If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

[Civettone]

I find the comparison in sorties fascinating. Luftwaffe crew flew on average one sortie a day, sometimes more sometimes less. The RAF fighter pilots often took off for several sorties a day.

Why was this?

I can only come up with one reason and that is that the logistics and the maintenance infrastructure of the Luftwaffe failed to get serviceability high enough to allow for more missions.

Of course pushing the Luftwaffe air crew to more missions will lead to more fatigue and more losses. But the pressure on the RAF would have increased as well.

Kris

 

[parsifal]

In Russia, the relatively high sortie rate definitely affected readiness rates. I know that is counterintuitive, and apparently contradictory, but it is what it is. Sortie rates did not remain constant. Sometimes, usually at the start of a campaign after a short period of rest and refit, the germans could mount high sortie rates, but as serviceability rates dropped as the push progressed, so too did the sortie rates (as a measure of the total airframes available).

Quoting sortie rates is also subject to the vagaries of the supporting logistics. If an aircraft is unfit to fly, and then removed from the active lists as it is sent back to rear area workshops for overhaul or repair, your sortie rate relative to the unit itself remains high, but the sortie rate relative to the total airframes available will drop. The LW in Russia tended to send back to the rear (sometimes even back to germany) aircraft in unflyable condition. These rebuilds are actually removed from the active lists as they were rebuilt, though the LW was not above including them in reports intended to be presented to hitler.

The point is, knowing the true sortie rate of the Lw is more difficult than it seems. For operations over SE Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940, I don't have a lot of hard data, which doesn't help.

 

[pbehn]

I find the comparison in sorties fascinating. Luftwaffe crew flew on average one sortie a day, sometimes more sometimes less. The RAF fighter pilots often took off for several sorties a day.

Why was this?

I can only come up with one reason and that is that the logistics and the maintenance infrastructure of the Luftwaffe failed to get serviceability high enough to allow for more missions.

Of course pushing the Luftwaffe air crew to more missions will lead to more fatigue and more losses. But the pressure on the RAF would have increased as well.

Kris

When planning a mission you have to know how many aircraft you have available. If you send huge numbers of aircraft out in the morning you do not now how many will be available for operations in the afternoon. The LW were crossing the Channel and so their missions lasted longer. Park controlled operations over south east England, He frequently mobilised squadrons to cover many possibilities. When a bomber group was forming up behind Calais Dunkerque and into Belgium it is not obvious whether they will attack across the Channel or loop round and attack London up the Thames estuary. Pilots records and recollections do not dwell long on missions they were sent up and returned without seeing the enemy or firing their guns.

 

[parsifal]

Up until 18 august, the german sortie rate sat somewhere below 1000 per day, give or take. After 18 august, the weather improved and with it the sortie rate for the LW. The average of 1,000 sorties per day was cracked 18 august and continued to be exceeded through to 6 September, with peaks of over 1,600 sorties on 30 and 31 August. This period saw the Luftwaffe continue the policy first seen on 18 August of attacking RAF bases further inland, and was the period in which the Germans came closest to victory. Correlating to this concentration on the sector fields was a decrease in RAF sortie rates, as might be expected. I haven't found a precise number on RAF sortie rates in this period, but some sources vaguely suggest an average of about 600 per day If correct, the RAF was turning aircraft around more effieintly than the LW given the much smaller size of FC.

In the earlier phase of the battle Tangmere was the only one of the crucial Sector Stations to be in a vulnerable position close to the coast, but the new deep penetration tactics used after 18 August saw the network of stations around London come under attack. The success of this phase of the German attack was partly accidental, in that they didn't know of the existence of the vital sector control rooms. If the control rooms had not been built at major fighter stations then this stage of the battle would have been rather less dangerous for the RAF, although the fighter stations and squadrons would still have come under severe pressure.

Although the first attack on the inland stations came on 18 August, a return of the bad weather prevented the Germans from returning in force until 24 August. This marked a period in which the Germans flew an average of 1,000 sorties per day, peaking at over 1,600 sorties on 30 and 31 August and lasting until 6 September. The gap saw two significant events. The first was a conference at Goering's palatial home at Karinhall on 19 August in which he repeated that the RAF was the Luftwaffe's main target. Enemy fighters were the first target, either in the air or on the ground, followed by the aircraft industry and the ground organisation of the bomber forces.

The second came on 20 August, when Churchill paid his famous tribute to the men of Fighter Command, remembered many for the line 'never in the field of Human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few'. What does still surprise is how early in the battle this speech was made - on 20 August the hardest part of the battle still laid in the future.

