Was Port Moresby the first rea defeat of the IJN in the air? (1 Viewer)

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Conslaw

Senior Airman
627
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Jan 22, 2009
Indianapolis, Indiana USA
Japan conducted over 100 raids on Port Moresby starting February 1942. In the course of those raids, several IJN aces ran up huge scores, and the conventional wisdom is A6M Zeroes made mincemeat out of allied fighters. The score between the fighters is debatable, but the undeniable fact is the Allies were not driven out of Port Moresby. The strategic objective was not achieved. Are there any statistics that support an argument that despite the end result, the attrition of allied air forces in and around Port Moresby was worth the resources expended by Japan in the effort?
 
Hard to say. Statistically, what do you hope to prove?
The Japanese game plan from the beginning was to shock the western powers with a series of rapid victories, then fight a defensive war until the western powers lost heart. Key to this plan was to overwhelm the scattered garrisons before any meaningful defense could coalesce. In this they failed. They did not have the resources necessary to complete their conquests fast enough. Nor did they have adequate resources to defend their conquests. In the Southern Area, they had only one fighter unit, and one bomber unit until July, 1942. Australian forces exceeded this by April, and US reinforcements meant a steady buildup of strength. While the Japanese had air superiority in the first few months of 1942, by the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, Allied airpower vastly outnumbered the Japanese. And there was nothing they could do to change that.
 
The battle of the Coral Sea is big factor in this question. The bombing of Moresby was ongoing to soften the defences and reduce Allied aircraft
numbers. As Greg noted this failed as the build up of Allied forces was unstoppable.

Coral Sea in May was a strategic loss for japan because the plan was to secure Port Moresby by the 10th May but the invasion force was made to
turn back with the Japanese losing a lot of aircraft in the process plus pilots - allied replacements were coming at a growing rate, Japanese were not.

All the raids on Moresby were negated by this setback for Japan as they then had to resort to the long overland route.
 
I'm basically just trying to kickstart a conversation in a forum that has been too quiet lately. Specifically, I am curious whether there is any positive spin the IJN can take out of the early phase of the New Guinea air campaign, because the war at sea and the land ware became a disaster, and in 1943, the Japanese Army's air units were devastated.
 
It's a hard question to answer. I see no upside. They captured Rabaul without a fight, but the Australians and USN made them pay for every inch of ground thereafter. The 4th AG was nearly wiped out attacking Lexington in February. The landings at Lea and Salamaua should have been unopposed, but here again, USN airpower turned up to spoil the party. This delayed things long enough that Port Moresby was reinforced and the invasion fleet was turned back at Coral Sea. Japanese airpower failed to neutralize Port Moresby, failed to support the landing at Milne Bay, and failed to prevent the US landings at Guadalcanal.
 
It's a hard question to answer. I see no upside. They captured Rabaul without a fight, but the Australians and USN made them pay for every inch of ground thereafter. The 4th AG was nearly wiped out attacking Lexington in February. The landings at Lea and Salamaua should have been unopposed, but here again, USN airpower turned up to spoil the party. This delayed things long enough that Port Moresby was reinforced and the invasion fleet was turned back at Coral Sea. Japanese airpower failed to neutralize Port Moresby, failed to support the landing at Milne Bay, and failed to prevent the US landings at Guadalcanal.
 
It's a hard question to answer. I see no upside. They captured Rabaul without a fight, but the Australians and USN made them pay for every inch of ground thereafter. The 4th AG was nearly wiped out attacking Lexington in February. The landings at Lea and Salamaua should have been unopposed, but here again, USN airpower turned up to spoil the party. This delayed things long enough that Port Moresby was reinforced and the invasion fleet was turned back at Coral Sea. Japanese airpower failed to neutralize Port Moresby, failed to support the landing at Milne Bay, and failed to prevent the US landings at Guadalcanal.
Reinforcement of Port Moresby had occurred in Jan 1942 when 30th Australian Infantry Brigade and supporting arms arrived. The next Australian Brigade arrived in July.

