Was the self defending bomber really a failure? (1 Viewer)

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Joe I think I understand your point now....basically that the Mosquito could not carry the tonnage of bombs that the B-17 could....and that as a result of that could not undertake the "strategic bombing" mission, as you see it. If I am reading you right essentially you are saying that the B-17 was a true strategic bomber, and a Mossie was not.

However, I see a couple of flaws in that line of thinking. Firstly, your definition of what consitutes "strategic bombing", is far too narrow. You seem to equate strategic bombing as a concept with the mass destruction of cities enmasse, that is not the only definition of strategic bombing campaigns. If you have a factory, that has one piece of machinery needed to halt the entire program, you can either level the factory, with B-17s, or you can take out the piece of machinery, using a precision bombing attack, and in this I think the Mosquito was superior to the B-17. The point I am making is that the term "strategic bombing" is pretty wide....there was more than one way to bring German industry to its knees...

According to Jurgen Brauer from Augusta State University

What is strategic bombing? In the memorable language of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS),
... strategic bombing bears the same relationship to tactical bombing as does the cow to the pail of milk. To deny
immediate aid and comfort to the enemy, tactical considerations dictate upsetting the bucket. To ensure eventual
starvation, the strategic move is to kill the cow (USSBS, 1947, p. 5).
Less originally, consider the following two definitions:
Strategic bombing ... is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which will most weaken the enemy
by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war (USSBS, Jan. 1947, p. 2, pt. 2).
Strategic bombing is best defined as the use of air power to strike at the very foundation of an enemy's war effort
– the production of war material, the economy as a whole, or the morale of the civilian population – rather than
as a direct attack on the enemy's army or navy. A strategic air campaign almost always requires the defeat of the
enemy's air force, but not as an end in itself. While tactical air power uses aircraft to aid the advance of forces on
the ground or on the surface of the ocean, usually in cooperation with those forces, strategic air power usually
works in relative independence of armies and navies ... (Levine, 1992, p. 1).
In the hope that military efforts will be starved, strategic bombing, the first definition suggests, is
about bombing of non-military assets. One shoots at the economic cow that (re)fills the military's pail.
The focus on the ultimate objective – the opponent's ability to prosecute the war – is operationally
vague and is at any rate restricted to the physical inputs to war-making, neglecting human capital and
institutional aspects. The definition also lacks operational clarity. The second definition helps to
separate out strategic from tactical bombing and identifies three operational objectives: (a) the
opponent's actual arms production; (b) the enemy's potential to produce civilian and military goods;
and (c) the morale of the adversary's civilian population. The definition also suggests that strategic
bombing is to achieve certain war outcomes by itself, to avert the need for a land-based invasion of
the opponent's territory, the capture of its capital, and the deposing of its leaders.


I believe a mass deployment of fast light bombers like the Mosquito could achieve that stated definition, perhaps a luittle differently to a Heavy Bomber like the B-17, but still achieve the mission objective of economic dislocation on the enemy.....

Secondly, I still dont get why a mass raid by Mosquitoes could not be used for mass destruction. The Mosquito could carry a single 4000 lb bomb or 4 x 500 lb bombsor even 2 x 1000 lb bombs....Dont know what the ordinance types for the B-17 are, but I doubt they are heavier than those I have just listed. A 4000 lb bomb is more than enough to destroy structures, you just have to drop enough of them. And to drop enough of them, you need numbers. If, instead of 400 B-17s attacking a target, each dropping 6000 lbs of bombs, (for a total drop of 2.4 million lbs) you had a Mosquito force of 1000 Mosquitoes, each dropping 4000 lbs, you are going to drop 4 million lbs in that comparison raid....this never was attempted in the war, so its all just theary, but to me I cannot see how 4 million lbs of explosive dropped by Mosquitoes would not do the same hob and more as 2.4 million lbs of explosive dropped by the B-17s......and the fleet costs are going to be similar I think.

