Mass produced HS-123s

[wiking85]

There is a serious degree of memory telescoping going on here. Helicopters were not perceived as ground attack aircraft, certainly not in 1939 through to 1942, which then brings us to the fact that between the end of production of this aircraft and when a potential need for a cheap, affordable low maintenance attack aircraft is actually required, a lot happens that renders the Hs 123 obsolete.

Not sure if you're just trolling or just not understanding what I'm saying. Clearly in WW2 there were not such things as attack helicopters, even though there were experiments with them dropping bombs and mounting MGs on them. I said as attack helicopter equivalents in the post-Korea sense, though perhaps in the parlance of the time I should have said as 'ground attack aircraft' as CAS was known at the time, though this misses the sense that I mean it. I meant for it to be used in the way modern attack helicopters are, as integral to the divisions or corps they support rather than as separate air force air support.

Not sure why you think the requirements for a cheap, affordable, low maintenance attack aircraft rendered the HS123 obsolete given that history showed the exact opposite. The reason the Luftwaffe cancelled it was because they wanted a more complex, longer range, more 'modern' DIVE BOMBER. The Ju87

Firstly, the Ju 87. It is superior to the Hs 123 simply because it has two crew, radio, better radius of action, heavier bomb load and is available in numbers. Sure, it is a dive bomber, but it is a more versatile airframe; the Hs 123 is far too lacking in capability. Not only that Bf 109s and Bf 110s were used as jabos during the Battle of Britain and in North Africa and the Med, and they were designed as fighters, the Bf 110 a multi-role aircraft.

So not a cheap, affordable, low maintenance attack aircraft, just a more complex, longer range DIVE BOMBER. It wasn't really available in numbers by the time that the Hs123 was taken out of production. There were only about 300 available for the invasion of Barbarossa. Only about 360 had been built by September 1st 1939. Again it was designed to be a superior dive bomber, which is the opposite of a CAS aircraft and quite a bit more expensive than the Hs123. After all the Luftwaffe repeatedly requested for it to be put back into production, again as late as 1944, so clearly the Ju87 was not able to do what the Hs123 was. Sure the Bf109 and 110 were used as fighter-bombers, but they were much more expensive and competed with the Ju87 in their roles. Clearly you're unable to maintain logical consistency in your posting as what you're writing here contrasts with the previous section AND also at odds with the historical role the HS123 played.

Bear in mind that during the Battle of Britain the Ju 87's low performance in a enemy fighter heavy environment led to such high losses to the extent that the LW decided to withdraw it from the theatre. It is worth noting that the Hs 123 was not employed during the Battle of Britain because of its low performance, which provides another good reason not to keep it in production. The arrival of the Ju 87D is another reason why the Hs 123 is not necessary.

Again you're clearly missing the entire point of this thread, as the BoB was about operational and strategic air operations, not close air support for the army. The HS123 was used for army support, not independent air operations. The Ju87 was found to also not be suitable for that, but still was used until the end of the war for tactical bombing in support of the army. So you're either trolling or just completely disengaged from this discussion.

The Germans had aircraft that were fulfilling the ground attack/CAS role in the Bf 110, Ju 87 and the Bf 109, followed by the Fw 190F and Gs, all of which were better uses of production materials as alternatives to keeping the Hs 123 in production. If I can remember, other types, such as the Fw 189 and Bu 181 were employed as low rent strike airtcraft, which certainly the Hs 123 could have been used for, but to keep it into production for that long, when the need for these aircraft arose is just a waste of resources.

You clearly are unaware that the Hs123 was used until 1944 when it had to be withdrawn due to lack of spare parts. A bunch of aircraft were shoehorned into tactical bombing roles, but they still built the purpose designed CAS aircraft the HS129 and employed them in the hundreds. All I'm saying is that they already had a perfect aircraft for that role ready in 1936 and as a POD they recognize that and instead focus on making the 123 instead of the 129 and not force a bunch of fighters into the CAS role that it was unsuited for (the Bf109 was not a great fighter-bomber). The Ju87 was highly specialized aircraft that was also shoehorned into other roles, including direct ground attack where despite claims it did not excel.

