syscom3
Pacific Historian
Incorrect. The IJN did not have the shipping needed to invade Hawaii AND the PI, Malaya and Guam. Logistics was always the weak point for Japan and it got continually worse as the war progressed.
The Battle For Australia
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Incorrect. The IJN did not have the shipping needed to invade Hawaii AND the PI, Malaya and Guam. Logistics was always the weak point for Japan and it got continually worse as the war progressed.
mikewint
Captain
Syscom, I need to state more correctly, by easily I meant that after the attack the islands were wide open to attack by land. both the army and navy were in total disarray. With their carriers off shore they easily had air superiority over the islands. As to available shipping, the devastation of the attack and the state of the land and naval forces would have allowed almost any type of shipping to ferry troops and land them ashore. Would dedicated landing (LST) really been needed?
buffnut453
Captain
So let's say the Japanese went the whole enchilada and occupied the Hawaiian Islands. Then what? It was just another island-chain outpost that was vulnerable because of Japan's inability to resupply, plus it could easily be by-passed using Australia as a starting point to push up through Guadalcanal. The fundamental problem was that Japan's leadership entirely misjudged American resolve in the face of attack. Had the entire Pacific Fleet been sunk, I'm certain America would have rolled up its sleeves and rebuilt it. It would have taken time but it would have happened and no amount of breathing space would have enabled Japan to catch up industrially. Like I said, the war would have been longer but the ultimate result would have been the same - defeat for Japan.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... The fundamental problem was that Japan's leadership entirely misjudged American resolve in the face of attack. "
And THAT is it in a nutshell. And they had misjudged the Soviets in 1939.
MM
And THAT is it in a nutshell. And they had misjudged the Soviets in 1939.
MM
michaelmaltby
Colonel
delete
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Mike, the Japanese never had the shipping needed to invade Hawaii. Not to mention there is a big difference between a fast carrier group sneaking up on Hawaii from the north and a huge fleet chugging up slowly from the south.
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- #27
parsifal
Colonel
Hi BF
Many times Ive played a simulation called "War In The Pacific" (WITP). A monster game, easily the most detailed simulation on the subject designed by Richard Berg and Jim Dunnigan. These guys are legends. Dunnigan for example is no longer a simulations designer, he is considered far too valuable for that. The US pentagon snapped him up some time ago as a strategic analyst. Hes one of those guys working in the backrooms advising the US brass on how to fight and win their wars. Bergy is still a game designer AFAIK, and IMO considered the best in the business. Its not so much a "game" in the sense of a computer sim as a serious historical study. To give you some idea of the scale of this thing it has nine (yes nine) A1 sized map sections, over 10000 counters, and a rule book over 150 pages long and CRT tables booklet over 40 pages long. In additiona to the main theatre maps, there are over 100 tactical maps that depict most of the main island groups (like Guadacanal Iwo, Okinawwa) at the most tactical scales possible. Normally on the TO maps you deply at divisional or regimental level (occasionally at battalion level). On the tactical maps, depending on the scale of the map, you break your parent units into company strength or even smaller.
In China, the chinese forces are depicted at army size units (since they have over 300 divisional sized units, and thats just the KMT).
Warships are depicted as individual ships down to destroyer sized, below that you have multiple hulls per counter. Aircraft are deployed as "points" with varying chanracteristics for each type. Each point represents 10 aircraft.
Play is on the turn based but with simulataneous movement/combat, on the basis of a 1 week passage of time per turn, but there are impulses for air and naval activity that roughly equate to 2 days of time per impulse.....and air battles can slow down to even a single moment of time. Its one of the most innovative methods of time and distance scaling that I have ever seen. It works, and works well. When you dont need all that much detail, such as occurred in China, you dont get bogged down in cludge and fiddle....but when the fate of the war depends on 5 minutes of combat, and the deployment of a few hundred soldiers, the systems allows for that.
If you constantly engage your air and sea assets for every 2 day period they burn out really quickly....you need time to rest these units, refit, and absorb replacements in the case of the air formations ( a big problem for the Japanese, who simply do not have enough land based formations to cover all the territory.
The game takes into account Japanese Pilot quality, their crappy replacement system, superior night fighting skills, superior land tactics/training/morale at the beginning of the war. Gradually these skills advantages disappear as Allied experience and success mounts, and the Japanese take losses they simply cannot afford to absorb.
Rules are in play for production and shipping. Shipping is depicted in lots of approximately 100000 deadweight ton lots. There are optional rules for captured Allied shipping in the Indies, which helped the japs somewhat. Rules are also in place to reflect such issues as US torpedo failures, Long Lance, and the cockeyed use of Japanese subs. There are also rules for the US intell advantages that affected the conduct of ops so dramatically.
