Interwar examples where a heavy presence might have made a difference?

[Admiral Beez]

Before the Pacific war, Churchill suggested that the USN send a battlefleet to Singapore, as a deterrence to the Japanese. Obviously, given his sending of Force Z, Churchill thought a lot about deterrence. Are there examples where a heavy prewar deployment might have made a difference in Axis war plans? For example, in March 1936 when Germany moved to remilitarize the Rhineland, what if the French and British marched armies into the territory? AIUI, Germany planned to quickly withdraw if challenged.

What other reasonably feasible prewar opportunities are there for a large intervention having an impact on Axis plans?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Before the Pacific war, Churchill suggested that the USN send a battlefleet to Singapore, as a deterrence to the Japanese. Obviously, given his sending of Force Z, Churchill thought a lot about deterrence. Are there examples where a heavy prewar deployment might have made a difference in Axis war plans? For example, in March 1936 when Germany moved to remilitarize the Rhineland, what if the French and British marched armies into the territory? AIUI, Germany planned to quickly withdraw if challenged.

What other reasonably feasible prewar opportunities are there for a large intervention having an impact on Axis plans?

Closing Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to the Italians in response to its invasion of Abyssinia.

 

[Snautzer01]

Churchill's gun boat diplomacy. For what a legend he was, he was not a strategic genius.
Try to get a nation involved in problems they not have.
As the UK was a kinda bankrupt, good plan for the Brits, not for USA.
Its a good plan sending a few boats to make your point onto an enemy wich is fighting with sticks.
Different ball game as they have an iron fist navy hanging around.
Britain only saw that, when defeated as what happened in the region.
I think USA planners knew they could not sustain a war in ww1 surplus and did not bite.

 

[EwenS]

While the USN resisted efforts to base a fleet at Singapore, they did agree to take on an increased burden of convoy escort in the Atlantic in 1941, finally escorting convoys to the MOMP. That allowed the withdrawal of RN ships from the Atlantic to refit for redeployment to the IO to build a stronger Eastern Fleet to serve as a deterrent.

Unfortunately the Japanese struck before these plans could be fully implemented. The first signs of it were in the movements of the Repulse & 4 R class battleships, which went out as escort to various WS convoys in late 1941 / early 1942.

 

[Snautzer01]

That is later in the time line i think. Much cockyness had eveporated at end 1940. For all arms. Hanging on by finger nails for the motherland will get a clear view of what is possible.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is later in the time line i think. Much cockyness had eveporated at end 1940. For all arms. Hanging on by finger nails for the motherland will get a clear view of what is possible.

Yeah, I think Beezy's question was more about pre-war. Shirer makes a good case that aside from the Rhineland, there were a couple of other moments when Allied firmness might have put paid to Hitlerian ambitions.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yeah, I think Beezy's question was more about pre-war.

Correct, and thanks. Perhaps greater US assistance to China pre-1937 would be an example.

Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian

history.state.gov 3.0 shell

history.state.gov

"At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. Moreover, the domestic conflict between Chinese Nationalists and Communists left U.S. policymakers uncertain of success in aiding such an internally divided nation. As a result, few U.S. officials recommended taking a strong stance prior to 1937, and so the United States did little to help China for fear of provoking Japan. U.S. likelihood of providing aid to China increased after July 7, 1937, when Chinese and Japanese forces clashed on the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, throwing the two nations into a full-scale war. As the United States watched Japanese forces sweep down the coast and then into the capital of Nanjing, popular opinion swung firmly in favor of the Chinese. Tensions with Japan rose when the Japanese Army bombed the U.S.S. Panay as it evacuated American citizens from Nanjing, killing three. The U.S. Government, however, continued to avoid conflict and accepted an apology and indemnity from the Japanese. "