Why does the German Army like 20mm auto cannons so much? (1 Viewer)

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Here some info on the Mg 301 MV-1000m/s(3281 ft/sec),cyclic rate of fire 1000 rds/min,weight 55kg(121.3lbs)muzzle energy 5.2 mt(37612 ft lbs),gas operated with horizontal wedge lock and shortened bolt travel belt one side only,electric primer.MG 213a 20mm Further development of MG301 employing Krieghoff's system.By Mauser at direction of Air Force High Command Characteristics same as MG 301 Modification of MG301 for Functional and manufacturing reasons.Belt feed right or left Several Experimental Specimens produced.This from the Book German Aircraft guns ww1-ww2.
 
Hi Vanir

havent seen you aropund that much, but perhaps youve just been lucky we havent crossed paths lately..... good to hear from you anyway.

Oh mate I'm a boring fight. Even if you think you win, I just leave. I don't want to play king of the castle with you, but I'll tell you I'm as often wrong as the next person but I always know what I'm talking about. If I've had problems with you in the past, it is wholly because you took exception to that piece of democratic freedom.
 
Looks like the missing link between the 2cm Flak38 and the 1960s Rh202 cannon. I'm surprised the Heer didn't adopt it towards the end of WWII. A twin Mg301 would have a greater rate of fire then the widely used flakvierling and you'd probably need only half as many crew members.
 
Oh mate I'm a boring fight. Even if you think you win, I just leave. I don't want to play king of the castle with you, but I'll tell you I'm as often wrong as the next person but I always know what I'm talking about. If I've had problems with you in the past, it is wholly because you took exception to that piece of democratic freedom.

I dont think we had any problems, just saying hi having not seen you in a while
 
Source. Zaloga and Ness. Red Army Handbook 1939 - 1945.
20mm. 4.7%
37mm. 10%
50mm short. 7.5%
50mm long. 54.3%
75mm. .1%
88mm. 3.4%
105mm. 2.9%

It's readily apparent the German 5cm/60 cannon was a serious tank killer. However I find it interesting that almost 5% of Soviet tank losses were caused by 20mm fire.
 
It's readily apparent the German 5cm/60 cannon was a serious tank killer. However I find it interesting that almost 5% of Soviet tank losses were caused by 20mm fire.
Lots of old/light tanks still in service ? T-26 or BT series should be vulnerable to 2cm guns if coming too close.
 
2cm PzPatr standard AP can manage up to 24mm penetration on case hardened steel at 90-degress, 12mm at 60-degrees (a good hit angle in combat). Only the thinnest, lightest tank armour is going to get reliably penetrated and things like netting and external gear will really soak them up and double protection.

You want Mk101 style 3cm minimum against case hardened tank armour, but you'd go at SPG with 2cm batteries.

Oh hey, but one of the good things about older tanks from an enemy's point of view is spalling. Expecially things like T-26 with rivets.
 
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Sure if you have a choice. But sometimes you don't get a choice.

I had an Air Force guy tell me the A-10 30mm cannon chews through modern tank armor by landing multiple hits in close proximity. Perhaps the WWII era flakvierling works the same way vs 45mm thick T-34 armor.
 
Just remember that airborne AT is more an implied threat than a real threat. The most effective airborne tank killers at Kursk were HS129, equipped with a high powered 20mm cannon. There is no doubt this weapon could in theory penetrate the deck armour of a T-34. However claims of the LW AT aircraft are grossly overblown, as are those made by the VVS against the Heer. Instead of the 500+ tanks destroyed by the LW, as claimed, it appears maybe 150-200 were actually destroyed. For the Soviets, instead of the 400+ tanks that they claimed were destroyed by sturmoviks....maybe 90 at most.

In 1944, Allied claims of destroying over 100 tanks attached to the Lehr Division are grossly overblown. instead, prior to Falaise, maybe 2 or 3 tanks were destroyed by direct air attack. What did suffer were the soft skinned vehicles and light AFVs, like Halftracks and the like.


Its not that airborne AT threats in WWII were not crucial, they were, but they just were not that effective against fully armoured targets. What they did do was to interdict, and restrict flexibility for a ground force threatened by such attack. The tanks represent just a small fraction of the force structure.....if the force canot move by day because of the threat of air attack its mobility options are severely restricted. This is basically what happened to the germans at Normandy
 
That's not surprising since the LW had so few dedicated AT aircraft.

The Me-110 could carry a 3cm Mk101 cannon but I doubt more then a couple dozen were employed in the AT role. Cannon armed Ju-87Gs probably amounted to less then 300 total aircraft. Perhaps 800 cannon armed Hs-129B2 and Hs-129B3 aircraft saw combat. 1,100 cannon armed AT aircraft would be a considerable number if available for a single battle but it doesn't amount to much when spread all over Europe, Russia and North Africa over a 3 year period.