As for accuracy stats, no I dont have any, but I think it worth noting that the Mosquito was the weapon of choice for precision raids, where the neeed to hit targets precisely was a priority. And they were used as Pathfinders, night and day, in this regard i still dont see the point you are trying to make.
 
Even with the use of a precision bomber like the Mossie, you didn't have the luxury to destroy "key components."

I think Amiens proved that precision strike could achieve desired objectives. Then there's that incredible attack by 633 Sqn on the heavy water plant in Norway! :lol:


They did, but how big do you think factories and railyards are? read below...

And toward the end of the war that's exactly what many of the raids were doing. I think you fail to realize how much land an aircraft factory or an oil refinery makes up. .

Actually, I do realise. During my days in uniform, I spent some time as a targeteer undertaking target systems analysis. You don't need to obliterate a target to neutralise it - you just need to destroy the key components.

Additionally you have to remember that sometimes targets were hit in waves to ensure total destruction of the target. The flight of bombers would be adjusted to ensure that bombs from all flights within the formation put their bombs on the target, or so that was the plan.

Entirely agree - but you don't need formations of 4-engined aircraft with 10 men each onboard to achieve the same objective. It just took some time for the Allies to figure out that strategic effect could be delivered by something other than a big strategic bomber with a huge crew.
 
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I think Amiens proved that precision strike could achieve desired objectives. Then there's that incredible attack by 633 Sqn on the heavy water plant in Norway! :lol:
I'm well aware of 633 Sqn and their strike, and I think its an understatement to say that more than "key components" were destroyed.

Actually, I do realise. During my days in uniform, I spent some time as a targeteer undertaking target systems analysis. You don't need to obliterate a target to neutralise it - you just need to destroy the key components.
And again, do you actually think you had to luxery to do that, especially during WW2??? When targets like Schweinfurt were hit, you think 8Th AF planners were concerned whether they were hitting the primary machine shops or material stores? The objective was to flatten everything and most of the time the "shot gun" effect was not very effective.

Entirely agree - but you don't need formations of 4-engined aircraft with 10 men each onboard to achieve the same objective. It just took some time for the Allies to figure out that strategic effect could be delivered by something other than a big strategic bomber with a huge crew.
True - but it took time for other technologies to mature so you could build a bomber that not only carried a large bomb load but could do it effectively and safely. After WW2 big bombers were still being built with fairly large crews, but the mission changed for the crew. Instead you had crew members manning radar and ECMs in lieu of guns - in some respects you still had a large bomber that was self defending, but it was doing so in a whole different scale.

Look at bomber aircraft today - they are still "self defending" but they are defending themselves through speed, stealth and ECMs that are easily operated by a minimal crew.
 
Joe I think I understand your point now....basically that the Mosquito could not carry the tonnage of bombs that the B-17 could....and that as a result of that could not undertake the "strategic bombing" mission, as you see it. If I am reading you right essentially you are saying that the B-17 was a true strategic bomber, and a Mossie was not.

