What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention? (1 Viewer)

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Akuma

Airman 1st Class
252
140
May 26, 2021
There are actually two questions here. The discussion of this topic by it's nature must be highly speculative but firstly, I would like to know what happened to the reports coming out of China after the middle of July 1940 about the new fighter that the Japanese were fielding. We know that Chennault was sending in all the information he could gather on Japanese bombers, on the Ki-27, the A5M and the little he could scrounge on the A6M. It is a matter of record that General George Marshall listened and took what Chennault was saying seriously. There are reports of other U.S. people in China doing the same and of other highly placed peoplein the U.S. getting that information. But ultimately no one did anything. Why?
Secondly, if the reports on the A6M had been taken seriously what could have been done?
 
It is a matter of record that General George Marshall listened and took what Chennault was saying seriously. There are reports of other U.S. people in China doing the same and of other highly placed peoplein the U.S. getting that information. But ultimately no one did anything. Why?
Secondly, if the reports on the A6M had been taken seriously what could have been done?
I suspect that racial prejudice and the mythology of oriental technical ineptitude was so pervasive in the ranks that any attempt from "top down" to encourage serious consideration of "Buck Rogers stuff" from a known insubordinate maverick would have a tough time trickling down. "What can the General be thinking of?? Brainwashed, maybe? We know anything that hot from the Japs 'sgotta be BS!!"
 
I suspect that racial prejudice and the mythology of oriental technical ineptitude was so pervasive in the ranks that any attempt from "top down" to encourage serious consideration of "Buck Rogers stuff" from a known insubordinate maverick would have a tough time trickling down. "What can the General be thinking of?? Brainwashed, maybe? We know anything that hot from the Japs 'sgotta be BS!!"
There have been some good histories documenting prejudices after December 7, but there are none that I know of that address the level of prejudice, in the years leading up to world war two, required to create that sort of myth.
 
There have been some good histories documenting prejudices after December 7, but there are none that I know of that address the level of prejudice, in the years leading up to world war two, required to create that sort of myth.
My parents grew up in the 20s and 30s, (my mother was born in Japan and left at age 9 in 1933, and my paternal grandfather was born in Tokyo and left in 1908 at age 14.) They were both well aware of "Japan bashing" in the US in the interwar period. If you're not aware of this, maybe you need to do a little more research. It's history and it's not hidden. My mom, despite her caucasian status was teased unmercifully, shunned and called "Jap Squaw", "Geisha Girl" and "Mama San" by her classmates in a small town in Maine, and later in Vermont.
The very senior Navy dental surgeon who extracted my impacted molars was, in his first career, a Wildcat pilot in VF10, "the Grim Reapers", and he said that the scuttlebutt in flight training (pre Pearl Harbor) was "The Japs are lousy pilots and their planes are junk!" When PH happened, the reports back of Japanese aircraft performance were dismissed as delusional, and they were still being trained to do "round 'n round" dogfighting. First contact was a rude shock, but they'd been given an introduction to the Thach weave at Pearl before embarking for the Solomons, so their losses weren't too bad.
He had a huge scar on his left forearm where he'd lost his grip on the landing gear crank while taking off from Cactus in the midst of a strafing attack, and it gave him a dual compound fracture as it unwound. He managed to evade the Zeros, "single-handing" the plane with gear and flaps down, but absorbing a lot of lead. When the raid was over, he managed to get the plane safely on the ground, but it was a write-off. The ship sent an SBD to collect him after the medics patched his arm up. He kept a plaque on his wall paying homage to " The Grumman Iron Works" with a picture of his shot up Wildcat.
 
This is circa 1939 - when Australia's 'fighter' force consisted of 3 Bristol Bulldogs and 58 Hawker Demons...

Scan0583.jpg


(Compagnoni tapes)
 
There are actually two questions here. The discussion of this topic by it's nature must be highly speculative but firstly, I would like to know what happened to the reports coming out of China after the middle of July 1940 about the new fighter that the Japanese were fielding. We know that Chennault was sending in all the information he could gather on Japanese bombers, on the Ki-27, the A5M and the little he could scrounge on the A6M. It is a matter of record that General George Marshall listened and took what Chennault was saying seriously. There are reports of other U.S. people in China doing the same and of other highly placed peoplein the U.S. getting that information. But ultimately no one did anything. Why?
Secondly, if the reports on the A6M had been taken seriously what could have been done?

Chennault arrived in China in 1937. I believe the Zero's first operations were in July 1940. We started sending aircraft to China in late 1940/ 41. Flying Tigers recruited in April 1941, started training in August, went operational in December, AFTER Pearl Harbor.

Aside from getting individual units to adopt "boom and zoom" tactics earlier, in hindsight, would it had really made a difference? The only thing I see that "should have" been done was building up forces in the Philippines but I think everyone knew, from Roosevelt down, that war with Japan would eventually come.

Some of the AAF units who had to fight the Zero with P-39s and P-40s actually held the line until the P-38 arrived in the SWP in numbers. After that the tide turned quickly.

