I know that was my point, in the late 30s there was no war, bombers didn't need escorts, in fact the RAF were looking forward to being intercepted so their Wellingtons could shoot the enemy down in numbers. Then we have the idea of using a plane like the P-38 to take pictures "WTF are you talking about, build the interceptor and stop this BS about escorts and pictures".Well, considering the original "Circular Proposal X-608" according to some books (not primary source) was for an interceptor with 2 hours of endurance the discussion about long range bomber escort may never have come up.
Especially when you consider that the P-38F was the first P-38 to be fitted with drop tanks. In fact the first 128 P-38Fs may not have had drop tanks as built (?). Some early P-38Fs were refitted after delivery.
THE MYSTICAL MERLIN POWERED P-38
- Thread starter FLYBOYJ
- Start date
Maybe a misplaced lack of urgency. Discussing cabin heating uses words like comfort and discomfort, the effects of being in low air pressure at very low temperatures goes beyond comfort, in themselves they can be fatal, flying a plane makes them a more dangerous, and over enemy territory very, very dangerous. All the effects of extreme are dangerous to a pilot, the cold doesn't have to kill you, the drowsiness, lack of attention and mental abilities can do that quite easily too.
drgondog
Major
Joe - the 1st and 14th (with P-38G) arrived summer 1942 and flew several escort missions. Air Technical Services - Fighter section was not in play with Cass Hough until 1st and 14th were sent to MTO as well as 8nd which never flew combat mission - and all 78th FG P-38's followed (not the pilots).
7th PRC arrived with P-38F in spring 1943 and reported the issues.
The finger pointing doesn't really belong to Lockheed and Republic for the many bugs experience with the P-38F through J-15, not Republic for the P-47C through D-6's. Pt the fat finger on Wright Field which never did anything remotely interesting on Operational Suitability. Thank god Eglin took the bit in their teeth in mid 1943 and got Wright Field out of the way.
Alaska and Pacific and China weren't as much of a test except for deep winter, but even then the bomber/interceptor missions were low/medium altitude.
1940 long range escort was a fantasy as far as AAC/AAF were concerned because the AAC/AAF-Hq planners were still convinced that the B-17 would not need escort (Arnold had misgivings and changed the priorities of the Emmons Board to raise a 1500 mi range Pursuit to number 1). Nobody outside Bradley and Kelsey during their engagement as project officers for P-38 had a clue that a clandestine effort was underway at Lockheed to equip the late P-38E with pylons and plumbing for Ferry Tanks - at that time expressly verboten by Wright Field/Echols and AAF-GHQ. That said the 'fighter designs' attempting to meet 1500 mi range were all twin engine types, of which only the P-61 survived.
The 'rational thinkers' at AAF Hq were still convinced that while only T/e Pursuit could go 600 miles, they could not compete with s/e point interceptor performance (Spit/109) during BoB demonstrated re: Bf 110s.
Lot of FUs by AAC/AAF along a broad front relative to putting 'reliable performers' in the hands of the warriors.
drgondog
Major
On the subject of Merlin installation into a P-38J.
8th AF ATS was well underway with a collaborative effort with R-R in late winter/spring 1944. I touch on this in my new book.
What absolutely killed the project was the simple fact that NAA had Top (and exclusive) Priority on Merlin 60 series engines from Packard for P-51 projects. In the cold light of reality, the second issue was simply the projected mission. The P-51B had demonstrated that it was the premier escort vehicle for 8th and 15th AF in spring 1944 - 8th AF planners were already demanding higher percentage of NAA production and willing to give up both the P-38 and P-47 for ETO.
By then the math and the results were clear - Mustang cheaper to buy , better overall performance envelope, more available every month, perfectly suited to strategic escort and much less expensive to operate and maintain.
Result? Merlin P-38 dead in the ATS/R-R uterus.
8th AF ATS was well underway with a collaborative effort with R-R in late winter/spring 1944. I touch on this in my new book.
What absolutely killed the project was the simple fact that NAA had Top (and exclusive) Priority on Merlin 60 series engines from Packard for P-51 projects. In the cold light of reality, the second issue was simply the projected mission. The P-51B had demonstrated that it was the premier escort vehicle for 8th and 15th AF in spring 1944 - 8th AF planners were already demanding higher percentage of NAA production and willing to give up both the P-38 and P-47 for ETO.
By then the math and the results were clear - Mustang cheaper to buy , better overall performance envelope, more available every month, perfectly suited to strategic escort and much less expensive to operate and maintain.
Result? Merlin P-38 dead in the ATS/R-R uterus.
The WW2 era heated flight suits I've seen were very bulky affairs.
Maybe added up to too tight a fit in some pilot's seats in some aircraft.
Plus a lot of fighters had switches and relays on the side of the cockpit, they might've been hard to reach when you were squeezed into the cockpit.
The rheostat I had was just one control for the whole suit. OK maybe for aircrew that were standing up, or semi mobile in a aircraft.
But that same suit on a pilot in a fighter, sitting on a parachute, I can imagine a burning butt when the suit was adjusted so your extremities were comfortable.
Maybe added up to too tight a fit in some pilot's seats in some aircraft.