However, I see a couple of flaws in that line of thinking. Firstly, your definition of what consitutes "strategic bombing", is far too narrow. You seem to equate strategic bombing as a concept with the mass destruction of cities enmasse, that is not the only definition of strategic bombing campaigns. If you have a factory, that has one piece of machinery needed to halt the entire program, you can either level the factory, with B-17s, or you can take out the piece of machinery, using a precision bombing attack, and in this I think the Mosquito was superior to the B-17. The point I am making is that the term "strategic bombing" is pretty wide....there was more than one way to bring German industry to its knees...
Ok - point taken - but show me where any WW2 aircraft was ever used to take out one piece of equipment...
Secondly, I still dont get why a mass raid by Mosquitoes could not be used for mass destruction. The Mosquito could carry a single 4000 lb bomb or 4 x 500 lb bombsor even 2 x 1000 lb bombs....Dont know what the ordinance types for the B-17 are, but I doubt they are heavier than those I have just listed. A 4000 lb bomb is more than enough to destroy structures, you just have to drop enough of them. And to drop enough of them, you need numbers. If, instead of 400 B-17s attacking a target, each dropping 6000 lbs of bombs, (for a total drop of 2.4 million lbs) you had a Mosquito force of 1000 Mosquitoes, each dropping 4000 lbs, you are going to drop 4 million lbs in that comparison raid....this never was attempted in the war, so its all just theary, but to me I cannot see how 4 million lbs of explosive dropped by Mosquitoes would not do the same hob and more as 2.4 million lbs of explosive dropped by the B-17s......and the fleet costs are going to be similar I think.
What you say is true but as stated, if you were going to deploy 1000 Mossies (I doubt you'd ever get that many up at once) to do the job of 400 B-17s, you're still going to deliver them the same way unless you have a thousand Mossies attacking a target at low level at all different directions, and I doubt that would produce the same results than if you showered a target from altitude. To do that with the Mossie, you're basically flying a high altitude pathfinder mission, with a bombadire in the lead plane. On the bombing run as such, you don't bomb at 350 knots at altitude, you're doing so at well under 200 knots. As I said earlier, you think Mossie drivers would want to sit in a large formation being pelted by flack for 40 seconds until the lead plane gives the order to release their bomb load?
As for accuracy stats, no I dont have any, but I think it worth noting that the Mosquito was the weapon of choice for precision raids, where the neeed to hit targets precisely was a priority. And they were used as Pathfinders, night and day, in this regard i still dont see the point you are trying to make.
And agree 100% about their accuracy, as far as my point - you didn't drop bombs at altitude and expect results if you were flying 350 knots.
 
I'm well aware of 633 Sqn and their strike, and I think its an understatement to say that more than "key components" were destroyed.

Actually, from a systems perspective, it was a "key component" that was destroyed - it was the fuel (not heavy water...my mistake...must now watch 633 Sqn 20 times in a row as a penance!:oops:). Without the fuel, the rockets were useless so the 633 Sqn raid counts as a very successful form of target systems analysis.

And again, do you actually think you had to luxery to do that, especially during WW2??? When targets like Schweinfurt were hit, you think 8Th AF planners were concerned whether they were hitting the primary machine shops or material stores? The objective was to flatten everything and most of the time the "shot gun" effect was not very effective.

They weren't concerned for 2 main reasons:

(1) Vengeance - stamp on the aggressive exansionism of the Axis powers.
(2) Inability to hit targets with such precision and accuracy from high altitude using the Norden bombsight and large group formations.

The objective was to destroy Germany's war-machinery which, to use the 633 Sqn analogy, could have been accomplished just as easily by preventing munitions leaving factories as it could by plastering acres and acres of industrial cities and sending thousands of bombs down to do nothing more than churn dirt. However, items (1) and (2) above both militated against such an approach. Undoubtedly, the strategic bombing campaign had a massive impact but I think the resources expended were disproportionate to the results achieved - German fighter production continued to increase despite the Allies' growing air superiority.

After WW2 big bombers were still being built with fairly large crews, but the mission changed for the crew. Instead you had crew members manning radar and ECMs in lieu of guns - in some respects you still had a large bomber that was self defending, but it was doing so in a whole different scale.

Look at bomber aircraft today - they are still "self defending" but they are defending themselves through speed, stealth and ECMs that are easily operated by a minimal crew.

Valid points, although the systems are as much about identifying the threat as they are about neutralising it...and there are other platforms which form the modern analogy of the escort fighter (eg AWACS, WIld Weasel, CAPS....and, yes, good old traditional fighter escort (at least for large gorilla packages), albeit a rather Cold War layaway in tactical terms). Stealth is the classic form of passive self-protection but methinks both this and the ECM topic diverge from the object of the thread which was about self-protection of bombers during WWII which, in the context of the question, was rather more...shall we say, active?

Ultimately, though, I think we both agree that the fundamental principle of an armoured porcupine flying unescorted over enemy territory was unsuccessful.

