The Doolittle Raid....

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That would expose those ships to defeat in detail without much prospect of payoff. You're putting how many scores or hundreds of sailors -- and a few useful bottoms -- in danger for a feint, essentially.

Hell, the Japanese might think the planes were Midway-based, being twin-engined, and homing on the atoll from a search leg, and ignore their arriving vector.

Or those slow cargo ships or tankers (which are mighty valuable at this stage in the war!) might be found by the search pattern and simply killed by a small follow-on strike (or the odd submarine laying around, which might discover them outbound despite the late arrival of IJN subs anyway), because the USN couldn't spare them any escorts from TFs 16 & 17.

Too much could go wrong for such a small possibility of payoff.
 
Well, those ships are not any more vulnerable as part of the task force with airplanes on improvised launching decks than they are normally, and they can still carry cargo and oil. The bombers would be doing low altitude bomb attacks, since it was well into 1943 before the USN pried the torpedo production at least partly away from that gang of incompetent feather merchants in RI and got private industry to building effective weapons. Of course we could have borrowed some from the RN, who seemed to have pretty darn good torps but lacked a submarine fleet capable of being of much use except at Malta. Compatibility with our ships' tubes would not have mattered when aircraft were the launchers.

After the battles to defend the 'Canal cost us the Hornet, with the Saratoga and Enterprise both badly damaged, the USN was slap out of carriers in the Pacific and had to borrow an RN carrier to have enough hulls afloat to stay in the war. Did y'all know that?

By the way, Commander Ring was replaced as Hornet CAG before the ship left for the Solomans. Seems that the new Captain did not like him much for some reason.
 
Well, those ships are not any more vulnerable as part of the task force with airplanes on improvised launching decks than they are normally, and they can still carry cargo and oil.

Sure they are, because you don't normally (try to) sail slow cargo ships around the flanks of a battle fleet that can run between 22 and 28 knots, and launch strike packages.

Of course they're more vulnerable. They're slower, have little or no escort, and are by design operating ahead of USN combat units.


Twin-engined Army planes, presumably manned by Army crews. And in what numbers, and with how much training?


Of course I and others know that. How does that reflect on the utility of slapping a flight-deck onto a Liberty ship or tanker and having it creep around KdB at ten or twelve kts while having Army pilots doing mission profiles they have little or no training flying?

By the way, Commander Ring was replaced as Hornet CAG before the ship left for the Solomans. Seems that the new Captain did not like him much for some reason.

His incompetence couldn't be known before Midway; it couldn't be ignored after it.
 
The USN still had CVEs active in the PTO while Saratoga was laid up in Pearl after Guadalcanal.
 
Well, those ships are not any more vulnerable as part of the task force with airplanes on improvised launching decks than they are normally, and they can still carry cargo and oil.
They AREN'T part part of the taskforce, and can't be. Part of the task force's value is its speed, and any force is only as fast as its slowest unit. Unless you have a large banana boat available for conversion you don't have a viable taskforce hull.
Operating independently a CVE is:
Combustible,
Vulnerable,
Expendable.
A typical CVE could hit 24 knots in a brief high speed dash and once or twice hit 28 in a desperation move by running their 440 PSI boilers at 660 for a few minutes. Their sustained cruise speeds were somewhere south of 20 knots. Not good company for a 28-30 knot fast carrier taskforce.
 
A few .months AFTER Midway they might have been a viable option, but weren't ready in March 1942 when they would have had to ship out. Early days P38 training was not up to snuff, and with the complications of shipboard operation and the shortcomings of air combat tactics then being taught, would likely have been Zero fodder. USAAF pursuit doctrine hadn't quite adjusted to the concept of a complex twin engine fighter.
For the Doolittle raid, forget it.
 
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Even basing P-38s on the atoll, the plane was such a new factor that the impact would likely have been minimal.

I've had discussions about rushing the TBF in that same Midway time-frame, and the objection in my mind is still the same: you've got to have well-trained crew if you want the best out of the plane. I'm no pilot, but even so I know that transition takes time, because new planes make new demands just as much as they offer new potential. Going from one to two engines, and figuring new tactics for a heavier airplane, etc.

