What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942?

[Admiral Beez]

Someone high up in Japan decides to wait until Spring 1942 to see what happens in Russia before commencing war against the USA, Britain and the DEI. This nameless person might have saved their nation, as by end of March 1942 the Germans have clearly overstepped themselves in Russia, with the failure of Operation Typhoon to take Moscow. With unrestricted U-Boat attacks I would say the USA will declare war on Germany without Japan's nudge by Jan-Feb 1942. We have to assume that Japan has managed to survive on the rapidly dwindling resources and industrial capacity it has unto this later date.

It's now April 1, 1942, 3 months, 25 days since the aborted Dec 7th attack on Pearl Harbour. On a Japanese military front beyond the near exhaustion of fuel for its ships, aircraft, vehicles forges and furnaces (yes, I know that's critically bad), not much has changed from Dec 1941, no new carriers have entered service, though the two Junyo class CVLs are close to completion. The first 150 or so Ki-44 fighters have entered service. The IJNS Yamato has now entered service. the Germans are bogged down in Russia where the Soviets are now receiving their first convoys of support from USA/Britain, Britain is gaining strength in North Africa and the North Atlantic, and most importantly the USA is now actively at war.

Looking at this new world situation in April 1942, what does Japan do? I think attacking Pearl Harbour would be insane.

 

[The Basket]

Japan has ready declared war on USA by invading Philippines

 

[SaparotRob]

Japan was in a similar situation as Germany. Strike before running out of resources and cash or give in to UK and USA demands. I don't think Japan would back down from their China acquisitions. Japan was in a far more weakened state in early 1945 and didn't back down then.
The only thing I can come up with is:
The USA is distracted and sending men, materiel and a buttload of anti-submarine destroyers to the ETO.
Japan does a repeat of December, 1941 thinking that the Americans wouldn't want a two front war and wouldn't want to fight all the way through the defensive rings around Japan. The Kantei Kessen (?) strategy. Perhaps a carrier or two as well. Yorktown and Hornet stay in the Atlantic.
A lot would depend on if Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Wake, Guam, and Samoa have been reinforced. I have to believe every American held possession would be seeing U-boats everywhere.
BTW the last time I tried one of these scenarios I lost Malta while defending Wake Island.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Strike before running out of resources and cash or give in to UK and USA demands. I don't think Japan would back down from their China acquisitions. Japan was in a far more weakened state in early 1945 and didn't back down then.

Backing down in China is their best option, which will require the ouster of China-hawks from the Japanese government (maybe a IJN coup) and some reasonably executable exit. That's the discussion that needs to take place between Japan and the US, someone in the US needs to offer Japan a face saving way out of China. Heck, let Japan keep Korea and Manchuria and open the oil taps again and Japan may well join the Wallies. Might as well make some use of those shiny new carriers.

 

[SaparotRob]

That would be interesting. As you just pointed out, Admiral Yamamoto was no fan of war with the U.S. The IJA did have a lot of "hot heads". Could this diplomatic path been derailed by a convenient assassination? Would the US even entertain any thoughts of accommodation?
In the grand scheme you might just be on to something. Sacrificing two places most Americans hadn't heard much of might be doable. I could see Winston Churchill going along with that quid pro quo "for the greater good". At least Korea. There had been much made of Japanese conquest in Manchuria in the press and newsreels.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I could see Winston Churchill going along with that quid pro quo "for the greater good". At least Korea. There had been much made of Japanese conquest in Manchuria in the press and newsreels.

Churchill was already or always worried about Soviet expansionism. So a strong Japan in Manchuria on Russia's backdoor would be positive to Churchill. Also independence initiatives in India, Burma and Malaya will be tamped down, and Hong Kong is safe, likely Suez too. The British Empire in the east may last another few decades compared to its collapse in 1947 to 1960.

 

[The Basket]

Well much better.

No pearl harbour means no midway.

So already starting on a good run.

I do not believe for one instant the Japanese would give up on China or Korea.

So war is inevitable somewhere down the line.

