Ukrainian purchase options, 2014-2022

[tomo pauk]

2014 - once the undeclared war is cooled down - is the start of this what-if.
Similar as with other threads - what should've the Ukrainians been doing differently to better prepare themselves against the big & powerful country run by an aggressive dictator? Bar the nuclear weapons. Also mind the money available, it is not like they will be able to buy F-15s or Eurofighters by the dozens.

To start out - an even greater emphasis on the redundant, distributed, movable and otherwise better ground-based air defenses.

 

[GTX]

what should've the Ukrainians been doing

Join NATO

 

[z42]

Interesting, but hard question. I'm far from very knowledgeable, just some random thoughts :

Ukraine was/is(?) one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in Europe. Would a giant (Loan funded?) procurement program have led to actual improvement in military capability, or would it just have led to a bunch of oligarchs lining their pockets? Seems only the 2022 full scale invasion was able to cause an upheaval in how these things are done?

Considering the huge difficulties UKR has had in acquiring sufficient numbers of air defense systems, is this an area where developing something indigenous could have provided something a) functional b) affordable c) available in numbers? B) seems particularly important for defending against drones, you don't want to expend your very expensive and very limited Western SAM missiles on some drone puttering along at a few hundred km/h (or slower).

 

[GTX]

Ukraine was/is(?)

Was

 

[tomo pauk]

Join NATO

Kinda kills out the discussion
So I'd add another condition to the non nukes: no NATO Ukraine.

Considering the huge difficulties UKR has had in acquiring sufficient numbers of air defense systems, is this an area where developing something indigenous could have provided something a) functional b) affordable c) available in numbers? B) seems particularly important for defending against drones, you don't want to expend your very expensive and very limited Western SAM missiles on some drone puttering along at a few hundred km/h (or slower).

IMO, while they would've been better off with the most modern systems that are available in good numbers, there is still a lot of mileage to be gained from the legacy systems. Eg. they can try to purchase the Gerpards, that NATO countries feel like they are not the ticket. With some negotiations, the Gepards will not cost an arm and leg, and might possibly be paid on yearly basis, rather than at once.
Stick the pairs of Iglas and the like on the Gepards for extra points.

Ukrainians can expect to fight very much out-numbered in the skies, so make an effort to turn the AAMs into SAMs. They know that unmanned aircraft and helicopters are a thing by decades now, so give some thought in outfitting the light aircraft with Iglas, AA-8s or even AA-11s; keep these aircraft at low altitudes and not close to the borders so they are less likely to be picked out by Russian radars.
See how to get more of the AA-10s and AA-11s from the former users.
Also see in the West about the Roland and Crotale systems.

The heavy SAMs that have radar receivers need to be modified into the ground-launched anti-radiation missiles - the SA-5 will probably have the range of close to 350 km against a surface target, both on land and on a ship.

 

[GrauGeist]

One of the reasins why Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, is because they got rid of their Kremlin puppet president and started pushing to eliminate Russian backed corruption.

They did invite NATO backed military advisors and started training alongside western troops, which is one reason why they have been so effective in countering the Russians.

What they needed, would have been better air defense, both in hardware and networking as well as pushing through their initial order for F-16s that was being brokered a few years before the invasion (2022).

I would suggest they also invested more in highly mobile armor, like the M2, wich has been proven to be devastating to anything Russia has thrown at them so far.

 

[Dimlee]

Interesting, but hard question. I'm far from very knowledgeable, just some random thoughts :

Ukraine was/is(?) one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in Europe. Would a giant (Loan funded?) procurement program have led to actual improvement in military capability, or would it just have led to a bunch of oligarchs lining their pockets? Seems only the 2022 full scale invasion was able to cause an upheaval in how these things are done?

Considering the huge difficulties UKR has had in acquiring sufficient numbers of air defense systems, is this an area where developing something indigenous could have provided something a) functional b) affordable c) available in numbers? B) seems particularly important for defending against drones, you don't want to expend your very expensive and very limited Western SAM missiles on some drone puttering along at a few hundred km/h (or slower).

About oligarchs.
In this timeline (2014 on), "oligarchs" are irrelevant because they ceased to exist. The only person who could be called an oligarch (with reservations) in 2014-2019 was President Poroshenko due to the combination of power, wealth and media control. However, he was restricted in all those fields: by the parliament, by transferring control over his accounts to third parties and by distancing himself from the media assets he owned. Add to that the strong opposition, split of executive power with the Government (usually not loyal to the President) and vigilant watch of the press and NGOs.
The only other person who fit the definition of oligarch after 2014 was Kolomoyskyi, but only for a very short time—until early 2015, when he lost his state job.