There is a summary of the Port Moresby defences on this thread:-

And also here, including extracts from a pre-war Japanese study of the defences.

And more here from the Australian RAAF Official History

The first includes some detail on how the Lexington & Yorktown strike on Lae/Salamaua was made to work
 
It's interesting to compare losses (to me anyway). According to South Pacific Air War Vol. 2, the Japanese lost 35 aircraft in the March-April 42 timeframe. These are confirmed losses, including aircraft shot down by AA, destroyed on the ground, etc. For the Allies in the same time period, they lost 50 aircraft. As for fighters, the Japanese lost 26 Zeros (14 destroyed on the ground) for 19 P-40s, the vast majority being RAAF.
 
They appear to be total as there are a handful of non-operational losses listed such as the 3 B-25s that ditched off the Papuan coast after becoming lost on a flight from Charters Towers to Port Morseby (pg 181). Japanese losses all appear to be combat related though..
 
It's interesting to compare losses (to me anyway). According to South Pacific Air War Vol. 2, the Japanese lost 35 aircraft in the March-April 42 timeframe. These are confirmed losses, including aircraft shot down by AA, destroyed on the ground, etc. For the Allies in the same time period, they lost 50 aircraft. As for fighters, the Japanese lost 26 Zeros (14 destroyed on the ground) for 19 P-40s, the vast majority being RAAF.

This series of books is really key to understanding the importance of these battles. I wish they weren't so expensive but they are very useful.

My impression so far is that if you include the next several months, through to the Battle of Milne bay and other engagements, then Port Morseby / New Guinea in 1942 was a defeat for the Japanese. In February, the Allies were very much holding on by the skin of their teeth. The heroism of those fighter pilots and the ground forces are almost unbelievable, and the conditions they had to survive in were equivalent to desperate refugees. It's amazing some of these guys could even walk, let alone fly high performance planes in combat. They also got to the battle area with almost no training on type - the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area. But they held on... just.
 
the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area.

Always best to ask questions about this sort of claim, for example would the USAAF have let the RAAF keep any scarce and precious P-40 with that sort of attrition rate? Two thirds of what total? Which Battle Area? Port Moresby New Guinea (first attacked 3 February 1942), Darwin Northern Territory (first attacked 19 February 1942), Broome Western Australia (3 March), Horn island Queensland (14 March), Derby Western Australia (20 March), Katherine Northern Territory (22 March), Wyndham Western Australia (23 March). Why would the RAAF form its new fighter squadrons a continent away from the combat zone?

Early P-40 arrivals in Australia, the initial P-40E for the USAAF and P-40E-1 the RAAF (and 18 P-40E-1 officially for the Dutch/Netherlands East Indies) were treated as a common pool, with aircraft assigned to the RAAF and USAAF regardless of who they officially arrived for. The RAAF reports USAAF units erected 39 of its order aircraft while by early September 1942 RAAF units had erected and flight tested 268 P-40 for the USAAF. The RAAF initially "borrowed" 75 USAAF aircraft to be "repaid" from the order of 173 allocated to it, the allocation was cut to 143, but 14 were lost at sea, so 129 were delivered, of these 63 were permanently transferred to the USAAF. (there were various effectively temporary transfers both ways, sometimes more than once, some possibly only paper entries). In the period weeks ending 6 March to 2 April 1942 the USAAF handed over 75 P-40E to the RAAF, plus 4 attrition replacements, while 10 of the RAAF order P-40E-1 had arrived, by end April RAAF order arrivals were 50 but at least 20 had been transferred to the USAAF. When the paperwork was sorted out as of September 1942 the RAAF had received 162 P-40, including 33 officially from the US forces in Australia (162-129 = 33), part "repayment" was made in August 1944, with 20 P-40N transferred from the RAAF to the USAAF. The aircraft intended to become A29-145 crashed on its delivery flight from the USAAF, hence why the initial batch of RAAF P-40 serials are A29-1 to A29-163.

