What do you guys think of the Big Wing formation?
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The Big Wing was incompatible with the integrated air defence system developed by the British in the 1930s. It was fundamentally flawed by a lack of control and the one factor that was immutable in terms of making successful interceptions, time.
Time:
Leigh Mallory asserted that he could get a Wing of five squadrons into the air in six minutes and that it could be over Hornchurch at 20,000 ft in twenty five minutes. After two months of practice, on 29th October 1940, the Duxford Wing took seventeen minutes to get airborne and a further twenty minutes to assemble and set course for Hornchurch. After forty minutes it was nowhere near its destination.
On 15th November an analysis of Wing operations showed that it took an average of fifty six minutes for the Wing to reach Sheerness and that it patrolled for an average of just twenty four minutes before returning to Duxford.
Communication.
When the Wing passed into 11 Group's area, Park had no real idea where it was. Park wanted aircraft of Leigh Mallory's VHF equipped squadrons to be fitted with Hornchurch's fixer crystals, in this way Hornchurch would be able to establish the wing's position. Leigh Mallory refused. As an example of the confusion, on 25th October Leigh Mallory asked permission to send the wing to Kent. Park agreed and asked it to patrol a line Sheerness to Maidstone at 25,000ft. The Wing was already climbing from Duxford when the request was made, but still took thirty minutes to reach Sheerness. During the hour it was in Park's area he received six position reports from 12 Group and NONE after the Wing had crossed south of the Thames. This led to confusion at Fighter Command, the Observer Corps and Anti Aircraft units who now had an unidentified formation flying at uncertain positions around 11 Group's area.
Eventually Park arranged for a section of fighters from one of his 11 Group squadrons to accompany the Wing in his area so that he would know where it was. They worked on an R/T frequency which enabled the Wing to be plotted on his operations tables.
Effectiveness.
The Duxford Wing was ordered up on thirty two occasions. On nine it failed to form up at all. It engaged in combat on seven occasions, but on only one did it get to the incoming aircraft before other units. On that one occasion it shot down eight bombers, NOT the fifty seven claimed by Bader.
A nice anecdote, from Vincent Orange's biography of Dowding
"One day, in late September, Duke-Wolley was leading his Hurricane squadron (based at Kenley in 11Group) on a standing patrol over Canterbury in Kent, near the south-east coast. Looking north, he saw a black mass far below coming from the direction of London and recognised it as the 12 Group wing. He had spotted it miles away and had a decisive height advantage even as far south as Canterbury. This contradicted Leigh-Mallory's advocacy of Duxford as a base from which to gain safe altitude before flying into Park's area. The wing looked so determined that Park-Wolley decided to act as its top cover. The wing leader, failing to identify fellow Hurricanes and thinking he was about to be attacked, orered his followers to orbit. Duke-Wolley, thinking the wing was preparing to intercept a raid that he had not spotted, followed suit. For some minutes there was a complete stalemate until the wing began to run short of fuel, having taken so long to assemble, and retired in good formation northwards. At least on this occasion it made few victory claims. The whole ludicrous business also underlined the fact that radio communication between non affiliated squadrons was impossible at that time."
Duke-Wolley's report on the day's events seems to have made the rounds of 11 Group over the next two weeks and caused 'huge delight' among pilots and ground crews in that Group.
Cheers
Steve
Time:
Leigh Mallory asserted that he could get a Wing of five squadrons into the air in six minutes and that it could be over Hornchurch at 20,000 ft in twenty five minutes. After two months of practice, on 29th October 1940, the Duxford Wing took seventeen minutes to get airborne and a further twenty minutes to assemble and set course for Hornchurch. After forty minutes it was nowhere near its destination.
On 15th November an analysis of Wing operations showed that it took an average of fifty six minutes for the Wing to reach Sheerness and that it patrolled for an average of just twenty four minutes before returning to Duxford.
Communication.
When the Wing passed into 11 Group's area, Park had no real idea where it was. Park wanted aircraft of Leigh Mallory's VHF equipped squadrons to be fitted with Hornchurch's fixer crystals, in this way Hornchurch would be able to establish the wing's position. Leigh Mallory refused. As an example of the confusion, on 25th October Leigh Mallory asked permission to send the wing to Kent. Park agreed and asked it to patrol a line Sheerness to Maidstone at 25,000ft. The Wing was already climbing from Duxford when the request was made, but still took thirty minutes to reach Sheerness. During the hour it was in Park's area he received six position reports from 12 Group and NONE after the Wing had crossed south of the Thames. This led to confusion at Fighter Command, the Observer Corps and Anti Aircraft units who now had an unidentified formation flying at uncertain positions around 11 Group's area.