Plus a lot of fighters had switches and relays on the side of the cockpit, they might've been hard to reach when you were squeezed into the cockpit.
The rheostat I had was just one control for the whole suit. OK maybe for aircrew that were standing up, or semi mobile in a aircraft.
But that same suit on a pilot in a fighter, sitting on a parachute, I can imagine a burning butt when the suit was adjusted so your extremities were comfortable.
I could believe that this would have been a sensitive political issue. Allison was owned by GM and, without the P-38, the Alison engines would have had no applications in modern aircraft aside from the P-63, which was only being produced for export. The P-38 configuration did lend itself well to the trubosupercharged engines due to the space available in the booms.
- Thread starter
- #47
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
At the same time understand that the engines were "government furnished" and Lockheed could have worked this on their own with company funds. I don't understand your statement about the turbocharger though, the system on the P-38 was fine.
When RR were asked to produce an engine for a high altitude bomber, they discounted a turbocharger set up. Although it could be done on a Wellington, as it was on many US bombers, it is very difficult to put it in a single engine fighter unless the fighter is designed around it like a P-47.
soulezoo
Senior Airman
Or a P-39!!! Oh, wait....
The P-39 would have been ideal, if only someone had thought about it.
drgondog
Major
Joe , I had to think about this before answering. Lockheed didn't have an easy path to R-R to go beyond securing several Merlin 'loaners'.
Packard was obligated by Contract to manage the dispositions by % to RAF and AAF and Materiel Command was the driver for Priority allocations. ATS 'belonged' to Materiel Command - which was the Jan 1944 org in ETO under which Hough in Air Technical Section (reporting to Kelsey) set aside a P-38J for proposed modification. R-R was straining to keep up with RAF demand. Packard capacity never met demand for NAA and had zero capacity for alternative production draws for new programs.
The immediate barriers included 1.) submitting a unique mission justification for the modification, 2.) executing design changes required to stuff a Radiator/Intercooler matrix mated with a Merlin 61 (definitely not trivial) and not increase parasite and Pressure drag over Allison installation, 3.) Justifying an 'infringement' on A1 priority that Packard was issued for NAA - when Packard couldn't keep up with NAA or Curtiss (even Spares for P-40F/L were cut for FY 44 drastically after Packard strike delayed P-51B-1 deliveries in June 1943), 4. Justifying re-tooling for P-38K to produce 'something in Spring 1945 that P-51D/P-47N and new P-51H couldn't do better for far less purchase and operations dollars.
Both Kelsey and Hough were (IMO) still enamored with the P-38 after combined 10 years of intimate proximity with Lockheed/P-38 Program and wished to see a P-38 unencumbered by Northern Europe ETO cold issues. In January 1944, when they concocted the cool idea of burying a 1650-1 into the P-38, the major issues had not yet been solved with P-38J-10 and even the J-15 just coming away from the Base Depot mod centers. By June, when the program was killed, most of the reasons to go Merlin 61 were no longer valid.
I spent some brain cycles earlier in my career wondering what a Meredith Effect cowl/Radiator/adjustable exit gate config might gain in cooling drag combined with reverting to F/G cowl configuration and eliminating the LE Intercooler. Placing a 51B radiator/Intercooler matrix would have been a tight fit - but 'doable'
- Thread starter
- #52
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
As always excellent information Bill. Yes, it would have been a challenge to acquire 2 Merlins either as assets or loaners. Going back to the original story, it seems logistically it would have been easier to have RR complete the initial modification but as pointed out those who were pushing to do this were playing with airframes and engines that "really wasn't theirs." Maybe if this occurred a year earlier or if Lockheed had the interest the outcome might have been different but then again you had the development of the P-38K which IMO would have negated the need to pursue a Merlin engine P-38.
drgondog
Major
The P38K with different prop and gear ratio had impressive capability but not enough over standard J to get giddy over. The AAF early 1944 testing carefully was loaded 600 pounds less than the J it was compared against for speed and climb.
- Thread starter
- #54
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Then it's our guess how giddy we would have gotten with a Merlin P-38. I know we have the figures on paper but was it worth it with later model Js and Ls coming on board?
drgondog
Major
IMO? No. The 'performance issues' were largely focused in high altitude ETO ops. When intercooling/after cooling and oil cooling issues were sorted out the rest of the issues were solved by process.
The sad historical comparison to the P-51B vis a vis operations reliability were almost directly focused on the long gestation process for P-38H to J-15 - at least six months. The 51B solved oil breather/consumption issues and defective radiator matrix issues in less than 30 days from beginning of combat ops. What still lingered for P-51B were issues associated with gear uplock failures in high AoA/G maneuvers and gun jamming.
Bill - is there a ballpark on the P-51 losses caused by the U/C extending under high G?
drgondog
Major
Not to my knowledge. Losses in combat were only verifiable by a witness. I'm aware of only one such example in the 355th - during a dive/strafing attack on a barge on the way home from Munich by Demers. Several documented examples existed - including both P-51D prototypes, P-51D-1-NA in Jan 1944 and P-51D-1-NT in July 1945 - the latter failed at WS 75 (inconclusive on uplock) during High G rat race.
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