I hope you do realize that the Hs123 was used from 1939-44 as a ground attack aircraft, was very successful in that role, the luftwaffe repeatedly asked for more, and was never considered a waste of resources:

Henschel Hs 123 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Shortround6]

The Hs 123 role changed during WW II, a lot of the 1943-44 missions were more night harassment than day time take part in the battle stuff, however the same is true of the Ju 87. A lot of their late war missions were done at night. Neither one could survive in daylight.

Poland, France and Early Russia had opponents that were severely lacking in AA guns. The air forces rarely (but not never) were able to put up enough fighters to stop the German CAS efforts. The CAS aircraft still got shot at by infantry rifles and LMGs and a few heavy (rifle caliber) MGs.

1950s helicopters had much better radio communications and years of practice from WW II and Korea to sort out some of the problems, but only some, things were not as smooth as either the ground or air units liked.

The Hs 129 had armor to help it survive. It had a lot more firepower than the Hs 123.

The Germans already had provisions for more fire support than most of their opposition. It was ground fire support. But the Germans could not supply that to many of the 2nd rated divisions. Again some of this stuff was supplied to get around command and control problems.
A German infantry regiment had 6 7.5ch howitzers and 2 15cm howitzers in addition to the battalion mortars. At time the 7.5 howitzers were split up between the battalions or were used to back up only one battalion depending on mission. The thing here is that these regimental or battalion assets were not in the division change of command like the normal artillery battalions were. The lower commanders could use their judgement as to how to use them and when. Calling for artillery support from division and being told you can't have it because the guns were busy (supporting another unit or moving) was all too common in WW I and early WW II.

On the flip side the British army went from about 40 radios per division to around 1000 per division in Holland near the end of the war. Ability to allocate, direct both artillery and air support in a timely fashion had gone up exponentially.

Germans were better than the British in 1940, not so good in 1944.
But you need the communications and the support systems for CAS, not just the planes.
HS 123 doing close support for divisions that were using horse wagons for fuel/bomb transport?

In both the US and British armies they designed and built infantry guns (by the hundreds) but when they tried to give them to the battalion/regiment commanders they were told, "Great, now give us the men for them. If you don't give us more men (and trucks) we don't want them because all of our men are already busy."
The famous Stug IIIs were not issued to panzer divisions in the early part of the war. And the 6 vehicle battery had a number of auxiliary vehicles. Like armored ammunition carriers and more importantly at least one armored observation vehicle to spot for the Stuggs while they tried to stay out of sight, the direct fire role was secondary.

What I am trying to get at here is that for CAS to really successful you need to have a command and control system in place and a supply system in place. Otherwise you just have some pretty planes flying around blowing stuff up pretty much at random.

 

[Andrew Arthy]

The Hs 123 role changed during WW II, a lot of the 1943-44 missions were more night harassment than day time take part in the battle stuff, however the same is true of the Ju 87. A lot of their late war missions were done at night. Neither one could survive in daylight.

The Hs 123 was used on daylight ground-attack missions on the Eastern Front until January 1945 (after temporarily being taken from operations between May and September 1944 due to lack of aircraft/spare parts). It was never used at night. In the winter of 1944/1945 it was serving with the II. Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader 2 in Hungary, under the command of Luftflotte 4.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Seeing how helicopters were used post-WW2 and how the HS123 functioned as a CAS aircraft it seems as though it could have been the equivalent of a WW2 attack helicopter. So what if the Luftwaffe got over its obsession with having the latest and greatest dive bomber and instead focused on mass producing thousands of Hs123 C's and used them as helicopter equivalents? This would mean no HS129 and the Ju87 is limited to specialist heavy dive bombing missions. The goal would be to imbed 40 Hs123C's per panzer and motorized division, while every infantry corps would have a 40 aircraft support unit. How would this impact the course of the war or even just Barbarossa in 1941? Remember IOTL in 1941 the Luftwaffe fielded fewer aircraft than during the invasion of France in 1940, so this would see them having air support that would far exceed OTL 1941 if they hit the TOE I mentioned. It would be CAS more than operational interdiction, but the number of twin engine bombers wouldn't be impacted.

