GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Very few types come to mind (conventional gear, or otherwise), that had the cockpit at, or behind, the props:
Whirlwind, P-38, Beaufighter and KI-46 are some.
How to bail out from a bomber (B-24)?
- Thread starter uhebeisen
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Whirlwind, P-38, Beaufighter and KI-46 are some.
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- #22
uhebeisen
Airman
but in all statements it is mentioned that he did not pull his ripcord. So what does this phrase mean then?
I would assume that someone had found the dead body with a parachute attached to it. Or does this sentence have a special meaning, something like a coded term among aviators?
How would anyone know he didn't pull his chord is my question. They are not on a "static line" which pulls it after leaving the plane automatically, who can see if you don't pull it? And if he wasn't with a parachute attached how could he?
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- #24
uhebeisen
Airman
There is a story of an eyewitness (he was about 4 years old then). He describes that the dead copilot was found near the farmhouse "Weiershüsli" about 300 meters away from the farmhouse in "Üetwilen" where the airmen were kept. Maybe someone of them had to identify the copilot and then he saw that he had his parachute on but not used it.
If the copilot didn't attach de chute correct and jumped out of the plane then the parachute won't be that far away. This is my assumption.
People do assume things. If you see a fellow crew member falling you assume he didn't open or couldn't open his chute possibly before you assume he had no parachute. Things fall at different rates from aeroplanes when the Pam Am Jumbo exploded over Lockerbie the debris was spread over 100miles (160km) of Scotland and Northern England. In peacetime in parachute clubs parachutes have been incorrectly attached with no stress at all on the people involved.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
It's also entirely possible that when he jumped, he may have struck part of the aircraft (wing, tail, etc.), rendering him unconscious or even suffering fatal injuries.
If that were the case, he wouldn't have been able to open his 'chute as he fell to earth.
If that were the case, he wouldn't have been able to open his 'chute as he fell to earth.
Not about the B-24 but two other four-engined Allied bombers: The Lancaster's escape hatches were notoriously small while the Halifax's were larger and gave the crew better chance to escape. The Lancaster was the most important heavy bomber and Bomber Command had the heaviest casualties of all WW2 armed forces after all.
Why would Avro not recifty that flaw in production which should not have been too hard? This omission cost dearly.
Why would Avro not recifty that flaw in production which should not have been too hard? This omission cost dearly.
Because Bomber Command didn't want to lose production? The effect of smaller hatches wasn't known in full until the war ended?
I don't know about the difference in British and American WW2 aircraft production but when you see how many smaller and greater changes especially in B-24 production were made one wonders if it would have been possible with altering Lancaster escape possibilities by some inches.
Not on the Ju 88, MosquIto, beaugfighter, he 111, Tu2, Pe2, B18 bolo or any number of tail draggers. flight crew are a little (in some cases a lot) behined the prop. b26, b25, he 219 crew are ahead of prop.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
As has been mentioned, the effect, or otherwise, of the escape hatches in the Lancaster v the Halifax, were not fully known, or realised, until after the war, when aircrew survival statistics were available, showing survival of Lancaster v Halifax crews.
In the Lancaster, perhaps it wasn't so much the size of the escape hatches, but their location. Discounting the upper hatches, for use when ditching or belly landing, the Lancaster's main escape hatch was in the floor of the bomb aimer's compartment and, although not large, was adequate. The only other means of exit was via the entrance door on the starboard side, just in front of the tail planes, or, for the tail-gunner on occasions, exiting, backwards, from the turret, if able to don his chest-type parachute pack (stored outside the turret, on the starboard side), and be able to rotate the turret 90 degrees to allow exit. (in the later "Rose" turret, the tail gunner was able to wear the parachute pack, and could exit directly from the turret, over the twin .50 Brownings, out of the open rear glazing section of the turret).
Officially, the entrance door was not to be used for parachute exits, due to the very real danger of hitting the tailplane on exit, and all crew were supposed to exit via the nose hatch. For the upper gunner and tail gunner, this meant travelling the length of the fuselage, over the bomb bay, rear spar and the high main spar, the latter difficult enough even without the encumberance of flying kit, almost impossible with the chest parachute pack fitted, and then past the radio operator's and navigator's positions, through the cockpit, down under the instrument panel and into the nose.