A key feature of this period of the battle was the repeated heavy attacks on the sector stations. North Weald was hit on 24 August, Biggin Hill twice on 30 August, Debden, Croydon, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch twice on 31 August. Biggin Hill was worst hit and the vital control room was knocked out of action. The staff moved to an emergency control room in an estate office in a nearby village, but this could only handle one of the three squadrons based at the airfield, so the remaining two were controlled from other sectors. 31 August also saw Fighter Command suffer its heaviest losses of the battle, with 38 aircraft shot down. The benefits of the RAF's 'home advantage' can be seen very clearly on this day. Of the 38 pilots shot nine were killed. Others will have been wounded and put out of action, but many were able to return almost immediately to the battle. In contrast very few of the crews of the 39 German aircraft lost on the same day will have escaped to fight again.

September started as August had ended. On 1 September Biggin Hill was hit for the sixth time in three days. Most of the buildings were now unsafe and most work had to take place outside, but the station somehow managed to keep working (largely due to the bravery of the WAAFs). Hornchurch was attacked on 2 September, North Weald on 3 September and Biggin Hill on 5 September. The aircraft industry also suffered. Vickers at Weybridge was hit on 4 September, Hawker on 6 September. The attacks also began to creep closer to London. On 5 September the oil farm at Thameshaven was hit and set on fire. The Germans returned on 6 September, and again during the raid on London on 7 September.

During 18 August 1940, Luftwaffe units flew a total of 970 sorties over Britain: some 495 by medium bombers, 460 by fighters and 15 by reconnaissance units. Of this total, about 170 of the bomber sorties were flown on the night of 17/18 August; the remainder were flown during the daylight hours on 18 August. Less than half of the available (or serviceable) aircraft on the Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 OBs were involved in the action that day, so it was clear that the Luftwaffe was not greatly extended in providing forces for the offensive. LF 5 did not take any part in the fighting, although its reconnaissance aircraft were active over Nthn England and Scotland

Altogether, the Luftwaffe lost between 69 and 71 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair as a result of its operations over Britain on 18 August 1940. Of this total, 59 were lost to certain or probable action by fighters while two fell to ground fire, four to a combination of both and one collided with a British training aircraft. The remaining three crashed in German-held territory owing to technical failures. Altogether, the losses represented seven per cent of the force committed. Around 29 aircraft crashed in England. Personnel losses were 94 German crews killed, 40 captured and 25 returned with wounds. Some 27 to 31 German aircraft returned with damage.

The gross underestimation of Fighter Command's strength issued to Luftwaffe units meant the British reaction was much stronger than expected. During the 24-hour period, Fighter Command flew 927 sorties, slightly fewer than the Germans. Only 41 of these sorties were flown by night, 28 on 17/18 August and 13 on 18/19 August. The remaining 886 sorties were flown by day, a number almost exactly equal to the 861 serviceable Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant and Gladiator day fighters available to squadrons.[6]

However, the average operational sortie rate of one per serviceable fighter was not spread evenly throughout the command, however. Nos 12 and 13 Groups in the Midlands and north of Britain, with a third of the serviceable fighters between them, put up 129 (or only 15 per cent) of the day sorties, and of these only three made contact with the enemy. No. 11 Group put up one-third of the serviceable fighters in 600 sorties, or more than two-thirds of the total; on average. Each of the serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1.7 operational sorties. No. 43 squadron flew the most sorties: 63 operations including five each from the 13 serviceable at the beginning of the day.

Only 403 (45 percent) of the total number of sorties flown by Fighter Command were directed at the three major German raids. A further 56 (or just over 6 per cent) were standing patrols to protect shipping off the coast. Most of the remaining 427 sorties (nearly 50 per cent) were made to engage the reconnaissance aircraft. Usually several half-squadrons were committed. This was not excessive. But by sending more units to counter the flights, German aircraft were forced to fly higher and were denied the opportunity to drop to low altitude to take higher resolution photographs. This contributed to a lack of German intelligence which often failed to distinguish fighter, bomber and naval airfields from each other. Much of the time their strength was directed at non-fighter airfields on this date.

Of the 403 sorties put up by Fighter Command to meet the major German attacks, 320 of those made contact with the enemy, meaning 80 percent of the fighters sent to intercept the bombers did so. The percentage would have been higher, had the bombers on the afternoon raid not turned around short of their targets.

