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FWIF here- just googled a website devoted to WW2 History- They listed the "top ten" reasons why Hitler lost WW2- some of which are not relevant to aviation, but a few might pertain. Here are the ones I feel are relevant even yet today. (1) Have the Luftwaffe concentrate the bombing missions to the RAF bases, and to the chain of Radar towers- "The old expression: he who is forewarned is forearmed" applies here to the Radar advantage the RAF had, and which apparently Goering ignored.(2) Take the advice of his Generals and Field Marshalls-- as a Corporal in WW1- Hitler felt the enlisted soldier's distrust of the Prussian upper class who comprised 90% of the Officer Corps when he invaded Poland in 1939. (3) Accelerate the "Wunderwaffen" program, instead of waiting until late 1944, when the available supply of raw materials needed was almost "kaput"! (4) Waiting to invade Russia through Poland until the Japanese allies had agreed to also invade Russia- forcing Stalin to fight a 2-front war. Just a guess here, but think Japan would have to change their timetable for the attack on PH to make this 'jibe' with Hitler's June 22nd. 1941 op. Barbarossa--History can teach us many lessons, the cost of the tuition can be steep--HansieIve fought Market Garden on the sand table at staff college. I was the lucky SOB given command of the irish guards, tasked with flying down hells highway to relieve the paratroopers. our paratroop force had elected to drop in the DZ adjacent the town, rather than the DZ some miles from the target. it helped, but the incessant attacks along that highway made the job of my relief force almost impossible, much as it was historically.
monty was the ideal general for the british army of 1944. by that time the british were out of men. there were no replacements left. Every loss to the new BEF was a permanent loss. Consequently, every yard gained every little piece of resistance erncountered had to be utterly crushed before allowing the ground to be occupied. this was the only game the british army could play by 1944. monty understood it perfectly. these rules of engagement applied as much to the market garden operation as any. trouble was, these basic, unalterable rules of enagement also made the objectives of the operation impossible to meet.
monty's plan would have been great if it had worked, and would have materially shortened the war if it had. but it never had the slightest chance of success really, which makes all the more tragic really.
The worst defeat? no, not a chance. Dunkirk and Burma '42 were both worse. probably the greatest defeat for the british in WWII came at Singapore
Our ability to break the Purple Code the Japanese were using was a great advantage. And Adm. Nimitz's decision to have an uncoded message about the salt water treatment facilities being "kaput" from Midway, and the response over the Purple Code-- "AB" forewarned the USN. Darn shame the elevators were not functioning, as Adm. Spruance had to send the torpedo planes sans fighter escort- but the Japanese were indeed "caught with their pants down" when they were ordered to change from bombs (for the second strike on Midway) to torpedoes (for attacking potential American Naval vessels. History sometimes "turns on a dime"-- The USN was lucky at Midway, the Japanese were not.Odd to say Pearl Harbour was a disaster because from a military perspective it was successful with minimal losses.
The decision to go war with USA was political so the mistake was there. Although the politics in Japan was military so you know what I mean.
I don't think Midway was a military mistake either as the Japanese was simply caught out and unlucky.
For s country as weak as Japan was to go to war with the USA was absolutely nonsense.
The definition of blunder usually involves the word "stupid". Mussolini's insistence on joining Adolf in attacking the UK in 1940 must rank high up in the stupid territory. 20 aircraft lost and many more damaged dropping 54 tons of bombs on places like Harwich while at the same time RN Swordfish torpedo aircraft sank/damaged half of Benito's capital ships.
Entry of Italy into the war. Mussolini believed the war, after the defeat of France, was over: not at all, the war was just starting...
When the war was looming Italo Balbo, whose name I do not need to explain in this Forum, was desperate: "The Duce has never seen the thickness of a N.Y. phone book…" he used to say. He knew that Americans would not stay idle if a punch-up in Europe was in view.
After three costly wars in Spain, Abissynia and the reconquest of Lybia, after the sanctions from Society of Nations and consequent autarchy, after "Quota 90" ( an artificial imposed parity of 90 Lire for 1 Pound Sterling, something like the Euro of nowadays) the Italian economy was stranded, and with no raw materials nor energetic supplies in any quantity to declare the war was recklessness.
Mussolini was so excited and convinced that U.K. would try, somehow, to get out of the war that, after May 1940, there was even no need of Hitler to convince him.
Probably (and almost surely) the King Vittorio Emanuele III had a sort of mental disease, and so was not able to react in the right way to avoid the war.
But above all, the war in Italy was not felt. Twenty years before the Italians had seven hundred thousand dead in a war against Germans, with enormous sacrifices, and no one in Italy wanted a war, except a few fanatics.
Mussolini, once a young socialist, in a political speech once boasted: "If God exists" he said "I'll give him a minute to struck me with a lightning!" looking ostentatiously at the watch.
God spent thirty years instead of a minute, a very reasonable time considering the divine standards.
Another possible factor in the demise of Mussolini lay in his overt persecution of the Mafia, especially in Sicily. Don Vito Genovese became allied with the American armed forces effort to drive Mussolini and the German forces out of Sicily, and later, the Italian mainland. And on the "homefront", the Eastern seaboard docks were controlled by "Lucky" Luciano's mob, and that "protection" from sabotage and longshoremen striking in wartime moved Luciano from Ossining prison to a lower State (NY) "country-club" minimum security prison, until 1946, when he was freed, on the condition that he went to Sicily and never re-entered the US.Probably the desire of glory and respect for Italy were common between VEIII an Mussolini, and surely VEIII appreciated conquest and internal order, but to say that Mussolini and VEIII did appreciate or approvate each other is a bit of a stretch. VEIII and most of all, the Court, considered Mussolini a parvenu, while Mussolini considered the Court a viper nest.
Many times, in the Count Ciano Diary, Mussolini is reported to have said about the Monarchy: " ... how many good things I could do if I did not have to pull all these braked carriages..."
Operation Market Garden. Ike was caught between a rock and a hard place about Montgomery: What he did against Rommel in Africa did not mean he could lead a multi-national Allied force,
combining Airborne, Group and Armored Divisions
.
into a conquest of Holland and thus into Germany, preserving the vital bridges. If Ike hadn't held a grudge against his best Field Commander, George Patton, and had studied the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where Patton outflanked and outmaneuvered Montgomery's troops-hands down, as seen with Messina
.
You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?
Like he did with Overlord?
.
Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations? sorry, duplicated response. Your point about the 1 hour time factor in Messina is well taken.
In Carlo D'Este's book about Patton, I believe he detailed that Sicilian campaign with both Monty's forces and Patton's. I deduced that Patton's strategy was not based on the same factors as was that of Monty, so perhaps it would be fair to say that Messina was a "touchstone" for Patton, a "milestone" for Monty. Ah, if only Patton hadn't slapped two soldiers in field hospitals, in front of witnesses, well who can say how the balance of the ETO campaign might have developed.??You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?
Like he did with Overlord?
.
Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations?