Rn vs IJN

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

And that's a fair point about battleship use, I don't think any country could afford to risk them which is why they did see relatively little action, though you are correct to point out that the RN seemed to be much less hesitant than other navies. So that does suggest that they could have gotten more use from them.

The issue to me is that, of course depending on how constrained the battle area is, destroyers positioned further out from the core fleet, of whatever size, can then reach out and hit very hard with their torpedoes. Launching torpedoes does not produce a flash, destroyers are small, fast targets which can be hard to hit even with radar guided guns, and the IJN ones can launch torpedoes at the very limits of the range of a battleship, let alone a heavy cruiser.

That can change of course if fighting is taking place amid complex and narrow island channels etc.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think the US battleships were engaged twice in surface combat, IIRC

Don't forget the fast BBs engaging ships fleeing Truk after Hailstone.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Don't forget the fast BBs engaging ships fleeing Truk after Hailstone.

That is interesting, can you elaborate? I am much more familiar with the early-mid war & get a bit lost after 1943

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One thing which could definitely make a surface night action between RN and IJN interesting is that the RN could deploy radar carrying Swordfish at night, and make night torpedo attacks. Same option potentially amid bad weather like squalls, which were very common in the Pacific.

 

[RCAFson]

Don't forget the fast BBs engaging ships fleeing Truk after Hailstone.

IIRC, USN BBs engaged surface forces at Casablanca, 2nd Guadalcanal (both Nov 1942) and in 1944 near Truk and at Surigao Straits.

 

[Shortround6]

Don't forget the fast BBs engaging ships fleeing Truk after Hailstone.

Kind of why we need to use qualifiers like "ship to ship" as there were a number of ship to ship that were not BB to BB.
Warspite at Narvik for instance.
The Mutsu is supposed to have fire four 16in shells at an allied Recon plane during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Only time she fired her main guns in anger before her own magazines blew up and destroyed her.

The Japanese had a problem with battleships. The Kongos, as rebuilt, were fast battlecruisers roughly equal to the Repulse/Renown. The 2 Nagatos were close to the QEs or the Colorado's although much faster.

But that is only 6 ships before the Yamato shows up.
The Fuso and Ise were faster than the American 14 in ships but the Americans had better armor, more powerful guns.
The British 15in BBs were not that far behind the 14in Japanese ships. 1920-1938lb shells compared to 1485lb shells made up a lot of difference for the British ships.

The Japanese could not afford to go toe to toe with the Americans or British even with nominal equal numbers.

British on the other hand, viewed some of the old 15in ships as semi-expendable. Don't waste them but if losing one (Or two?) gets a decent advantage then go for it.
Again, Warspite at Narvik, The Warspite survived, it took the Germans close to two years to replace the losses at Narvik which crippled German naval operations for a large part of WW II.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is interesting, can you elaborate? I am much more familiar with the early-mid war & get a bit lost after 1943

The potted Wikipedia notes about it:


At this point, reports reached Admiral Spruance concerning the group of warships fleeing through North Pass. Spruance was so adamant on engaging in ship-to-ship combat that his carrier commander, Admiral Mitscher, ordered his CAGs to stop attacking Katori and her companions. Spruance put himself in tactical command of Task Group 50.9, made up of four destroyers, heavy cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans, and the new battleships Iowa and New Jersey, which he personally led in a surface engagement against the previously damaged Japanese ships.[19] The battered Japanese ships did not stand much of a chance against Task Group 50.9, though members of his staff saw Spruance's decision to engage in surface action when aircraft likely could have achieved similar results as needlessly reckless. Indeed, the Japanese destroyer Maikaze managed to fire torpedoes at the battleship New Jersey during the engagement. Fortunately for Spruance, the torpedoes missed, and the "battle" ended with predictably one-sided results. The U.S. Navy surface combatants incurred virtually no damage, and it was the only time in their careers that Iowa and New Jersey had fired their main armament at enemy ships.

Meanwhile, New Jersey's 5-inch (127 mm) guns combined fire with U.S. cruisers to sink Maikaze and Shonan Maru, while Iowa targeted and sank Katori with numerous hits from her main battery. Nowaki was the only Japanese ship from this group to escape, only suffering very minor damage at the hand of a straddle from a High Capacity 16-inch (406 mm) round from Iowa.[18][20]

Operation Hailstone - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

IIRC, USN BBs engaged surface forces at Casablanca [...]

Great catch, I totally spaced that one.

 

[z42]

In part because of the scarcity of actions involving battleships. Which kind of skews the evaluation.

The Japanese could not replace lost BBs and kept them away from risky areas (combat) for much of the war.

With such a small data set it is hard to judge actual potential.

The interesting question is, why were there so few ship vs ship battles involving BB's then? Clearly the big navies of the world had plowed a lot of money into building BB's, so why didn't they use them that much?

My answer would be that, trite as it sounds, that air power changed the game. The increased spotting and strike distance afforded by aircraft (whether launched from land or from a carrier) meant that, with few exceptions, by the time the BB's would have been able to join in the battle was already over.

Another part of the answer may be in a change in doctrine. Nobody, except maybe the IJN, was planning to refight the battle of Jutland. And yes, the IJN was a bit of a special case, with their obsession with their Kantai Kessen doctrine. So they tried to save their BB's for the climactic final battle, which of course never came.

 

[z42]

The issue to me is that, of course depending on how constrained the battle area is, destroyers positioned further out from the core fleet, of whatever size, can then reach out and hit very hard with their torpedoes. Launching torpedoes does not produce a flash, destroyers are small, fast targets which can be hard to hit even with radar guided guns, and the IJN ones can launch torpedoes at the very limits of the range of a battleship, let alone a heavy cruiser.

That can change of course if fighting is taking place amid complex and narrow island channels etc.

I think it's more about the rise of air power, as I described above.

One thing which could definitely make a surface night action between RN and IJN interesting is that the RN could deploy radar carrying Swordfish at night, and make night torpedo attacks. Same option potentially amid bad weather like squalls, which were very common in the Pacific.

The RN was very very angry that the High Seas fleet managed to slip away in the night and reach their harbor without being obliterated after Jutland. So during the interwar years they focused very heavily on night fighting, including night time air strikes against ships in harbor (e.g. developing a wire device to cause the air dropped torpedoes to belly flop instead of hitting the harbor bottom). Taranto then being a good example of that doctrine in action.

 

[Shortround6]

The interesting question is, why were there so few ship vs ship battles involving BB's then? Clearly the big navies of the world had plowed a lot of money into building BB's, so why didn't they use them that much?

Well, aside from South America and Germany there were only 6 countries that had battleships. (ok, 7 if you count Turkey)

And Italy and France were in the same boat. Not enough of them, not updated well (France) and very hard to replace.

The US had not updated any of theirs to the extent that the British, Japan and Italy did and then with Pearl Harbor about 1/2 of theirs were sunk or under going repair for several years.

Going from a 5 (15 actual ships) in the world pecking order to around a 2.5 (8 sunk or damaged) just on hulls meant the US couldn't afford to loose any for prestige reasons.
And the Arkansas, New York and Texas were pretty 2nd rate, Which puts the US at an iffy 2 on the BB scale. Only 4 of the late WW I ships with 2nd rate AA and a speed of 21 kts. If they can't fight they are screwed because they are lucky to out run a fast freighter. Until the North Carolinas are finished and/or the least damaged PH ships are repaired the US has got 3 fewer than the Japanese. Japan adds the Yamato in secret as the US adds the North Carolinas but the US is really stretched thin BB wise. Japanese can't afford to loose any unless they can take out a bunch of the American ships because they know the Americans are building the South Dakotas and rebuild some of the damaged ships from PH. US lied a bit and refloated/rebuilt a couple of ships that would have sunk in deeper water.

Turkey wasn't going to fight anybody.
The Soviets weren't going to drag out their relics if they could help it. Had enough trouble keeping them afloat in their bases.
French were out of the fight from June 1940 to 1943.
Italy was trying up the RN.
Germany and the RN did most of the BB vs BB fighting.

Depending on the home country's dockyard capabilities it could take close to 4 years to build a new Battleship.

Loosing and old one like an British R was one thing if you had several new ones being built. Loosing a new one, like the PoW, was a real kick in the butt.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The interesting question is, why were there so few ship vs ship battles involving BB's then? Clearly the big navies of the world had plowed a lot of money into building BB's, so why didn't they use them that much?