So in the bigger picture, even if "people listened," given the time span of events, what really "could have" been done???
 
My parents grew up in the 20s and 30s, (my mother was born in Japan and left at age 9 in 1933, and my paternal grandfather was born in Tokyo and left in 1908 at age 14.) They were both well aware of "Japan bashing" in the US in the interwar period. If you're not aware of this, maybe you need to do a little more research. It's history and it's not hidden. My mom, despite her caucasian status was teased unmercifully, shunned and called "Jap Squaw", "Geisha Girl" and "Mama San" by her classmates in a small town in Maine, and later in Vermont.
The very senior Navy dental surgeon who extracted my impacted molars was, in his first career, a Wildcat pilot in VF10, "the Grim Reapers", and he said that the scuttlebutt in flight training (pre Pearl Harbor) was "The Japs are lousy pilots and their planes are junk!" When PH happened, the reports back of Japanese aircraft performance were dismissed as delusional, and they were still being trained to do "round 'n round" dogfighting. First contact was a rude shock, but they'd been given an introduction to the Thach weave at Pearl before embarking for the Solomons, so their losses weren't too bad.
He had a huge scar on his left forearm where he'd lost his grip on the landing gear crank while taking off from Cactus in the midst of a strafing attack, and it gave him a dual compound fracture as it unwound. He managed to evade the Zeros, "single-handing" the plane with gear and flaps down, but absorbing a lot of lead. When the raid was over, he managed to get the plane safely on the ground, but it was a write-off. The ship sent an SBD to collect him after the medics patched his arm up. He kept a plaque on his wall paying homage to " The Grumman Iron Works" with a picture of his shot up Wildcat.
The kind of things your parents mentioned is the kind of stuff I've suspected but have never found actual admissions or evidence of. In the histories I've read it's mentioned as a 'after PH attitude' while I feel certain it existed well before that. It's as if everyone knows it was there but no one wants to talk about it. Your reference of the post PH attitudes about Japanese aircraft performance is well documented but what I'm trying to find is documentation of those same attitudes before PH. The U.S. leadership was receiving reports about the Japanese aircraft abilities from presumably trusted sources. I'm feel fairly certain they informed others about these; yet it seems nothing was done. Did their prejudices rise to the level of denying capabilities that they were certain American aircraft manufacturers had? I've come across pre-war references where Americans believed that both the British and Germans were capable of designing 'buck rogers' aircraft; so why not the Japanese? I'd like to find some detailed references to the kind of pre-war 'Scuttlebutt' your dental surgeon was talking about.
 
Chennault arrived in China in 1937. I believe the Zero's first operations were in July 1940. We started sending aircraft to China in late 1940/ 41. Flying Tigers recruited in April 1941, started training in August, went operational in December, AFTER Pearl Harbor.

Aside from getting individual units to adopt "boom and zoom" tactics earlier, in hindsight, would it had really made a difference? The only thing I see that "should have" been done was building up forces in the Philippines but I think everyone knew, from Roosevelt down, that war with Japan would eventually come.

Some of the AAF units who had to fight the Zero with P-39s and P-40s actually held the line until the P-38 arrived in the SWP in numbers. After that the tide turned quickly.

So in the bigger picture, even if "people listened," given the time span of events, what really "could have" been done???
While the Zero was a high performance aircraft that debuted in China in July 1940 and was operating there for some 17 months before Pearl Harbor, it should be remembered that the Ki-27 and the A5M were also advanced for that time and had also been operational in China for some time before. I'm under the impression that their performance was denied the same as that of the Zero initially was. I'd like to know why? If a country comes out with a capable aircraft isn't it logical that they could come out with improved versions or even a departure with much improved performance? If I remember correctly the Fw-190 was a bit of a surprise but not so much so as to deny it's possibility from an industry that had already produced the Bf-109. We know that the U.S. Military was at least considering improved performance aircraft in the late 30s. Again I thought that budget restraints were starting to be lifted during that period.
I'd like to think that if there was more trust in the reports on Japanese aviation capabilities those U.S. aircraft being considered would have been developed more rapidly.
 
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Sad to say, but therenwas always a predujice against the "yellow devils".
California's history is full of cases where Chinese miners were persecuted.
The Japanese (who were mostly farmers) came under the same scrutiny and bias prior to the war.

What did NOT help the Japanese-Americans, was the Naiihau Incident immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
Sad to say, but therenwas always a predujice against the "yellow devils".
California's history is full of cases where Chinese miners were persecuted.
The Japanese (who were mostly farmers) came under the same scrutiny and bias prior to the war.

What did NOT help the Japanese-Americans, was the Naiihau Incident immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
I've read one or two articles about that incident. It's the attitudes that seem unbelievable.
 
I've read one or two articles about that incident. It's the attitudes that seem unbelievable.
With the ferocity that Japan was consuming the Orient, I cannot beleive that the USAAC (or USN) believed that the Japanese were idiots.
Rather, I feel that the disinformation (as wrong as it was) was intended to instill confidence by belittling the adversary.

