Basically - how much damage were the Luftwaffe day-fighter aircraft in that task (radar-less night interception) were doing during the night against the RAF BC? Actual losses to themselves, either due to enemy action, or 'self-inflicted'?
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I would like to give the above post a very high -- go read -- thumb. In fact go through the other stuff from him. Its good.My 'history' feature on wilde Sau ace Friedrich-Karl Müller of JG 300 and NJG 11 complete with rare photos and first person accounts is available to read in the free 76-page November 2019 issue of Eduard INFO - download it here
Wasn't there a member here who was writing a book on JG300?
Thanks for your excellent Blog. Always interesting reading.no, he was looking at Moskito-hunting in the Luftwaffe. I doubt that will ever come to fruition. Besides other writers/researchers have covered the subject in some depth now. My own 18-page e-article " wilde Sau und Moskitojagd " is still available from Air War Publications here and features rare photos and first-person accounts from JG 302/JG 301/JG 300. and NJG 11. Andreas Zapf has written the history of Kurt Welter's 10./NJG 11 in his 'The jet night fighters'. More on my blog here
From my understanding of it - Wilde Sau was a response to Allied EW and the resulting disruption of traditional night-fighter tactics.Basically - how much damage were the Luftwaffe day-fighter aircraft in that task (radar-less night interception) were doing during the night against the RAF BC? Actual losses to themselves, either due to enemy action, or 'self-inflicted'?
HiThe basic idea was that the single engine fighters were doing nothing during the night, so why not use them as night fighters?
The navigation was aided by light "streets", search light signals for city identification etc. One of the main differences towards the normal night fighting was that the Wilde Sau would operate in the FLAK zones over the cities and that the FLAK would be limiting there Hight of coverage to allow the Wilde Sau pilots to operate above. Using the light from the burning cities and search light they would attack the bombers illuminated from beneath.
Also the FLAK would use flare grenades to bring "light into the sky" as well as using clouds as screens "leichentuck"(cloth covering a dead body) to illuminate the bombers. Later on a number of German bombers would fly high above the bomber strems dropping flare to illuminate the enemy bombers to alow botj regular night fighters as well as Wilde Sau fighters the posibility to see the enemy and attack.
This meant that the regular night fighters that at this stage of the war in the skyes did not enter over the cities or into the FLAK zones, but were operating on the rout to/from the targets, and Wilde Sau over the targets, giving even more exposior of the bombers for attack.
Wilde Sau pilots were instructed to bail out if they could not find a suitable airfield for landing or running out of fuel.
The book was published in 2000, a lot of research has been done since then, bringing new information to light.The Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker has a chapter on the Wilde Sau. It seems it was act of desperation, try it and see if it works
Indeed, that was also why most of the pilots were coming from bombers or had been commercial pilots (like Friedrich-Karl Müller - "Nasen-Müller") with instrument flying skills. Also many of the pilots were flying instructors with massif experience in handling the aircrafts under all conditions and again instrument qualifications.It did basically. The wilde Sau came to prominence just as the entire Nachtjagd organisation was laid low by 'Window'. Only problem was their feats required exceptional airmanship. While they may have been guided by searchlight avenues etc,, take offs and landings were carried out in almost total darkness. Navigating through banked ice clouds and then attempting to find an airfield to put down on in darkness was beyond the capabilities of most pilots, especially regular Luftwaffe fighter pilots who were not necessarily instrument-trained
I think Bekker was published in the 70's. I read it in high schoolThe book was published in 2000, a lot of research has been done since then, bringing new information to light.
Indeed, that was also why most of the pilots were coming from bombers or had been commercial pilots (like Friedrich-Karl Müller - "Nasen-Müller") with instrument flying skills. Also many of the pilots were flying instructors with massif experience in handling the aircrafts under all conditions and again instrument qualifications.