My answer would be that, trite as it sounds, that air power changed the game. The increased spotting and strike distance afforded by aircraft (whether launched from land or from a carrier) meant that, with few exceptions, by the time the BB's would have been able to join in the battle was already over.

Another part of the answer may be in a change in doctrine. Nobody, except maybe the IJN, was planning to refight the battle of Jutland. And yes, the IJN was a bit of a special case, with their obsession with their Kantai Kessen doctrine. So they tried to save their BB's for the climactic final battle, which of course never came.

Everyone pretty much held back their battleships during WW I too. Largely due to the huge expense in building them, and the consequent risk in losing them.

I know from reading Neptune's Inferno that the US were hesitating to send their remaining battleships to the South Pacific largely due to fuel.

Aircraft definitely posed a risk to ships operating on their own, but countries that had aircraft carriers as well as battleships could operate their warships under a protective umbrella of naval air defense, i.e. fighters. Of course not everyone realized that postwar. And that also required air defense to be working properly.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

How does the cost of building an aircraft carrier compare to the cost of building a battleship? Both with and without aircraft?

I would imagine as a ship, the aircraft carrier itself, though very big, would cost a lot less than the battleship because you aren't having to make such massive heat treated steel plates for the armor belts.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

How does the cost of building an aircraft carrier compare to the cost of building a battleship? Both with and without aircraft?

I would imagine as a ship, the aircraft carrier itself, though very big, would cost a lot less than the battleship because you aren't having to make such massive heat treated steel plates for the armor belts.

I think the American fast BBs cost between $80 and $100 million dollars each. The Iowas had to cost more than that, what with their new 16" designs and bigger power plants -- not to mention the turret kerfuffle.

I find it hard to imagine their carrier contemporaries costing that much, even factoring in the cost of planes and aircrew.

 

[don4331]

British estimated costs during Inter war period:

	Maintenance cost (annual)	Aircraft cost (annual)	Capital Cost (annualized)	Mid life Refit cost (annualized over life)	Total Cost (per annum)
Single engine Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$0	$862,745	$0	$0	$862,745
Twin Engined Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$0	$2,000,000	$0	$0	$2,000,000
Four Engined Airplane (Squadron of 16 A/C)	$0	$4,764,706	$0	$0	$4,764,706
Capital Ship	$1,519,607	$169,118	$1,507,353	$268,627	$3,464,705
Cruiser, Large	$916,667	$112,745	$458,824	$98,039	$1,586,275
Cruiser, Small	$637,255	$112,745	$281,863	$73,039	$1,104,902
Aircraft Carrier (36 A/C)	$1,250,000	$2,029,411	$992,647	$110,294	$4,382,352
Aircraft Carrier (15 A/C)	$784,314	$845,588	$796,569	$95,588	$2,522,059
Destroyer Flotilla (J.Class - 8 Vessels)	$1,627,451	$-	$891,176	$71,078	$2,589,705
Submarine (1000 tons)	$195,098	$-	$125,980	$-	$321,078
Liberty Ship	$40,000	$-	$400,000	$-	$440,000

NOTES
(a) Maintenance covers the pay, victualling and miscellaneous expenses of the personnel, naval stores, fuel and armament stores consumed, and the cost of annual docking and repair.
(b) The figure for aircraft covers cost of replacing equipment (assumed life-5 years) plus annual cost of maintenance of personnel and material chargeable. It has been assumed that Capital Ships would carry 3 aircraft and Cruisers 2 aircraft.
(c) This figure represents the capital cost of building the ship divided by its 'life'. The lives assumed are:
Capital Ships 26 years
Carriers 20 years
Cruisers 23½ years
Destroyers 22 years
Submarines 14 years
(d) Large repairs take place about every ninth year of the ship's life. In the case of a Capital Ship, a second large repair takes place about the eighteenth year. The figure taken for this column represents the aggregate cost of large repair(s) divided by the vessel's life as scheduled under (c). The actual cost of large repair is, for the most part, conjectural as little or no experience has been gained of these vessels.
(e) Submarines are not subjected to 'Large Repairs'. The average annual cost of all repairs and of periodic renewal of batteries is reflected in column (a).
(f) Liberty ship is just the ship, cargo value would be separate.

