Not saying the British should have adopted the TBD in 1938. Just that it could have pushed some people to think that perhaps the Albacore was not really that good and idea and they needed to get moving on what would become the Barracuda.
Which people do you think needed pushed?
I don't think that you truly appreciate the problems caused by the "strained and antagonistic" (Roskill) relationship that existed between the RN and the RAF in relation to naval aviation in the 1930s. There are no two ways about it, not having complete control over both ship & aircraft development, as in the USN & IJN, definitely held the RN back. Blaming the aircraft companies is an easy way out.
The problems are set out in detail in chapters VII &XIII of Roskill's "Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939".
Looking at the Albacore development story in more detail, it starts with the issue of Spec M.7/36 on 8/9/36 for a single or twin engined Torpedo, Spotter, Recce aircraft with an enclosed crew cockpit to succeed the Swordfish then entering production. Around the same time, 10 July 1936, Spec O.8/36 was issued for a Dive Bomber, Recce aircraft. On 11 Feb 1937 both were combined into Spec 41/36. These Specs seem only to have been issued to Fairey.
Fairey produced
17 designs for M.7/36 including both bi-plane and monoplane, and single & twin engined, layouts and with different types of engine. By Dec 1936 this seeems to have been narrowed down to a monoplane powered by Bristol Taurus or Mercury engine or a Taurus engined biplane (the latter described in one source "as a sop to the Admiralty") after extensive wind tunnel testing at the RAE. They also offered a further 5 designs to meet O.8/36 including both biplane & monoplane designs.
But at a meeting on 22 Jan 1937 the Admiralty selected the Taurus engined biplane for the former role, the reason being
"After having examined various wing arrangements, the conclusion has been reached that, having regard to the present stage of development, the requirements of these specifications are best met by a biplane of orthodox design. This decision is dictated principally by the requirements of take-off, the limitation of dimensions and mechanical difficulties of wing folding."
The Air Ministry then issued a revised and combined Spec on 11 Feb 1937 to which the Admiralty agreed and a contract was issued for 100 on 6 May 1937.
Note the involvement of both the Admiralty & the Air Ministry in this decision making process. But given the way that the Admiralty were excluded from aircraft development in the period, the question arises as to just how fully informed technically they were in arriving at their conclusions. ISTR reading that the relevant inter-service technical committee run by the Air Ministry not the Admiralty, only met some 4 times between about 1930 & 1937. Thereafter, following Inskip, it met much more frequently as relations between the two forces improved somewhat until the eventual handover in May 1939.
And having seen the Admiralty prefer a biplane in Feb 1937 leading to the Albacore order in May 1937, the Air Ministry in Jan 1938 issued a new Spec, S.24/37, that led to the monoplane Barracuda. Someone must have realised pretty quickly that a mistake had been made.
One thing that did seem to come out of the 1937 designs was that the Admiralty disliked the low winged monoplane designs presented by Fairey as it interfered with the observer's view for navigation and spotting purposes. It seems to be why most (all?) of the designs for S.24/37 adopted a high wing e.g. Fairey Barracuda, Supermarine Type 322 and Blackburn B-29.
During recent digging around I have found a 1939 Spec S.15/39 for a torpedo and dive bomber, recce aircraft clearly intended as a Barracuda successor. While Fairey are supposed to have carried out some work on it it went nowhere until 1940 when E.28/40 was issued to Folland for a "Research Aircraft for the FAA" to investigate problems decklanding aircraft of increased weight. It was to be a mid/high wing monoplane using a variety of high lift devices with a Sabre engine. Folland developed the Fo.116 to mock up stage with the Centaurus, the design incorporating variable incidence wings, leading edge slots and Fowler trailing edge flaps. Work stopped in 1943 after the project was abandoned. That coincides with the start of the Fairey Spearfish development programme and a much less restrictive design environment.
I find it interesting that in so far as fighters were concerned, just how quickly the RN moved to change the aircraft designs to be procured once it achieved full control of naval aviation. So we have the interim O.8/38 that led to the Fulmar followed by N.8/39 (two seat front gun) and N.9/39 (two seat turret fighter) drawn up during the period of joint control of the FAA and issued a month after the Admiralty took full control. But by the end of 1939 the Admiralty had rejected all the proposals received and added consideration of new responsibilities for protecting its shore bases while ditching the turret fighter concept altogether, sought designs for a two seat and a single seat fighter with much higher performance than originally contemplated. Those decisions in Jan 1940 led to the Specs for the Firefly & Firebrand (the latter intended as a 400mph aircraft).
Incidentally going back to TBD development, it was one of two prototyped to meet the requirement. The other was a biplane by Great Lakes! But the development of a new TB for the USN from 1934 represented a decision by them to get back into the TB game. It was a role that had virtually disappeared before that. USS Ranger was for example designed without any torpedo storage and did not carry a TB until 1941.