This journey is not particularly easy, even on the ground, dressed in civilian clothes, as I discovered when trying it.
If the Lancaster had been fitted with a floor escape hatch aft of the bomb bay (and aft of the area of the H2s blister, if so equipped), then this might have increased the odds of surviving, but then, hindsight is a wonderful inventor !
The Halifax also had a nose escape hatch, perhaps easier to reach for the crew in the forward section of the aircraft, especially given the much larger area and depth available in the nose section, compared to the Lancaster. The second emergency exit was again the entrance hatch but, unlike the Lancaster, this was located on the port side, and "wrapped" around the fuselage, being part on the fuselage side, and part on the underside, and was sufficiently far forward to allow exit without the risk of hitting the tailplane, and this allowed the upper gunner and tail gunner to be able to exit quicker and easier, and much more safely, than in the Lancaster.
As for crew not pulling the "ripcord", there could be various reasons, and, as already mentioned, injury could be one of them. If knocked unconscious during exit, then, unless recovered in time, it would be impossible to deploy the parachute canopy. Even a relatively minor injury, for example a wounded or broken hand, wrist or arm, could prevent the crewman from pulling the "D" ring.
Deploying a chest-mounted parachute would be slightly easier than a back-pack 'chute, the latter normally used by USAAF bomber pilots (gunners and some other crew used the chest pack), as the "D" ring is on the pack, in view of, and easy reach of, the jumper. A short, swift tug releases the Bowden cable ("ripcord") from the cones which hold the closing pins in place, the pack opens, and the canopy streams, lifting the pack and risers above the head of the jumper. On the chest type pack, the Bowden cable has two steel pins which pass through holes in two steel cones, the tension of the packed canopy and lines keeping the pack closed until the "cord" is pulled, These cones, pins and the attached cable can, if needed, be easily accessed by opening the cover flap, secured by two "press studs", and formed the most basic way of being able to deploy the 'chute, and very rarely failed.
However, the US aircrew back-pack type parachute had the "ripcord" handle mounted on the left shoulder, which was enclosed within a flexible metal tube. This ran over the shoulder, and into the pack closure pocket on the center, rear of the parachute pack, where again, the Bowden cable and pins system was used to keep the pack closed. A very firm pull on the "ripcord" withdrew the pins, when a "kicker spring" enclosed within the drogue, or pilot 'chute, forced the pack open, then filled with air and withdrew the canopy, followed by the rigging lines. From pulling the "ripcord" to full canopy deployment took around three seconds.
However, this type of pack employed four cones and pins, and meant that pulling the "cord" needed a very firm grip, and a very deliberate and firm "pull".
Even in full working order (i.e. no damage to the Bowden cable, pins or cones) this could take some effort. If any one (or more) of these pins was bent or damaged, it / they could jam in the cone, preventing the pin(s) from releasing from the cone(s), and therefore preventing the pack from opening and the canopy deploying.
In addition to the above, there have been instances were the body of an aircrew member has been found on the ground, with his parachute assembly being found elsewhere, unopened, or sometimes partly deployed, but with no evidence of damage to the harness or pack.
In these cases, it is probable that the harness was not secured properly or fully, when the person literally fell out of the harness before, or during attempted deployment of the canopy. There is at least one recorded instance where a Spitfire pilot was seen to bail-out safely, at a safe altitude, closely followed by a second object, which turned out to be the complete parachute assembly. It was assumed that this unfortunate individual followed "standard procedure" when exiting his aircraft on the ground - release seat harness, release parachute harness, and climb out - and in the "heat of the moment", in his rush to bail-out quickly, did this, instinctively, as normal procedure, and paid the price.
Also, there are known instances, late in the war, where Luftwaffe aircrew were seen to bail out safely and deploy the parachute, only to have the harness fail and fall to their deaths. It is thought that this was due, at this period of the war, to poor quality materials or construction (of the harness).
Although perhaps not really relevant to the OP question, it is also possible that even a fully serviceable, correctly deployed parachute can suffer damage during opening, which, in some cases, can prove fatal, especially where a reserve 'chute is not available, such as with aircrew.