The first cumulative RAAF P-40 loss figure in the reports is 10 by week ending 16 April 1942 (plus 1 awaiting formal write off), it was 20 by week ending 30 April (plus 6 awaiting formal write off). Just before the RAAF received its next shipment of P-40 in the second half of January 1943 it had lost 59 (plus 1 awaiting formal write off) of the original 162 received.

Early RAAF P-40 Kittyhawk squadrons,

75 squadron formed Townsville Queensland 4 March 1942, to Port Moresby New Guinea 21 March 1942 (Air Force Confidential Order A.36/44 "End date for in Australia for tax purposes 1 July 1941 to 1 June 1944", war does bring a lot of death and taxes) back to Townsville on 11 May, with 22 May declared "Begin date for in Australia for tax purposes 1 July 1941 to 1 June 1944", various bases in Queensland, back to New Guinea 25 July, to Horn Island Queensland 25 September. Partly as the RAAF still had the red circle as part of its markings 75 Squadron were initially shot at by the ground defences at Port Moresby, causing one to be written off and 2 damaged. This was the only aircraft lost during the three day transfer in March, one had turned back with fuel problems.

76 squadron formed Archerfield Queensland 14 March 1942, to Townsville 16 April, to New Guinea 18 July, to Northern Territory Australia 30 September.

77 Squadron formed Pearce Western Australia 16 March 1942, from the shipment of 19 P-40 that had arrived there. Stayed in the area until moved to Batchelor Northern Territory in August 1942.

Townsville to Port Moresby distance around 680 miles. Brisbane Queensland to Port Moresby is around 1,300 miles. Hobart Tasmania to Port Moresby is around 2,300 miles. Perth Western Australia to Darwin Northern Territory is around 1,650 miles. Perth to Sydney New South Wales around 2,050 miles. Of the P-40 moved to Port Moresby from Townsville in March 1942, all (eventually) arrived but one was written off due to friendly fire, by mid April 1942 RAAF P-40 losses by all units to all causes were 11, by January 1943 losses were out of 162. Which becomes "the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area".

 
Always best to ask questions about this sort of claim, for example would the USAAF have let the RAAF keep any scarce and precious P-40 with that sort of attrition rate? Two thirds of what total? Which Battle Area? Port Moresby New Guinea (first attacked 3 February 1942), Darwin Northern Territory (first attacked 19 February 1942), Broome Western Australia (3 March), Horn island Queensland (14 March), Derby Western Australia (20 March), Katherine Northern Territory (22 March), Wyndham Western Australia (23 March). Why would the RAAF form its new fighter squadrons a continent away from the combat zone?

Early P-40 arrivals in Australia, the initial P-40E for the USAAF and P-40E-1 the RAAF (and 18 P-40E-1 officially for the Dutch/Netherlands East Indies) were treated as a common pool, with aircraft assigned to the RAAF and USAAF regardless of who they officially arrived for. The RAAF reports USAAF units erected 39 of its order aircraft while by early September 1942 RAAF units had erected and flight tested 268 P-40 for the USAAF. The RAAF initially "borrowed" 75 USAAF aircraft to be "repaid" from the order of 173 allocated to it, the allocation was cut to 143, but 14 were lost at sea, so 129 were delivered, of these 63 were permanently transferred to the USAAF. (there were various effectively temporary transfers both ways, sometimes more than once, some possibly only paper entries). In the period weeks ending 6 March to 2 April 1942 the USAAF handed over 75 P-40E to the RAAF, plus 4 attrition replacements, while 10 of the RAAF order P-40E-1 had arrived, by end April RAAF order arrivals were 50 but at least 20 had been transferred to the USAAF. When the paperwork was sorted out as of September 1942 the RAAF had received 162 P-40, including 33 officially from the US forces in Australia (162-129 = 33), part "repayment" was made in August 1944, with 20 P-40N transferred from the RAAF to the USAAF. The aircraft intended to become A29-145 crashed on its delivery flight from the USAAF, hence why the initial batch of RAAF P-40 serials are A29-1 to A29-163.