My war scenario would be wait for the Americans to try and liberate Philippines or cut off Australia from American supply.

Both would have support from ground based bombers and recon so already better off.

If Japan pushes to the Dutch East Indies then war with America is gonna happen.

Since Japan lost then any change in any outcome is going to be better since it's hardly going to be worse.

 

[Admiral Beez]

My war scenario would be wait for the Americans to try and liberate Philippines

If Japan's not yet at war with the USA I assume the Philippines don't need liberating.

 

[Shortround6]

No, but if the tensions are high will the US stop reinforcing the Philippines. Some of the B-17s at Pearl harbor were on their way to the Philippines. I don't know if the A-24s were already onboard ships on there their way when the Japanese attacked.
The Philippines got M3 tanks and M3 tank destroyers. Given another 2-4 months of training would the Philippine army been any better?

But I guess the question is whether they would have gone to war or not?

If the US and Britain had turned off the oil once could Japan trust them not to do it again?

 

[ThomasP]

The US demanded that Japan initiate the pull out from China "immediately" and gave Japan the option of doing so in a manner such that in 3 months time it would be clear that it would not be practical for them to reverse course and move back in to China even if they wanted to. Japan's reply was the time span required was "unreasonable", primarily due to the need to 'change the mind of the [Japanese] people', a requirement which was oriented more toward the 'manifest destiny' group in their government and military. The Japanese Ambassador communicated this to the US State Department several times in the last few month before the war, and the US knew they were serious about it due to the intercepted and decoded communiques (ie Magic) between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador to the US.

The more reasonable members of the Japanese government were willing to pull out for two reasons:

One reason is that they had no interest in going to war with the US (they knew that the odds were such that it was a forlorn hope - short of the US not having the will to fight, which they did not think was the case. (In early-1941 the Japanese military command had informed their government that if they were to have any chance of mounting serious operations against the US, the war would have to be started before they reached less than 12 months supply of oil. Japan waited until they were down to ~13 months supply.)

Another reason is that they realized that they had bitten off more than they could handle by trying to seriously invade large parts of China. The war in China was becoming less popular with the general public as time dragged on, and it was costing more and more in terms of troops and economics, with little or no return in sight. A large number of the powerful in Japanese society were already trying to figure how to get out of the quagmire that was the war in China.

I once again refer anyone interested to the link below:

"The PEARL HARBOR ATTACK HEARINGS"

It is mainly concerned with the lead up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the archive of intercepted diplomatic and military messages also provides a lot of information on the politics of the time as viewed from the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador to the US, as well as some of the related US views. This is shown by intercepted and decoded communications under the auspices of Magic et al. It is somewhat tedious reading and it helps if you make notes in order to build a timeline. It provides some insight into the diplomatic negotiations relative to China. It also, I think, answers the question of whether the US knew if and/or when an attack was coming against Pearl Harbor.

Although we cannot know for sure, based on what I read in the above records I would have to say that Japan would have been willing to pull out of China if they had been given a 'reasonable' amount of time (whatever that might turn out to be) as long as the US lifted the oil embargo and resumed the guarantee of oil supply at a reasonable price. As Admiral Beez points out above, a method of saving face might have gone a long way toward allowing the situation be resolved peacefully.

My more general opinion is the US movers and shakers (ie some of the government and many wealthy individuals) were not really interested in peace with Japan, they simply viewed Japan as a speed bump in the way of the US exploiting China economically.

Also, I would again like to suggest that anyone interested in the war in the PTO read the following book:

"War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by Edward S. Miller, published by the United States Naval Institute, and by Shinchosa Ltd. in Japanese

Although it is primarily concerned with the US perspective, it also necessarily includes some of the aspects of Japanese thinking on the subject.

 

[Shinpachi]

What Japan needed was immediate victory in China to secure stabler supply of resources.
Japan would have accelerate the production of liquid coal in Manchukuo to shut up the IJN's mouth.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Shinpachi,

Do you know if any of the people in power thought that an ~immediate victory in China was remotely possible?