Eventually Park arranged for a section of fighters from one of his 11 Group squadrons to accompany the Wing in his area so that he would know where it was. They worked on an R/T frequency which enabled the Wing to be plotted on his operations tables.
Effectiveness.
The Duxford Wing was ordered up on thirty two occasions. On nine it failed to form up at all. It engaged in combat on seven occasions, but on only one did it get to the incoming aircraft before other units. On that one occasion it shot down eight bombers, NOT the fifty seven claimed by Bader.
A nice anecdote, from Vincent Orange's biography of Dowding
"One day, in late September, Duke-Wolley was leading his Hurricane squadron (based at Kenley in 11Group) on a standing patrol over Canterbury in Kent, near the south-east coast. Looking north, he saw a black mass far below coming from the direction of London and recognised it as the 12 Group wing. He had spotted it miles away and had a decisive height advantage even as far south as Canterbury. This contradicted Leigh-Mallory's advocacy of Duxford as a base from which to gain safe altitude before flying into Park's area. The wing looked so determined that Park-Wolley decided to act as its top cover. The wing leader, failing to identify fellow Hurricanes and thinking he was about to be attacked, orered his followers to orbit. Duke-Wolley, thinking the wing was preparing to intercept a raid that he had not spotted, followed suit. For some minutes there was a complete stalemate until the wing began to run short of fuel, having taken so long to assemble, and retired in good formation northwards. At least on this occasion it made few victory claims. The whole ludicrous business also underlined the fact that radio communication between non affiliated squadrons was impossible at that time."
Duke-Wolley's report on the day's events seems to have made the rounds of 11 Group over the next two weeks and caused 'huge delight' among pilots and ground crews in that Group.
Cheers
Steve
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- Thread starter
- #3
I also recalled (from 'Darwin Spitfires') that Wg Cdr Caldwell's insisting on sticking with the big wing is also one of the factors as to why the Spitfires up at Darwin didn't do well. Such a shame for an otherwise amazing pilot.
It was a cause of considerable friction with other officers at the time, not least with the then Acting Squadron Leader E M Gibbs of No. 54 Squadron. Caldwell threatened him with a Court Martial on at least one occasion.
The problem in Australia was more time, the entire wing, though usually just three rather than five squadrons, just didn't have time to get up and gain enough altitude in the time available. Caldwell consistently gave away any opportunity for a quick attack with forces available in an advantageous position for a larger but later attack. It was not smart tactics, but be careful trying to tell an Australian that
Many officers, particularly with experience from the BoB, felt that the best tactical unit for defensive operations was the single squadron and that even on offensive operations more than two were difficult for one man to control.
Cheers
Steve
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Since it seems to have been a failure, it was a bad idea
I suspect that part of the logic of its genesis is the basic military dictum that you concentrate your forces, as generals and admirals who divide their forces tend to get the crap beaten out of them. They missed the simple fact that things like bomber formations are more like a 19th Century army's train of supply wagons than that same army's infantry or cavalry forces, in that their ability to turn and counterattack their attackers is quite limited.
Pre-war the RAF (and the USAAF) seemed to be built around much more rigid formations than did the Luftwaffe, and, from what I've read, this reduced the effectiveness of the RAF in the early days of the Battle of Britain. The RAF started with quite rigid groups of three aircraft, operating in fairly tight formations, while the Luftwaffe operated in leader-wingman pairs, with far less attention needing to be paid to formation keeping. Humans only have so much processing power, do not multi-task well, and the simultaneous necessity to keep close formation, scan for enemy aircraft, monitor the aircraft's internal condition, and fly aircraft with marginal stability
I suspect that part of the logic of its genesis is the basic military dictum that you concentrate your forces, as generals and admirals who divide their forces tend to get the crap beaten out of them. They missed the simple fact that things like bomber formations are more like a 19th Century army's train of supply wagons than that same army's infantry or cavalry forces, in that their ability to turn and counterattack their attackers is quite limited.
Pre-war the RAF (and the USAAF) seemed to be built around much more rigid formations than did the Luftwaffe, and, from what I've read, this reduced the effectiveness of the RAF in the early days of the Battle of Britain. The RAF started with quite rigid groups of three aircraft, operating in fairly tight formations, while the Luftwaffe operated in leader-wingman pairs, with far less attention needing to be paid to formation keeping. Humans only have so much processing power, do not multi-task well, and the simultaneous necessity to keep close formation, scan for enemy aircraft, monitor the aircraft's internal condition, and fly aircraft with marginal stability
It's genesis in 12 Group was a complete inability of Leigh-Mallory and certain junior officers to understand how Britain's air defence system worked. It really was a simple as that.
Cheers
Steve
Further than that, they didn't understand how air warfare was conducted, the problems continued into France in 1941.
