"The Royal Navy, Not the RAF, Won the Battle of Britain"

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Still think it would be unlikely. Over the winter of 1940 the British regrouped and if they new there was an invasion coming in the summer they would have a good 8 months to prepare for it. I think even if the Germans had better tactics (with regards to bombing ships) the regrouped British would be too much for them. It would of been a slaughter on both sides (particularly the Germans). Without proper landing craft and plans (going on if they use the same plan as that proposed in 1940) it would almost always of been a failure in my opinion. You can only land and supply so many divisions and one time and I feel the Germans would be stranded if they got any men ashore as they would of been unable to resupply them adequately (look at D-Day).

For the German invasion to succeed it would need a major revamp of the plan and the drawing up and making of a suitable sized landing craft fleet. All of which would take time and during that time the British would be reinforcing their defences and preparing for the coming invasion (and perhaps some attacks in North Africa).

But the point still lies that Hitler didn't really want to invade Britain and always had his eye on Russia and we all know what happened after that...
 
If the RN had been forced to fight without RAF air superiority, they may not have failed entirely to hold the KM back, but they would have struggled. RN AAA systems were of inferior quality in the early stages of the war , and the FAA's fighter force was composed of very second-rate machines, so defending major surface assets from air attack would have been very difficult.

What major surface assets, the RN doesn't need to bring to the battle Battleships, much less Carriers. It has plenty of destroyers in the area - and ports such as Harwich Humberside would be beyond escorted fighter range. The Royal Navy is quite capable of operating at night - it will be a long nervous night for the Germans crammed in their barges, as they crawl in an elongated 's' shape across the Channel, listening to the sound of gunfire getting closer, with the dark brightened suddenly by an explosion as a ship goes is engulfed in flame. Come the daylight hours the RN has gone back to base to rest reload, while the German barges try to work out how to beach themselves after their tugs have been sunk, or drift who knows where!

Maybe some will land, but their equipment, and follow on even of the first wave is doubtful.
 
I think it's worthy of note that the coastal defences that ringed the British Isles probably played more than their silent part would lead to believe, if only for the fact that they were never tested - testament indeed to their perceived effectiveness if you're looking for a way in.

It was never intended to be strong enough to repel a German invasion, only to hold it for long enough for greater resistance to assemble behind the point of attempted insertion.

In this way, the British didn't have to concentrate ground forces behind designated areas of probable insertion.

They ran a mock-umentary on it last year on TV, I didn't think it was particularly biased in favour of the Brits and seemed to present a reasonable argument as to why a German invasion would have failed.
 
Waynos,

My scenario is set in a situation where the LW has 'won' the BoB, and therefore has air superiority. Under these circumstances, it can reasonably be expected that the sky would be full of bombers pounding surface units and bases - after all, that is the point of gaining air superiority in the first place.

I take your point about the failure of the attempts to knock out the CH system during the BoB - but CH was just one of many targets. If, again, the LW has won the BoB, it can safely be assumed (for the purposes of the scenario), that CH was neutralised as part of the BoB campaign, and that the LW would concentrate their Kampfgruppen on 12 Group airfields and RN assets, as these would be the two main obstacles to a sucessful invasion and occupation of the UK. It is also true that only one 11 Group airfield was ever knocked out historically - but had the bombing not switched to London, it is unlikely that Biggin Hill would have been the only casualty. Concentrated German bombing was just days away from putting 11 Group out of business altogether, and I believe that if, hypothetically, bombing was concentrated on 12 Group bases and RN assets, it would have a very seious effect - especially as I believe bombing of cities would have been suspended to provide more aircraft for direct military support of the invasion.

Lastly, where would the KM surface units be? I'm not sure, but I would bet most of the big units ( i.e S&G and the Panzerschiffe), would be out in the North Sea/Atlantic beating up commerce and drawing RN units off the invasion force. The major KM surface units could not defeat the RN in a stand-up fleet action - but setting them loose on convoys would leave the Admiralty with a very thorny strategic problem. Do you divert ALL forces to the Channel, lose the Med (and therefore India, even before Japan enters the war) and Atlantic, and starve to death as the pocket battleships decimate the convoys? Or do you cover all the oceans but expose the home islands to a greater risk of invasion? It's not one I would like to try and solve

EDIT: Merlin, missed your post in typing this, the Rn would have to commit some major assets just in case the Germans did likewise - as per my point above. The KM was a powerful threat as a fleet in being (Graf Spee in 1939 and Tirpitz later in the war are great examples), and RN assets would have to be available to defeat any possible KM deployment, regardless of where it might be.

Cheers

BT
 
The RN subs wouldn't expend torpedo's on barges or tugs. They would on the merchantmen that the KM would have to use in the invasion.

One thing to ponder too .... the German invasion fleet would need to sortie from several ports. That would give the RN and remnants of the RAF the opportunity to defeat the invasion fleet in detail.

Any way you look at it, the Germans never had the capability to invade Britain with a guarantee of success. After Dunkirk, each week that went by meant the Brits were getting stronger.
 
Hello BombTaxi
now LW bombers escorted only by Bf 110s would have had hard times against surviving British fighters while attacking 12 Group bases and Royal Observation Corps could have track them after they got near the coast.

Off Norway Scharhorst had got a bad torpedo hit into its stern by a RN A Class DD and Gneisenau had almost its bow blown off by a sub torpedo hit, so I doubt that they were available for High Sea operations in time.