Not to mention that as USAAC fighter pilots, they probably had a pittance of overwater nav training.
 
Would've been the P-38E then, which began delivery in October '41, if I remember correctly....
Quite similar in range weren't they, the B-25 and P-38?
How many P-38's could they have loaded, in the same space as the B-25?
Could they have had loaded the P-38's with an external tank plus a 500 pound bomb?
 
Like using the Mosquito, I think it "would have" been a matter of the P-38 with a full load meeting the take off requirement. I would think they could have gotten at least one more aircraft aboard the carrier. Now would the same or similar results been accomplished with a diminished bomb load?
 


Would the P-38 have had the desired range carrying 1 bomb and 1 drop tank?
 
Something to consider with the B-25 over the P-38:
The B-25 crews were selected from a bomb group that had been flying the B-25 since it went into service summer of '41 - thus includes ASW patrols on the east coast.
They started intensive training in February of '42 that lasted almost two months, the raid being conducted 18 April '42.

The P-38, on the otherhand, started deliveries to the 1st Pursuit Group in July with sixty P-38s (no suffix) that weren't combat ready and would never be used for anything but training
A month later, they received P-38Ds, which still were not combat ready.
By late Fall, the P-38E started to be introduced.

The point to all this, is that while the P-38 was trickling into service with it's upgrades and multitude of changes, the B-25 was being actively used and importantly, over water.
So while the P-38E would have been available, the experience of it's pilots would be far behind that of the B-25 group's.
 
The USN still had CVEs active in the PTO while Saratoga was laid up in Pearl after Guadalcanal.
Few and far between. CVE1, USS Long Island flew off the first batch of Marine F4Fs and SBDs to Henderson Field on 13 August '42, then scurried back to San Diego to train carrier pilots. Others trickled in over time, but weren't a significant factor until late 1943. The Uboat war absorbed most of the early output of CVEs.
 
Long Island was with Saratoga at Guadalcanal.
Copahee (CVE-12) delivered fighters and SBDs to the Cactus air force during the melee in October of '42 as well.

Saratoga was back in action by the holidays and within a few months, the Essex would join ops in the Pacific.
 
P-38:
Length: 37 ft 10 in (11.53 m)
Wingspan: 52 ft 0 in (15.85 m)

B-25:
Length: 52 ft 11 in (16.13 m)
Wingspan: 67 ft 7 in (20.60 m)

8 x 16.13 = 130 meter (16 B-25's, 2 X 8)
8 X 11.53 = 93 meter (16 P-38's, 2 X 8)

....this leave them 37 meters, or thereabouts, for another 6 P-38's using the same space as the B-25's, question is though....could they take off using the same distance?

Why did they use USS Hornet, do refresh my memory please....
 
Jan, it would fall more on the reliability of the machine and experience of the pilot/crew.
The B-25 was conducting ASW combat ops at about the time the P-38 was trickling into service.
The B-25 crews were seasoned and the B-25s were debugged where the P-38 still had some teething problems and inexperienced pilots.
 
Why did they use USS Hornet, do refresh my memory please....
Would you have preferred the Ronald Reagan or the Gerald Ford?
They used what they had. Hornet was brand new and pretty green. Would you rather have sent her on a major high stakes confrontation like Coral Sea for her first sortie? The Doolittle raid gave her a little more sea time before things got ugly.
 
P-38 had 300 gallons of internal fuel (if it had self sealing tanks) and if you use one drop tank it better be a really big one.

From Wiki "
  • Installation of a 160-gallon collapsible neoprene auxiliary fuel tank, fixed to the top of the bomb bay, and installation of support mounts for additional fuel cells in the bomb bay, crawlway, and lower turret area, to increase fuel capacity from 646 to 1,141 U.S. gallons (538 to 950 imperial gallons, or 2,445 to 4,319 L)."
Each B-25 carried four 500lb bombs, 3 HE and one incendiary.

B-25s had a navigator (and work station) and long range radio.

P-38 option seems like not as good a return on investment.

14 of the B-25 crews eventually made it back to allied controlled areas.

P-38 pilots may have had a much less chance.
 

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