Regards
Mark
 
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The objective was to destroy Germany's war-machinery which, to use the 633 Sqn analogy, could have been accomplished just as easily by preventing munitions leaving factories as it could by plastering acres and acres of industrial cities and sending thousands of bombs down to do nothing more than churn dirt. However, items (1) and (2) above both militated against such an approach. Undoubtedly, the strategic bombing campaign had a massive impact but I think the resources expended were disproportionate to the results achieved - German fighter production continued to increase despite the Allies' growing air superiority.

But a 633 Squadron analogy was not going to put a facility like Schweinfurt or Ploesti out of action. The only reason why strategic bombing didn't do much to fighter production was because by later in the war most assembly lines were moved out traditional factories and as we all know were found in forests, caves or even underground. For the technology at hand at the time, the large 4 engine bomber was the way to go despite the inefficiencies, the Mosquito concept was the wave of the future when eventually mated with radar ECMs and higher performing, higher load carrying airframes.
 
But a 633 Squadron analogy was not going to put a facility like Schweinfurt or Ploesti out of action.

I think we're pretty much saying the same thing but using different words. I'm not suggesting a single-unit attack like 633 Sqn would have put a Schweinfurt or a Ploesti out of action, I'm merely stating that greater use of more precise delivery means coupled with better target systems analysis (which Allied PR and imagery analysts certainly COULD do) might have achieved the same (or better) results as massed formations of heavy bombers carpeting the landscape.

The Mosquito concept was the wave of the future when eventually mated with radar ECMs and higher performing, higher load carrying airframes.

Agree entirely.
 
I know the Mosquito has a special place in most folk's mind, as a great alternative to heavy bombing, but in reality, how would it have fared against the German anti-aircraft that was able to bring a great deal of damage to the heavies?

Thier need for lower altitues in order to conduct thier precision bombing would have put them right into the "sweet spot" of the 88 batteries. The Mossie's speed was an advantage to it, but loaded down with ordinance would have also hampered it's abilities to evade the Fw190's, which even unloaded, would have difficulties getting away from, especially the Fw190D. If a B-17 had a chance of surviving a round from the Mk108 (or Mk103), how would a Mosquito fare?

If the German defenses were able to deal with the high altitude bomber stream, don't you suppose that they would adjust thier tactics once they realized that smaller, high-speed inbound bomber groups were coming in at lower altitudes?
 
Valid point, GrauGeist, although I doubt the Flak 88 would be the weapon of choice, at least not against fast aircraft coming in at treetop height. I suspect smaller-calibre weapons with much higher firing rate would be more appropriate. As always, any new tactic or technology would, sooner or later, be overcome by a countermeasure or superior technology. Simply ringing every target with hundreds of light AAA guns would create severe problems for attacking bombers no matter how low or fast they flew, although it would, to an extent, depend on early warning of the incoming raid.
 
Some things to consider:

Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.

A Mosquito based strategic bombing would greatly reduce the time for possible interception, reducing losses from fighters. The Mosquito cruising speed is better matched to that of potential fighter escorts so they could still escort missions. The Mosquito's speed reduces flak effectiveness as does it's much smaller radar cross section. Higher speeds will reduce bombing accuracy but tighter formations may be able to offset this. The Mosquito may also be able to fly several sorties per day against the same target to increase its effective bomb load.

Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.
 
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I'm merely stating that greater use of more precise delivery means coupled with better target systems analysis (which Allied PR and imagery analysts certainly COULD do) might have achieved the same (or better) results as massed formations of heavy bombers carpeting the landscape.
Agree - but you looking at a "would have, should have" that was more than likely not even given a thought till the war was well over. To try to take out a massive target like Ploesti for example at low level would have meant more aircraft being used during the raid with hopes that all goes according to plan with several hundred aircraft over the target at one time. Look what happened when the USAAF tried to bomb Ploesti at low altitude.

