RAF and they were quickly returned or crashed on delivery flights, the first 58 Australian built Beauforts initially used their RAF serials. The RAAF orders from Britain was slowly reduced, firstly by 10 in June 1939 to help pay for an order for 18 Beaufighters, another 50 cancelled in December 1939 as being replaced by Hudsons plus another 16 to help pay for the increased costs of Hudson order, the remaining 14 were to be Twin Wasp powered with 8 Australian order engines sent to Britain for flight tests, the 14 were finally cancelled in April 1940, after which serials A9-1 to A9-90 were reallocated to the local RAAF order Beauforts but were ultimately used on the RAF order aircraft, T9540 becoming A9-1 and so on.

On 13 July 1940 Australian Air Board Agendum 2928 approved purchase of 90 more Beaufort for the 32 Squadron plan, so taking the RAAF order total to 180. This became War Cabinet Agendum 151/40 and approved by minute 792 of 12 February 1941. However on 26 February 1941 War Cabinet Minute 810A ordered 52 Lockheed Hudson and cancelled 52 of the just made Beaufort order but assumed more British orders were coming, so material gathering went ahead for more than the current number on order. On 20 May 1941 War Cabinet Minute 1110A Supplement 5 to 151/1940 cancelled the remaining 38 Beauforts of the February 1941 order, replacing them with another 94 Lockheed Hudson (Hopefully some to all Lend-Lease), making the total Hudsons on order 146.

In April 1941 Britain asked to increase their order from 90 to 180, which was agreed. In September 1941 the British said they would absorb up to 40 aircraft a month from Australia. On 3 October 1941 Australia informed Britain production would go to 40 per month, provided they could obtain the relevant tools and supplies. On 2 February 1942 Australian War Cabinet Minute 1845 authorised Beaufort production of 20 per month expanding to 40 per month.

The RAAF idea of two seater fighters in 1941 was the Beaufighter. The Demons were trainers. On 19 June 1939 Australia requested an allocation of 18 Beaufighter from the first production batch. Overseas Indent 712 was being raised for this, part paid by reducing the Beaufort order from UK under O.I. 657 to 40 from 30 but OI 712 had not been drafted as of 1 August, and was probably only a draft as of 22 December. The 18 Beaufighter were reported on order from Britain as of 7 March 1940. On 18 April 1940 War Cabinet decided the 18 Beaufighters along with the final 14 Beauforts still on order from Britain were to be cancelled so that 49 more Hudsons could be ordered, of which 18 were to replace the Beaufighters, 14 to replace the Beauforts and 17 for other units. At the end of May 1940 War Cabinet approved diversion of all 49 Hudsons from this order to the RAF.

The second RAAF Beaufighter order was under Overseas Indent 910 in mid 1941, for 54 aircraft. In the 21 August 1941 Chiefs of Staff report confirmation was being requested of the Beaufighter delivery schedule ex UK of 12 in December 1941, then 14 per month January to March 1942, the confirmation arrived within a week. The 27 November 1941 report from the UK has the first 12 aircraft in various stages of assembly, and the first to be test flown "this week", but none were shipped until February 1942.

There was a half serious idea to purchase Japanese fighters in 1940.
 
Let's also look at the RAAF. Australia didn't produce a single seat, single engined fighter until the Boomerang in summer 1942, entering service in 1943. Meanwhile Canada has been producing the Hawker Hurricane since 1938. Without relying on imported RR engines what fighter could the RAAF consider from 1937 onwards? My thinking is the Curtiss P-36 / Hawk 75.
Canadian Car and Foundry produced its first Hurricane in 1940. They needed the Merlin engines that Henry Ford refused to produce.
 
Canadian Car and Foundry received a contract to build 40 Hurricanes in 1938, which is not quite the same thing as producing them since 1938, first official production in February 1940. Hawker received a contract to build 600 Hurricanes in 1936, producing the first in December 1937.

US Merlin production began in August 1941, even if Ford had agreed to produce them it is unlikely many would have been built much earlier, this is the same month the final Hurricane I were rolled out of the CCF factory apart from a laggard in October, CCF did not officially produce any Hurricanes in September 1941 and only the 1 in October.

For CCF Hurricanes,
144 Merlin 28 imported in 1942, but without accessories and so could not be flown
141 Merlin 28 reported imported in 1943. (Merlin 28 production ceased in February 1943)

480 Merlin 29 imported 1942/43 for the RCAF order for what became known as the mark XII.

Apart from the mark XII and a few test flights no Hurricane flew using a US built Merlin. All CCF mark I arrived in Britain as airframes only, it did not make sense to ship Merlin III across the Atlantic to Canada to then return in CCF Hurricanes.

Few Canadian built Hurricanes were test flown immediately after assembly and in fact most as rolled out of the factory were not ready to fly even if an engine was available. A report in December 1941 noted stored mark I airframes were complete less wheels, brakes, tyres and tubes but needing engines, propellers, instruments, and all other appendix A Serial 1160 Embodiment Loan Equipment. The mark II then in production emerged from the factory in a similar state to those stored, "require from England, wheels, brakes, air compressors and drives and couplers for same, hydraulic pump drives and couplings, airscrews and instruments". The brakes being magnesium alloy castings.
 
US Merlin production began in August 1941, even if Ford had agreed to produce them it is unlikely many would have been built much earlier, this is the same month the final Hurricane I were rolled out of the CCF factory apart from a laggard in October, CCF did not officially produce any Hurricanes in September 1941 and only the 1 in October.

Few Canadian built Hurricanes were test flown immediately after assembly and in fact most as rolled out of the factory were not ready to fly even if an engine was available. A report in December 1941 noted stored mark I airframes were complete less wheels, brakes, tyres and tubes but needing engines, propellers, instruments, and all other appendix A Serial 1160 Embodiment Loan Equipment. The mark II then in production emerged from the factory in a similar state to those stored, "require from England, wheels, brakes, air compressors and drives and couplers for same, hydraulic pump drives and couplings, airscrews and instruments". The brakes being magnesium alloy castings.
Your syntax is slightly confusing (which is unusual for you). The 1st Packard Merlin ran in August '41. Production started weeks before to have the final product assembled and on the test stand for that date.
Deliveries to airframe manufacturers commenced in October '41 The "fine tuning" of the assembly line done to be able to repeatedly produce product.​

While the Ford fiasco probably only cost a couple months, the Canada gov't/RCAF turning down RR to build Merlins probably cost a few more.
Canadians were concerned Merlin was too small and would soon be replaced by "the next generation" engine; so, wanted to build something with future. The BPC was concerned that Sabre wasn't ready for licensed production. As the 2 sides couldn't agree, nothing came of building either.
We would note that due to the slight delay, Packard started off building Merlin XX (2 piece block) which was better long term.
 
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Here's quite an extensive history of CCF Hurricanes
 
Canadian Car and Foundry produced its first Hurricane in 1940. They needed the Merlin engines that Henry Ford refused to produce.
Packard was looking at the sample engine and some drawings about 2-3 weeks after Ford refused. The actual contract with Packard was not signed for about 2-3 more months.
Was Packard simply sitting on their hands or were they coming up with a estimate of what they would need to do and what a suitable time line for delivery would be?
 
Packard was looking at the sample engine and some drawings about 2-3 weeks after Ford refused. The actual contract with Packard was not signed for about 2-3 more months.
Was Packard simply sitting on their hands or were they coming up with a estimate of what they would need to do and what a suitable time line for delivery would be?
What were they doing? Figuring out their bid
 

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