Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System

[tyrodtom]

As for the P-47, there were some that served in Korea, but most were kept in Europe due to the fear that the USSR could come pouring across Europe. When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing. I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.

There were no P-47's in Korea, under USA control, the only remote possibility is from RCAF , Taiwan, we gave them about a 100 in the late 40's.
No P-47's in Europe either under USA control, unless you're counting the hundreds we gave or sold to France, Portugal, Turkey.
The only P-47's the USA had was in ANG units in the continental US, during the Korean war era.

If you have any proof otherwise , I think several would like to see it.

 

[swampyankee]

I suspect that McNamara and his "whiz kids" understood the USN (and USAF and USA) designation systems quite well; they may not have understand why the three services needed distinct designation systems, but they understood how the systems work.

The reason, of course, the whiz kids couldn't understand the logic of the need for three distinct systems was because there wasn't any.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing.

For USAF, yes. USN had already launched ITSELF down that primrose path.

I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.

After all the blood, sweat, and tears that went into creating the OV10, the mission it was supposed to fulfill had already grown beyond its capabilities. It was supposed to be the do-it-all machine to defeat the Viet Cong, but by the time it arrived the opponent was the NVA and the scale of weaponry and scope of the mission had escalated. The Bronco wasn't up to protecting Jolly Greens on deep penetration aircrew recoveries and recon insertions along the HCMT or in Laos or The North. The Nav was retiring A1s at the time, trading for A7s, so Mac prodded USAF to once again swallow its pride and adopt another "tailhooker".

 

[XBe02Drvr]

my beliefs are that McNamara is responsible for most of the 58 thousand dead Americans. I guess it's just me.

You're not alone, brother! He wasn't lacking in smarts, just in wisdom and in humility.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The reason, of course, the whiz kids couldn't understand the logic of the need for three distinct systems was because there wasn't any

"Oh, come on! We've always done things our own way; it's just plain logical. We invented it, and we've always done it this way."

 

[Zipper730]

...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.

I'm curious what problems did Taylor and Adams cause? From what I remember, Westmoreland's seemed to be a guy who was unequipped for counter-insurgency operations, and felt as if adopting a "kill 'em all, let God sort it out" mentality was what would work (well, if you kill everybody on the other side -- it sort of does, but there might be some reasons you might not want to do that...).

President Kennedy had begun troop with drawls and wanted less U.S. involvement.

I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back. You are correct though, Johnson generally was whole-heartedly in support of scaling things up.

I'm no fan of McN, but aligning service nomenclature and logistics is logical, insofar as the equipment can get the job done. Using similar equipment reduces training and resupply costs, and using similar terminology reduces misunderstandings.

I can agree with that.

I'm not defending the political aspects of the war, just saying that operationally, simplification is usually a good thing.

Generally, to a degree -- that is correct. It's much easier to do things when you can understand everything.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back.

He may have wanted a larger US presence in 1961, but by 1963 he'd already issued NSAM 263 with the stated goal of winding down our involvement by 1965. LBJ reversed that in one of his worst decisions. Some historians argue that NSAM 263 was not a harbinger of withdrawal, and there's some truth to the idea that 263 was more an attempt to pressure Diem's government into reforms.

I still believe that under its original conditions (both Kennedy and Diem alive) it would have resulted in our early withdrawal. Once both leaders were killed, I think, 263 was doomed to be dead letter no matter what.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

He may have wanted a larger US presence in 1961, but by 1963 he'd already issued NSAM 263 with the stated goal of winding down our involvement by 1965. LBJ reversed that in one of his worst decisions.

I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.

I still believe that under its original conditions (both Kennedy and Diem alive) it would have resulted in our early withdrawal. Once both leaders were killed, I think, 263 was doomed to be dead letter no matter

I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.
I was still in high school when the first conventional troops went ashore after the Tonkin Gulf charade, and my sense of optimism about the Vietnam situation vanished.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.

Much agreed. I also wonder how much information Kennedy shared with Johnson, given their distaste for and distrust of each other.

I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully be saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government.