The first cumulative RAAF P-40 loss figure in the reports is 10 by week ending 16 April 1942 (plus 1 awaiting formal write off), it was 20 by week ending 30 April (plus 6 awaiting formal write off). Just before the RAAF received its next shipment of P-40 in the second half of January 1943 it had lost 59 (plus 1 awaiting formal write off) of the original 162 received.

Early RAAF P-40 Kittyhawk squadrons,

75 squadron formed Townsville Queensland 4 March 1942, to Port Moresby New Guinea 21 March 1942 (Air Force Confidential Order A.36/44 "End date for in Australia for tax purposes 1 July 1941 to 1 June 1944", war does bring a lot of death and taxes) back to Townsville on 11 May, with 22 May declared "Begin date for in Australia for tax purposes 1 July 1941 to 1 June 1944", various bases in Queensland, back to New Guinea 25 July, to Horn Island Queensland 25 September. Partly as the RAAF still had the red circle as part of its markings 75 Squadron were initially shot at by the ground defences at Port Moresby, causing one to be written off and 2 damaged. This was the only aircraft lost during the three day transfer in March, one had turned back with fuel problems.

76 squadron formed Archerfield Queensland 14 March 1942, to Townsville 16 April, to New Guinea 18 July, to Northern Territory Australia 30 September.

77 Squadron formed Pearce Western Australia 16 March 1942, from the shipment of 19 P-40 that had arrived there. Stayed in the area until moved to Batchelor Northern Territory in August 1942.

Townsville to Port Moresby distance around 680 miles. Brisbane Queensland to Port Moresby is around 1,300 miles. Hobart Tasmania to Port Moresby is around 2,300 miles. Perth Western Australia to Darwin Northern Territory is around 1,650 miles. Perth to Sydney New South Wales around 2,050 miles. Of the P-40 moved to Port Moresby from Townsville in March 1942, all (eventually) arrived but one was written off due to friendly fire, by mid April 1942 RAAF P-40 losses by all units to all causes were 11, by January 1943 losses were out of 162. Which becomes "the Aussies lost about 2/3 of their P-40s just flying them across Australia to get to the battle area".


Well, ok that's fair. My comment was in rather broad strokes and not very precise. Checking carefully it looks like around 40% of two sqns lost in accidents in Australia overall, 75 Sqn lost about 1/3 and 77 sqn lost about 1/2 of their planes in accidents in Australia. 76 sqn was taken to Milne Bay by ship and had at least some experienced pilots, so no accidents in Australia.

By 'battle area' I mean northern Australia, coming from where the aircraft were assembled to where they were deployed (Canberra or the vicinity of Sydney for 75 Sqn, or for 77 Sqn apparently via Melbourne) or in accidents where they were prepping for combat in the north. The same exact thing happened to to the US 49th FG. They were assembled near Brisbane IIRC after having been shipped. It took 4 or 5 'hops', and they pranged them in landings and ground looped on takeoff due to the unfamiliar torque.

Many of the damaged aircraft were subsequently repaired in all cases, but it was a bit of a shit show initially. The loss rate of military aircraft in general in this stage of the Pacific war was nothing less than catastrophic, many being sunk on ships like the USS Langley, others bown up at Java before even being put together etc. And landing and takeoff accidents were very common.

My point was not to denigrate the Australian pilots by any stretch - To the contrary, it was to emphasize the difficult field conditions and relative lack of training of the pilots, as well as logistics problems contributing to maintenance issues. All of which they overcame to make a major difference in the war in this region.

