Sorry, I don't quite follow your banter...
Are you saying that Ben Kelsey, the head of Wright Field's fighter development program, had nothing to do with the introduction of the AAF's A-36/P-51?
Doesn't sound like the same Ben Kelsey that I knew...
Cheers,
Dana
Simply stated - YES, that is what I am saying.
All the fighting and approvals and funding were way above his pay grade in 1940, and beyond his scope to approve a Defense Aid contract for RAF fo NA-91/P-51-NA in 1941. As to A-36, HQ-AAF drove first the A-36, then the P-51A down Materiel Command's throat in February-April 1942. I guarantee that Captain, then Major Ben Kelsey was NOT vocalizing support of NAA/Mustang to his boss in 1941 and early 1942 - when his boss was getting crap beat out of him by General Fairchild, Col. Schlatter and General Barney Giles. In addition to the 'will' issue, he was faced with a 'no longer here issue' as he was attached to 8th AF in April, 1942 to help with planning/logistics of moving P-38s to Great Britain while the fight over the A-36 was in full rage. He was not present and accounted for when the AAF snatched the P-51-1 from the NA-91 contract in May 1942. He was a 'no can do - not here' factor for the discussions and contracts for A-36, XP-78 (P-51B), P-51A, and P-51B and P-51C. However, to his credit he Did return in time to MC as Chief, Fighters in October 1942 - just in time for the XP-75 prototype development decision, but gone again to depart as CoS for 9th AF in Nov 1943.
EDIT - 8-17-2021
The two contracts that Fairchild drove - and ordered the acquisition of 500 A-36s.. Col Timberlake - Chief Production Engineering Div for MC protested on basis of inadequate Allisons and impact on B-25 production , but over ridden by M.Gen Harmon C/AS for HQ-AAF- and Echols complied. Elephants were in the room. IIRC Chief Fighter Branch reported to Chief Production Engineering. Fairchild also ordered that a follow on order for 1200 P-51 should be acquired - and converted to Merlin 'as soon as possible'
Notable events while Kelsey was in Great Britain as part of Spaatz party April 1940 - July 1940
NAA/AFPC LOI signed April 10
Material Command reviews (Echols/Brett) LOI and NAA Contract Vehicle - note that Allison V-1710 included. but finally approve Foreign Release Agreement, April 24 in return for 2 XP-51 from NA-73. UNTIL DELIVERED, AAC-MC knew zero about the details of P-509/NA73 including incorporation of Alison V-1710, Meredith Effect Cooling system, or proposed High Speed/Low Drag airfoil/wing.
Schmued begins detail design for NA73X
NA 1620 Specifications transforming P-509 to NA-73 delivered to RAF for joint review April 24
A-250 (Foreign Aid) contract executed May 1940
Preliminary Design of X73/NA73X released to Experimental Department for fabrication
Notable events while Kelsey was in Great Britain 4-42 through 9-42
April - A-36 Contract executed by Echols
May - Arnold has lunch with Hitchcock, Air Marshall Sholto and Amb Winant to receive first notice of R-R project to install Merlin 61 in Mustang
May - NA-91 - 58 P-51-NA extracted from RAF contract DA-140 delivery commitments of 150 for Mustang IA.
June -Two NA-91 of 58 P-51-NA allocated to XP-78 (P-51B), although NAA started Design in May 1942
June - Col, then General Chidlaw, AC/S Materiel Command became the primary point of contact for NAA
June - 1200 P-51A requested by HQ-AAF, Contract AC 30479, with provision to convert balance to P-51B-5
June - Gen. Saville Directorate Air Defense ordered e P-51-NA to be sent to Eglin for Operational Suitability Testing - instead of Wright Field, marking the end of Wright Field for that task.
August 1942
MC approved a.) Installation of Packard 1650-3 in XP-78, b.) the order for 400 P-51B-1, c.) A1 Priority for NAA for Tooling, parts and Packard Merlin 1650-3 associated with P-51B production.
Dana, help me out. Where is your evidence that Ben Kelsey was EVER and advocate for NAA/Mustang.