Not that this has anything to do with Heer use of high velocity 20mm cannon against ground targets. :)
 
The Mk101 was adapted to a couple of Me-110E of ZG26 with Luftflotte 2 (kommando tunisia/fliegerfürer afrika presumably) but was being produced for the Hs129B. Later they got the Mk103 and FlaK based Bk3.7 option on both the Henschel B-2 and 110G-2 as standard kits. They're both real good against light tanks but would have serious troubles with something like a T-34/85.

There was no special high velocity 2cm I can think of on the Hs129 at Kursk. These should've had Bk3.7 and Mk101/103, standard armament is 2MG151/2MG17.
The Soviets were trying out their new Nudelmans on sturmoviks and even put a few in escorting Yaks. Surplus LaGG were fitted with upgraded 23mm nose guns about that time period and reportedly also used as sturmovik escorts, as were La5 strapped with bombs.
German reports of these sturmovik formations battle effectiveness against tanks is noteworthy, I've read field diaries describing the Il2 circling tank lines and making repeated passes at the rear/upper armour until their ammo ran out or all the tanks were destroyed, despite being continually pounced on by German fighters. They attacked without regard for Luftwaffe local air superiority and were very effective at disrupting formations for infantry assaults, these were the kind of comments I read. What I read for equipment used in the field is that attacks by sturmoviks on tank formations uses big Nudelmans, and AP/shaped charge rocket volleys, and canister munitions, and bombs, and repeated strafing in concert with rocket attacks.

As for a rocket attack, say for a Typhoon volley I've read such colourful terms as "equivalent to a battleship broadside" in general publication. When a vet Sherman commander from D-day was being interviewed he talked about three Tigers up on a hill that held them up from breaking out a whole afternoon. He said the next day Typhoons destroyed them in a rocket attack. He didn't make it sound like they drove away.
And finally there are photos roaming around with tanks missing turrets and the caption claims it was an Allied aircraft rocket attack that did it.

I agree that a lot of aerial tank kill claims appear to be grossly overstated, however some of these weapons used are quite capable of reliably destroying tanks...conditionally speaking.
 
Rear of tank not heavily armored nor is the back deck nor turret roof. 20mm adequate, multiple 20mm more than adequate until later vehicles were armored better. Then 30mm a more realistic weapon.
Some vehicles blow up after catching fire due to engine area hits. Fuel then was usually gas except some Shermans used by the UK (and USMC in the Pacific) and the T-34 and later Soviet tanks. Maybe the lighter tanks taking direct hits turret roof could blow due to ammo hits. Even the Tigers and Panthers were vulnerable to rear deck engine grate hits. You can see mods of plates fitted above the grates to reduce this, late 44.
Open hatches are not proof against anything
Rockets are pretty nasty things though not particularly accurate.

For ground mount weapons, the lower hull side is generally very vulnerable if you can get shots in there. Everything cannot be well armored if mobility is a concern.


Most of the blown up/missing turret vehicles were crew-destroyed to prevent Allied use.....clue would be no corpses or body part in the pictures. If you see body parts, then the vehicle is no doubt a combat casualty of some kind.

Air attack forces the tanks to button up which greatly reduces crew effectiveness.
 
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The first reported usage of the MK 101 on the Bf 110 was with the experimental Zerstörer C-6 (12 built). Intended for Anti-shipping strikes it did not really prove to be successful. I don't know what happene to these 12 aircraft - I assume rebuilt as standard fighter-bomber.
 
This is a direct quote I have taken from another website (The Dupuy Institute) authored by Chris Mitchell , a moderator of that site, and author and associate of Zetterling. It highlights some of the problems and information issues that need to be considered with any reports about tank Busting aircraft......

"I have been asked over the year(s) by Niklas Zetterling, Jeff Duquette and others about the particular stories about the effectiveness of the Hs-129 B-2s and Ju-87 G-1s in tank busting, particularly on July 8. Nearing completion of this section in my book, I am now prepared to discuss it.
There are two seperate stories of German tank busting that circulate about Kursk. First is the Rudel story that on or about 7 July he personally killed 12 tanks with the new experimental Ju-87 G-1 (the Stuka with the 37mm cannons) and this lead to the formation and use of the tank busting stuka squadrons.
The second story is the Maj. Bruno Meyer story about seeing a Soviet tank brigade coming out of the woods at Gostishchevo on July 8 and calling in all five squadrons of the IV/9th Ground Assualt Wing of Hs-129s B-2 (the Hs-129 armed with the 30mm cannon) and halting the attack by destroying 40-50 Soviet tanks in a short time

This story was first published by Hans Seidemann (VIII Air Corps commander at Kursk) in 1947 as part of his write-up he did for the US Army on air operations at Kursk.