Between 27 and 34 RAF fighters were destroyed. One source of the battle indicated the figure to be 31 destroyed or beyond repair. Of these, 25 fell to German fighters, two to return fire from the bombers. One was shot down by British ground fire in error and the loss of the remainder cannot be established. Some 26 of the fighters lost were Hurricanes, and five were Spitfires. Personnel losses for the RAF amounted to 10 British fighter pilots killed on the day, and another who died of wounds. Around 19 pilots were wounded, 11 so seriously that they did not take part in the rest of the battle.[5]

Losses on the ground amounted to eight fighters (two Spitfires). Around 28 aircraft of other types were destroyed on the ground. The total destroyed or damaged beyond repair amounted to 68 aircraft, although 17 of these were trainers or non-operational types.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this period of the battle was the slow but steady decrease in the quality of the British fighter pilots. As more experienced pilots were killed or wounded they had to be replaced with novices, many of whom would later become equally experienced, but that was in the future. The experienced squadrons were also becoming worn down, and under the Dowding system they were thus moved away from the battle and replaced with fresh squadrons. Unfortunately the intense nature of the battle in late August and early September meant that this policy failed. The inexperienced squadrons suffered much heavier losses than the tired units they were replacing, and in some cases had to be withdrawn themselves. But the system of squadron rotation meant at least that sortie rates would necessarily drop for the RAF as some of its units entered a rest period

On 8 September Dowding replaced the rotation system with a new 'Stabilization Scheme' (presumably because it was designed to stabilise the experienced squadrons). Fighter Command's squadrons were split into three categories. 'A' class categories were to be manned entirely with fully trained pilots and were to be used in No.11 Group and in the Middle Wallop and Duxford sectors of the neighbouring groups. Five 'B' class squadrons in No.10 and No.12 Groups were also to be kept up to strength and were to be used if an entire 'A' class squadron needed to be rested. The remaining squadrons, in every other group, became 'C' class squadrons. These had a core of five or six experienced pilots and were used to give new pilots enough experience to allow them to be moved to 'A' or 'B' class squadrons. At about the same time the number of pilots in each squadron was reduced from 26 to 16 - a move that in the short term allowed more squadrons to operate at full strength but at the price of eliminating each squadron's reserves, forcing just about every pilot to fly on every mission.

This period also saw an alarming trend in the number of fighters available to replace losses - the weeks ending 31 August and 7 September were the only two in the entire battle in which Spitfire and Hurricane losses greatly outnumbered the weekly output of new or repaired aircraft. Three more weeks at the same rate and Fighter Command might had run out of fighters, assuming it had enough pilots left.

 

[pbehn]

This period also saw an alarming trend in the number of fighters available to replace losses - the weeks ending 31 August and 7 September were the only two in the entire battle in which Spitfire and Hurricane losses greatly outnumbered the weekly output of new or repaired aircraft. Three more weeks at the same rate and Fighter Command might had run out of fighters, assuming it had enough pilots left.

A long post and a great read Parsifal. I am sure the trend you noted was alarming, but up to that point production and repair had exceeded losses. On the other side of the Channel the situation was actually much worse. The RAF were struggling to replace the numbers of fighters but the LW were not replacing their bombers and twin engine fighters in any significant way. The switch to mass raids on London was caused by a mix of
1 Ideology :- revenge for bombs on Berlin.
2.Strategy:- believing the RAF was weak and knockout blow was possible and maybe force a victory.
3. Pragmatism:- The bomber and fighter units of the LW had lost so many aeroplanes and pilots/crews from each of their squadrons that they ceased to be effective and increasingly could not be used as they had been. When squadrons were down to 3 or 4 serviceable crews/aircraft they had to be consolidated to attack. The only practical way to do this was to issue an order with basic instructions on timing, form up location (behind Calais) and target (London).

The Battle of Britain was a battle of attrition as many are. While Churchill, Dowding and Park worried about the state of their forces as the battle reached its peak, Goering was quite certain that the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters and it was time to deliver the knockout blow.

 

[Civettone]

Indeed. It was quite simple really. The Luftwaffe was logistically unable to fight a battle of attrition, while the RAF was. The only thing the RAF could not keep up was the supply of pilots. They were cutting short the training of recruits, something which they only managed to restore by the middle of the war. Interestingly enough, at the same time the RAF and USAAF were raising the standard of their new pilots, the Luftwaffe reduced theirs and paid the ultimate price in 1944. One could argue that they learned the wrong lesson from the RAF of 1940.

Kris

 

[Hop]

Thanks Steve, but what I meant was rather a breakdown of RAF losses similar to the LW, in operational losses with and without enemy action and in non-operational losses. Sorry, I should been clearer.

There are RAF breakdowns of losses available. For example, The Narrow Margin has figures for August and September:

Spitfires and Hurricanes
Accident - 66
Enemy action on ground - 23
In action - 696

I'm not sure how comparable the figures are, though. The RAF's figure show less than 9% of losses to accidents, whereas the figures for the Luftwaffe, also August and September only:

Bf 109 and Bf 110
Due to enemy action - 559
Not due to enemy action - 75
On non operational flights - 44

That's double the percentage of the RAF losses to accidents. And Luftwaffe bombers seem to have been even more accident prone:

Level bombers
Due to enemy action - 348
Not due to enemy action - 110
On non operational flights - 50

That makes roughly a third of bomber losses accidents, during the height of the battle. I've looked at the figures before and the day bombers had a much, much higher accident rate than the night bombers, which doesn't really make sense.

