The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter Bergjon12
- Start date
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A more limited strategic bombing campaign, with more airpower devoted to ASW, air supremacy and tactical striking power.
hw97karbine
Airman 1st Class
- 248
- Mar 23, 2025
The arguments for and against are laid out in this video, the author concludes that an earlier start to the campaign would have been feasible.
It took until 1944 for the 'oil targets' to swim up to the top of the target priority list. Unfortunately, it also took until 1944 for the Americans to provide a really effective and long range escort. In 1943, US bombing raids often ended up with heavy losses, and 'oil targets' were barely touched in that time.
British used best part of the long nights in the winter of 1943/44 to do the Battle of Berlin - that ended up not just as a waste of men and material resources, but also of the most precious commodity - time. Not to be misunderstood here: shorter war is a better war, lowering the human cost. In 1942-43, British were mostly attacking population centres, as well as facilities that were not directly related to the oil.
Sad irony is that WAllies have had resources to pull off both night time bombing and the escorted daylight bombing in 1943 at least against the targets that were 500 miles away from the UK, if not 600 miles away.
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What kind of % of bombs vs. the scatter radius might we call precision in the context of ww2?
I would argue in the sense that the accutacy achieved by WWII level-bombing at night came close to WWII level-bombing by day.
Hi
For RAF Bomber Command basically it was, see Directives of AOC Bomber Command (in Volume IV of 'The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany') 13th April 1940. Air Commodore J. C. Slessor (Director of Plans) to Air Marshal C. F. A. Portal: Under Hypotheses A 'The Germans do not invade the Low Countries but authority for unrestricted action is given' it was objective (a) "Identifiable oil-plants (List C.I, Plan W.A.6). Under Hypotheses B 'Germany invades Holland and/or Belgium' it was objective (c) "The oil-plants in the Ruhr (Vide Annex A, and list C.I. Plan W.A.6."
This priority continues in other directives.
In the Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945' Chapter 25 'The German Oil Position During the War', these early attacks are mentioned, on page 142 it mentions:
"It will be remembered that the elimination of Germany's oil supplies were also the most favoured of the bombing plans that had been prepared before the war. Accordingly as soon as bombing operations were started in May of 1940, oil became the first priority of the offensive, a position it retained until July of 1941. Storage facilities at refineries, and above-ground storage depots, were first on the list of nominated targets, followed in turn by hydrogenation plants, refineries operating on domestic crude oil, and finally, Fischer-Trosch plants.
By the end of March, 1941, 344 attacks had been made on 29 oil plants and storage installations for a total cost of only some 1,500 tons of bombs. The two most powerful attacks were one of 38 aircraft on Leuna, on 16 August, 1940, and another of 56 aircraft on Gelsenkirchen on 9 January, 1941. But the average number of aircraft per attack was only seven or eight, as has already been observed, the only damage of note that was caused during the whole of this offensive was the hydrogenation plant at Gelsenkirchen Nordstern.
The recognition that these attacks were proving abortive, and the realisation that Germany's oil position had materially changed for the better by her conquests in western and eastern Europe, were responsible for the decision, in July, 1941, to abandon the offensive."
It should be noted that by the end of 1940, due to the conquests, Germany's oil stocks were more than 60% greater than they had been twelve months earlier. Also by the end of 1942 their stocks of oil were not materially less than they had been at the start of the war, although after this date things would get worse due to the German military getting 'over stretched' due to their expansion of the war. So later in the war oil would become a very viable target again, but this does show that "fuel targets" were basically "top of the priority list from day one".
Mike
IIRC it was mentioned somewhere that the Germans had only one (or a couple?) TEL plants, which weren't attacked until quite late. And their existence wasn't exactly a secret either, since they had been built by Standard Oil. I have a vague recollection that at least one of these plants was somewhere in the vicinity of Hamburg, but I'm unable to find any confirmation of this. But if so, that was within relatively easy striking distance, no need to wait for P-51 escorts to be available.
Thank you for bringing all of this to the attention.
I'll now attack the report.
'Cost of only some 1500 tons of bombs'?? From the one that does bombing of the enemy production centres, bombs dropped are investment, not a cost.