Is it a good idea to use helicopters in combat? You need complete air superiority.

The He123 seems to have worked well in very messy weather conditions on the Russian front.

	He 123	Ju 87 B-2
Empty weight		6085 lb
Gross/Loaded weight	4883 lb	9370 lb
Top Speed	212 mph at 3900 ft	232 mph at 13500 ft

The Henschel Hs 123 was a smaller, lighter aircraft that did not [edit] have the Ju87's load carrying capability. At 3900ft, it may well have equalled the Ju87's top speed. In a war zone facing an enemy with a good air force, neither aircraft stood much of a chance.

Think about Torpedo 8's Douglas TBD Devastators versus the Fairey Swordfishes used on the Channel Dash. Both forces were completely destroyed without hitting the enemy. Both enemies were impressed. The Swordfish crews had a higher survival rate. Torpedo 8 created an opportunity to dive bomb the Japanese carriers, although not with Hs123s. The Swordfish cannot be blamed for the British not being able to follow up the attack.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Henschel Hs 123 was a smaller, lighter aircraft that did have the Ju87's load carrying capability.

(my bold)
Please, do tell.

 

[Howard Gibson]

(my bold)
Please, do tell.

Oops! I meant "did NOT". Original post now edited.

 

[Shortround6]

The Hs 123 did have a rather good climb, a bit under 3000ft (clean?) which also translates into the ability to keep maneuvering.
None of the single engine light bombers of 1939-40 could really really runaway which leaves turning, jinking, dodging. The Hs 123 can do it longer before it runs out of airspeed.

I believe the Hs 126 was assigned to army divisions for "support" although 'support' also included recon, artillery spotting and the like in addition to light bombing.

Another problem with assigning too many planes to "support" in army units is that the army commanders (divisional and lower) are very loath to loan "their" aircraft to neighboring units that are running into trouble "in case" they need then in the next few hours. That assumes that the units to left and right even have a good idea of what is going on with their neighbor.
This was one of the lessons the British and US learned in NA. The air units were not really incorporated into the land units but were paired with them or the air units were placed under control of the army commanders. It actually diluted the air effort as the air commanders could not form up large raids or concentrate the effort at key points/times.

A lot has to do with command and control (and supply) and somewhat less on the actual characteristics of the planes. The characteristics are important, but how to use them was also very important.

 

[wiking85]

Is it a good idea to use helicopters in combat? You need complete air superiority.

Are you unfamiliar with how militaries use helicopters today? They were also used in WW2.

The He123 seems to have worked well in very messy weather conditions on the Russian front.

More like in general. It was used and despite leaving production in 1938 it was able to soldier on through 1944. So it could survive despite lack of air superiority.

	He 123	Ju 87 B-2
Empty weight		6085 lb
Gross/Loaded weight	4883 lb	9370 lb
Top Speed	212 mph at 3900 ft	232 mph at 13500 ft

The Henschel Hs 123 was a smaller, lighter aircraft that did not [edit] have the Ju87's load carrying capability. At 3900ft, it may well have equalled the Ju87's top speed. In a war zone facing an enemy with a good air force, neither aircraft stood much of a chance.

Not sure what the load matters given that the Hs123 filled a different role than the Ju87. Also the Hs123 survived through 1944 despite being out of production since 1938. Combat loss rates must have been miniscule. CAS vs. tactical bombing. So the Ju87 suffered considerably heavier losses.

Think about Torpedo 8's Douglas TBD Devastators versus the Fairey Swordfishes used on the Channel Dash. Both forces were completely destroyed without hitting the enemy. Both enemies were impressed. The Swordfish crews had a higher survival rate. Torpedo 8 created an opportunity to dive bomb the Japanese carriers, although not with Hs123s. The Swordfish cannot be blamed for the British not being able to follow up the attack.

And yet we also have the Hs123's OTL record on the Eastern Front and it survived despite having zero production since 1938.