According to this source, for 75 Sqn RAAF

13 March 1942 Kittyhawk crashed during landing at Townsville
18 March 1942 Kittyhawk crashed during landing at Townsville
20 March 1942 Kittyhawk in a forced landing at Laverton, Victoria
25 March 1942 Kittyhawk makes a forced landing at Cooktown
16 April 1942 Kittyhawk damaged in a belly landing at Rockhampton (this one seems to be caused by a broken control cable - it was the same plane that had crashed landed 20 March)
27 April 1942 a Kittyhawk flipped over on landing, killing the pilot (just west of Cooktown). An American Airacobra crashed at the same time.
7 May 1942 a Kittyhawk was lost in a takeoff accident.
17 May 1942 Kittyhawk crashed at Rockhampton on (pilot uninjured)

So that's 8 crashes during landing or takeoff in Australia, out of 25 aircraft initially assigned to the unit.

at Port Moresby, 75 Sqn had another 5 aircraft written off in landing accidents, with one pilot killed in one of these. So that brings it up to 13 out of 25 lost in accidents. I think there were more accidents (at Morseby) in which the aircraft were repaired.

For 76 Sqn RAAF - source here

Received aircraft in June 1942 - they were taken to Milne Bay by ship so had few accidents in Australia.

19 July 1942 3 x Kittyhawks damaged in accidents in the Milne Bay area. One Kitty daamaged during takoff, two more Kittyhawks were damaged when one was landing (engine out) and crashed into another.
28 March 1943 1 x Kittyhawk lost when Sqn leader Truscott was killed in an accident when he hit the water (flying near New Guinea)
20 April 1943 two Kittyhawks collided, one pilot killed.

For 77 Sqn RAAF - source here

These 12 are all in the vicinity of Townsville I believe

4 April 1942 Kittyhawk collided with a ground vehicle
16 April 1942 Kittyhawk landing gear collapsed during takeoff when it hit heavy sand
20 April 1942 Kittyhawk A29-60 crashed on landing when landing gear malfunctioned
20 April 1942 Kittyhawk A29-62 crashed on landing
24 April 1942 Kittyhawk burst tire and 'tilted forward' damaging propeller
15 May 1942 Kittyhawk engine failure forced landing damaged pilot burned in fire (survived)
22 May 1942 Kittyhawk struck a tree during landing
5 June 1942 Kittyhawk sank into soft ground bending airscrew and cracking engine
8 July 1942 Kittyhawk damaged in forced landing
10 July 1942 Kittyhawk forced landing after losing power
11 July 1942 Kittyhawk forced landing after engine trouble
15 July Kittyhawk lost when pilot bailed out after being disoriented in a cloud

18 August 1942 Kittyhawk crash landed near Alice Springs
19 August 1942 Kittyhawk crashed at Alice Springs

(19 aircraft remaining with 77 Sqn at this point)

7 Sept 1942 Kittyhawk force landed Melville Island near Darwin after running out of fuel
22 Sept 1942 Kittyhawk crashed on takeoff due to burst tire
1 Oct 1942 Kittyhawk damaged in taxiing accident

So that's 17 crashes in Australia.

There are about ten more incidents in Oct through Dec that but this is beyond the work up phase.
 
The RAAF is a great topic to study because you can largely stay at home, never going near the place, with things like the Chiefs of Staff reports, unit histories (including some of the maintenance units), the individual aircraft cards, the aircraft accident cards, even some of the accident courts of inquiry documents online.

The 75, 76 and 77 Squadron references being used are mostly transcriptions of the unit histories.
Checking carefully it looks like around 40% of two sqns lost in accidents in Australia overall, 75 Sqn lost about 1/3 and 77 sqn lost about 1/2 of their planes in accidents in Australia. 76 sqn was taken to Milne Bay by ship and had at least some experienced pilots, so no accidents in Australia.
In answer to the above 4 statements, No, No, No, No. For example 76 squadron reference, the aircraft flew to New Guinea, but I note the new definition of lost used below.

By 'battle area' I mean northern Australia, coming from where the aircraft were assembled to where they were deployed (Canberra or the vicinity of Sydney for 75 Sqn, or for 77 Sqn apparently via Melbourne)
In answer to the above 2 statements, No, No. 1 AD (Aircraft Depot) was in Melbourne, 2 AD in Sydney 3 AD in Brisbane, the online listings do mention some but not all of the initial AD. A29-1 to 3 were transferred from the USAAF in Sydney. 77 Squadron drew its aircraft directly from the ship that had arrived in Western Australia as 4 AD did not form there until mid May 1942.