The obvious problem is that air forces wouldn't know what caused many losses. They'd just know that aircraft failed to return. How they classified those losses would depend on the air force, and possibly even the individual units involved.

 

[Hop]

On sortie rates, from Eagle in Flames by Hooton:

Luftwaffe sorties:

Aug 5-11 2,700
Aug 12-18 5,875
Aug 19-25 3,150
Aug 26-1 6,625
Sep 2-8 6,075
Sep 9-15 3,650
Sep 16-22 3,100
Sep 23-29 3,400

The three peak weeks for Luftwaffe fighter sorties were

Aug 12-18 3,825
Aug 26-1 4,700
Sep 2-8 4,050

Those were the only weeks where Luftwaffe fighter sorties exceeded 2,000.

RAF fighter sorties for those 3 weeks:

4,800
5,000
4,950.

RAF fighter sorties were over 3,000 a week from the second week of July until the last week of September.

 

[psl]

how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?

 

[pbehn]

how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?

Between take off and landing.

 

[buffnut453]

Ba-dum-dum!

In reality, the distances involved probably had much to do with the differing sortie rates. It takes time to build an airborne formation and then transit from Europe to Britain. By comparison, the RAF was able to keep most assets on the ground and only scramble them when needed. By their very nature, the RAF sorties would be of far shorter duration than those carried out by the Luftwaffe.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Love seeing older members coming back.

 

[Koopernic]

When planning a mission you have to know how many aircraft you have available. If you send huge numbers of aircraft out in the morning you do not now how many will be available for operations in the afternoon. The LW were crossing the Channel and so their missions lasted longer. Park controlled operations over south east England, He frequently mobilised squadrons to cover many possibilities. When a bomber group was forming up behind Calais Dunkerque and into Belgium it is not obvious whether they will attack across the Channel or loop round and attack London up the Thames estuary. Pilots records and recollections do not dwell long on missions they were sent up and returned without seeing the enemy or firing their guns.

In essence you are saying that Luftwaffe sorties over Britain were far more likely to see action whereas RAF sorties were often precautionary. That makes sense since the Luftwaffe fighter pilot is much more likely to be fatigued and his machine in need of arming and servicing.

 

[pbehn]

In essence you are saying that Luftwaffe sorties over Britain were far more likely to see action whereas RAF sorties were often precautionary. That makes sense since the Luftwaffe fighter pilot is much more likely to be fatigued and his machine in need of arming and servicing.

That is the historical fact Koopernic, there were very very few LW raids on the UK that were not met by the RAF in some way. To ensure all or most possibilities of a LW formation changing direction there were a lot of RAF sorties that were sent up "just in case" and didn't see action.

 

[pbehn]

how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?

Seriously, some RAF sorties were planes scrambled as the airfield was being bombed, others were standing patrols over the south coast while some by twin engine fighters involved chasing aircraft inland across the Midlands. The Chain Home RADAR only looked out so once a raid crossed the coast it was tracked by the observer corps, this was obviously not so good or as quick.

 

[Stig1207]

Thanks Hop, for the breakdown of RAF losses, and the more detailed the numbers crunching becomes, the more questions to ponder!

As to the operational losses without accident being comparatively higher for than the Luftwaffe, I see your point; however, the RAF accident rate seems surprisingly low considering the scale and hectic activity of the operations.

It does certainly seem counter intuitive that the LW bomber operational losses without enemy action are so relatively high, but in October it's worse; where they exceed the losses due to enemy action, 78 and 64 respectively. This is of cause at the time the shift form day to mainly nighttime operations occurred. The twist here is that according to Foreman, FC claims for bombers also fell dramatically; a quick count gives 40 destroyed, so less than the LW's reported losses to enemy action.

 

[Civettone]

It seems to me that the reason for the high German losses in non-combat are due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts ...


Kris

 

[stona]

It seems to me that the reason for the high German losses in non-combat are due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts ...


Kris

They were operating much further from their home bases and support infrastructure. Luftwaffe logistics were 'strained' to put it politely.

Many an aircraft would have been grounded for want of a part which should have been readily available with better management and planning.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Could these accidental losses be a way of including cannibalised aircraft in the loss reports?

 

[Civettone]

Could these accidental losses be a way of including cannibalised aircraft in the loss reports?

Interesting idea. I doubt the Germans would do that. I guess they would cannibalise aircraft but would not write them off but put them up for repair.

Kris