Tank & AFV armament alternatives, 1935-45 (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

P.M. Knight answers some of this in his books on early Cruisers. The powers that be expected the battle tempo to be sufficiently slow to use the tanks for some time, then send them back for overhaul/major maintenance. So specific durability/reliability figures were not required. Admittedly, my understanding is that a lot of WW2 belligerants thought the same as well at the time.

My understanding is that it is only in 1942-43 that the British set a specific value, 3000 mile life for Cruisers and 2000 mile life for Churchills before overhaul, without failure/replacement of a major assembly. Cromwell was the first Cruiser to meet this, A30 and Comet met it as well, late Churchills met it, Black Prince was still in development but it was apparent it would have met the requirement. Late Covenanter was close, late Crusader sorta was getting there, but initially it had a pretty mediocre life of 1000-1500 miles with many systemic issues.

As for 2 pdr, I also agree that having the normal full suite of full caliber ammo almost from the start would have helped a lot. The French for example started experimental work/trials on AP ammo for their casemate guns and the 47mm tank gun in 1932 IIRC, starting with uncapped AP shot (still better against thick plate than the atrocious 2pdr APHE which had an excessively large cavity), and entering service with APBC with hardened tip (APC for tank guns). Admittedly, old APHE or uncapped ammo was actually quite common among low caliber gun users (Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Germany...)
 
I have purchased P.M. Knight's book on the Crusader and I am working my way through it. I may get a few more of his books but I can't afford the complete collection.
I do recommend this book based on what I have read so far. There is a lot of 'stuff' behind the scenes that winds up causing trouble later. Like 'just cut 6 1/2 inches' from the height of the Liberty engine. Not that the Liberty was trouble free in the early cruiser tanks, but it got worse in the Crusader which is kind of the opposite of what you would expect after you already had around 700 in service. It was supposed to have been the 'safe' choice.

To cut the British some slack the Fighting in NA was very different than what most people contemplated for combat in Europe in the 1930s. The Soviets and Americans may not have had actual mileage requirements but the size of their countries made them more mindful of distance than some other countries.
For the French it is difficult to find a 600 mile difference from the northern border to the border with Spain. You can do it but you really have to use the corners
For the British and going cross country it it about 700 miles from John O' Groats to Land's end so the idea of doing such journeys without maintenance is not surprising. Also the extensive rail networks didn't require it. For the US it is over 800 miles from Boston to Charleston and over 1600 miles from the top of the coast of Maine to Miami Florida. Yes the US had rail roads but they were expecting their motorized army to go further distances just to get to battle sites than the Europeans.
And likewise the tanks/vehicles they needed for 'colonial duties' were different than those needed for European conflicts.

Combine the distances traveled with the wear and tear caused by the Desert environment and things were worse for everybody, including the Germans and Italians.

But the British were expecting Cruiser tanks to go 25-35mph on roads, they were expecting them to operate "behind the lines" quite possible beyond even heavy artillery support and with a lot of zigging and zagging, not drive 10 miles behind the enemy front lines, drive around for an hour and then drive 10 miles back. You are going to loose some tanks due to break downs. For every tank that makes it to 1000 miles, in order to have a 500 mile average, you had to have tank that broke at 1 mile
 
Soviets were actually experimenting with the gun that was equivalent of the M1936 (a.k.a. F-22) 'multi-purpose' gun, at least on the KV-1:



It was just a plain-vanilla KV-1 otherwise.
This ZiS-5 (F-22) version was supposed to do fire the 6.5kg projectile at 780 m/s (that is probably the very hot load ammo version), with penetration ability of 75mm at 1000m, 90 deg hit; ammo compatibility with the M1902/30, M1936 (F-22) and M1939 (USV) guns is noted:



This kind of a tank gun would've been very handy to have in 1942 and 43.

German modification of the captured KV-1, featuring a tank gun as was used on the Pz-IVG for example.
 
BR-350B for F-34/ZIS-5 was able to penetrate up to 78 mm at 1000m. The difference between 50clb and 41clb versions of the ZIS-5 was less significant than the projectile design, the use of the F-34 barrel made the ZIS-5 much cheaper. The Soviets tested the F-27 with the ballistics of the AA 3-K (813 m/s), however it was not well suited for the use in the KV turret. The Soviets did not need any 76mm guns with a higher ballistics. They need 85-mm. The limiting factor was the turret ring diameter - the Soviets needed American/British machines for mass production of armor plates with a 1600mm turret ring cutout.
tomo pauk said:
View attachment 810471

This kind of a tank gun would've been very handy to have in 1942 and 43.
Click to expand...
The mass-produced F-34/ZIS-5 with the BR-350B projectile fully corresponded these parameters .
 
What the Soviets reckoned during the war, wrt. their tank/AFV guns vs. German tanks. Note that armor of the selected parts of the German tanks is 'normalized', ie. the vertical equivalent of the slanted (where applicable) armor is specified to level the playing field. tanks listed start with Pz-I (T-I) and end with Tiger B, a.ka. Tiger II (T-VI-B). Note two Pz-IV graphs, for 'normal' and for up-armored.



Several conclusions can be drawn from the graph, IMO.
Soviets were in disadvantage due to not up-gunning their tanks in early 1943, if not already in 1942 (when we account for the German self-propelled vehicles - tanks and other AFVs - with the long-barrel gun ability to destroy Soviet tanks well beyond 1km mark).
The 85mm gun would've helped a lot there.
For the peace of mid, the 100 and 122 mm self-propelled cannons should've also been in service by 1943.
 
Hi
For a recent single volume study, of what has been discussed on this thread, I would recommend 'The Second World War Tank Crisis; The Fall and Rise of British Armour 1919-1945' by Dick Taylor, Pen & Sword 2021. It covers the majority of the problems that arose and why.

Mike
 
I am working my (haphazardly) through some books on early British armor. So far no real explanation on the lack of HE round for the 2pdr and 6pdr. Just trying to find when it was adopted is tough.
What the troops thought seems to be at odds with the high command. Troops wanted HE. In late 1942 the British crews in Crusaders with 2in smoke bomb throwers were getting 2in HE bombs from the infantry with their stronger propelling chargers (a lot of the smoke ammo issued to tanks had light propelling charge (12 grains?) and had a max range of 120 yds. OK for screening your own tank but being able to lob smoke shells 300-500yds to screen the gun itself might have been more useful. Tankers also used the HE bombs with the standard charge (47grains?) and fired them flat at close range. The infantry mortar had a solid back end. The tank bomb thrower was a breech loader. It went through several marks and some may have been stronger than others.
As mentioned earlier, the troops wanted 7.9mm AP and incendiary ammo. They were willing to take captured German ammo and use it their guns. They wanted more effective ammo of all types. They weren't getting it.
British tank commanders didn't have a lot of good choices. Sit back and get shot, retreat and get shot until you were out of range, Charge like manics and get shot until you got close enough for the MG to be effective and drive over the AT gun.
Not coming up with new/better AP rounds for two years after the BoF (6pdr AT guns were issued before the better 2pdr AP shot) just seem to get glossed over.
 
The Soviets with their Valentines made much use of the 2" breech loading mortar in lieu of HE gun fire. Using their own HE mortar rounds. My old ex Red Army acquaintance said he kept lots of them to hand together with Soviet smoke mortar rounds to screen forward movements. He relied upon the small size and quietness of his Valentines and the longer range Soviet mortar smoke rounds enabled him to take leaps into dead ground to flank Axis tanks and AT guns.He used a lot of German ammunition for his BESA as it was more readily available than the Soviet resupplies to him.
 
Last edited:
The Soviets faced the normalization effect already in 1941 - it was discovered that the T-34 was penetrated by a 50mm German AP shell, although given the slope of the armor this should not have been the case. I have definitely written about this on the forum, probably more than once. For German tanks, the normalization effect was of less importance, as the angles of inclination of their armor were small - with the exception of the Panther, but its armor did not impress the Soviets.
tomo pauk said:
View attachment 811154

Several conclusions can be drawn from the graph, IMO.
Click to expand...
And why are you so shy about citing the source of the information?