About corruption.
If we narrow the definition of corruption to the definition given by TI:

https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption

Then, yes, corruption is "one of the worst in Europe", and there is a risk that some funds are embezzled. But the higher risk and impact is the lack of expertise and discipline: in management and in the execution, on all levels. It happened actually with several programs, including SPG Bohdana, Neptune missile and others.

 

[Dimlee]

Kinda kills out the discussion
So I'd add another condition to the non nukes: no NATO Ukraine.



IMO, while they would've been better off with the most modern systems that are available in good numbers, there is still a lot of mileage to be gained from the legacy systems. Eg. they can try to purchase the Gerpards, that NATO countries feel like they are not the ticket. With some negotiations, the Gepards will not cost an arm and leg, and might possibly be paid on yearly basis, rather than at once.
Stick the pairs of Iglas and the like on the Gepards for extra points.

Ukrainians can expect to fight very much out-numbered in the skies, so make an effort to turn the AAMs into SAMs. They know that unmanned aircraft and helicopters are a thing by decades now, so give some thought in outfitting the light aircraft with Iglas, AA-8s or even AA-11s; keep these aircraft at low altitudes and not close to the borders so they are less likely to be picked out by Russian radars.
See how to get more of the AA-10s and AA-11s from the former users.
Also see in the West about the Roland and Crotale systems.

The heavy SAMs that have radar receivers need to be modified into the ground-launched anti-radiation missiles - the SA-5 will probably have the range of close to 350 km against a surface target, both on land and on a ship.

Gepard proved to be a great asset, highly praised by the crews. The only "small" problem: Germany was reluctant to provide even helmets in the first days of the invasion. Any lethal German weapon before Feb 2022 was a pipe dream, unfortunately.
Saying that, MoD could search and buy Soviet AAA systems in other countries.
Agree about AAM to SAM transformation.
SA-5, as an anti-radiation weapon, is an interesting idea.

 

[Dimlee]

What they needed, would have been better air defense, both in hardware and networking

Networking, indeed. Not just air defence, but everywhere. Satcom collapsed on the first day of the invasion, and many systems were hacked. Starlink could prevent or mitigate.

 

[tomo pauk]

Gepard proved to be a great asset, highly praised by the crews. The only "small" problem: Germany was reluctant to provide even helmets in the first days of the invasion. Any lethal German weapon before Feb 2022 was a pipe dream, unfortunately.

See whether some Dutch or Belgian Gepards can be acquired.
OTOH, the indigenous 30mm stuff is also worthy of the adoption into the fully-fledged AAA.

Also - see if the MiG-29s and/or Su-25s can be bought from the non-Russian users.

 

[SaparotRob]

See whether some Dutch or Belgian Gepards can be acquired.
OTOH, the indigenous 30mm stuff is also worthy of the adoption into the fully-fledged AAA…..

And grab as much Gepard ammo from the Swiss while you can.

 

[tomo pauk]

And grab as much Gepard ammo from the Swiss while you can.

Seems like the Swiss were also not allowing the ammo produced by them and in the inventories of other countries to be shipped to Ukraine once the fighting started in 2022. So indeed pick up the 35mm ammo from any of the owners willing to part with it.

Swiss can <expletive>.

 

[Shortround6]

There was a towed twin mount 35mm that used the same ammo. The 35mm Oerlikon is used by around 30 countries.
But in may widen the ammo supply sources.

Oerlikon GDF - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Norwegian manufactured ammo was not fully compatible with the Gepard guns but could be modified.
I don't know if there were other suppliers for ammo.
Japan manufactured the guns under license at one point.

I don't know what the ammo compatibility issues may or may not be with the 35/1000 revolver gun.

 

[Dimlee]

See whether some Dutch or Belgian Gepards can be acquired.
OTOH, the indigenous 30mm stuff is also worthy of the adoption into the fully-fledged AAA.

Also - see if the MiG-29s and/or Su-25s can be bought from the non-Russian users.

And Su-24s, the only "heavy bomber" of the PSU.

 

[tomo pauk]

A good anti-aircraft system that is covering large swathes of territory needs also to be capable of tackling the cruise missiles. Again, these are a known quantity already some 30-40 years when we discuss the time frame of this thread. Problem with them is that they fly very low, reasonably fast, and are relatively small.
Advantage that Ukraine has is that terrain is rather flat, so the radars on cranes can cover good the low altitudes. The passive means of observation and tracking must be incorporated, since the radars will be attacked by anti-radiation missiles. Also some back-up radars need to be in the readiness. Having small aircraft with FLIR and similar deices can help, ditto with FLIR and the line on the top of high-rise buildings. I've read the articles by some officer/technician from Serbia that human-operated laser guns can also be incorporated as the means of alerting the upper command (that is post-1999 lessons learned talk).