Some things to consider:

Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.
No matter what you're stripping off the bomber to make it faster, during WW2 all precision bombing runs at altitude were done at speeds between 150 - 180 mph if my memory serves me correctly and the bomb run could last as long as 2 minutes. Over the target you would probably be more vulnerable to fighters in a Mosquito than you would be in a B-17 or any other heavy because you didn't have the defensive armament to shoot back. Even the B-29 with more advanced bombing systems coupled with the Norden commenced a bombing run at 210 mph according to my references.
A Mosquito based strategic bombing would greatly reduce the time for possible interception, reducing losses from fighters. The Mosquito cruising speed is better matched to that of potential fighter escorts so they could still escort missions. The Mosquito's speed reduces flak effectiveness as does it's much smaller radar cross section. Higher speeds will reduce bombing accuracy but tighter formations may be able to offset this. The Mosquito may also be able to fly several sorties per day against the same target to increase its effective bomb load.
You're still looking at 2000 pounds per aircraft less when compared to a B-17
Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.

Disagree - the Mosquito if deployed in the same manner as any heavy would have come across the same problems over target. The advantage would have been the time in and out of target which I agree, but at the cost of less of a bomb load. You would have needed way more aircraft to do the same job and in the end may have expended the same effort if going with a large 4 engine bomber. Lastly the Mosquito was not an easy aircraft to repair as a result of battle damage and had other operational and logistic issues that would have burdened any effort to deploy it in the numbers needed.
 
Not to even mention the logistical effort to guide 2-2.5 times the bombers to their target and at a lower altitude.
 
Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.

Did the Allies ever try conducting a pilot study of such operations to gauge results?
A series of pilot studies would seem appropriate: Mosquitos strategic bombing in daylight, night time, high level, low level, etc.
 
That would be suicide. WWII Germany had excellent light flak and it just kept getting better. There's a reason Allied heavy bombers stayed as high as possible even though it greaty reduced bombing accuracy.

25,000 marks. Approximate price for 8.8cm Flak41
5,000 marks. Approximate price for 3.7cm Flak43.
If the RAF start bombing from treetop height then Germany starts building 5 x 3.7cm Flak43 for each 1 x 8.8cm Flak41 that got purchased historically.

3.7 cm FlaK 43 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It's worth noting the 3.7cm Flak43 was a superb weapon. Probably the best of it's type during WWII. It was also inexpensive, designed for mass production under wartime conditions. It could be manually directed or slaved to radar. A single 3.7cm shell is likely to cause mortal damage to a RAF Mosquito.

Ideally you take out German light flak with heavy bombers operating at 20,000 feet. Then send in Mosquitos at treetop level. Unfortunately the RAF cannot bomb accurately from 20,000 feet so most of the German 3.7cm flak are likely to survive. An unsolvable problem with WWII era bombing technology.
 
But the Mosquito took less bombs to destroy a V-1 site, Dave.

Mosquito - 39.8t
B-17 - 165.4t
B-25 - 182t
B-26 - 219t
 
But the Mosquito took less bombs to destroy a V-1 site, Dave.

Mosquito - 39.8t
B-17 - 165.4t
B-25 - 182t
B-26 - 219t
Poor comparison.

How many sorties were involved? How many aircraft per mission? Bomb load per aircraft? That's like saying it took 200 B-29s to level Tokyo but one to level Hiroshima and not saying that an atomic bomb was used!:rolleyes:
 
I can't help but think the discussion goes down a rathole in trying to extrapolate the possible efficiency improvements had the Mossie replaced the B-17 and B-24 for Strategic Bombing campaign.

It isn't as simple as strapping a Norden into the Mossie and have it perform with a bombardier in daylight missions. I first think about the P-38 with Droop Snoot mods as well as P-38 dropping en masse on a lead Droop Snoot. One could certainly cruise into the target with higher cruise speed but accuracy per se for the individual Mossie shouldn't be greater at same altitude than a B-17 (or the aforementioned P-38). I could be convinced that a Mossie had good bomb run stability and equal the B-17 as a bomb platform but have to see facts.