On average, that meant that under 4.5 tons of bombs (roughly, two Welligton's full bombloads) were dropped per an attack. That is pittance, even for the RAF BC standards of 1940-41.
Bureaucracy at it's best in that part of the report - we are making pinprick attacks, with average of 7-8 bombers per attack, and are surprised that these don't yield any result. So we abandon the offensive - what offensive??
At the end, deeds speak louder than words.
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Hi
On the night 16/17 August 1940 when 38 BC aircraft attack the oil target at Leuna, 150 BC aircraft (7 lost) were making attacks on enemy targets, Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys, targets were the Ruhr, Frankfurt, Jena Leuna and Augsburg (for obvious reasons) plus airfields in Holland. That was a large number of aircraft for BC to deploy with their then strength, looking through 'The Bomber Command War Diaries' by Middlebrook & Everitt, will indicate the large number of targets that had to be covered due to the war situation, that is the German Army was 20 miles away undertaking invasion preparations. You appear to want to concentrate all the available aircraft on one target? It would take more B-17s with larger bomb loads to achieve any success and even then it often failed to 'destroy' the oil facility.
A few nights later 19/20 August 120 BC aircraft were out on operations using Blenheim, Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys, to five targets in north Germany, to Ambes oil refinery in France , airfields in Holland, Belgium and France plus minelaying, 3 aircraft lost.
It can be argued that BC could not cause much damage to Germany with the small forces they had available but it was sending a message to the German leadership and people that Britain was not out of the war and would resist the German military with whatever they had. Deeds indeed!
Do you believe that bombing oil targets should have been concentrated on at the expense of the attacks on invasion, barges, shipping, airfields troop concentrations etc.? When the German oil assets were now spread all over occupied Europe so even more difficult to eliminate despite the efforts of BC, which is why it was abandoned in 1941.
Mike
Barrett
Staff Sergeant
It was not only feasible, it was a reality.
Look up B-29 Eagle radar, optimized for bombing rather than navigation.
Thumpalumpacus
Lieutenant Colonel
In addition to targeting fuel refineries, I'd also work on rail depots. I know they're easier to repair. But you slow down internal communications, force a decision about workforce deployment, cut into steel output. and maybe seed both targets with delayed-action cluster bombs to keep the repair crews on their toes.
War started much earlier than the BoB, and was still on when BoB ended. Let's not have the invasion panic as some kind of a fig leaf to cover the RAF BC.
Other German industries, like the aircraft factories, were spread even more, yet BC tried to bomb them.
Same for the German cities.
So yes, I believe that the oil targets should've been a lonely top 1 priority for the BC, and also for the AAF once these are in UK.
- Thread starter
- #16
Interesting contributions so far, thanks all.
Some points:
1. Fire Leigh-Mallory from fighter command.
2. Concentrate on NW Germany for a period of 6-12 months. This way all strikes can be escorted by fighters and the thing turned into a battle that will grind down the LW fast.
3. Conduct long range strikes against selected targets with mixed NF-bomber-rocketeer Mosquito groups at night. Build more Mossies, fewer Lancs.
4. Remove defensive armament from british night bombers OR replace it with 50 cal or 20mm.
5. Target railroad bridges.
6. Target aluminum plants.
7. Target sources of bauxite.
Some points:
1. Fire Leigh-Mallory from fighter command.
2. Concentrate on NW Germany for a period of 6-12 months. This way all strikes can be escorted by fighters and the thing turned into a battle that will grind down the LW fast.
3. Conduct long range strikes against selected targets with mixed NF-bomber-rocketeer Mosquito groups at night. Build more Mossies, fewer Lancs.
4. Remove defensive armament from british night bombers OR replace it with 50 cal or 20mm.
5. Target railroad bridges.
6. Target aluminum plants.
7. Target sources of bauxite.
What was a 'thing' that Germany was lacking the most?
- Thread starter
- #18
Aluminum.
That was the reason they didn't build many large planes, and aircraft in general.
The aluminum could have been knocked out in a relatively short time, fingers crossed, and that would have been that.
Any good source that can confirm that aluminium was a 'thing' that Germany lacked the most?
- Thread starter
- #20
No, because that is not actually a factual proposition.