The Hs 123 did have a rather good climb, a bit under 3000ft (clean?) which also translates into the ability to keep maneuvering.
None of the single engine light bombers of 1939-40 could really really runaway which leaves turning, jinking, dodging. The Hs 123 can do it longer before it runs out of airspeed.

I believe the Hs 126 was assigned to army divisions for "support" although 'support' also included recon, artillery spotting and the like in addition to light bombing.

Another problem with assigning too many planes to "support" in army units is that the army commanders (divisional and lower) are very loath to loan "their" aircraft to neighboring units that are running into trouble "in case" they need then in the next few hours. That assumes that the units to left and right even have a good idea of what is going on with their neighbor.
This was one of the lessons the British and US learned in NA. The air units were not really incorporated into the land units but were paired with them or the air units were placed under control of the army commanders. It actually diluted the air effort as the air commanders could not form up large raids or concentrate the effort at key points/times.

A lot has to do with command and control (and supply) and somewhat less on the actual characteristics of the planes. The characteristics are important, but how to use them was also very important.

Not really a German problem by 1940, especially as they worked out their air support doctrine early. Just as the Allies were working things out in 1942 German CAS was at peak performance, see 2nd Kharkov. Assigning them to specific units is the entire point of the short ranged CAS aircraft and once again look at how helicopter doctrine works for the US from the 1960s on; having assigned attack helicopters in divisions is anything but a liability and in the scenario I'm proposing tactical/operational bombing would be handled by different aircraft, so concentration at the point of decisive effort is still possible. Not only that, but the Germans did assign aircraft directly to army units during Barbarossa and had zero problems and tons of benefits by not having to go through the Luftwaffe chain of command. There is a whole section on that in ER Hooton's Eagle in Flames.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Are you unfamiliar with how militaries use helicopters today? They were also used in WW2.

Helicopters are used by modern militaries in conditions of complete air superiority. Fairey Swordfish worked successfully to the end of the war escorting convoy away from the Luftwaffe. From the material I can find, it is not clear how many squadrons were using Hs123s. If it is two or three squadrons, a production base of 250 aircraft (from Wikipedia) can replace significant losses. The Luftwaffe fought to the end of the war on the Russian Front, so the Hs123s had escorts.

On the Channel Dash, the Fw190s dropped their landing gear and flaps so that they could chug along behind the Swordfish and shoot at them. This required them to strip away the RAF escorts, but they were up to that task. Perhaps the Russian weren't.

 

[Shortround6]

Comparing US helicopter practice to early WW II CAS is like comparing cell phones to tin cans and string.

In the US 2nd LTs could call in air strikes/support with portable radios using voice and at vastly greater ranges than WW II radios, let alone early or Sept 1939 radios.
Now a request might have to be OK'd by a higher officer or sometimes operations were pre-authorized.
Early Ju 87s didn't have voice radio. using code and key slowed down things even when everybody was lined up ahead of time.
Spain showed that CAS was very useful but we also have to consider the times and conditions. Like lack of adequate artillery support in general. The fact that a handful of He 51s with six 10kg bombs each could break up an attack or scatter a column and delay a troop movement by several hours. The Germans were working hard to make things better. But there was a long, long way to go to get to the attack helicopters of early Viet Nam.

The US trialed a lot of weapons combinations but used very few (if any) in combat. French experience in Algeria did not go well for one thing.

Note that the "Plan" was to use stand off weapons and NOT fly over the top of the enemy troops. Some trials involved hovering behind trees or ridge and then rising to fire and then ducking back down and evolved into advancing at moderate speed. The early 2.75 rockets had abysmal accuracy when fired from a hovering fight state.

You also had one thing that lead to the attack helicopter.
The US Army was prohibited by law from operating fixed wing aircraft (aside from transports) in the 1950s. Which, until the law was changed, meant Helicopters or nothing.

 

[don4331]

	Hs 123 A-1	Ju 87 B-2
Empty weight	3130 lb.	6085 lb.
Gross/Loaded weight	4883 lb.	9370 lb.
Top Speed	212 mph at 3900 ft.	232 mph at 13500 ft.
Bombload	1 - 551 lb. bomb or 130 litre drop tank centerline & 4 - 110 lb. bombs wing	1 - 1102 lb. bomb centerline 1- 2205 lb. bomb (if you leave rear gunner and some fuel behind)
Range	200 miles with 441 lb. bomb load	370 miles with 1102 lb. bomb load

Corrected He to Hs for Henschel
Added empty weight, bombloads and range numbers. Hs.123 hold 270 litres of fuel in main tank.