Juha
 
Concentrated German bombing was just days away from putting 11 Group out of business altogether

Source for this? Dowding certainly never expressed such an opinion. As Churchill pointed out to the cabinet on 2nd September 1940:

The Prime Minister then reviewed the results of the last month of hard air fighting. We had every right to he satisfied with those results. He was tempted to ask why the enemy should continue attacks on this heavy scale—which included some days as many as 700 aircraft—if it did not represent something like their maximum effort. This might not, of course, be the explanation. But our own Air Force was stronger than ever and there was every reason to be optimistic about the 1940 Air Battle of Britain.

Lastly, where would the KM surface units be? I'm not sure, but I would bet most of the big units ( i.e S&G and the Panzerschiffe), would be out in the North Sea/Atlantic beating up commerce and drawing RN units off the invasion force.

From June to November Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in dry dock undergoing repair after being bombed/torpedoed in June.

Of the 3 Panzerschiffe, Graf Spee had already been sunk and Lützow was in dry dock after being torpedoed.

That left only the Admiral Scheer, which began sea trials at the end of July after undergoing a refit. She could have been ready at a stretch.

That means the Germans could have assembled a force of 3 - 4 cruisers and 8 or so destroyers.
 
A few observations. There has been some comments about the capability of the Swordfish, and how it was only effective against static targets. This is patently untrue. Stringbags and Albacores were used very effectively against moving targets, the most famous of which are Matapan, and the operations against Bismarck. Less well known is the virtual domination of the Central basin by the airgroups of just one or two carriers, until the arrival of FleigerKorps X in January 1941. until that point the British had wrested the complete initiative off the Italians (and no, the Italians were not a bunch of cowards who didnt want to fight, its just that the carriers gave the british such an overwhelming advantage at sea that the italians could not risk an open confrontation). in that time they had sunk a number of warships, as well as over 250000 tons of merchant shipping, helped to immobilise an entire navy (the french fleet) and suppressed the activities of another (Supermarina)

Unique in the worlds airforces at that time was the ability of the British carrier groups to hit with pinpoint accuracy targets at night. The strikes against Taranto, Bismarck, Sardinia, Genoa, Tripoli, Matapan, and many other places were all delivered in the dead of night. And this was not a case of a four engined bomber lumbering blindly around the sky trying to find an entire city, the RN FAA demonstrated time and again the ability to find, and hit, very accurately individual ships of all sizes, in the dead of night. They had spent years in the prewar period training and developing the techniques needed for such operations, and in 1940 they were a truly unique group of men completely overlooked in the modern observations, because they operated so differently to the more flashy American and Japanese air arms

In the case of an invasion, one has to assume an RAF badly wounded, and forced to withdraw to the midlands, but one would also have to assume a Luftwaffe also heavily wounded, and unable to dominate the sky to quite the extent it had over Europe up to that time. There could well be opportunities for the FAA to land its a/c on undamaged land bases, or undertake fast carrier raids at night, with devastating results. The barges earmarked for invasion were capable of a sea speed of 2 knots, the distances to the nearest debarkation points was over twenty miles. thats a travelling time of at least ten hours, but when one factors into account the effects of tides and currents, the travelling time for each journey is going to be in the order of 20-24 hours. Then the barges have to unload, if the the Normandy experience is anything to go by, these transports attempting a beach landing (sometheing they are not designed to do), are going to need something like another 24 hours to unload. So the RN, for each transport that leaves France, is going to have a massive window of opportunity to deal with that transport, probably in the order of 36-48 hours...time enough to pound it with everyhting the RN can bring to bear, destroyers, MTBs, night flying FAA a/c, mines (something frequently overlooked...there were mines applenty off the British coast, and the germans were not adequately prepared for this threat) day bombers (less impeded by the LW because of the losses to the German fighters the same as the RAF fighters).

The invasion would have been a disaster for the germans. The professional officers organising it knew this, both from the army and the navy. It was organized half heartedly because the germans had no experience in amphibious warfare (Norway was not an amphibious invasion, it was a surprise landing party on a gigantic scale)

Laslty, a word about German aeronaval capabilities at this time. The Germans did have a specialist air unit at this time, and it had proven itself very effective. It was FliegerKorps X, but in the late summer of 1940 it was not operationals, it was recovering from the losses it had suffered over Norway. When the Germans had tried to use non-specialist units in the maritime role, such a their attacks against the channel convoys, and against Dunkerque, they were generally unsuccessful. It is untrue to say they were completely inneffective, but they were certainly a lot less efficient than the specially trained units, which were simply unnavailable because of losses at that time. Against fast moving destroyer forces i dont give the german non-specialist forces much chance of a hit. The level bombers wouold have been more or less useless 9the germans had no torpedo equipped units at this time, and their divebombing capabilities were very restricted. that left the Stukas, and the bomb carrying Me 110s. a Stuka carrying a bomb is fairly short ranged. An Me 110 operating as a Fighter bomber is more long ranged, but unable to be escorted, and therefore vulnerable, even to a skua or a gladiator.

I just cannot see how the Germans could hope to pull off the invasion with any hope of success.

Having said all that IMO it was the RAF that won the actual battle its just that ther was some doubt about the ability of the RN to influence an invasion, if the need arose
 
Not that I disagree with your Parsifal, on the contrary, I find them excellent, but I just wanted to note that the Ju 88 (dubbed the Big Stuka) also had dive bombing capability.
 

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