Extrapolated (Lexington class)

	Maintenance cost (annual)	Aircraft cost (annual)	Capital Cost (annualized)	Mid life Refit cost (annualized over life)	Total Cost (per annum)
Aircraft Carrier (80 A/C)	$1,875,000	$5,073,528	$1,488,971	$165,441	$8,602,939

 

[don4331]

The costs relatively match what I have for Kriegsmarine ships:

Bismarck (capital ship)	197,000,000 Reichsmarks
Admiral Hipper (cruiser, large)	85,800,000 Reichsmarks
Nurnberg (cruiser, small)	85,800,000 Reichsmarks
Z1 Leberecht Maas (destroyer)	13,700,000 Reichsmarks
Graf Zeppelin (aircraft carrier)	104,500,000 Reichsmarks*

Graf Zeppelin is, of course, incomplete, missing armament, and aircraft.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

HMS Rodney (completed in 1927) cost approximately £6M in 1939-40 British pounds (not including ammunition or aircraft).
HMS King George V (completed in Dec'40) cost approximately £7.4M (not including ammunition, aircraft, or radars).
HMS Illustrious was expected to cost approximately £4M on completion (not including ammunition, aircraft, or radars).
Aircraft cost for 36x airframes was approximately £470,000 (including radios and armament, not including ammunition/ordnance).

But as indicated by don4331 posts above, the yearly operating costs of 36x aircraft would raise the yearly operating cost of the Illustrious above that of the Nelson and maybe the KGV as well(?).

NOTE that the KGV class would have been more expensive (as completed) than the Nelson for several reasons, some of which include the more sophisticated fire control system, improved armour quality, more powerful machinery, etc.

 

[z42]

I think the American fast BBs cost between $80 and $100 million dollars each. The Iowas had to cost more than that, what with their new 16" designs and bigger power plants -- not to mention the turret kerfuffle.

I find it hard to imagine their carrier contemporaries costing that much, even factoring in the cost of planes and aircrew.

Wikipedia mentions that the Essex class carriers cost between $68-78 M each, in 1942 dollars. Although those were stamped out in large numbers which probably drove down the per unit cost substantially. Then one can also worry about how comparable the dollar costs are for wartime construction vs. peacetime, with price controls trying to curb inflation etc. etc.

 

[z42]

How does the cost of building an aircraft carrier compare to the cost of building a battleship? Both with and without aircraft?

I would imagine as a ship, the aircraft carrier itself, though very big, would cost a lot less than the battleship because you aren't having to make such massive heat treated steel plates for the armor belts.

In addition to the dollar cost, there's also the question of lead times and how quickly you can scale up construction. BB size guns and armor were AFAIU very long lead time items. Try to build a BB barrel too fast and it'll deform or crack and you'll have to start from scratch. An aircraft carrier, by contrast, is much closer to 'standard' ship building, and you can slap them together relatively quickly.

Of course, the aircraft carrier is useless without competent aircrew, which takes a long time to train. So similarly to BB guns, you have to setup a training pipeline years in advance.

 

[z42]

Everyone pretty much held back their battleships during WW I too. Largely due to the huge expense in building them, and the consequent risk in losing them.

I know from reading Neptune's Inferno that the US were hesitating to send their remaining battleships to the South Pacific largely due to fuel.

Aircraft definitely posed a risk to ships operating on their own, but countries that had aircraft carriers as well as battleships could operate their warships under a protective umbrella of naval air defense, i.e. fighters. Of course not everyone realized that postwar. And that also required air defense to be working properly.

I wonder how much of the doctrinal changes between the world wars came about due to increased situational awareness? In the dreadnought era you were aware of a rather small bubble around your ships, and if you sent out a small squadron and it happened to bump into the enemy battle fleet your small squadron would likely be obliterated. So you either stayed in port, or then you went out with your entire battle line. Sort of the Mahanian doctrine in a nutshell.

By WWII, however, there was long range aerial reconnaissance, radar, spies and coast watchers with portable radios, etc. So there was much less chance of unexpectedly bumping into an enemy fleet. And thus there was much more of a choice of whether to close to within surface gunnery range or not, and it was relatively less risky to send out small batches of ships on different missions rather than keeping your entire battle fleet all at once in the same spot. And as we saw in the Pacific, in many cases they chose to rather send out air strikes at long range and then scurry away long before the surface guns came within range.