Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

[Admiral Beez]

I find it amazing that after Midway, the IJN kept Nagumo in charge of their carrier force for the October 1942 Battle of Santa Cruz.

Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands - Wikipedia

Was Nagumo politically connected? Was he really the best Admiral available?

 

[SaparotRob]

I found it amazing but everything thing I've read said he was there due to seniority and nothing else.

 

[SaparotRob]

Really good with torpedoes, though.

 

[pbehn]

If you don't admit you lost anything why would you demote the person who didn't lose?

 

[SaparotRob]

Don't have the timeline straight but I would've promoted Adm. Nagumo to Aleutian Command.

 

[The Basket]

I don't think Nagumo did anything wrong at Midway. A lot of the whats and ifs were not his due.

He was still the world's most experienced carrier commander.

Military has a chain of command. If Nagumo is a nitwit then who put him there is also a nitwit. So easier to overlook than to resolve.

 

[The Basket]

His obvious replacement would be Yamaguchi.

Er...

How about the admiral at Coral Sea?

Shigeyoshi Inoue was in bad form with Yamamoto for various issues in that campaign.

Maybe this is a case of the win some v lose some.

Not Nagumo's fault the IJN didn't have radar, or Shokaku and Zuikaku, or the Americans set a trap, or that IJN carriers were fuel/air bombs. He probably did everything right. Maybe a few google searches would have sorted him nicely but Wikipedia only appeared in 2001.

 

[33k in the air]

I don't think Nagumo did anything wrong at Midway.

He arguably did one thing wrong: he steered northward toward the detected American carriers, closing the range. Given that he knows his aircraft have better range than his adversaries, why close the distance? Better to steer southward increasing the distance from the U.S. carriers, thus making any possible strike from those carriers operate at the edge or even beyond their capability, while you properly prepare your own strike. Then you can steer back toward the enemy when ready and launch at a range that makes any retaliatory strike difficult.

 

[SaparotRob]

I wish I remembered that.

 

[The Basket]

It may have been doctrine to close with the enemy at every opportunity.

The shorter distance works for your carriers as well.

Hiryu chasing after the Americans was a monster mistake but may have been Yamaguchi pulling the strings.

Not saying Nagumo was God tier but if you're dealt 7-2 off suit then you got to get lucky.

Moral of Midway is don't fall into your enemies surprise trap.

 

[33k in the air]

Moral of Midway is don't fall into your enemies surprise trap.

Or rather don't make large, complicated offensive plans that rely on your enemy doing exactly what you want them to do.

 

[GrauGeist]

One thing that most overlook, is that no matter what Nagumo did (or Yamaguchi or Yammamoto, etc.), the US Navy knew ahead of time.

Had the Japanese codes remained unbroken, many battles would have been in Japan's favor.

 

[Admiral Beez]

His obvious replacement would be Yamaguchi.

Er...

How about the admiral at Coral Sea?

Shigeyoshi Inoue was in bad form with Yamamoto for various issues in that campaign.

Maybe this is a case of the win some v lose some.

Not Nagumo's fault the IJN didn't have radar, or Shokaku and Zuikaku, or the Americans set a trap, or that IJN carriers were fuel/air bombs. He probably did everything right. Maybe a few google searches would have sorted him nicely but Wikipedia only appeared in 2001.

Nagumo's lack of recon and CAP was dangerously neglectful doctrine. He came very close to disaster off Ceylon where he didn't have a CAP up as he approached the island. At Midway, not having one carrier dedicated to fighter rotation whilst leaving the other three carriers free to prepare and launch strike aircraft demonstrates a lack of big picture thinking.

But to be fair, Nagumo is a subordinate to those who must have established the doctrine of limited reconnaissance and CAP flights.

 

[GrauGeist]

Nagumo didn't have a carrier dedicated to CAP because that was not Imperial Navy doctrine.
Each carrier's air group operated independently, which is one reason why Zuikaku was not with Kido Butai at Midway: her air group had been depleted at the battle of Coral Sea. Had the IJN adopted a philosophy of co-operation/co-training between air groups, she could have taken aboard Shokaku's remaining air group and/or transferred other air groups aboard to bring her numbers up to operational strength.
The RN and USN had the ability to seamlessly transfer whole or partial airgroups between carriers to stay at strength.

