Your favorite Pacific battle / campaign to study?
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Morison's sources are given as Japanese Navy official sources and CV plane complements from WDC #s 161733 and 161709
Akagi (21 VF,21VB,21VT)
Kaga (30 VF, 23 VB, 30 VT)
Hiryu (21 VF, 21 VB, 21 VT)
Soryu (21 VF, 21 VB, 21 VT)
That is a total of 272 for the four CVs in the Carrier Striking Force. Seems there is a discrepancy somewhere.
Akagi (21 VF,21VB,21VT)
Kaga (30 VF, 23 VB, 30 VT)
Hiryu (21 VF, 21 VB, 21 VT)
Soryu (21 VF, 21 VB, 21 VT)
That is a total of 272 for the four CVs in the Carrier Striking Force. Seems there is a discrepancy somewhere.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Parshall and his colleagues in Japan and the US painstakingly combed through IJN documents and came up with the figures I quoted. Morrisons figures might have included aircraft that were disassembled and in storage aboard the carriers, but were not available for use. In addition, there were a pair of the new Judy dive bombers available for recon use, but were not equiped for dive bombing missions.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Again, Morison:
Yorktown-(25 VF, 37 VB, 13 VT)
Enterprise-(27 VF, 38 VB, 14 VT)
Hornet- (27 VF, 37 VB, 15 VT)
That gives a total of 233 on the US CVs.
Yorktown-(25 VF, 37 VB, 13 VT)
Enterprise-(27 VF, 38 VB, 14 VT)
Hornet- (27 VF, 37 VB, 15 VT)
That gives a total of 233 on the US CVs.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Sorry if I am off by one. US figures are quite accurate because there are so many sources available that dont have to be translated.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Sorry, I was not nit picking but had forgotten how many AC from US CVs was in earlier posts. I may have added them wrong also. IMO, taken as a whole, the Midway Battle was definitely a battle where the US was the underdog for the following reasons. The IJN had a big edge in surface ships. So big that the US could not hope to survive if it came to a surface engagement. That edge was an advantage when it came to AA protection for the IJN CVs also. Although, the total number of AC on each side was roughly equal, the Midway based AC were of little threat to the IJN(they got no hits) and their VFs were of little hindrance to the IJN attacks. The Hornet air group was light on experience and leadership and was of little use in the battle, except for the sacrifise of VT8. The VTs of the US CVs were of little use because of the poor performance of their TBDs and poor weapons performance and the pilots had little experience in dropping live torpedos, except for the pilots who had fought at Coral Sea. Their only contribution was as decoys. On the contrary, the IJN VTs were probably the best in the world. I believe the VBs on both sides were roughly equal in value. The Val was a successful dive bomber and the IJN pilots were good. Eric Brown rates the Val above the SBD and although I don't understand that, the Val was formidable. The A6M was superior overall to the F4F4 and the IJN had an edge in VF numbers 93 to 79, according to Morison. Most of the IJN pilots were veterans and highly trained as well in their specialties. Probably with more experience and training overall than their USN counterparts. Another advantage the IJN had was with four CVs, they should be able to launch a strike faster than the three US CVs. The US had the advantage of knowing more about the IJN forces than the IJN knew about the US force but the IJN had counted on the US sending their fleet to counter the attack on Midway so they were hardly surprised when enemy carriers were observed. Overall, it should have been a disaster for the US. A little luck and the skill of the VBs from Yorktown and Enterprise saved the day for the US and changed the course of the war in the Pacific.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Very true. But Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance also knew that and understood very well that they were going to avoid a surface fight under any condition.
Incorrect. Parshall looked closely at the IJN AA weapons and how they were used. Besides being inferior, technically wise, they were further degraded by the lack of a CIC, radar and employment within the fleet.
The US carrier numbers equaled the IJN totals. In the end, that's what counted. Plus more B17's were flown up to Midway as the battle ended. And that was a threat the IJN had to eliminate before the invasion commenced. Time was not on the side of the Japanese and every day they couldn't invade was a major issue for their timetables.
I wouldn't call them decoys, but essentially you are correct. The primary problem with the VT's was the USN botching coordinated air attacks.
And Mr Brown conveniently ignores the fact that the SBD could carry twice the payload as the Val. His comments have been proven to be suspiciously "dumb" time after time. Look at it this way. A 1000lb bomb hit on a Japanese carrier was devastating. A 500 pound bomb hit on a US carrier was tolerable.
Yes, that's true.
Not true. The US already had plenty of veterans in the battle. In fact, the IJN fighter pilots were about to encounter the "Thatch Weave" for the first time and discover that they didn't hold all the cards in the battle
Not true. Read Parshalls book about the operational restrictions the IJN had to operate under. Something as little considered as carrier elevator transit times dicates how fast they can position and spot aircraft and then launch.
The IJN only expected two carriers to be present by June 6 or 7. The fact that they established two carriers early on (then three later in the day) shocked the heck out them. Read Parshalls book about the poor planning the IJN staff did for the battle.
The only disaster that could have befallen the US was losing three carriers. Losing one was bad enough, but Fletcher was going to leave the battle area after all of his air groups were used up and he needed to preserve his carriers.
