Admiral Beez
Major
The Seafire gets criticized its narrow track undercarriage, but is this fair? The Grumman Wildcat's similarly narrow.
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The Seafire gets criticized its narrow track undercarriage, but is this fair? The Grumman Wildcat's similarly narrow.
Good points. To be fair though, Not all Seafire landings are prangsNo, the Seafires problem was the arrester gear caused the nose to pitch violently down when it caught the wire causing the struts to fully compress and throw it back into the air before the wire then slammed it back onto the deck breaking the landing gear, look at the photo's of Seafire crashes and notice the nose is berried into the deck on most of them seafire carrier landing - Google Search
The track was never the issue. The fundamental problem was that the original Spitfire undercarriage was designed for grass airfield landings in which cross winds would rarely be an issue, there would be a low vertical velocity at touch down with 'wheeler' landings allowing a decent forward view over the nose. The Spitfire was designed to land at a maximum vertical velocity of just seven feet per second, anything ore than that and the undercarriage would break. Carrier aircraft were usually designed for almost double this figure, the Corsair undercarriage was designed to handle a vertical rate of descent of twelve feet per second, but was obviously much heavier. In the case of the Spitfire, why would Mitchell design a heavy, robust undercarriage that was used for a few seconds of each flight and was useless baggage the rest of the time?
Landing on a carrier almost none of the above applied. The aircraft was simply not designed for carrier operation. There were many issues as a result, but the question pertains to the undercarriage. Making a 'wheeler' landing on a grass aerodrome at speeds well above the stall allowed a good view forward, good directional control after landing and placed the landing loads vertically up the undercarriage legs, where Mitchell intended them to be. It worked well for RAF pilots.
In the case of stalled three point landings*, which is essentially what a carrier landing was, there is a bending component to the loads. This tended to wrench the attachment points free from the spar and collapse the undercarriage. Deck landings were always made in a three point posture at which attitude the wing was at stalling incidence, about 15 degrees. There's not much to be done about that, it is a function of the design of the aircraft, but it had nothing to do with the undercarriage track.
The Seafire suffered an appalling accident rate but what is truly remarkable is that some pilots managed to land them on carriers in a fashion that allowed them to be flown again.
*The Seafire landed at a mere 1.05 Vse, just three knots above the engine on stall speed, a much smaller margin than that for aircraft designed for carrier operations which typically landed at something like 1.25 Vse. Such a small margin was extremely difficult to maintain, as Eric Brown noted. It was much easier to accelerate a Seafire than to decelerate, giving a rather lopsided speed control, which meant that the entire final approach had to be flown just a few knots above the stalling speed. To make it even harder the ASI represented 10 knots with about 1/8" of needle travel!
Land any faster and the Seafire would not hit the deck in a three point attitude at the required three and a half degree descent angle. When the main wheels were first to hit the deck they would push the nose up (because they are forward of the CoG) while the tail was still descending. This obviously increased the incidence of the wing, and lift, and the aircraft would bounce back into the air and float in ground effect into the barrier two or three seconds later. This is what Fleet Air Arm pilots referred to as 'Float, float, prang'.
Was any of this fixed in the later versions? The Seafire was sent to Korea. Could the improvements of the later versions have been realistically incorporated into those of 1942-45?The track was never the issue. The fundamental problem was that the original Spitfire undercarriage was designed for grass airfield landings in which cross winds would rarely be an issue, there would be a low vertical velocity at touch down with 'wheeler' landings allowing a decent forward view over the nose. The Spitfire was designed to land at a maximum vertical velocity of just seven feet per second, anything ore than that and the undercarriage would break. Carrier aircraft were usually designed for almost double this figure, the Corsair undercarriage was designed to handle a vertical rate of descent of twelve feet per second, but was obviously much heavier. In the case of the Spitfire, why would Mitchell design a heavy, robust undercarriage that was used for a few seconds of each flight and was useless baggage the rest of the time?