So, if the Mossie individually isn't deemed a more capable precision bomber at high altitude, take it down. No question highly trained crews could hit targets with precision on the deck but for heavily defended targets like Ploesti or Berlin or Misburg each approach run would have ALL the available flak batteries along a vector in play (8mm to 122mm and everything in between)

Could you 'do' Ploesti at night? Dunno, finding the general area is bad enough, finding the Catcracker would be very difficult.

Escorted precision attacks? sure, but is that really the way Mossies would bomb in daylight and would it be better to go entirely unsupported by large formations (no real defense so why 'bunch up'). The higher you go the less effective precision bombing, the lower you go, the less range - and more exposure.

In the latter role at medium altitudes, is the Mossie more effective than a A/B-26 or B-25? Can't see why it would be.

So, make the case for Mossie Strategic attacks at night on the deck.
 
Some things to consider:

Stripping guns from the 4 engine bomber increases cruise speed. This reduces the time for interception by the fighters and reduces their intercept rate. It decreases AA accuracy and should reduce AA losses over the course of the mission and smaller crews mean fewer casualties. It might also allow for an increased bomb load. Against this is a probable decrease in bombing accuracy. Enemy fighter losses from defensive fire might be lowered, but this must be balanced against the increase in time that the fighter is exposed to the remaining guns, especially the tail gun. The bomber defensive box formation creates self limiting bomb accuracy, since by definition the bomb pattern will be same size as the formation.

Stripping guns and gunners on a B-17 might give you a couple of kts cruise speed, but longer range and c/oreiling and bomb load

A Mosquito based strategic bombing would greatly reduce the time for possible interception, reducing losses from fighters. The Mosquito cruising speed is better matched to that of potential fighter escorts so they could still escort missions. The Mosquito's speed reduces flak effectiveness as does it's much smaller radar cross section. Higher speeds will reduce bombing accuracy but tighter formations may be able to offset this. The Mosquito may also be able to fly several sorties per day against the same target to increase its effective bomb load.

The ultimate targets of Strategic interest (and effectiveness) were targets like Merseburg, Misburg, Leipzig, Brux, Posnan and Ploesti - a LOOOOOOONG way from Jolly 'Ol. The key question is whether One Mossie is as good as or better than a B-17 as a bomb platform at high to medium altitudes... and whether a Mossie can go to Brux or Posnan (1500 mile trip)

BTW if the Mossie is using H2S or H2X in any mode, the crafty squareheads figured out how to slave that signal to the ir fire control radars (and fusing) and 'cross section not relevant for daylight raids as German optics were excellent.


Overall I suspect that a large scale escorted daylight Mosquito bombing campaign would have been more cost effective and and just as costly to the Luftwaffe as the historical campaign.

Not enough data to make that judgment.

The Mossie HAS to be as accurate a bomb platform as a B-17 travelling 100kts slower - proof?

It has to have the range at the higher cruise speeds to make the long range Oil/Chemical campaign successful. I don't have a feel for this as my recollection was about 1200 mile round trip range w/2000 pounds... if greater than this thge longer range Poland and Czechoslovakia and Rumania targets are in play.

If those two criteria are provavble, even for only a 2000 pound bomb load, it might be worth looking at because it WAS a lot less expensive (crew and airframe) and might be as easy to protect with escorts to reduce the shoot downs that Might be greater than the heavily gunned B-17/24s
 
my goodness I don't think they were thatt accurate in Vietnam, in WW2 I believe the CEP was in the hundreds of metres

The LGB's were extremely accurate in the latter half of Vietnam with F-4 and F-105s.. Paul Dhoumer Bridge survived a LOT of iron bomb missions but went down with first Mk84 LGB package delivered by 355th F-105D's.

BUF on the other hand wasn't so very accurate w/ Mk 82's and 83's but a LOT better than WWII and Korea..
 

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