Unfortunately, the analysis of the reasons for making a particular decision is either absent or insufficient in this book. And in the case of the Soviets, the limited industrial capabilities were (almost always) the decisive factor. Most of the alternatives proposed here are completely unacceptable for the Soviets because of the excessively high technology requirements. It is pointless to propose deliberately unrealistic alternatives. And a deeper knowledge is needed to judge the reality of the realization of one or another alternative.
The main parameter that limited the use of any projectiles with high armor penetration was the round length. Since the turret ring diameter was limited - the Soviets didn't have a suitable machine for mass production of the turret rack with diameter exceeding 1500 mm until late 1943 (rather 1944), thus no any 76-mm gun with more powerful ammunition or any 85mm gun requiring a 1600mm turret rack could be mounted in the mass-produced T-34 until 1944. The Soviets were not able to provide the necessary production capacity of 1600mm turret racks earlier. No alternative should ignore this problem - the round length should not have exceeded a certain value either. Therefore, NO variants with either reinforced 76-mm or 85-mm guns for the T-34 earlier. Only self-propelled artillery units with a casemate-type design allowed longer rounds - and that's the reason why the SU-100 appeared.
tomo pauk said:
For the peace of mid, the 100 and 122 mm self-propelled cannons should've also been in service by 1943.
Click to expand...
If the Soviets could initially provide sufficient AP shell quality, the 85mm would have sufficed to destroy German tanks, however they wanted not only AP capability, but also powerful HE shells. Unfortunately even here they had to compensate the lack of quality with quantity - millimeters of the gun caliber. 122mm guns were necessary primarily to destroy fortifications providing low rate of fire due to a separate shell and powder charge.

The main problem for some of the participants in this discussion is that they have a firm belief that the usefulness of the tank as a weapon system is determined primarily by its ability to destroy enemy tanks. But the Soviets in World War II had different evaluation criteria due to different tactics of tank use. The Soviets had enough tanks and artillery, they lacked the experience to use these weapons wisely (e.g., using self-propelled artillery as tanks), whereas the Germans lacked the adequate AT artillery and used their tanks in the course of the war more and more often in the role of self-propelled AT units.

PS. The Soviets considered the Hetzer on the 38(t) chassis to be the most dangerous, this conclusion was drawn both in battlefield and testing reports. At the same time, the effectiveness of anti-tank self-propelled artillery units based on the Pz IV with a 75mm long-barreled gun was rated much lower. Reports noted that the excessive power of the powder charge (comparable to that of the Soviet 100mm cannons!) required thicker projectile sidewalls, precluding the feasibility of an effective high-explosive projectile, as well as the use of existing rounds.
 
Yet both the T-28, KV and IS series employed a 1600mm turret ring or larger, factory #83 was said to have sufficient tooling for producing such a turret ring for T-34M. That the T-28 got this ring from the get go already shows that the T-34 could have been designed with a 1600mm turret ring from day one. Was this tooling lost in Barbarossa? Per Yuri Pasholok's article on the early T-43 in 1942, it was repeatedly asked to use a 1600 mm turret ring for the 3-man turret but Morozov's argument against it was the weight penalty, not production factors. It would seem strange to insist on this larger turret ring if it was impossible to produce in adequate numbers anyway.
 
yulzari said:
He relied upon the small size and quietness of his Valentines and the longer range Soviet mortar smoke rounds enabled him to take leaps into dead ground to flank Axis tanks and AT guns.
Click to expand...

Hmm. Valentine armed with the Soviet 57mm gun = the best tank buster the Soviets never had?
 