Landing on a carrier almost none of the above applied. The aircraft was simply not designed for carrier operation. There were many issues as a result, but the question pertains to the undercarriage. Making a 'wheeler' landing on a grass aerodrome at speeds well above the stall allowed a good view forward, good directional control after landing and placed the landing loads vertically up the undercarriage legs, where Mitchell intended them to be. It worked well for RAF pilots.
In the case of stalled three point landings*, which is essentially what a carrier landing was, there is a bending component to the loads. This tended to wrench the attachment points free from the spar and collapse the undercarriage. Deck landings were always made in a three point posture at which attitude the wing was at stalling incidence, about 15 degrees. There's not much to be done about that, it is a function of the design of the aircraft, but it had nothing to do with the undercarriage track.
The Seafire suffered an appalling accident rate but what is truly remarkable is that some pilots managed to land them on carriers in a fashion that allowed them to be flown again.
*The Seafire landed at a mere 1.05 Vse, just three knots above the engine on stall speed, a much smaller margin than that for aircraft designed for carrier operations which typically landed at something like 1.25 Vse. Such a small margin was extremely difficult to maintain, as Eric Brown noted. It was much easier to accelerate a Seafire than to decelerate, giving a rather lopsided speed control, which meant that the entire final approach had to be flown just a few knots above the stalling speed. To make it even harder the ASI represented 10 knots with about 1/8" of needle travel!
Land any faster and the Seafire would not hit the deck in a three point attitude at the required three and a half degree descent angle. When the main wheels were first to hit the deck they would push the nose up (because they are forward of the CoG) while the tail was still descending. This obviously increased the incidence of the wing, and lift, and the aircraft would bounce back into the air and float in ground effect into the barrier two or three seconds later. This is what Fleet Air Arm pilots referred to as 'Float, float, prang'.
Was any of this fixed in the later versions? The Seafire was sent to Korea. Could the improvements of the later versions have been realistically incorporated into those of 1942-45?
The later versions used on the smaller and slower Majestic/Colossus class CVLs had their arrestor hook relocated to the tail. Perhaps that helped.One would think bigger carriers, a faster approach speed and a stronger arrestor hook would help.
Given a Merlin instead of the Griffon and a three blade prop instead of the contra-rotating, can we get to a reasonably safe Seafire design whilst still producing it alongside the Spitfire? Moving the hook to the tail and improving the damping of the suspension would be a good start, but there's still the low speed handling issues. What about larger flaps?Mike Crosley was not impressed with the Seafire III. he devotes an entire chapter to the effects of instability on various aspects of flight. In the section under 'deck landings' he remarks on its tendency to float 'serenely' over the wires.
The Seafire gets criticized its narrow track undercarriage, but is this fair? The Grumman Wildcat's similarly narrow.
Given a Merlin instead of the Griffon and a three blade prop instead of the contra-rotating, can we get to a reasonably safe Seafire design whilst still producing it alongside the Spitfire? Moving the hook to the tail and improving the damping of the suspension would be a good start, but there's still the low speed handling issues. What about larger flaps?
That might just increase the tendency to float, unless some "split" type flaps could be fitted. Perhaps spoilers would be more effective?but there's still the low speed handling issues. What about larger flaps?
Or a Typhoon with relocated radiator, reliable Sabre and a tail that doesn't tear off.I suspect the best 'Seafire' design would have been a Sea Hurricane with a less draggy wing and a Merlin 24 engine.
That would be a Centaurus then, or an Eagle. With a lightened airframe it could be quite a good performer, but should be called by another name, like Fury.Or a Typhoon with relocated radiator, reliable Sabre and a tail that doesn't tear off.
And a navalized version could be called "Sea Fury", hypothetically, of courseThat would be a Centaurus then, or an Eagle. With a lightened airframe it could be quite a good performer, but should be called by another name, like Fury.
The thick-winged version... we'll call it the Hawker Tornado. Seen below in I believe 1940.And a navalized version could be called "Sea Fury", hypothetically, of course