Many years ago , during a freefall drop, I correctly deployed my "T10" (round canopy) parachute, which fully deployed without problem. However, when looking up to "check canopy", I was slightly concerned to see that seven panels of the canopy were blown out or torn, and that one rigging line had actually severed !
The reason for this is that, whilst checking my altimeter, attached to the chest strap of the harness, I had, unknowingly, gone slightly head down, and entered a "track" across the sky, travelling at probably 140 to 160 mph, instead of the 120 mph in a "stable" position, and pulled the "ripcord" in this attitude. The opening shock at this speed caused the damage. Fortunately, I made a safe descent (staying with the main canopy, rather than deploying the reserve) and actually managed a "stand up" landing - although around a mile from my intended arrival point !
In the Lancaster, perhaps it wasn't so much the size of the escape hatches, but their location. Discounting the upper hatches, for use when ditching or belly landing, the Lancaster's main escape hatch was in the floor of the bomb aimer's compartment and, although not large, was adequate. The only other means of exit was via the entrance door on the starboard side, just in front of the tail planes, or, for the tail-gunner on occasions, exiting, backwards, from the turret, if able to don his chest-type parachute pack (stored outside the turret, on the starboard side), and be able to rotate the turret 90 degrees to allow exit. (in the later "Rose" turret, the tail gunner was able to wear the parachute pack, and could exit directly from the turret, over the twin .50 Brownings, out of the open rear glazing section of the turret).
Officially, the entrance door was not to be used for parachute exits, due to the very real danger of hitting the tailplane on exit, and all crew were supposed to exit via the nose hatch. For the upper gunner and tail gunner, this meant travelling the length of the fuselage, over the bomb bay, rear spar and the high main spar, the latter difficult enough even without the encumberance of flying kit, almost impossible with the chest parachute pack fitted, and then past the radio operator's and navigator's positions, through the cockpit, down under the instrument panel and into the nose.
This journey is not particularly easy, even on the ground, dressed in civilian clothes, as I discovered when trying it.
If the Lancaster had been fitted with a floor escape hatch aft of the bomb bay (and aft of the area of the H2s blister, if so equipped), then this might have increased the odds of surviving, but then, hindsight is a wonderful inventor !
The Halifax also had a nose escape hatch, perhaps easier to reach for the crew in the forward section of the aircraft, especially given the much larger area and depth available in the nose section, compared to the Lancaster. The second emergency exit was again the entrance hatch but, unlike the Lancaster, this was located on the port side, and "wrapped" around the fuselage, being part on the fuselage side, and part on the underside, and was sufficiently far forward to allow exit without the risk of hitting the tailplane, and this allowed the upper gunner and tail gunner to be able to exit quicker and easier, and much more safely, than in the Lancaster.
As for crew not pulling the "ripcord", there could be various reasons, and, as already mentioned, injury could be one of them. If knocked unconscious during exit, then, unless recovered in time, it would be impossible to deploy the parachute canopy. Even a relatively minor injury, for example a wounded or broken hand, wrist or arm, could prevent the crewman from pulling the "D" ring.
Deploying a chest-mounted parachute would be slightly easier than a back-pack 'chute, the latter normally used by USAAF bomber pilots (gunners and some other crew used the chest pack), as the "D" ring is on the pack, in view of, and easy reach of, the jumper. A short, swift tug releases the Bowden cable ("ripcord") from the cones which hold the closing pins in place, the pack opens, and the canopy streams, lifting the pack and risers above the head of the jumper. On the chest type pack, the Bowden cable has two steel pins which pass through holes in two steel cones, the tension of the packed canopy and lines keeping the pack closed until the "cord" is pulled, These cones, pins and the attached cable can, if needed, be easily accessed by opening the cover flap, secured by two "press studs", and formed the most basic way of being able to deploy the 'chute, and very rarely failed.
However, the US aircrew back-pack type parachute had the "ripcord" handle mounted on the left shoulder, which was enclosed within a flexible metal tube. This ran over the shoulder, and into the pack closure pocket on the center, rear of the parachute pack, where again, the Bowden cable and pins system was used to keep the pack closed. A very firm pull on the "ripcord" withdrew the pins, when a "kicker spring" enclosed within the drogue, or pilot 'chute, forced the pack open, then filled with air and withdrew the canopy, followed by the rigging lines. From pulling the "ripcord" to full canopy deployment took around three seconds.