It this story, he clearly identifies the time and date (afternoon of July 8), the location ("from the woods east of GOSTCHEVO station"), the unit ("4th Group/9th Antitank Ground Attack Wing"), the German air response ("in a short time, they were on their way to meet the enemy force"), the duration of the battle("after about one hour") and the result ("approximately 40 tanks had been knocked out") and its effect ("the remainder of the enemy force discontinued the attack and turned around"). Furthermore, he identifies elsewhere the strength of the antitank unit as 60 planes.

This story has the advantage of being specific enough that one can acually compare it to the opposing side's records (unlike most war stories).

There is some other confirming evidence for it in the German records. Primarily there is a claim in the VIII Air Corps records that they destroyed 84 tanks on the 8th, including 11 burned and damaged 21 tanks on July 8 and the comment for that day that the "The initial action by the antitank aircraft squadron was quite effective. Given the number of burning [enemy] tanks reported, it must be assumed that there was an even greater number that were just knocked out (more than 6 hits reported), Especially in the late afternoon attack from the northeast against SS Reich and the evening tank battle, the Russians were stopped and driven back."

The VIII Air Corps also reports the loss of two Hs-129s on this day

Over the years, an expanded version of this story has appeared, I gather first from a German source that I have not identified. It shows up in Robin Cross' "Citadel: The Battle of Kursk" book (pages 198-199) and in a number of web sites about Hs-129s. A German site that has the story is linked below, and it appears to have been drawn from the same source as the Robin Cross version.

The expanded version of the story has Major Bruno Meyer flying reconnaissance in the morning, when "as the morning mist clears" he sees 60 tanks and their supporting infantry emerge from the woods. He calls in all the units of his group with the lead elements arriving from Mikoyanovka airfield within 15 minutes. They are supported by Fw-190s lead by Maj. Alfred Druschel (CO 1st Ground Attack Wing), who bomb the supporting infantry. They usually have the battle resolved in an hour, with Cross' claiming six tanks "within a few minutes" and 50 tanks within an hour. Most accounts claim 40-50 tanks. All the accounts place the attack on the flank of the SS Panzer Corps or the woods near Gostishchevo. The account often provide a detail OB of five squadrons with 16 planes each.

This is clearly the same story, with some detail added.

The German language version of the story is at:
http://www.wehrtechnik.net/wehrtechnik/henschel_129.html

Now, before we take a look at the Soviet data...there are a few problems with the German reports.

First, this attack is noted in the German SS Panzer Corps reports as an attack at 1145 with 20-40 tanks and weak infantry units through the ravine from Visloye and Ternovka to the west agains the defenses at the Belgorod-Kursk highway.

Visloye and Ternovka are both in front of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This raises questions at to both the time and size of the attack (and therefore casualties).

Next, the sources I have located indicate that the IV/9th SG was created 18 October 1943 and its commander was Bruno Meyer. The III Pz Corps records do make reference to an panzer command as part of the 1st Ground Assualt Wing, but I do not know who commanded it, or what it consisted of. There were two AT squadrons (the 4th and 8th) armed with Hs-129s in the 1st SG. There is clear evidence that the 4.(Pz)/2 SG was also there as was the Pz. Sqdn/51 JG. All four of these squadrons were later used to create the IV/9 SG along with the 8.(Pz)/2 SG. I do not have clear evidence than this last unit was at Kursk, but I assume it was.

A good bio of Bruno Meyer would be of use here.

Third, the base listings I have put these Hs-129 squadrons at Varvanovka, not Mikoyanovka".....(to be continued)
 
(Continuing on)...."Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.

This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).

There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.

Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).


The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.

The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.

As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude."

Niklas Zetterling in that thread comments on the misinformation put out by Glantz and Carell on this incident. He writes "If I remember correctly, Glantz used this version and refered to Paul Carell".

Lawrence replies"

The actual passage in Glantz states (page 135):


quote:
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Burdeiny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps fared little better. It jumped off at 1200 hours, and after limited progress suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment, losing 50 tanks in the process. German aerial reconnaissance had detected Burdeiny's concentration of armor, and four squadrons of Henschel HS-109 aircraft, specially equipped with 30mm automatic cannon for antitank missions, broke up the Soviet attack, perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland. This unprecedented action, in which a tank attack was halted by air power alone, set a dangerous precedent. Indeed, throughout the battle, Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such lossees. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration.
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Now, I have a number of problems with this passage....