Since it seems to have been a failure, it was a bad idea
Pre-war the RAF (and the USAAF) seemed to be built around much more rigid formations than did the Luftwaffe, and, from what I've read, this reduced the effectiveness of the RAF in the early days of the Battle of Britain. The RAF started with quite rigid groups of three aircraft, operating in fairly tight formations, while the Luftwaffe operated in leader-wingman pairs, with far less attention needing to be paid to formation keeping. Humans only have so much processing power, do not multi-task well, and the simultaneous necessity to keep close formation, scan for enemy aircraft, monitor the aircraft's internal condition, and fly aircraft with marginal stability
Swampyankee,
You would be surprised what is actually doable. The basic formation for combat for my time in fighters is what's called "tactical", or a line abreast formation with 1.5 - 2.5 miles between aircraft. To maneuver, change direction, traverse weather, etc seems very difficult at first, but with time becomes second nature. The higher you go, the more difficult it becomes due to aircraft performance, but with all things some practice makes it much easier. Being 1.5 miles from your flight lead / wingy allows for much flexibility in both offensive and defensive situations but I must stress that it's difficult at first. However, with just a few hours of practice (plus training to reinforce the pain / cost associated with errors) and the learning curve becomes steep.
To me the biggest costs associated with flying a close rigid formation is how badly visual lookout suffers and limited number of shooters.. Spending all your time watching your flight lead only leaves the flight as a whole and you in particular open to what's called the, "unobserved entry" of a bandit. Having two towed decoys AKA wingmen means three aircraft are flying with loaded guns and only one is a shooter. Not a wise use of assets.
Cheers,
Biff
This is, of course, all true and was the reason why the British eventually adopted the more open formations, as flown by the Luftwaffe and developed in Spain.
There was a perfectly good reason, at the time, for the adoption of the rigid British formations. It all had to do with the anticipated targets and the firepower available. British interceptor and zone fighters expected to be attacking enemy bombers, and in order to shoot them down they would need to concentrate their firepower on the target by attacking in formations of three or more aircraft. There were six fighter attacks in which all RAF fighter pilots were trained:
Fighter Attack No.1 (From Above Cloud) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}
Fighter Attack No.2 (From Directly Below) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}
Fighter Attack No.3 (From Dead Astern) Approach Pursuit or Approach Turning [3 aircraft section versus single enemy}
Fighter Attack No.4 (From Directly Below) {A variation of No.2, attacking multiple aircraft}
Fighter Attack No.5 (From Dead Astern) {For attacking a large enemy formation, 3 aircraft section to attack selected aircraft}
Fighter Attack No.6 (From Dead Astern) {Attack conducted with entire squadron}
The smallest tactical unit employed was a section or flight of three aircraft, either attacking simultaneously or, from line astern, in succession. For this the section is obliged to fly in close formation.
Cheers
Steve
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Humans -- especially young humans -- consistently overestimate their ability to multi-task. For one thing, humans can't do multiple non-automatic tasks simultaneously (no matter how much training, scanning the sky, flying in formation, monitoring formation, and monitoring an aircraft's internal condition are not automatic tasks, even as much as walking. Note how badly people jaywalk while texting or listening to music); they switch between multiple tasks, and it takes finite time for those context switches to take place. I'm not surprised by what humans can do, but I am surprised by how consistently humans overestimate the in-built limits of our brains. A great example is how much less reliable eyewitness testimony and memory is than was -- and is -- commonly thought.
Swampyankee,
There is a difference between someone trained in multi-tasking and someone who isn't. It's all about risk management, or doing what task when in what type of environment. You don't scan your instruments (except fuel gauge) in a fight unless something yellow or red illuminates on the panel or Betty starts whining. You also don't text on your smart phone when walking in or near roads / intersections. However, we talk, run the radar, dispense countermeasures, shoot missiles and or gun, all while fighting / flying in a 3D battle space. Not super humans, just well trained ones. Situational Awareness (SA) breathes in and out in a fight, while driving, or while waking and texting. The key is to realize it and adopt the safest business / life practices you can. That is one thing that is not taught in drivers ed, or in my opine by the parents of these drivers as SA draining smart phones are a new threat.
Cheers,
Biff
A veteran of the big wing was in a documentary about the BoB he was very dismissive. He said it was great for the leaders having 50 planes covering their backs but behind it was "absolute bloody chaos".
The big wing theory doesn't even pass a basic scrutiny of what is a good idea. Stona has detailed the problems forming it, your enemy had frequently done what he wanted before you formed up. It was the military equivalent of sending a regiment into the Scottish highlands, you can crush any village you go into, but you never find your enemy who hits you when you are marching or sleeping.
