Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

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Okay…
The B-29 was used extremely little in its intended role as a high altitude bomber. In the Pacific it was used mostly at low altitudes.
Please define extremely little and high altitude. It was not used mostly at low altitude. High altitude in WWII was above 20,000 feet, few combat sorties were done above 30,000 feet, usually by pressure cabin aircraft like Mosquitoes.
The one main success of the B-29 in any role unique to it was only accomplished through the Modified Silverplate B-29s.
So as lots of bombers dropped bombs and laid mines only the A-bomb missions count when evaluating the B-29. The sea mining operations were rated as highly effective. The USSBS credited mines with sinking 210 merchant ships of 387,412 GRT, of which 185 ships of 332,820 GRT were in 1945, making 22% of Japanese shipping losses in 1945. (For the war mines accounted for 4.9% of tonnage losses and were dropped by other aircraft types, not just the B-29)
really the B-29 wasn't extremely successful. It only stayed in service in the B-50 because of USAF's Top brass's dogmatic refusal to use the B47 or B36.
No, try when the types were built and in what numbers.
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a success of the Manhattan Project, not the ridiculously expensive and poorly utilized B-29.
How cheap does it have to be to lose ridiculous and what was the correct utilisation?
wouldn't it make sense to test how air works at high atlitudes before designing something for that air?
Like building aircraft that can operate there for the extended times needed to map the wind systems? How much testing is required? What non aircraft methods should have been used?
I know Wikipedia isn't the best source, but it says, « The $3 billion cost of design and production (equivalent to $49 billion in 2022), far exceeding the $1.9 billion cost of the Manhattan Project, made the B-29 program the most expensive of the war.«
As noted the B-29 came in a close third in USAAF aircraft production costs, without counting the costs of modification centre work. $4,142,593,300 paid for 17,104 USAAF B-24, then add the costs of 166 LB-30, 932 PB4Y-1, 740 PB4Y-2 and 291 C-87. There is a slight over count somewhere, these figures add up to 19,233 airframes, actual production was 11 less, the non B-24 airframes add around another $500,000,000 to the B-24 project.
No, it did NOT fill the role of a high altitude bomber. It wasn't used at high altitude. And it was supposed to be practically invulnerable,
All the above statements are incorrect.
There was something better right away. And I was talking about world War 2 for reference. The B36 could fly higher and much farther, but it was SAC. And just because something is still used doesn't mean there isn't better.
There were no B-36 available until 1946 and while continuing war would speed production up, it would be available in tens, not the thousands of B-29, see the production time lines, the second production B-32 was in May 1948. Comparing their 1944 prices the "ridiculously expensive" B-29 was around a quarter to a fifth the cost of the B-36. And if the B-29 was so bad as a high altitude bomber the B-36 was designed to fly and bomb from even higher altitudes. The conclusion put forward is high altitude bombing did not work, enter B-29 with failure tags displayed, then enter the solution of a bomber that was going to fly even higher using the same bomb dropping technology.

High altitude precision bombing was possible within the range of the accurate ground bases aids, basically Oboe, the higher you flew the greater distance you could pick up the signals. Oboe Mosquitoes marked targets for the lower flying bombers, B-29 could have done the same in USAAF pathfinder units. It also helps to drop heavier bombs. "USAAF circular error by bomb weight, altitude not given, 100 pounds 2694 feet, 250 pounds 2078 feet, 500 pounds 1673 feet, 1000 pounds 1308 feet, 2000 pounds 571 feet."
Precision strategic bombing in itself was a failure during the war (especially the unescorted bombing the US was so fond of).
How much unescorted bombing is needed for the definition "so fond of"? Look at the total war effort and even the 8th Air Force bombers were escorted for about 97% of effective sorties. The B-29 had escorts available for around 25% of effective sorties assuming Japan was always the target.

Given the oil and transport campaigns in Europe are rated as failures, as part of the attacks on rail systems the heavy bombers went for things like marshalling yards, the medium and light bombers for tunnels/bridges and the fighter bombers for tracks and the rolling stock (with plenty of overlap between the different bomber types) do the non heavy bomber attacks get called tactical and so can be considered a success, or are they strategic? Fw190 fighter bombers were used in strategic raids on London for example.

All air forces were willing to run unescorted bomber raids if they though the defences were weak enough, the USAAF in the Mediterranean soon gave up on the idea for day to day operations, the USAAF in Britain was giving up on the idea in mid 1943, the USAAF fighting Japan was doing them in 1945 with B-24 etc. given the usual weak state of Japanese defences in the Pacific, same for the allied air forces operating out of India.
Its range was longer than any fighter of the time, if the purpose was to take advantage of that range, then no fighters could have escorted it the whole way.
Someone will no doubt post the B-29 range bomb load chart, how far it could go with a full bomb load. Next are the penalties for speed, altitude and tight formations, which reduced the early B-17F combat radius in Europe to 320 miles (range 640 miles) with 6,000 pounds of bombs, the official performance figures say 1,730 miles with that load. Going the other way the September 1944 B-24 raid on Balikpapan assumed no resistance except near and over the target, weak fighter defences, the final navigation check was an airfield, 2,500 mile round trip, mostly economic cruise, medium altitude, with formation flying only over and near the target.

The engineering tends to allow carrying more fuel per engine as you add engines, increasing the range, therefore most twin engined or larger combat types had greater ranges than the single engine types, the B-25 and B-26 out ranged the USAAF fighters at the time of their design, even single engine bombers tended to have more fuel capacity than fighters, the Ju87D out ranged the Bf109.
This is just supposed to be a place to exchange ideas, so if you think I'm wrong, tell me.
You are wrong in many areas and contradicting yourself.
 
Someone will no doubt post the B-29 range bomb load chart, how far it could go with a full bomb load. Next are the penalties for speed, altitude and tight formations, which reduced the early B-17F combat radius in Europe to 320 miles (range 640 miles) with 6,000 pounds of bombs, the official performance figures say 1,730 miles with that load.

The tactical mission reports of the 20th Bomber Command (which can be found at Japan Air Raids.org) contain such data as nautical miles fllown, hours aloft, fuel consumed to and from the target, fuel remaining after landing, gross take off weight, and bomb load, providing real world operational figures.
 

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