1. Factory No.183 in Kharkov even had a machine for a turret rack with a diameter of 1750 mm, but Pasholok does not mention whether this machine could provide production in the required quantity - not 1940 and not even the beginning of 1941, but 1942! Taking into account the Soviet tradition of overestimating own capabilities, I think not.
2. The tooling could indeed have been lost during the evacuation of the plant.
3. I did not say that the Soviets could not produce tanks with a 1600mm turret ring at all, I said that they could not mass produce just the T-34 with such a turret until 1944. It is enough to compare the production volumes of these tanks. The Soviets received the machines for mass production of T-34s with 1600mm turret ring as part of the Lend-Lease program.
4.Apparently, Morozov realistically assessed the capabilities of the plant and tried his best to defend the small diameter of the turret ring, as he was afraid that too much tooling modification would be required, and this would inevitably reduce the rate of production - the chances of mass production were sharply reduced.
 
tomo pauk said:
Hmm. Valentine armed with the Soviet 57mm gun = the best tank buster the Soviets never had?
Click to expand...
The Valentine didn't need a 57mm high ballistic gun - its major enemy was anti-tank artillery. And the low noise and low profile of light tanks and self-propelled artillery units (including the T-70 and SU-76) were noted by many veterans, who attached great importance to them. The T-34 could be heard from a long distance - it was a very noisy tank, but the noise of the Valentine and T-70 engines was comparable to the noise of a truck engine.
All the Soviets needed was an HE shell for the Valentine's gun!
 
There are several goals/missions that tanks were tasked with. Depending on the size of the tank (and year) you often needed 2 or 3 different tanks to accomplish the desired missions.

The Firefly was great tank for shooting up large German tanks, it wasn't very good at a lot of other things.
There several thousand M4 Shermans with 105 howitzers stuck in the Turret.

There was a HEAT round for the 105 that was good for 4in (101-102mm?) of penetration but most of these tanks had very few of them in the ammo racks.
Most of these tanks carried 66 rounds of 105mm ammo and around 4000-4500rounds of .30 cal. Exact ammo counts differed because of the 3 different hulls used.
The 76mm tanks held 86 rounds of 76mm ammo and around 6750 rounds of .30 cal
The 75mm gun tanks held 90 to 104 rounds of 75mm and from 4250(?) to 6250 rounds of .30 cal.
At times in 1944 the army was calling for zero 75mm tank production (they had enough already) but they kept changing the mix of 76mm armed tanks and 105 armed tanksn. Ot one point they want 4 105s for every 76mm. That changed when they found out how many tanks the Germans still had, but whatever they wanted in Europe that week had to have come out the factory several months earlier. Gotten to the docks. Gotten packaged for the sea voyage, got sent to England or the Med, unloaded, gone over for damage/weather and then trans-shipped to France (or unloaded in Italy?).

The 105 was absolutely great at infantry support. For anti-tank work it left a lot to be desired. The early versions had the power traverse left out for room. So slow turret traverse. Weight of the 105 HEAT round is about 37lbs. rate of fire is going to be less than the 75-76mm rounds.
The 105mm HEAT round had a MV of 1250fpm (381ms) so while the penetration of the HEAT round stayed the same with increasing distance, the chances of hitting went way down, way, way down. Time of flight to 1500yds is going to be over 4 seconds. Also note that the heat penetration is for a vertical impact. A Panther catching a 105 HEAT round on the glacis plate is having a bad day. But it may not penetrate. Might not even penetrated a well sloped 60mm plate.

If we are talking about 1935-40 tanks with their small size, ammo storage, rates of fire, ability to change targets gets even more important. Many of these early tanks were already deficient is some/many areas.

The co-ax gun was a major aspect of the tanks firepower against soft targets (men, vehicles, artillery). In the early tanks the 37-47mm guns were there to help drive off the enemy tanks so the friendly tanks could use their machine guns against the soft targets. British went a little to far (or a lot too far) with this.

SP guns are not tanks. They often cannot fight with sides or rear exposed to small arms fire, or they have open tops and can't fight (well) in built up or hilly areas. They also usually have very little mg ammo. Their MG is for self defense, not for infantry suppression to get their own infantry closer to the objective/s.
 
That like is standing in for an informative.
 
Shortround6 said:
There several thousand M4 Shermans with 105 howitzers stuck in the Turret.

There was a HEAT round for the 105 that was good for 4in (101-102mm?) of penetration but most of these tanks had very few of them in the ammo racks.
Click to expand...