1. They did not loose 50 tanks. The Corps probably lost as reported 11 tanks on this day.

2. I do not have confirmation as to whether the AT Air Group had 4 or 5 squadrons.

3. The planes were Hs-129s, vice HS-109s.

4. Not sure of the details about "perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland."

5. The actual description of the operations from the 2nd Gds Tank Corps operational report 182, 0700 July 9, 1943 (page Fond: 2nd Guards Tank Corps, Opis: 1, Delo: 32, Page: 187):

"26th Guards Tank Brigade cross the Lipovyi Donets at 1200 in the area of Visloye, along with 1 regiment/4th Gds Motorized Brigade and 89th Gds Rifle Division, attacked height 209.5. The brigade, despite heavy enemy fire, together with 89th Gds Rifle Division, took height 209.5, after which the enemy launched armored counterattacks, supported by aircraft in groups of 40-50 planes. 89th Gds Rifle Division fell back on Visloye and after an hour 26th Gds Tank Brigade's tanks, having taken losses, fell back on the eastern slopes of height 209.5, where they consolidated and continued to fight the enemy.
At 1800 on July 8 26th Gds Tank Brigade attacked height 209.5 for the second time, but was unsuccesful."

The SS records support this account. Therefore, I must take exception with the conclusion that "a tank attack was halted by air power alone".

Furthermore, this statement about halting a tank attack with air power alone is contradicted by Glantz in his second sentence where he states "suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment"

6. For number of reasons, I disagree with the conclusion that this "set a dangerous precedent." and that "Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such losses. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration."

While the Soviet reserves regularly did travel at night...they also moved surprisingly fast. Any delays in the arrival of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army could be better explained by the date they were ordered to depart and the fact that they sent the 5th Guards Tank Army off to Oboyan first before they turned it around and sent it to Prokhorovka. As it was, it appears that the Soviet units had a tendancy to go into battle too quickly from the march and may have done better if they rested and prepared. I do not think that the Hs-129 attack on the 8th of July was a major factor in causing the Soviet Army to conduct night marches, as they had been doing this for a while as a matter of course".
 
General von Mellenthin of XLVIII Panzerkorps wrote of the second day of fighting near Kursk, "...a large number of (Grossdeutscheland's) panzers were blown up by mines or destroyed by (enemy) aerial attacks."

This is a pretty damning description by a chief of staff in the field, I read the distinct inferrance routine aerial attacks at this time were highly dangerous to tanks.



You know what though, this gives me an idea of how the respective men in the field are drawing their own descriptions. You see the Germans are probably describing their experience of soviet tank busting in front of their eyes, those Nudelmans really mess up a PzIV if you hit it anywhere but the front, a PzIII stands up better to the back/sides, so the Germans probably use their experience to describe their own presumed Soviet experience of their own tank busting efforts

but on average, the Mk101 is probably doing more temporary disabling than serious damage compared to 37mm Nudelmans, and a T-34 stands up way better than a PzIV to aerial attack. The whole thing about the PzIV is being lightened on the sides and back so the front could be an assault facing, it was never an MBT.
 
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The Me-110 was designed for optional use of the high velocity 3cm Mk101 cannon right from the beginning. Here is a picture of a Me-110B with Mk101 cannon installation. I assume the Mk101 cannon installation was accomplished with a field kit.
Messerschmitt Me 110dj_f4.htm
m101b.jpg

Not that the Me-110 has anything to do with use of auto cannons by the Heer.



Bronco Models CB-35057 German 2cm Flakvierling 38 w/Sd.Ah.52 Carriage Trailer
cb35057pic01.gif

The flakvierling was small enough that it could be easily dug into a defensive position. Heer doctrine called for them to be placed on the flanks. They were (hopefully) out of small arms range and able to catch enemy infantry attacks in a cross fire. I suppose that also allowed enemy tanks to be engaged on the thinner side armor.

Heer doctrine also stressed firing at the turret ring of tanks with armor too heavy to be penetrated. I think American Bradley IFV gunners did the same thing when engaging Iraqi tanks at close range during 1991.
 
Rear of tank not heavily armored nor is the back deck nor turret roof. 20mm adequate, multiple 20mm more than adequate until later vehicles were armored better. Then 30mm a more realistic weapon.
Some vehicles blow up after catching fire due to engine area hits. Fuel then was usually gas except some Shermans used by the UK (and USMC in the Pacific) and the T-34 and later Soviet tanks. Maybe the lighter tanks taking direct hits turret roof could blow due to ammo hits. Even the Tigers and Panthers were vulnerable to rear deck engine grate hits. You can see mods of plates fitted above the grates to reduce this, late 44.
Open hatches are not proof against anything
Rockets are pretty nasty things though not particularly accurate.

For ground mount weapons, the lower hull side is generally very vulnerable if you can get shots in there. Everything cannot be well armored if mobility is a concern.


Most of the blown up/missing turret vehicles were crew-destroyed to prevent Allied use.....clue would be no corpses or body part in the pictures. If you see body parts, then the vehicle is no doubt a combat casualty of some kind.

Air attack forces the tanks to button up which greatly reduces crew effectiveness.


If the explosion has enough power to lift the many tons of a turret off it's turret ring, you're not going to see any reconizable human remains in a photograph. We're talking about a trememdous overpressure to lift a turret, it would turn a body to mush.
 

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