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I think any ac that could operate within those envelopes would have had relatively the same success with the same pilots or those of equal training.
I applaud the mention of the SBD - but it was the USN pilots flying an obsolete dive bomber taking complete advantage of Zeros drawn to the deck by the Torp bombers.
drgondog, that is the most oft-told and venerable story of the battle of Midway, and I suggest, it is, at least to some extent, an unfounded myth. The contribution of the TBDs was substantial and went beyond merely clearing the sky of defenders over the IJN carriers. However, I suggest that the success of the SBDs was not dependent on the sacrifice of the TBDs.
I believe I have made this point in the past in the forum, but I'll repeat it here. The IJN's greatest weakness was its inability to effectively deal with a high altitude aerial threat to its carriers. To mount an effective defense with any fighter system including the legendary Zero-sen, the IJN needed both EW RADAR and a reasonably sophisticated (aka 'British') fighter direction system . It had neither. It possessed EW RADAR during the battle of Santa Cruz and the obsolescent (not obsolete) SBDs were able to penetrate the fighter screen and do considerable damage to the Shokaku without serious loss to the attackers. I submit that even had the Zeros at Midway managed to detect the incoming SBD raid, it would have been difficult to forestall it. The SBD raid by three squadrons was approaching from two widely different points of the compass, diluting the numbers of defenders that could be arrayed against any one to something like the Santa Cruz situation. SBDs virtually always penetrated the IJN CAP. VALs when encountering a fighter directed CAP defense even when mounted by the obsolescent F4F, were most often (but not always) slaughtered. In this case, the early and undoubted effectiveness of the VAL against USN CVs owes much to the considerable skill and dedication of the pilots. When the PPI Scope and F6F were introduced, USN CAP defense became nearly impermeable until the advent of the Kamikaze.
There is sufficient unique characteristics in the swordfish relative to its predecessors to state that it (the swordfish) could undertake operations that its predecessors could not.
Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)
Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so.
Abut the only event that may be close in comparison would be the attack on Truk Lagoon during Operation Hailstone - starting on 17 February 1944.with regard to the avenger, I know of no strategically significant operations this aircraft undertook under similar conditions in its time frame.
Why dont you think TBFs could have flown the Taranto or Bismarck strikes? They did a fair job against Musashi and Yamoto, and Truk Atoll. Kate's had their day at Pearl, similar to Toranto.
The Shark had a lot less wing area than the Swordfish and used the AS Tiger engine instead of the Bristol Pegasus. If they wanted to they probably could have swapped engines.
You need to look at the date, 1940. Then you need look at the specifics of Taranto. Attacks at night, shallow harbour, difficult approach route, slow drop speed.
The torpedo that equipped the USN torpedo bombers was not a great piece of kit. In mid-1943 an analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots showed clearly why aviators distrusted the Mark 13: 36 percent ran cold, 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface, and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total in excess of 100 percent proved that many torpedoes were subject to more than one of the defects, just as the bulk of the problems were still due to the effects of poor air stabilization on water behavior. Better performance at reduced aircraft speeds was small comfort since aviators could not be held down by paper restrictions that imposed serious and dangerous handicaps in combat
In 1940 there was zero chance that the US could have pulled off Taranto given these limitations.
Musashi was lost after 19 torpedo hits and 17 bombs had hit her, broad daylight and ideal attack conditions. She had been subjected to attack by more than 170 aircraft. To sink or disable the three Italian battleships, the RN had just 21 swordfish. most observers believe that Musashi would probably have survived if her DC had been up to scratch.
Over truk, the USN committed over 550 aircraft over a two day period of frenetic strikes. There is no denying the damage was massive, but also the resources available were not comparable to the 1940 situation, and I don't believe these strikes were at night There wasn't an extensive use of torpedoes in these strikes that I am aware of. At no stage at any time in the war did Britain have access to 550 carrier borne aircraft, let alone Swordfish in 1940.