However, this type of pack employed four cones and pins, and meant that pulling the "cord" needed a very firm grip, and a very deliberate and firm "pull".
Even in full working order (i.e. no damage to the Bowden cable, pins or cones) this could take some effort. If any one (or more) of these pins was bent or damaged, it / they could jam in the cone, preventing the pin(s) from releasing from the cone(s), and therefore preventing the pack from opening and the canopy deploying.
In addition to the above, there have been instances were the body of an aircrew member has been found on the ground, with his parachute assembly being found elsewhere, unopened, or sometimes partly deployed, but with no evidence of damage to the harness or pack.
In these cases, it is probable that the harness was not secured properly or fully, when the person literally fell out of the harness before, or during attempted deployment of the canopy. There is at least one recorded instance where a Spitfire pilot was seen to bail-out safely, at a safe altitude, closely followed by a second object, which turned out to be the complete parachute assembly. It was assumed that this unfortunate individual followed "standard procedure" when exiting his aircraft on the ground - release seat harness, release parachute harness, and climb out - and in the "heat of the moment", in his rush to bail-out quickly, did this, instinctively, as normal procedure, and paid the price.
Also, there are known instances, late in the war, where Luftwaffe aircrew were seen to bail out safely and deploy the parachute, only to have the harness fail and fall to their deaths. It is thought that this was due, at this period of the war, to poor quality materials or construction (of the harness).
Although perhaps not really relevant to the OP question, it is also possible that even a fully serviceable, correctly deployed parachute can suffer damage during opening, which, in some cases, can prove fatal, especially where a reserve 'chute is not available, such as with aircrew.
Many years ago , during a freefall drop, I correctly deployed my "T10" (round canopy) parachute, which fully deployed without problem. However, when looking up to "check canopy", I was slightly concerned to see that seven panels of the canopy were blown out or torn, and that one rigging line had actually severed !
The reason for this is that, whilst checking my altimeter, attached to the chest strap of the harness, I had, unknowingly, gone slightly head down, and entered a "track" across the sky, travelling at probably 140 to 160 mph, instead of the 120 mph in a "stable" position, and pulled the "ripcord" in this attitude. The opening shock at this speed caused the damage. Fortunately, I made a safe descent (staying with the main canopy, rather than deploying the reserve) and actually managed a "stand up" landing - although around a mile from my intended arrival point !
I remember reading it in a book on the Lancaster, it was discussed and not done.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,971
- Jun 25, 2013
They're also ahead of the propeller plane in the DC-3, 247, Halifax, Lancaster, Stirling, and others. The cockpit is (at least a good chunk of it) is behind the prop plane in the tricycle-gear P-38, F7F, A-26 (later redesignated B-26), XF-11 (another Hughes boondoggle), XP-58, XP-67. Where the cockpit is placed is a design decision that is not particularly tied to whether the aircraft has tricycle or conventional landing gear.
One would think that ease of emergency exit would be a major concern in the design of a bomber aircraft, but sometimes it seems that not only was it not a major concern, but preventing easy emergency exits sometimes seems like it was a design goal.
Well they would be flying so high and fast they would be in no danger, getting out could be turned into a ceremony when they land, like opening a space capsule.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,971
- Jun 25, 2013
Of course, nobody would ever want to do something like, oh, shoot down the bombers dropping stuff on their cities.
Well into the jet age there were planes that were very difficult to get out of like the Vulcan or any jet that had just taken off or was coming into land. It always seems to me that much WW2 theory was based on the enemy just doing what you wanted them to do, not what you would do in the same situation.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,971
- Jun 25, 2013
Especially with the V-bombers that had ejection seats for *some* of the crew.
I saw a programme about the Vulcan and its crews a short while ago, if they were doing what they were supposed to do, who would want to bail out and who would want to go home, it quite probably wont be there.
Swede Ware
Airman
This is how we did it a few years back.......also jumped the -17 .........
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,971
- Jun 25, 2013
I think the same logic would have applied to B-52 and B-47 pilots. On the other hand, there were (and are) significant non-combat losses, frequently around take-off and landing, and not having flight crew die on a ferry or training flight would be beneficial.