In a word, this simulation is without any doubt super detailed and super accurate. The general line up is usually to have either 5 or 8 players, and with a dedicated time committment will usually take about 250 hours to play. So it aint no fantasy or beer and pretzels lightweight, i can assure you. We have tested this sim using average results from the CRTS, following as closely as possible the operational movements of each side. Played as history, the game delivers pretty much historical results. We have never been more than a week or two out in terms of japanese surrender.
So what happens when you give players a free reign to explore their own strateegies. To be fair, we usually dont restrict Japanese submarines operations completely. They get some use out of their subs to sink Allied shipping as Yoshida Akira has shown. We also assume Japanese industry starts the awar at their post Midway production levels....slightly more than their outputs at December 1941.
There is no doubt in my mind, with the experience of WITP behind me, to say that an invasion of hawaii is nearly impossible to pull off. However an invasion of Midway in December 1941 is not. This has major implications on tracking of the US Fleet. (we now have a house rule that prevents this preemptive strike until January 1942....to give the US time to reinforce its position there). The overarching shortage that dictates and dominates Japanese planning and operations is a shortage of shipping. They simply dont have enough of it to do everything. However, if they can corner and inflict a one sided naval defeat(s) on the USN in 1942, of sufficient magnitude (meaning they sink all or most of the US carriers for small or no loss to themselves....an almost impossible task, but possible, if the US make mistakes) the pendulaum swings and its the allies who cant effectively stop the Japanese. A few months of defeats in 1942 will dictate in large measure what happens in later parts of the war. And one sided victories in the pacific will have flow on effects in other TOs, like North Africa, and Russia.
The game is not so naive as to assume that the Japanese can achieve unconditional surrender, but it does have a neat system to postulate US war weariness and priotities (principally Europe first). If the US was faced with a rampaging European Axis, and no real prospect or result in the pacific, faced with a choice of either making a peace in the pacific, or losing the war outright, the assumption is the US will opt for a truce with Japan. Ive argued that this could only ever be considered a temporary truce....once the Europe first strategists had recovered position in Europe, the US would return to clear up the Pacific situation. But IMO this is also outside the parameters of a 1939-46 conflict timeframe. It might not be until 1947-8 that the US could return to the theatre with amuch reduced reputation. It would be a different war a different world really.
mikewint
Captain
Parsifal, again sir said so much better than I. As I said in post #17, the US is not defeated by Japan but merely accepts the status quo after Pearl. Since the Pacific war was always a number #2 priority. I'll bow to your knowlege about land invasion of Hawaii. I always felt that transport ships behind the carrier group could have followed up on the initial attack if successful or turn and ran if not. I was also surprised that the Japanese carrier group did not "hang-out" for a few days to see if the US carriers would return to Pearl. They were in little danger with Pearl destroyed.
- Thread starter
- #29
parsifal
Colonel
Thanks for the compliment Mike, but its undeserved. I am not saying that a direct assault on Hawaii was impossible, but it would be difficult, uncertain, and occupy a big percentage of Japans very limited ampibious assault assets. Even though the hawaii garrison was unprepred, it was quite big, and could rely on more or less immediate reinforcement from the mainaland. The japanese invaders would have no land based support, and limited carrier based support. After a couple of days they would have been left to their own devices, whilst the fleet withdrew to replenish. Neither did the Americans have much in the way of logistic support but then, they would be operating much closer to home. It would have been Guadcanal, on steroids, allover again.
The scenarios that Buffnut and Sys are describing are far more reality based than what im suggesting. What i am postulating, is based on an unrealistic pre-requisite.....that the US sufferes heavy, repeated defeats in the 1942 naval battles. The only point I am making is that the continued engagement by the US fleet in 1942 was critical to containing the japanese, and hence the argument "we only needed to sit back and outproduce the Japanese" is just as flawed as saying "production was an unimportant elementof allied victory". In fact allied victory was anchored on a whole range of issues.....production, manpower, tactics, training, naval and aerial engagement, and just plain luck
The scenarios that Buffnut and Sys are describing are far more reality based than what im suggesting. What i am postulating, is based on an unrealistic pre-requisite.....that the US sufferes heavy, repeated defeats in the 1942 naval battles. The only point I am making is that the continued engagement by the US fleet in 1942 was critical to containing the japanese, and hence the argument "we only needed to sit back and outproduce the Japanese" is just as flawed as saying "production was an unimportant elementof allied victory". In fact allied victory was anchored on a whole range of issues.....production, manpower, tactics, training, naval and aerial engagement, and just plain luck
buffnut453
Captain
Hi Parsifal,
Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl.
One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.