Hs.123 is much simpler aircraft - air-cooled radial (BMW 132A-3 of 632 hp) with carburetor and ground adjustable 2 blade propeller, fabric covered upper wing (from main spar back), open cockpit, short range radio (Telefunken FuG VII)....no wonder the Luftwaffe didn't like it.
Hs.123 did propose B and C models: B adding 2nd pair of MG17s in lower wings, making the entire upper wing from aluminium and upgrading the engine to 800 hp BMW 132F (which requires 3 blade prop). They also wanted to remove cover from tailwheel. C model adds 960 hp BMW 132K (needs C3 fuel) with 3 blade variable pitch propeller and enclosed cockpit; C model would have been able to care 1102 lbs bomb for very short distance. For what the aircraft is meant to do, IMHO, the C model appears to be going wrong direction - unnecessary complexity - although pilots in Russia would have appreciated the enclosed cockpit.

Unladen Hs.123 was only 17 seconds slower from 0 to 3km and back to ground than Bf.109B (2:40 vs 2:23). I suspect that performance, keeps it relatively safe from many fighters.

Getting an airplane in to squadron service is about more than just pilots - whole infrastructure need to be in place: From consumables (fuel/oil/ammunition/bombs/tires/engines/etc.) to mechanics to pilots.

For Polish and French campaigns, while say double the number of Hs.123s would have been assistance, I can't think they would have made major difference to the battles - the timelines are too short.
It really starts with North Africa for me - does Germany have the logistics to support Hs.123 in CAS role. (Historic Bf.109s flying in clouds were good for creating aces, but didn't really help the boys on the ground). Based on other threads, I don't foresee Germany have ability to supply the airplanes. (If they can supply them, the 8th army is in a world of hurt).
Barbarossa has same concern - Stalin is trading distance for time. Does Hs.123 allow Luftwaffe and/or Heer to make significant difference in drive to Moscow (Does taking Moscow in '41 end war in East?)

 

[tomo pauk]

Added empty weight, bombloads and range numbers. Hs.123 hold 270 litres of fuel in main tank.

Any photo, or a quote from an actual manual, or from an actual after-action report that Hs 123 used 250 kg bomb?

Hs.123 is much simpler aircraft - air-cooled radial (BMW 132A-3 of 632 hp) with carburetor and ground adjustable 2 blade propeller, fabric covered upper wing (from main spar back), open cockpit, short range radio (Telefunken FuG VII)....no wonder the Luftwaffe didn't like it.

Manual for the Hs 123 indeed lists the 132A, unlike our favorite WIkipedia articles.

 

[tomo pauk]

1 - 1102 lb. bomb centerline
1- 2205 lb. bomb (if you leave rear gunner and some fuel behind)

Both gunner and fuel remain on the B1 and B2.
The R1 and R2 also adds two drop tanks; both B1 and R1 on 1000 HP.

 

[wiking85]

Helicopters are used by modern militaries in conditions of complete air superiority. Fairey Swordfish worked successfully to the end of the war escorting convoy away from the Luftwaffe. From the material I can find, it is not clear how many squadrons were using Hs123s. If it is two or three squadrons, a production base of 250 aircraft (from Wikipedia) can replace significant losses. The Luftwaffe fought to the end of the war on the Russian Front, so the Hs123s had escorts.

On the Channel Dash, the Fw190s dropped their landing gear and flaps so that they could chug along behind the Swordfish and shoot at them. This required them to strip away the RAF escorts, but they were up to that task. Perhaps the Russian weren't.

Not necessarily as the fighting in Ukraine shows. They can be used with caution. Also slow fixed wing CAS was used extensively in WW2 outside of the west/Italy from 1943. The Eastern Front was so large that even the Ju87 and He111 were able to operate to the bitter end there despite the massive advantage in fighters the Soviets had by 1944-45. So clearly the Soviets weren't necessarily up to the task in all situations.