 

[GrauGeist]

Japan's timing of the invasion of China was unfortunate, as the war between the communists and nationalists was put on hold to fight the intruder.
Had there not been two armed camps, the Chinese may not have been able to fend off the Japanese.

 

[The Basket]

WW2 for Japan started in 1853.

The moment Admiral Perry appeared.

Japan didnt want to be a colony and the West treated China not well.....unless you liked opium.

So if you follow the Japanese logic of fight everyone or become a western puppet then things make sense.

So the idea of leaving Korea to a western power so it can build up a massive naval fleet off the coast of Japan? Never!

A cornered fighting animal is not going to become passive as soon as its boxed in.

Japan ain't leaving no place or going anywhere.

Better fight the Russians or Americans in China than on the streets of Tokyo.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan's timing of the invasion of China was unfortunate, as the war between the communists and nationalists was put on hold to fight the intruder.
Had there not been two armed camps, the Chinese may not have been able to fend off the Japanese.

I disagree, had there not been two armed camps, I'd argue the Chinese would have been able to fend off the Japanese.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The US demanded that Japan initiate the pull out from China "immediately" and gave Japan the option of doing so in a manner such that in 3 months time it would be clear that it would not be practical for them to reverse course and move back in to China even if they wanted to. Japan's reply was the time span required was "unreasonable", primarily due to the need to 'change the mind of the [Japanese] people', a requirement which was oriented more toward the 'manifest destiny' group in their government and military. The Japanese Ambassador communicated this to the US State Department several times in the last few month before the war, and the US knew they were serious about it due to the intercepted and decoded communiques (ie Magic) between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador to the US.

The more reasonable members of the Japanese government were willing to pull out for two reasons:

Your post reinforces my belief that Japan just needs a face saving and reasonable exit from China. If Japan postpones its planned commencement of hostilities against the USA, Britain and DEI until spring 1942 they might get their chance. The US, UK and USSR is at war with Germany and their erstwhile "ally" is on the ropes. Japan needs to make an offer to join their former British allies.

 

[Shinpachi]

Hey Shinpachi,

Do you know if any of the people in power thought that an ~immediate victory in China was remotely possible?

It's no one but Hirohito himself that believed the victory.
As long as Japan had been able to concentrate upon the war in China, not relying on the oil from the U.S. of course, the war would have ended with Japan's victory in a few years because the western countries, including Soviet Union, were busy about the "2nd Great War" in Europe. That would have been the same case for the Japanese as the Great War.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It's no one but Hirohito himself that believed the victory.
As long as Japan had been able to concentrate upon the war in China, not relying on the oil from the U.S. of course,

But to what end beyond more barren territory and unwilling people to subjugate? There's no known or exploited oil, tin, rubber, copper or aluminum in 1930's China. And China is purely an IJA affair, the IJN wants some fame and input.

 

[Shinpachi]

Please do not forget that Manchuria was also a barren land till 1905 when Japan began investments to develop and the western countries like the U.S. began to show keen interest.

Japan's National General Mobilization Law issued on April 1, 1938 not only banned the civilian use of strategic materials like steel, copper, zinc, lead, rubber, wool etc but promoted recycling these materials for the war in China. This was thought enough because Manchukuo was also growing as the logistic center to supply food, fuel, clothes and weapons for IJA in China.

And China is purely an IJA affair, the IJN wants some fame and input.

That would be why IJN claimed its 1942 turning point theory that the US Navy would exceed IJN in the number of warships after the year 1942.
December 1941 was neither too early nor too late for IJN.

 

[GrauGeist]

I disagree, had there not been two armed camps, I'd argue the Chinese would have been able to fend off the Japanese.

The war had been going for almost a decade before the Japanese invaded.
The Nationalists and Communists were being supplied and trained by other nations and were able to resist the Japanese at a higher level than had they been a unified nation under one leader and at (relative) peace.
I say relative, because the regional warlords were always causing trouble regardless of who was in charge.

So Japan had to contend, in essence, with two Chinas.