Indeed, and this is why I believe there's some truth in the assertion that NSAM 263 was intended to pressure Diem. Not just Kennedy, but our intelligence community as well understood that Diem was an obstacle to peace, given the corruption and brutality of his regime.

If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.

Not to mention that Johnson of course had his focus on his domestic agenda, and never gave the problems in SE Asia the thought they demanded if we were to remain.

I was still in high school when the first conventional troops went ashore after the Tonkin Gulf charade, and my sense of optimism about the Vietnam situation vanished.

It blew up before I was born. I've always been a student of history, so I've done some reading on it.

 

[Zipper730]

I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.

Did LBJ realize the benefits of special forces? I remember a guy handling diplomatic affairs in Thailand(?) was basically overseeing most matters, and wouldn't allow proper training for jungle-warfare teams.

Honestly, I remember there were three basic proposals for dealing with Vietnam, of which one was Rolling Thunder, and the other two I forgot. I remember reading "Going Downtown", and Broughton was pretty straight forward in saying that the second battle in the Gulf of Tonkin was basically bullshit and understood to be so shortly after the event occurred, but Johnson saw it as an opportunity.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Honestly, I remember there were three basic proposals for dealing with Vietnam, of which one was Rolling Thunder, and the other two I forgot.

Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.

 

[Zipper730]

Much agreed. I also wonder how much information Kennedy shared with Johnson, given their distaste for and distrust of each other.

That's a good point...

Johnson of course had his focus on his domestic agenda, and never gave the problems in SE Asia the thought they demanded if we were to remain.

The Civil Rights & Great Society stuff? You'd think he'd be able to delegate, but he micromanaged things like you wouldn't believe. Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.

It seemed there were people involved in the diplomacy issue (UK & US, which appeared to have talked now and then) about the effects of military operations in Vietnam on the morale of the population.

Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.

Well, those scenarios were mostly regarding aviation operations. There's probably more, of course. I just forgot what the (at least two) were.

I think one was an all-out bombing campaign.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.

Absolutely. That's also basis for the ridiculous restrictions placed upon air ops in the war: Johnson's fear of escalation.

 

[special ed]

In a Kissinger video interview done a few years back, he admitted that attacks on Hanoi targets were given to NVA leaders the day before the attack. The routes were also given. This was a result of the Paris peace talks so "civilian casualties are minimised". In addition, our troops on the ground could not take advantage of an unexpected opportunity in battle. A Captain or above had to radio for permission to attack if such an incident occurred. The signal went to the White House and back in about 20 minutes during which time the opportunity was lost. Johnson is alleged to have bragged. "They can't blow up a shithouse with out me."

 

[tyrodtom]

In a Kissinger video interview done a few years back, he admitted that attacks on Hanoi targets were given to NVA leaders the day before the attack. The routes were also given. This was a result of the Paris peace talks so "civilian casualties are minimised". In addition, our troops on the ground could not take advantage of an unexpected opportunity in battle. A Captain or above had to radio for permission to attack if such an incident occurred. The signal went to the White House and back in about 20 minutes during which time the opportunity was lost. Johnson is alleged to have bragged. "They can't blow up a shithouse with out me."

He may have thought that, but he was full of it.
My experiences is from after Johnson's era, but some of their policies remained.
Ever hear of free fire zones ?
And do you think if someone saw a " target of opportunity " We asked for permission.
Heck, we knew even a one minute delay would mean it would disappear, we weren't idiots.
We took care of whatever it was, then, maybe, asked for permission, if it was required.
Or maybe we didn't say anything.
Very few of us were career military, or had any interest in it. There wasn't satellites looking over our shoulders.
We did the job as we saw it.

I served with many troops who had been there in the late 60's, what we were doing in 70-71 was more or less the what they did in 66-69.
According to them.

There's " policy" and there's the real world.

All this trying to blame McNamara, Johnson, Kissinger, etc. etc. is just trying to shift the blame.
We all made mistakes.

 

[Zipper730]

I don't agree that the distinction between bombers and attack aircraft is semantics. Sure, they're both laying ordnance on the ground, but the missions are very different and usually require different specs and planforms.

Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.

...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.

I don't know much about Taylor and Abrams. What was wrong with them?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.

The difference is in the mission, no matter how agile the aircraft.