Cheers,
B-N
Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl.
One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.
Cheers,
B-N
buffnut453
Captain
Hi Parsifal,
Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl.
One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.
Cheers,
B-N
Great posts! I was never postulating that an invasion of Pearl Harbor was a feasible option for the Japanese - their focus was on the Dutch East Indies. Despite all the focus on the Pearl Harbor raid, all it really was a side-show to remove a flanking threat and provide the IJN with freedom of manoeuvre. Japan's major focus was getting oil and other natural resources (tin, rubber etc) from the territories it captured. That said, I agree with your last statement entirely - the timing of the Allied victory depended on all of the listed items. However, I still maintain that the US would never, ever have considered even a truce with Japan after the former's "sneak attack" on Pearl.
One of the key problems for Japan was their own expansionist policy. Every time they were faced with a choice to escalate or maintain the status quo, Tojo and his cronies chose to escalate. However, every island that was occupied was yet another drain on the scarce shipping resources available to Japan (plus a military resource drain putting troops and aircraft beyond the mutual support of other locations). One almost gets the sense of Tojo, looking at a map of the Pacific in May 1942 and seeing huge areas "owned" by Japan but, in reality, all that was controlled were a few rocky islands, the rest being a porous area in which the USN's Pacific Fleet were (relatively) free to roam. There really was nowhere for Japan to go from Jun 1942 onwards because there were insufficient resources to tackle Australia, India or America, thus Japan was stuck owning lots of islands but with no real means of adequately exploiting or defending her gains.
Cheers,
B-N
mikewint
Captain
Parsifal, richly deserved without a doubt. Nagumo had failed to execute Yamamoto's plan. His failure to launch the 3rd wave left vital fuel, machine shop and drydock facilities untouched. I understand his actions as it was getting dark and his torpedo and dive bombers had suffered disproportionate losses. Not lingering to get the carriers fell into the same cautious frame of mind though his DEs were getting low on fuel
Yamamoto could not have known that the US had already decided not to fight in the Pacific. Admiral Stark had already devised Plan Dog which assigned Kimmel's Pacific fleet to keeping Japan out of the Eastern Pacific and protecting the sealanes to Australia.
Midway was the deciding battle and Coral Sea had knocked out 2 IJN carriers. Yamamoto's Midway plan though rushed failed for a number of reasons though mostly because US codebreakers had cracked Navel Code D plus some very uncharacteristic Yamamoto errors: The May nuisance attack by flying boats which caused the vital recon mission not to be flown thus Yamamoto did not know whether the carriers were at Pearl; He dispatched his carriers too early or his subs too late so his vital sub picketline was not in place and the IJN carriers sailed into Nimitz's ambush
Yamamoto could not have known that the US had already decided not to fight in the Pacific. Admiral Stark had already devised Plan Dog which assigned Kimmel's Pacific fleet to keeping Japan out of the Eastern Pacific and protecting the sealanes to Australia.
Midway was the deciding battle and Coral Sea had knocked out 2 IJN carriers. Yamamoto's Midway plan though rushed failed for a number of reasons though mostly because US codebreakers had cracked Navel Code D plus some very uncharacteristic Yamamoto errors: The May nuisance attack by flying boats which caused the vital recon mission not to be flown thus Yamamoto did not know whether the carriers were at Pearl; He dispatched his carriers too early or his subs too late so his vital sub picketline was not in place and the IJN carriers sailed into Nimitz's ambush
- Thread starter
- #33
parsifal
Colonel
If the USN had been comprehemsively defeated, in '42, and the Germans had achieved more success in Europe, the Americans might be forced to make a peace, of sorts with the japanese if only temporarily. If they did not make this peace, they, and the allies may well have lost the war.
What your saying effectively, is that there was no way that the US could lose the war, no matter what they did, and no matter how badly things went for them. There are many books and authors that echo that sentiment, but I have to say I dont agree. Allied industrial power was just one ingredient in the crucible of victory, but not the only one. The Americans, could, and did, suffer heavy casualties, and bounce right back, however there were certain things that absolutely had to be achieved to maintain that economic dominance, as well as put into place the other necessary ingredients for victory.
Without control of the oceans, or at least without challenging japanese control of them, two things were likley to happen. Firstly, an allied retreat out of the Pacific and east asia is going to allow the Japanese to grow stronger, faster than she did. The Japanese could be expected to ramp up their production to their peak 1944 levels in perhaps half the time that they did........which means japanese production might peak as early as the end of 1942Shortages were the main reason why Japan lagged industrially behind the allies, and these shortages only got worse as their merchant fleet went rapidly to the bottom. However without those insignificant island bases like Midway in Allied hands, or ports isolated and short of supply, the allies would not be able to mount any effective sub campaign against the japanese. If the Allies lost their ability to challenge the Japanese fleet, because they lost their carriers, the allies wouold effectively lose control of the oceans.......a decreased Japanese loss rate is one of those effects.