75 Squadron, A29-33 the 20 March 1942 incident was under 1 AD, nil damage, so says the accident report. Then comes the 16 April incident which required depot repair.

So that brings it up to 13 out of 25 lost in accidents.
By counting aircraft from other units, by counting aircraft that did not take any damage and those repaired by the unit or depot, as lost you can end up with the above total. Also A29-33 had a further accident, so it alone suffered 300% losses using this new definition of loss. Not long before we get to "lost about 2/3 of their P-40s" using this accounting method.

76 Squadron, accidents from April 1943 are included. After service in New Guinea July to September 1942 it went to the Northern Territory, then to Western Australia in February 1943.

77 Squadron, please obtain a good map or at least look up the locations. The reported July incidents can only be considered in the vicinity of Townsville if Los Angeles is in the vicinity of New York. Dublin near Rostov on Don. Todd River regatta regardless, Alice Springs is shorthand for centre of Australia, Townsville is a port and one of the main gateways to the Great Barrier Reef.

There are about ten more incidents in Oct through Dec that but this is beyond the work up phase.
Nonsense, you have incidents from April 1943 for 76 squadron, a whole 14 month RAAF P-40 work up period. So we have March 1942 to April 1943 to find any and all reported incidents with P-40 having to make anything from unscheduled landings to crashing, even if no damage was taken every incident is classified as a loss. Given as of January 1943 the RAAF does note the total loss of 60 out of the initial 162, the new accounting measure should have no problems in finding well above 2/3 P-40 losses by April 1943, in fact the total could be more like A29-33 alone, 300% losses. The RAAF, able to take losses that would cripple any other air force and keep fighting, no wonder the USAAF let them keep the P-40s (or they could not get them back as they had all been lost).

If you want to claim the RAAF P-40 force suffered plenty of accidents/incidents/loss in its first 10 or so months of use no one will dispute that. Including incidents where NO damage is taken and also counting repaired aircraft as losses is wrong, skimming a few web pages is misleading. The longer the time limit used the higher the figure will become, and we have gone from movement to the battle area to any incident listed over a 14 month period. And think of all the non reported incidents there must be.

USAAF WWII Losses are roughly a third in the US, a third overseas to accidents and war weary and a third to enemy action. 1930's aircraft were largely designed to handle sub arctic to temperate climates, tropics tended to be listed under do not enter or do no linger, same for electronics. A similar limit was placed on the people involved, more so in Malaria areas. Stories of pilots having chronic dysentery/diarrhoea doing battle climbs into the much reduced atmospheric pressure needing to empty their boots upon return. Things like steel planking to make airfields were on the wish list in 1942, tropical airfields tended to be mud baths. The allied air force overall accident rates peaking in 1941/42. Improved quality of weather forecasts during the war. Including tracking lightning associated with weather fronts. More and better navigation aids, emergency landing areas. Better training all round, better facilities and so on made a difference as the war went on.
 
I'll reiterate a couple of things I already said, though I know from previous experience that it won't help:

1) I noted already that many of these aircraft were repairable. "Lost" is a vague term, I probably should have said 'crashed'. I never said they were permanently destroyed.
2) I never once suggested that crashing these planes was unique to the Australians. To the contrary. I have already pointed out that the US 49th FG had exactly the same problem (in fact, I think they crashed more of them, but I haven't tracked down my source for the 49th yet)
3) My point was that the Aussies, just like the Americans, had to go into combat without any time to train on type. Applicable both to pilots and ground crew.
4) And yes this continued with later squadrons. It wasn't just a matter of "Australia" learning the P-40, it was applicable to each unit.
 
I have heard the stories about blousing the boots so that the dysentary doesn't cause a mess in the cockpit and so on. I remember one guy talking about how it felt when you had severe stomach ailment which would have landed you in the hospital in civilian life, going from 20,000 feet to sea level in a matter of seconds The toughness of these guys is incredible.
 

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