The way human sight works 50 individual aircraft in close formation are much more easy to see than one, in the way that a flock of starlings becomes an object itself even though you only see individuals.. The big wing was always seen first (as others have pointed out) and that is a huge disadvantage. The fighters of the big wing were all SE fighters firing forward. Only the leading fighters can shoot the rest are just fodder if the wing is bounced. When spotting an enemy bomber formation once the decision is made to attack, who attacks what? Planes did get in each others way going for the same target. For the enemy escorts, 60 aircraft attacking is a problem, it is less of a problem when they approach like grenadiers on parade for the Queens birthday. Five squadrons of 12 aircraft attacking from different heights and directions would have been a much harder task for escorts and bomber crews.
The big wing theory doesn't even pass a basic scrutiny of what is a good idea. Stona has detailed the problems forming it, your enemy had frequently done what he wanted before you formed up. It was the military equivalent of sending a regiment into the Scottish highlands, you can crush any village you go into, but you never find your enemy who hits you when you are marching or sleeping.
The way human sight works 50 individual aircraft in close formation are much more easy to see than one, in the way that a flock of starlings becomes an object itself even though you only see individuals.. The big wing was always seen first (as others have pointed out) and that is a huge disadvantage. The fighters of the big wing were all SE fighters firing forward. Only the leading fighters can shoot the rest are just fodder if the wing is bounced. When spotting an enemy bomber formation once the decision is made to attack, who attacks what? Planes did get in each others way going for the same target. For the enemy escorts, 60 aircraft attacking is a problem, it is less of a problem when they approach like grenadiers on parade for the Queens birthday. Five squadrons of 12 aircraft attacking from different heights and directions would have been a much harder task for escorts and bomber crews.
Also, those on the outside of a formation are having to dedicate more brain-power to just maintaining that formation. The junior pilot usually goes into #2 position as its the easiest to maintain. In large formations you can see as the formation flies through an area of updraft, as the wave rolls through the aircraft one by one. Sitting at #4 is bad enough, but sitting ten aircraft out from the flight leader would have been near impossible without flying in 'route' formation (the 1 nm spacing that Biff spoke of).
The people who devised and decided this policy also believed that the tighter the formation the better, They would be impressed with The Red Arrows on display, the problem being that the red arrows are choreographed and rehearsed for months if not years and in battle the leader changes course in seconds as the situation changes.
It's referred to a 'parade' for a reason.
Anyone know exactly how tight a formation they were flying in combat?
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
There have been neuroscientists doing studies on the topic. Their conclusion (I can hunt up the journal articles if you want; I'm just working from news articles from Science and Nature) is that people cannot perform two actions requiring conscious behavior at once; they task switch. There are a couple of other issues that start showing up in the thirties, such as how fast eyes can refocus from close (reading instruments) to distant focus, and I've seen some reports that the speed at which people can task switch drops with age and stress.
If people could parallel process -- perform two acts requiring conscious thought simultaneously -- they could talk on a cell phone and drive with no loss of performance; they can't.
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They can, but not observing normal behaviour. I cannot drive at all with a mobile, I drove once using hands free, never again, but with people in the car it is no problem. The difference is the people in the car can see whats going on. If you speak on a mobile/ cell phone and don't give a damn about dropping out of the discussion for 15 seconds or swearing randomly it isn't a problem.
Close enough that they were concentrating more on not colliding with their formation colleagues than on what attacks the enemy might be developing. In the prewar RAF much emphasis was placed on flying tight formations and much pride taken in achieving them.
As I intimated above, this was to serve offensive tactics against the large 'fleets' of bombers expected to arrive from the continent (France or Germany depending on date) within hours of a war starting. They were not designed for the sort of air combat that in fact evolved and were completely unsuited to it.
Cheers
Steve
- Thread starter
- #19
Yes, in the defence of Britain ( and Malta, NW Australia as other examples) within the constraints imposed by 1930/40s technology. Detection times, endurances, distances and communications were such that it was just not possible to get up and assemble wings of several squadrons in time to make the interceptions in force that were the intention of the tactic.
The Luftwaffe, on occasion, did manage to make interceptions of American bombers in some considerable force, but then the distance travelled over hostile territory was much, much further and therefore took much longer. Plotting the progress of the formations sometimes enabled German controllers to estimate (you might say guess) the correct objective of the attacking force, enabling them to position substantial forces in position to intercept. They also had a good idea where the bombers would go after the attack, and once again this would be an egress taking hours and plotted throughout, not the minutes of an attack on Britain's southern aerodromes.
The idea of concentrating strong forces against an attacking formation makes perfect sense and is not in itself a bad idea. Understanding the situation in which this can be achieved was something that some in Fighter Command failed to do. In the context of the Battle of Britain, it was pretty much as you describe it.
Cheers
Steve
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