There are mixed reports about the M67 HEAT round. BuOrd initially estimated it could penetrate 5 1/2 inches (140mm) of armour and credit it with 130-140mm of penetration in late 1944. However, post-war estimates were reduced down to about 4.5 inches (115 mm) and then later 4 inches (102mm). These may be minimum values, as effectiveness depended somewhat on the angle of incidence when striking.

Some crews report successfully engaging German armour with it. I can find notes of couple of StuG/Jagdpanzers, a Mk IV and two Panthers claimed with M67 HEAT rounds from 105mm armed Shermans. The 3rd Armoured Group reported in late 1944 that the round was "very successful" in defeating German heavy armour, with the round managing to gain kills out to about 600 yards. Some US artillery units also report using HEAT against targets at ranges of 400 to 600 yards.

However, other Sherman crews reported the round was difficult to use at anything other than static targets and was only useful at ranges of just several hundred yards. This was credited to the combination of the M67's low velocity/arcing flight trajectory (muzzle velocity is a mere 1250 ft/sec), as well as some accuracy issue due to "erratic" behaviour of the round through the air (presumably wobbling/oscilating). There were also reports that the round could fail to detonate entirely unless it hit the target at a favourable angle.
 
HEAT rounds are rather variable for several reasons. And the short practical range in WW II was a real problem.
IF the round detonates at it's optimum distance from the armor perhaps the 105 could penetrate 130-140mm of armor.
Lets remember than the 105 how could fire a heavier HE round at 1550fps using max charge. The HEAT round was provided with it's own charge and they crimped the case to the projectile. They (every ordnance dept) needed time for the fuse to function while the cone was at decent distance from the armor. Higher velocity meant the nose of the projectile crushed in the cone was detonated closer to the armor which means the jet doesn't form properly and instead of a narrow deep hole, you get a wider/shallower hole. This also why thin armor screens, actual screen, tool boxes and the like screw things up. Detonation too far away. Hitting highly sloped armor runs the risk of of the fuse not detonating. The US was using an inertia fuse screwed into the base of the projectile. It needed not only time but significant rapid change in the velocity of the projectile to detonate. A glancing hit may not be enough to trigger the fuse. Now a solid AP shot may also glance off but if the tank crew firing the HEAT round expects to see an explosion when it hits and there is no explosion are they going to think glancing hit or defective fuse? And since it is a mechanical device the failure rate might have been higher than the crews liked. A certain times some air forces had around a 20% dud rate for their bombs dropped by bombers.
The British believed from their testing (and they were about the only ones who felt this way) that the HEAT round needs a certain degree of over penetration to get the desired results inside the tank. That is killing/wounding the crew, setting fire to ammo or fuel, disabling engine/transmission.

I do keep harping on about the machine guns in the 'tank' but consider that many/most of the M1 Abrams tanks could hold over 10,000 rounds of MG ammo. The Chieftain could around 6000 rounds and the Conqueror around 4000 rounds. I would also note that the two British tanks held roughly 50% more 120mm ammo and might be carrying more HE/HESH rounds as a result. Leopard II holds 4750 rounds? Soviet tanks carry less but the Soviet tanks don't carry as much main gun ammo either.
It is a bit of a wonder that since so many 1930s and 1940-41 light tanks used machine guns as their primary armament that so many countries were satisfied with poor (or lousy) machine guns in their AFVs. They go to the trouble of building an armored box, providing it with engine, transmission, suspension for mobility sometimes even giving the gunner and crew a radio, providing stowage for several thousand rounds of ammo. AND then they stick some sort of crap gun with small feed system, lousy sight or some other thing that limits the usefulness of even that gun.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 2 (members: 0, guests: 2)

Similar threads

Light fighters alternatives, 1935-1945
4 5 6
Replies
107
Views
5K
Shortround6
S
Steel in aircraft construction, 1935-45?
2 3
Replies
48
Views
2K
fshort
AA guns + rockets alternatives for 1935-45
2 3 4
Replies
74
Views
10K
SplitRz
Realistic limits of the small 12 cyl engines, 1935-45
2
Replies
36
Views
2K
Shortround6
S
Cold war European combat aircraft alternatives?
Replies
10
Views
149
tomo pauk
Menu
Log in
Register