Truth be told, people were scared sh!tless of the Japanese and had no way of knowing who/where would be next.
 
With the ferocity that Japan was consuming the Orient, I cannot beleive that the USAAC (or USN) believed that the Japanese were idiots.
Rather, I feel that the disinformation (as wrong as it was) was intended to instill confidence by belittling the adversary.

Truth be told, people were scared sh!tless of the Japanese and had no way of knowing who/where would be next.
It sounds as if that disinformation went hand in hand with a sort of anti-Asian prejudice.
 
If you've seen a wartime era cartoon, you'll see that they made Germans, Italians and Japanese out to be idiots.

While I can understand the motive behind it, it was woefully misleading.
Downplaying (or avoiding to acknowledge the enemy's strength) may lend to an idea of superiority, it undermined the soldier's (or aviator's) ability to be cautious and deal with the enemy as a dangerous adversary (which they certainly were).
That, at least in my mind, was a contributing factor in many casualties early on.
 
If you've seen a wartime era cartoon, you'll see that they made Germans, Italians and Japanese out to be idiots.

While I can understand the motive behind it, it was woefully misleading.
Downplaying (or avoiding to acknowledge the enemy's strength) may lend to an idea of superiority, it undermined the soldier's (or aviator's) ability to be cautious and deal with the enemy as a dangerous adversary (which they certainly were).
That, at least in my mind, was a contributing factor in many casualties early on.
You're right about the undermining of caution and prudence. I'd like to know why people apparently believed that nonsense.
 
You're right about the undermining of caution and prudence. I'd like to know why people apparently believed that nonsense.
Human nature.

Dehumanizing a class, race or nation gives a sense of superiority.

That tactic is about as old as the Human race itself.

Has anyone learned from the countless lessons over the eons?

No. No, they have not...
 
Chennault arrived in China in 1937. I believe the Zero's first operations were in July 1940. We started sending aircraft to China in late 1940/ 41. Flying Tigers recruited in April 1941, started training in August, went operational in December, AFTER Pearl Harbor.
From the various Flying Tiger books I read oh so long ago, I don't believe the AVG actually encountered any actual Zeros. They were operating in IJAF territory and often encountered "the new retractable gear KI27". I think that was the KI43, which in the swirl of a dogfight could be easily confused with a Zero if you've only seen the recognition posters.
IIRC, Nationalist Chinese troops captured a Zero and Chenault traveled to that location and inspected it, and he described it to USAAF, probably in similar glowing terms to what our own Greg P uses when describing his museum's Zero.
Given that Chenault was driven out of USAAC for the heresy of questioning sacred doctrine, his input from overseas would likely not be greeted with open arms and willing ears, especially as it flew in the face of prevailing bias.
 
Aside from getting individual units to adopt "boom and zoom" tactics earlier, in hindsight, would it had really made a difference? The only thing I see that "should have" been done was building up forces in the Philippines but I think everyone knew, from Roosevelt down, that war with Japan would eventually come.
Two tips from Chenault that could have made a big difference if they had been implemented in good time throughout the PTO:
1) Implement boom and zoom training in addition to round 'n round fighting, and don't forget deflection shooting.
2) Set up a robust network of ground observers with good communications around every airfield and likely target. Slow climbing American fighters need plenty of warning to get into boom and zoom position.
Many of the early days losses were the result of climbing into the fight from below.

We didn't have to wait for Pearl Harbor to do these things. Just think if MacArthur had a half hour warning of the Japanese raid on day one.
 
While the Zero was a high performance aircraft that debuted in China in July 1940 and was operating there for some 17 months before Pearl Harbor, it should be remembered that the Ki-27 and the A5M were also advanced for that time and had also been operational in China for some time before. I'm under the impression that their performance was denied the same as that of the Zero initially was. I'd like to know why? If a country comes out with a capable aircraft isn't it logical that they could come out with improved versions or even a departure with much improved performance? If I remember correctly the Fw-190 was a bit of a surprise but not so much so as to deny it's possibility from an industry that had already produced the Bf-109. We know that the U.S. Military was at least considering improved performance aircraft in the late 30s. Again I thought that budget restraints were starting to be lifted during that period.
I'd like to think that if there was more trust in the reports on Japanese aviation capabilities those U.S. aircraft being considered would have been developed more rapidly.
Again, even "IF" this intelligence was properly disseminated and taken seriously, we were still in peacetime. Yes, war was knocking on the door but I really doubt it would have made a major impact. So you knew your potential enemy had this highly maneuverable fighter with an insane range. You had 7 fighter aircraft either in production or being developed during this time (P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, F4U, F6F). Do you stop the presses and re-evaluate or press on with your original spec? Knowledge gained by knowing the capabilities of the Zero or other Japanese aircraft wasn't going to have a quick impact on what was already in production. The only US fighter aircraft I'm aware of that had production changes made based on combat reports and input from combat pilots was the F6F (cockpit mod and more powerful engines, April 1942) and even then, the first Hellcat with these improvements didn't see combat until September 1943.
 

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