And luck counts for everything. It was our time for it and not Japans.
By the way, even if the IJN had taken out the US carriers, either by sinking them or wiping out the air groups, there was still the issue of invading the island. And in that regard, they were going to be butchered and slaughtered. (read the book).
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Actually, the beam defense maneuver(The Thach Weave) was only used by Thach and two wing men, one of whom was not aware of what he was doing, in the battle. None of the other VF pilots were using it then. The IJN pilots were veterans of all the Pacific conquests so far and their training was extremely thorough. According to Lundstrom, "The First Team," the Japanese were the more experienced. Once a strike was positioned on deck, the IJN carriers should have been able to launch more quickly, just because of four flight decks instead of three. Of course, you are correct that the TBDs were not intended to be "decoys" Unfortunately, they wound up being so. Based on the US force on Midway, it is hard to see how the Japanese would have been slaughtered. Their air strikes were not that heavily opposed. I haven't read Parshall's book but one book which seems to be counter to the conclusion of a large number of other accounts of the battle doesn't necessarily prove a point but I will be on the lookout for the book. Sounds interesting! Being lucky can sometimes trump being good but thank God for the skill of VS5, VB3, VS6 and VB6.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
And it worked beautifully, as a dozen or so Zero's were tied up in knots trying to defeat the tactic.
And after seven months of war, the USN wasn't?
After rethinking what you're saying, I agree. Four decks (regardless of efficiences) is better than three
The Midway air strikes were heavily opposed and the Zero CAP accounted for nearly every single allied plane being shot down. As Parshall showed in the book, each allied attack on the IJN carriers that morning contributed to the downward spiral in their defenses that culminated in the Dauntless's having an clear cut opportunities in hitting them. That is the advantage of having the initiative and forcing the enemy to react.
Note - The morning attack on Midway cost them 11 AC shot down and 15 damaged bad enough to be unserviceable and effectively no longer available for any action that day or the next.
The beauty of Parshalls book is his use of surviving Japanese sources, all of which have been available for US authors for decades. He uses rosters, patrol logs and after action accounts (and time lines) to buttress his claims. And he doesn't for a moment fail to mention that he had lots of assistance from Japanese sources who were all to willing to help him out.
Get the book and read it. Its something you wont put down once you start.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Thanks for the recommendation. I found the forward online on the Battle of Midway Roundtable and am looking forward to reading the book. Since my book budget is strained right now(along with all other budgets) I am hoping to get the Durango Public Library to order or borrow it for me.
Soundbreaker Welch?
Tech Sergeant
It could be devastating on battleships like the USS Arizona.
I think the Dauntless was a match for the Val, and could even be used as a heavy fighter if the situation arose.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
And many US carriers took 500 pound bomb hits and didnt sink.
Soundbreaker Welch?
Tech Sergeant
I guess that's why the Japanese did suicide bombing.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
It seems that the burning avgas did more damage than the high explosives.
After reading the IJN accounts of the out of control fires in the hanger decks of their four carriers at Midway, and later the near sinking of the USS Franklin due to a similar fire issue; one can see just how important damage control philosophy is. And thats why the Essex class carriers never had a war loss.
And again, the great thing about "Shattered Sword" is its accounts by Japanese survivors of what was going on in the ships through out the battle, from beginning to end. I will say it again: "get the book and read it".
Milos Sijacki
Senior Airman
Iwo Jima was always my fav campaign and battle in the Pacific theatre of battles, especially after I had seen "Letters from Iwo Jima" movie.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Renrich, one more thing I would like to clarify ....
Both forces were experienced.
But the IJN was still the more proficient in launching coordinated strikes in a minimum of time and hassle.
Therefore, the edge in this battle, goes to the IJN.
Both forces were experienced.
But the IJN was still the more proficient in launching coordinated strikes in a minimum of time and hassle.
Therefore, the edge in this battle, goes to the IJN.
Soundbreaker Welch?
Tech Sergeant
That sounds like a cool book Syscom, I'll try to get it from the library.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Thanks, Sys, I am looking forward to getting my hands on the book. It would have been interesting to see how the war had gone if the silly, to me, Doolittle raid had not gone forward and Enterprise and Hornet had been available for Coral Sea and consequently the Hornet air group had had more battle experience. Lots of what ifs but enjoyable to speculate about.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Things could have been different in the following ways:
- the IJN did not divide forces between the Aleutions and Midway, and had their two light carriers available for operations with the main fleet, or operating as an independant raiding force.
- The Yorktown was not available for the battle.
- The IJN command staff "war gamed" Midway in a truthfull manner and changed their plans accordingly.
- The Enterprise dive bombers missed the Soryu completely (read the book to see how lucky the USN was on that attack ..... just 30 meters inaccuracy and the battle changes)
In the end though, even if the Japanese won the sea battles, they would have still failed in the land battle (or been so severly mauled, they were crippled for quite some time).
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Also, if Hornet and Enterprise had been at Coral Sea, Lexington may not have been lost and would have been available at Midway.