 

[The Basket]

Shokaku and Zuikaku were both in carrier group 5 and Zuikaku did recover Skokaku air group. So I would need a check on whether Shokaku aircraft couldn't be transferred to Zuikaku.

Probably simple doctrine because Zuikaku may have had to sail with a limited air group which again may have been against doctrine. Also 4 carriers should have cleaned up Midway.

So it's all ifs and buts sprinkled with Doctrine with a healthy splash of hubris. So perfect recipe for disaster.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Also speaking to Nagumo (and Yamaguchi) charging after the Americans, it was part of the fabric of the IJN to ALWAYS be on the offensive. Once Hiryu was the only remaining IJN CV and knew where TF16 was, no admiral in the Japanese fleet would have even thought of not heading straight for the enemy. Defensive minded they were not. I hate to constantly reference Shattered Sword, but in it Parshall and Tully do a good job of explaining both the Japanese culture and the extension of said culture into the IJN.

For decades I'd scratch my head regarding some of the Japanese decisions during the Pacific War, after reading what was in Shattered Sword a lot of the fog was lifted for me.

Also to fleet reconnaissance, it's true they IJN could have done better, and actually their search plans/patterns weren't that bad for 1942, in fact I believe they considered them quite extensive for the time period. One other helpful possibility was that the four cruisers that were sent to shell Midway could have devoted another dozen (I believe) extra search aircraft to KdB. Just another example of the overly complicated (for no reason) plan Yammamoto came up with that had IJN units parading around the Pacific doing virtually nothing while leaving KdB to do all the heavy lifting.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Nagumo didn't have a carrier dedicated to CAP because that was not Imperial Navy doctrine.
Each carrier's air group operated independently,

Which just seems nonsensical. You've built up a team of carriers into a cohesive fighting force, but then intentionally build in weakness so that your fleet cannot simultaneously defend itself and launch offensive strikes, meaning that all your enemy needs to do is to maintain a rotation of attacks to neuter your offensive capability? Did Japan ever war game this out?

Wasn't Nagumo an author of much of the Kido Butai's doctrine (reconnaissance dependant on CA/CL float planes, limited CAPs, etc.). What happened to the aircraft aloft at Midway? Surely those from the now wrecked Akagi, Kaga and Sōryū were landed onto Hiryū? Surely it wasn't a case of, this isn't your carrier, go ditch into the sea.

Just another example of the overly complicated (for no reason) plan Yammamoto came up with that had IJN units parading around the Pacific doing virtually nothing while leaving KdB to do all the heavy lifting.

This is a good point. Had the KB been sailing with the Yamato and other fast battleships these would have likely attracted some of the USN attacks, and put more AA into the air, giving Nagumo better odds.

 

[SaparotRob]

The conquest of Midway was gamed out by the staff. Results favorable to the USN during the war games were discounted. This is from The Shattered Sword, Miracle at Midway, Incredible Victory, The Battle of Midway, and possibly a report I did in school.
Nagumo as I recall, relied on his Air Staff (whose names I can't remember since no ships were named after them). Calling GrauGeist.

 

[Admiral Beez]

One thing that most overlook, is that no matter what Nagumo did (or Yamaguchi or Yammamoto, etc.), the US Navy knew ahead of time.

Had the Japanese codes remained unbroken, many battles would have been in Japan's favor.

Give the Japanese air search radar from their German allies and even with the broken codes the Japanese have a good shot.

Did any of the Axis nations have secure signals encryption? What of the Italians?

 

[GrauGeist]

Zuikaku returned to Japan after Coral Sea with remnants of Shokaku's air group after she took several bomb hits, rendering her incapable of launching/recovering.
It's one thing to land aboard another carrier, but to operate with that other carrier air group is entirely different.

We find their doctrine strange because we're accustomed to how our native militaries operated, which had the ability to be interchangeable.
Their doctrine developed independently based on their military traditions and experiences and it did work well, until that practice was put to a hard test.