Hi Milosh,
Here's what I have for the USAAF in the ETO. Sorties are bombing sorties, not ALL sorties. Loss rate would be lower for ALL sorties.
1) B-17 – 291508 sorties – 4688 lost equals a combined 1.61% loss rate. 2.0 long tons per sortie. (571461 long tons)
2) B-24 – 226775 sorties – 3626 lost equals a combined 1.60% loss rate. 1.8 long tons per sortie. (404025 long tons)
3) B-25 – 61177 sorties – 380 lost equals a combined 0.60 loss rate. 1.2 long tons per sortie. (75875 long tons)
4) B-26 – 129943 sorties – 911 lost equals a combined 0.70% loss rate. 1.2 long tons per sortie. (151234 long tons)
5) A-20 – 39492 sorties – 265 lost equals a combined 0.67% loss rate. 0.7 long tons per sortie. (28443 long tons)
6) A-26 - 11567 sorties – 67 lost equals a combined 0.58% loss rate. 1.4 long tons per sortie. (16120 long tons)
Data from DerAdlers post above.
From RAF Bomber Command we have the data below. Sorties are ALL sorties, not just bombing sorties.
1) Lancaster – 148403 sorties – 3832 lost equals a combined 2.45% loss rate. 4.1 long tons per sortie. (608612 long tons)
2) Halifax – 82773 sorties – 2232 lost equals a combined 2.70% loss rate. 3.1 long tons per sortie. (224207 long tons)
3) Wellington – 47409 sorties – 1709 lost equals a combined 3.60% loss rate. 1.1 long tons per sortie. (41823 long tons)
4) Stirling – 18440 sorties – 769 lost equals a combined 4.17% loss rate. 2.5 long tons per sortie. (27821 long tons)
5) Mosquito – 39795 sorties – 396 lost equals a combined 1.00% loss rate. 0.9 long tons per sortie. (26867 long tons)
6) Whitley – 9858 sorties – 431 lost equals a combined 4.37% loss rate. 1.1 long tons per sortie. (9845 long tons)
7) Hampden – 16541 sorties – 607 lost equals a combined 3.67% loss rate. 0.7 long tons per sortie. (9115 long tons)
8) Blenheim – 12214 sorties – 534 lost equals a combined 4.37% loss rate. 0.3 long tons per sortie. (3028 long tons)
9) Manchester – 1269 sorties – 76 lost equals a combined 5.99% loss rate. 2.1 long tons per sortie. (1826 long tons)
Data from Osprey Combat Aircraft (31) Lancaster Squadrons by Jon Lake © 2002
The math seems pretty simple to me. The highest US loss rate was 1.61%. The only British aircraft with a lower loss rate was the Mosquito. When I cited a 15% lopwer loss rate, I was citing loss rate on bombing missions, which is 1.38% If you include all missions (photo, fighter, etc) … THEN you get to 1.00%.
If I posted loss rate for bombing missions only (I have the data), they average 0.42% higher all around.
In general the British Lancaster carried more bombs. No news there, we all know it. The USA dropped more tonnage but took more sorties per ton to do it.
There is no "winner" here or "loser." It is just combat statistics. That's why I responded when Lancaster said he noticed how much better the Lancaster did than the B-17. Better at WHAT?
It flew fewer sorties and had a higher loss rate. Doesn't make it better or worse. It means that the threat when the Lancasters flew was, on average, about 0.85% higher for Lancasters than it was for B-17's.
That is hardly a standout statistic to make a case for better or worse.
So I posted to say that I didn't notice the Lancaster as being any better or worse, except at payload, which we can easily see even in Wikipedia numbers for the aircraft specs. When it came to COMBAT, you were statistically about in the same ballpark for probability of survival in a Lancaster or a B-17, and the war would not have gone as it did if either of the top two British or US bombers had not been there and doing good work.
On the other hand, if we didn't deploy the bottom two bombers (for tonnage dropped), would we have noticed? You would if you had been a crew member since the bottom two US bombers had a much smaller loss rate than the bottom two British bombers.
I attribute that to the fact that the bottom two British bombers for tonnage were the Manchester and the Blenheim, which operated in a much more hostile early war sky while the bottom two US bombers for tonnage, the A-20 and A-26, operated later in the war when air superiority was, if not a fact, well on its way to becoming so. The A-26 in particular, operated late in the war when we were sending over 1,000-plane raids while the A-26's were being a nuisance. The Germans, rightly so, were MUCH more concerned about a large number of bombers going for a single target than a small number of attack planes going for myriad smaller-priority targets.