Overlord/D-Day and the Me-262

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re the vulnerability of Me262 air bases

For this what-if, maybe we can assume the clever Luftwaffe kept the aircraft secret and that the Me262 has not been used before. Imagine if 300x Me262 rather suddenly appeared during the post D-Day operations.

Further, let's assume that the Luftwaffe were clever and they built (in secret for the most part) bases that were sufficiently camouflaged (maybe pond/flooded-runway and dispersed-roads-for-runways types), so that the locations came as a surprise to the Allies.

It might give the Germans a week or two of running rampant before the Allies to get up to snuff and begin dealing with 300x Me262it effectively.

As a point of possible interest, in a wargaming campaign I have mentioned before, one of the players went the Swiss and Scandinavian route with hangars and maintenance facilities in the sides of mountains and used nearby roads for runways, while another player built one of his airfields as a flooded runway type. Most of the other players had secondary runway plans in place, using roads and dispersed airfield facilities. Admittedly, it was only a game, and the none of the opposing forces had any significant advantage in numbers (the most airframes anyone had at one time was ~350), but it did take a while for reconnaissance efforts to sort out where some aircraft were operating from, and some operating runways were never located during the ~6 month long (scenario time) campaign - despite serious efforts.


As an aside, did the Me262 ever get fitted with drop tanks operationally? Maybe DTs could be used to help rationalize increased safe(er) operating margins re distance from the front.

Also, did the Germans have any advanced bomb sights that might have been usable by the Me262 if developed just a bit more? Maybe a type that would allow accurate shallow dive/glide-bombing?
 
Yabut I'm pretty sure B-17s and Lancasters can range well beyond the Me-262's roughly 300-mile combat radius. They're hitting Berlin and Nuremberg already. And they're already under SHAEF's control. Defend the fields or attack the coast.


Yes, I knew that. What I was asking was did the Allies use B-17s to attack airfields in 1944? Because I don't think that was common or considered their best use.

Yes, I'm sure the Allies will react to conditions. I was just curious if I was right that this was not done historically.
 
Lets modify the scenario.

Suppose the Germans have enough Me-262s such that 300 are operational and effective given Allied attacks on German airfields. The Germans have more than 300, but Allied attacks reduce the effective count down to 300. After a week of attacks by the Allies on the beachhead, how many ships have the Allies lost?
 
Yes, I knew that. What I was asking was did the Allies use B-17s to attack airfields in 1944? Because I don't think that was common or considered their best use.

Yes, I'm sure the Allies will react to conditions. I was just curious if I was right that this was not done historically.

I've read of one or two instances of it, mainly during the Ardennes battles. That only underscores how the Allies were willing to use the heavies against airfields on an emergency basis -- as 200 jets attacking the landings would surely be considered.

ETA:

On December 24, 1944 the 8th Air Force launched mission #760, the largest aerial mission of the war, which involved more than 2000 heavy bombers. The mission was to bomb German airfields and supply lines, to stop the German offensive in the Ardennes known as the Battle of the Bulge. B-17 "Treble Four" (44-8444) was chosen as lead for the 487th Bomb Group, which led the entire 8th Air Force that day.

 
Yes, I knew that. What I was asking was did the Allies use B-17s to attack airfields in 1944? Because I don't think that was common or considered their best use.

Yes, I'm sure the Allies will react to conditions. I was just curious if I was right that this was not done historically.
February 1944 - B17 and B24 attacks on airfields in France.

August 1944 - B17 and B24 bombers attacked airfields in Belgium, Netherlands, and Western Germany.

Others in between and either side as well.

Suppose the Germans have enough Me-262s such that 300 are operational and effective given Allied attacks on German airfields. The Germans have more than 300, but Allied attacks reduce the effective count down to 300. After a week of attacks by the Allies on the beachhead, how many ships have the Allies lost?
To put a bit more perspective on this, Luftflotte 3 sorties for July 1944 totalled 15,545 compared to the allied total of 96,850.
Bombing attempts by Luftflotte 3 were difficult as smoke would be laid making observation hard and AA fire was rated as very heavy.
Luftflotte 3 had more success against shipping with minelaying sorties rather than direct attacks.

The 262 as has been mentioned, was not really a terrific bomber. Two 250kg bombs is not a lot and with a low accuracy rate wouldn't
have much overall effect. Couple that with the large amount of defensive fire plus opposition from day and night fighters and the 262's
speed isn't going to make it invulnerable.
 