However loss of control of the oceans is going to have quite significant effects on the allies as well. The US economy is very resistant to seaborne interdiction, but not completely so. Access to world markets, both imports and exports are still a key to US economic exapansion. Mount a successful interdiction campaign because the allied navies are no longer able to operate, and all of a sudden the unbeatable US economy becomes very threadbare. Ive read some accounts that estimate that without the freedom of the oceans, the US economy would only reach about 60% of its historical outputs.
If you assume that Japan has an economy roughly 50% larger than its wartime efforts and an American economy 40% smaller than historical, plus you have a major unanswered emergency in the ETO, the prospects of an allied defeat loom very large indeed.
My opinion (and bear in mind this is all speculation, so there are no "right" answers here), is that the Allied leadership, faced with such a harsh possibility as actually losing the war, or making a pact with the devil and making peace (temporary) with the japanese, are going to swallow their pride and make peace.
How long such peace would last, who knows, but not long IMO....about as long as it takes to get the situation under control.
The key thing I am trying to say, however, is that Allied victory was anchored on a number of different factors. Economic strength was one of them. But continued control or dispute of the oceans was another. There were pleanty of others, but these two are of the most interest to the PTO
What your saying effectively, is that there was no way that the US could lose the war, no matter what they did, and no matter how badly things went for them. There are many books and authors that echo that sentiment, but I have to say I dont agree. Allied industrial power was just one ingredient in the crucible of victory, but not the only one. The Americans, could, and did, suffer heavy casualties, and bounce right back, however there were certain things that absolutely had to be achieved to maintain that economic dominance, as well as put into place the other necessary ingredients for victory.
Without control of the oceans, or at least without challenging japanese control of them, two things were likley to happen. Firstly, an allied retreat out of the Pacific and east asia is going to allow the Japanese to grow stronger, faster than she did. The Japanese could be expected to ramp up their production to their peak 1944 levels in perhaps half the time that they did........which means japanese production might peak as early as the end of 1942Shortages were the main reason why Japan lagged industrially behind the allies, and these shortages only got worse as their merchant fleet went rapidly to the bottom. However without those insignificant island bases like Midway in Allied hands, or ports isolated and short of supply, the allies would not be able to mount any effective sub campaign against the japanese. If the Allies lost their ability to challenge the Japanese fleet, because they lost their carriers, the allies wouold effectively lose control of the oceans.......a decreased Japanese loss rate is one of those effects.
However loss of control of the oceans is going to have quite significant effects on the allies as well. The US economy is very resistant to seaborne interdiction, but not completely so. Access to world markets, both imports and exports are still a key to US economic exapansion. Mount a successful interdiction campaign because the allied navies are no longer able to operate, and all of a sudden the unbeatable US economy becomes very threadbare. Ive read some accounts that estimate that without the freedom of the oceans, the US economy would only reach about 60% of its historical outputs.
If you assume that Japan has an economy roughly 50% larger than its wartime efforts and an American economy 40% smaller than historical, plus you have a major unanswered emergency in the ETO, the prospects of an allied defeat loom very large indeed.
My opinion (and bear in mind this is all speculation, so there are no "right" answers here), is that the Allied leadership, faced with such a harsh possibility as actually losing the war, or making a pact with the devil and making peace (temporary) with the japanese, are going to swallow their pride and make peace.
How long such peace would last, who knows, but not long IMO....about as long as it takes to get the situation under control.
The key thing I am trying to say, however, is that Allied victory was anchored on a number of different factors. Economic strength was one of them. But continued control or dispute of the oceans was another. There were pleanty of others, but these two are of the most interest to the PTO
Messy1
Master Sergeant
Excellent posts Parsifal!
I only really know the bare bones of what went on in the war between Japan and Australia so be patient with me. If things had gone more Japans way in that the American Navy had not taken such a high toll of their carriers and other shipping and if the Japanese had of defeated the Australians in New Guinea, then how possible was it that Japan could have successfully invaded Australia?
I have heard that the Japanese Navy had a desire to invade Australia, but I think that serious planning for such an invasion wouldn't have been worth while at least until New Guinea was fully in Japanese hands and that a number of other conditions would have been needed to of been met before it could be seriously considered.
I would say that Australia would have been a valuable prize for Japan but I have no real idea of what kind of forces would have been needed to take and hold a vast country such as Australia, from what I understand Australia was largely undefended in 1942 with most of it's forces fighting abroad.