If you have studied Materiel Command track record of dismal operational testing (the reason the task went to Eglin), the dismal track record of RFP funded failures for Pursuit/Fighter aircraft, the Attack Turkey over which MC fought for (XA-32 and yes Ben was there for that one) versus the A-36, castigated by Combat officer review of the turkeys that MC sent to combat (A-24/25), the contract for the XP-75, THEN the additional purchase for 2500 more when it could not compete with any of the Big 3 already in serial production.
BTW Echols bought the XP-75 after he took an entourage to Rolls-Royce to look at the Merlin conversion just before first flight, see the performance projections and be subjected to gushing reviews of the Mustang from RAF. Kelsey was back as Chief, Fighter Branch when XP-75 contract approved - if you want to give him credit for that?
So where was the magic touch of Ben Kelsey in Fighter Development after 1940-41 or Echols at any point in time after 1940. Neither had anything to do with any feature of any Mustang at any time - and yet they claimed much support and influence in the development via articles, books and the referenced article. Pathetic.
Look to Echols career final resting place as a Military Governor of Occupied Germany before he saw the handwriting on the wall and went 'military-industrial complex' in 1946.
Summary
I'm saying that M.General Muir Fairchild rammed the A-36 up M.General Echols' rear end - and Maj. Ben Kelsey had zero to do with ether approval or funding. I'm saying that Ben Kelsey had zero to do with NAA/NACA collaboration on the 45-100 airfoil. I'm saying that Kelsey had nothing to do with DA-140 for the NA-91/RAF contract in July 1941. He was a mouse in room full of elephants during the A-36 fights. The A-36 was a major turf war between HQ CAS Directive and Planning & Requirements versus Materiel Command.
I am also saying that AAF-MC Col Mark Bradley intervened on behalf of the P-51B in July 1943 to persuade Echols to fund the 85 gal fuse tank in order to test Combat Radius extension
mandated by Fairchild's FAREP.
More on NA-91. The article also touted Kelsey as the 'assigner of DA-140 for the NA-91, which at the time was a pure RAF requirement to finally install the 20mm guns they wanted on NA-73, but prevented by Materiel Command. Note: Kelsey could have issued the requirement to assign AAF serial numbers to all of NA-91 150 ships when AAF made the decision in April 1942 to snatch 58 of the 150 for TAC recon (Forced also by HQ), he might have still been at Wright just before heading to 8th AF.
I did a LOT of research on over 1000 NAA/HQ/MC telex, and written external/internal NAA docs of the December 1939 through December 1943 period as well as sourced most of the docs cited in USAF136 by Boylon to cross correlate the dialogue within HQ-AAF, MC and NAA.
Echols (and Kelsey, by extension) was NOT an 'advocate of the Mustang - until it was too big of a success to not jump on the bandwagon..
If you have source docs from 1941 through July 1942 showing otherwise, a.) I would be pleased to acknowledge a different fact base rending my opinion (and Paul Ludwig's) questionable, and b.) astonishment regarding the contradictions between Kelsey 'fanboy of P-38' and 'Kelsey - pioneer of passionate support for the Mustang'.
I first formed opinions regarding Kelsey when I became acquainted with several NAA luminaries of that period through my father and Al White. The Opinions regarding Kelsey support/non support were held by Horkey and Schmued. For the record, the primary communicators to NAA re: P-51 were Cols. Branshaw and Chidlaw and Bradley with respect to specs, funding, change orders. Those tasks were above Kelsey when he was at MC before 1943 and he never issued any correspondence or report other than his January 1942 Test report of his personal comparison of XP-51 versus P-40E - in which he described 'problems' with main gear doors opening and 'shuddering' in dives, he concluded that the Mustang was faster at all altitudes than the P-40E. Contrast that Mustang 'support' with his gushing reports of the P-38. There were zero examples of correspondence between Kelsey and Kindelberger, Atwood, Rice, Schmued - including the time when Gen Brett/Col Echols 'traded approval to proceed NA-73 for AFPC in return for two freebie XP-51s.
Dana - have deep respect for your research, but we definitely have a different view of General Kelsey and M.Gen Echols.
Regards,
Bill