Maybe if the Luftwaffe stocked up on the Italian Motobomba FFF? Dropping a few hundred every day in the midst of the invasion/supply fleet(s) could have a significant effect. Or air laid mines.

re how many ships are lost?

How many sorties can the Me262 make during the time available before attrition and maintenance become the dominating factors. What (possibly only imaginary) % probability of hit per sortie do you want to use, based on what (possibly only imaginary) weapons and method of delivery?

Shallow dive/glide bombing? 20%/sortie max hit rate for the best of the best. Relatively high attrition rate for the Me262.

Low level bombing? Maybe 1-5%/sortie hit rate. Relatively low to moderate attrition for the Me262.

Motobomba FFF? Unknown %/sortie hit rate as too varied due to circumstances and having never been used in such an environment, but definitely a problem in a close quarters target rich environment. Bigger ships with torpedo bulges would not be sunk (it only had a 260 lb warhead) but might occasionally sustain moderate damage. Lighter combat ships and merchant vessels could easily sustain serious damage or even be sunk. It only weighed 770 lbs and was retarded by parachute after the drop so probably usable by the Me262. Relatively low attrition rate for the Me262.

Air-laid mines? Again, retarded by parachute after drop, so probably usable by the Me262. Magnetic and influence bottom laid mines are ship killers. Would the off-shore shallows along the invasion beaches lallow such? Did the Luftwaffe have any that could have been carried and laid by the Me262? Relatively low attrition rate for the Me262.
 
Low level bombing? Maybe 1-5%/sortie hit rate. Relatively low to moderate attrition for the Me262.

Risky over the landing beaches:

PhoNor-USNA-p012623-Omaha-9-10-Jun-unloading.jpg


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Attacking the craft offshore lowers bombing accuracy as the targets will be moving.
 
I used the 2,500 - 3,000 ft altitude due to that altitude being what the RAF considered as "above effective" small arms AA ground fire when attacking German ground units.

The RAF/FAA also used the same ~altitudes when defining 'high dive bombing', ie where the DB dropped its bomb at ~3,500 ft and recovered no lower than 2,500 ft, for the same reason of remaining above effective small arms fire.
 
Yes, I knew that. What I was asking was did the Allies use B-17s to attack airfields in 1944? Because I don't think that was common or considered their best use.

Yes, I'm sure the Allies will react to conditions. I was just curious if I was right that this was not done historically.
The B-17 was used to attack airfields, though it certainly isnt the best use, in big week itself airfields were targeted but mostly the ones associated with aircraft production. Big Week - Wikipedia. I believe they were also used to counter the "baby Blitz" around the time of "Big Week" and they were certainly used against various V1 and V2 sites, on 8 Nov 1942 Abbeville airfield in France was raided, for example. VIII Bomber Command 17 | American Air Museum
 
Lets modify the scenario.

Suppose the Germans have enough Me-262s such that 300 are operational and effective given Allied attacks on German airfields. The Germans have more than 300, but Allied attacks reduce the effective count down to 300. After a week of attacks by the Allies on the beachhead, how many ships have the Allies lost?
It sounds a simple "what if" but ignores a lot of "stuff". Building up a force takes much more time than many realise, especially of a new type, all combat ready with trained pilots and support. P-51Bs started arriving in UK in mid 1943 but there were only 100 deployed on "Big Week" end February 1944, numbers climbed quickly after BUT. The Me262 had two jet engines with an engine life of around 25 hours. 600 engines that last just 25 hours before major service or replacement quickly becomes a fantastic number of engines produced, serviced, replaced. I have no idea when the USA got 600 jet engines in regular service or when they had 300 jet aircraft of any type let alone one type but I would bet a lot that it wasnt 1945 probably closer to 1950. That is just the engine issue, the Me262 demanded top class pilots, if they werent top class, able to make up for all sorts of shortcomings that early jets had, you just lose a pilot and aircraft.
 
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Some tremendous info. Thank you gents.

Ref. the 262 as a dive bomber, note the reference here (search for "dive"): The German Jet Me-262 in 1944: A Failed Opportunity – Part I

As I-we have noted, the airframe was far too slick for the mission. Critical Mach was c. .85, and without dive brakes there was little prospect for speed control with the shark-sleek nose pointed at Earth. In comparison, the SBD's optimum dive speed was 240 its.