The possible means of tackling the cruise missiles - even the MANPADS can be used. Obviously, a good deal of warning must be offered, since the engagement time is merely in seconds for a MANPAD in normal operation against the cruise missiles. Installing these rockets on light aircraft, from turboprops to the jet-powered trainers allows for the increased engagement time, and the rocket can already start with some airspeed.
Obviously, having the more serious missiles is a boon. Also light helicopters can be used, and so can the Su-25s.
The MAPAD set on an UCAV is probably easy to do with enough of incentive.

 

[SaparotRob]

A satellite link other than Starlink?

 

[Admiral Beez]

2014 onwards...

Purge the military of any Russophiles. In Feb 2022 the Russians were able to rush into Kherson and elsewhere because nominally-Ukrainian officers and troops switched sides, refused to destroy roads, bridges, etc.

Conversely, reach out to Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the Donbas to break Russia's hold on them. Invite the US (or even China) to partner on minerals to drive economic improvement in the Donbas area. Most of Ukraine, see below was free of Russian control.

In hindsight, I'd like to have seen President Obama act on Ukraine in support of Euromaidan BEFORE Russia invades Crimea. It's all well and good to complain and threaten afterward, but imagine Putin's frustration if in late Feb 2014, in support of interim president Oleksandr Turchynov (following the impeachment of Viktor Yanukovych), President Obama, along with EU President Barroso, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, UK PM Cameron and German Chancellor Merkel fly to meet Turchynov, not in Kyiv, but in Sevastopol.

 

[Dimlee]

A satellite link other than Starlink?

In 2025:

These are the six European alternatives to Elon Musk's Starlink

There are concerns about whether Europe can continue to rely on Starlink. These are the European alternatives.

ioplus.nl

10 Starlink Competitors & Alternatives: Full Guide (2025)

Uncover top Starlink competitors providing robust satellite internet services with unique features and competitive pricing.

thenetworkinstallers.com

Fewer options in 2021-2022, of course.
Viasat failed at the start of the invasion in 2022.

 

[Dimlee]

2014 onwards...

Purge the military of any Russophiles. In Feb 2022 the Russians were able to rush into Kherson and elsewhere because nominally-Ukrainian officers and troops switched sides, refused to destroy roads, bridges, etc.

Conversely, reach out to Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the Donbas to break Russia's hold on them. Invite the US (or even China) to partner on minerals to drive economic improvement in the Donbas area. Most of Ukraine, see below was free of Russian control.

Purging was done. The enemy didn't sit on its hands and continued to recruit.

Rush to Kherson - there were many factors, and there are various versions today. Historians will be able to study the documents after the war. Three important factors are often overlooked, even by the experts:
1. Landscape. It's difficult to build a defence in the plain when your enemy has superiority in strike capabilities.
2. Air dominance of VKS (Russia) and very short flight time from airbases in Crimea.
3. No forces in Ukraine to defend all areas. The frontline was just too long. Several brigades were moved from the South to the Kyiv region.
Yes, according to open sources, there were issues with bridges, and at least two high-ranking SBU (secret service) officers were charged with treason related to the failures in the south. But no, there were no troops "switching sides" or refusal to follow orders, to such an extent that it could influence the defence operations.

Reaching out to occupied territories... it was tried for many years. It was hard to compete with the huge propaganda machine of the Kremlin.

US (or other foreign) business as the economic shield.
Yes, it's a nice idea - in theory. In this reality, the assets of Cargill, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus and Chinese COFCO and others were destroyed by Russian missiles, foreign retailers' properties were ransacked and "nationalised" since 2014, foreign vessels were under fire in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, etc.

 

[Dimlee]

In hindsight, I'd like to have seen President Obama act on Ukraine in support of Euromaidan BEFORE Russia invades Crimea. It's all well and good to complain and threaten afterward, but imagine Putin's frustration if in late Feb 2014, in support of interim president Oleksandr Turchynov (following the impeachment of Viktor Yanukovych), President Obama, along with EU President Barroso, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, UK PM Cameron and German Chancellor Merkel fly to meet Turchynov, not in Kyiv, but in Sevastopol.

I'd like to have seen it as well...
And to have seen Allied forces in Poland in August 1939.
And Allied Expeditionary Corps in Crimea in November 1920 (preventing the Red Army assault and further massacre of nearly 100,000 on the peninsula)...
US and British Navies in Shanghai in 1937?