ALSO: you'll enjoy this. Scroll to about 3:30

View: https://www.facebook.com/flitetest/videos/dive-bombing-with-a-giant-german-me-262/1311992869262591/
 
It sounds a simple "what if" but ignores a lot of "stuff". Building up a force takes much more time than many realise, especially of a new type, all combat ready with trained pilots and support. P-51Bs started arriving in UK in mid 1943 but there were only 100 deployed on "Big Week" end February 1944, numbers climbed quickly after BUT. The Me262 had two jet engines with an engine life of around 25 hours. 600 engines that last just 25 hours before major service or replacement quickly becomes a fantastic number of engines produced, serviced, replaced. I have no idea when the USA got 600 jet engines in regular service or when they had 300 jet aircraft of any type let alone one type but I would bet a lot that it wasnt 1945 probably closer to 1950. That is just the engine issue, the Me262 demanded top class pilots, if they werent top class, able to make up for all sorts of shortcomings that early jets had, you just lose a pilot and aircraft.


Everything you said is true.

I wasn't really trying to explore the strategic question. I think we all already understand there is no German move that wins in 1944, and no way for the Germans to have 300 Me-262s suddenly surpirse the Allies. I was just curious about a very tactical question ... how effective would a bunch of Me-262s be at attacking some time around D-Day.
 
If the Me262 was deployed as intended: Heavy Fighter, then it would have inflicted serious damage against Allied air assets.

Once it's confined to a bomber role, it becomes an easy target for fleet CAP and AA.
Why do you think the best fighter of WWII is an easy target for CAP? I understand they are well outnumbered, and that matters. I understand the airfields are in danger, and that matters too. But while in the air and at speed, I don't think they are an easy target at all.
 
Why do you think the best fighter of WWII is an easy target for CAP? I understand they are well outnumbered, and that matters. I understand the airfields are in danger, and that matters too. But while in the air and at speed, I don't think they are an easy target at all.
As a heavy fighter, the 262's speed and 30mm cannon are a force to be reckoned with, but as a bomber, it has to operate slower and lower in order to try and deliver it's ordnance.
This is where the Allied AA and CAP have the upper hand and any advantage that the Me262 has, is now negated.

If we look at how the Me262 attacked B-17s, they avoided the traditional head-on attacks because of their sheer speed was so high, they literally had no time to aim their cannon unlike the Fw190A-8, which was able to have enough time to train their weapons in the 17's cockpit.
As.a result, the Me262's optimum attack angle was abeam and bring the nose up and rake the wing root and foreward fuselage in the few seconds they had before passing over target.

So the best formula to wreak havoc on the landing fleet, would be to bring the Do217s in en-masse and have the Me262s sweep the CAP clear.
The Do217s would then have the time to accurately deploy the Hs293s and Fritz-X with a high degree of accuracy.

So in the end, this what-if still gets to use Me262s, but in their intended role and the invasion fleet has been decimated.

Win-Win.
 
Or, since we're in the realm of "what-if", what if the Luftwaffe took the signs of an invasion seriously and moved all their Do217K/Ms of III./KG100 into the region, armed with the "Fritz-X" and Hs293 guided bombs while using the Me262s as air cover?
Historically they did use all of their available Do217 & He177 equipped anti shipping units against the Normandy invasion using both Fritz X and Hs293. I & II KG40 & III /KG100. II/KG100 was transitionning to the He177 and wasn't ready to participate. There were about 70-80 He177 on hand plus some Do217 equipped with these weapons. These units faced at least 4 problems:-

1. They were forced to operate at night making ieentification of targets and guiding the weapons difficlt.
2. The extensive radar guided night fighter screen the Allies employed over the beachhead meant most didn't get through;
3. The effective use of jammers installed in warships, developed as a result of previous experience of these weapons from Aug 1943 onwards.
4. A lack of replacement aircraft. The Do217 production line was closed in May 1944 and III/ KG100 received only 11 new Do217M-11 in each of June and July (having lost 32).

Historically their results while minimal have proved difficult to track, because the attacks happened at night, weapons couldn't always be identified. So mines and ordinary torpedoes tended to get the blame. There also seems to have been a bit of Allied cover up, probably for morale reasons. Post war analysis has identified the HQ ship Lawford as a probable victim of an Hs293.

See "Warriors and Wizards" by Martin J Bollinger.

So, even if the Me262s can keep the Allied fighter cover away to let the bombers through, little success is likely due to the ECM activity.
 

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