 

[wiking85]

It really starts with North Africa for me - does Germany have the logistics to support Hs.123 in CAS role. (Historic Bf.109s flying in clouds were good for creating aces, but didn't really help the boys on the ground). Based on other threads, I don't foresee Germany have ability to supply the airplanes. (If they can supply them, the 8th army is in a world of hurt).

Thanks for the chart.
Why wouldn't they have been able to if the production infrastructure is there? They were able to send over an entire Fliegerfuehrer to Africa:

Fliegerführer Afrika - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus the Italians fielded several hundred of their own biplanes:

Fiat CR.42 Falco - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus the HS129 operated in North Africa too: Hs 129. Combat Use.

Barbarossa has same concern - Stalin is trading distance for time. Does Hs.123 allow Luftwaffe and/or Heer to make significant difference in drive to Moscow (Does taking Moscow in '41 end war in East?)

That is the question. If say there were even 2,000 Hs123Cs operating instead of the ~40 that were available at any one time in 1941 (and ~360 Ju87s) then the odds improve quite a bit, especially if the bulk are available in the Center (say 1000 for AG-Center, 600 for AG-South, 400 for AG-North). Even with 'only' 1000 (500 for Central, 350 for South, 150 for North).
Those pocket battles get even nastier for the Soviets:

Henschel Hs 123 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Polish campaign was a success for an aircraft considered obsolete by the Luftwaffe high command. Within a year, the Hs 123 was again in action in the blitzkrieg attacks through the Netherlands, Belgium and France. General Heinz Guderian was continually impressed by the quick turnaround time offered by II.(Schl)/LG 2. Often positioned as the Luftwaffe's most-forward based combat unit, the Hs 123 flew more missions per day than other units, and again proved their worth in the close-support role. With Ju 87s still being used as tactical bombers rather than true ground support aircraft and with no other aircraft capable of this mission in the Luftwaffe arsenal the Hs 123 was destined to continue in service for some time, although numbers were constantly being reduced by attrition.

The short range does mean they are going to have to displace forward more often, but they could handle not having airfields to operate from:

the Hs 123 performed well in a theater where mud, snow, rain and ice took a heavy toll on the serviceability of more advanced aircraft.

Simple, cheap, and rugged has lots of virtues for that type of campaign. Especially as they could survive small arms fire, heavy use, and lack of infrastructure with extreme climate changes. So if they could 6+ sorties per day and keep operating they'd actually have much greater impact than any Ju87 or other model.
In Poland it was supposedly up to 10 sorties per day:

Henschel Hs 123

The Henschel Hs 123 was the second dive-bomber to be used by the Luftwaffe, replacing the Heinkel He 50, before being replaced by the famous Ju 87.

www.historyofwar.org

The fighting in Poland revealed one big advantage of the Hs 123 - it could operate from very basic fields that couldn't have supported any more modern aircraft. II (Schlacht)/ LG 2 was thus able to advance closely behind the advancing armies, flying up to ten sorties a day.

Especially given how quickly they could respond to air support requests:

Battle of France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Closer examination reveals the army had to wait 45–75 minutes for Ju 87 units and ten minutes for Henschel Hs 123s.[165]

If we go off the turn around time then the Hs123 with 10 sorties per day was essentially capable for doing 3-4x more sorties than the Ju87. Plus being cheap enough to have basically twice as many Hs123s over Ju87s an each being at least 3x more combat available you're getting vastly more CAS bang for your buck. How much of a combat multiplier could we have had then?

A prime example of where it could have been extremely useful during Barbarossa:

Battle of Raseiniai - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Having 4 or so Hs123's dive bomb the lone KV tank holding up the division for a day would be a big help. 4x50kg bombs times 4 bombers would be 16 bombs able to be dropped with a high degree of accuracy and very likely to have either scared off the crew or knocked out the tank.

During brutal battles like the Smolensk pocket it could have been game changing:

Battle of Smolensk (1941) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Closing the pocket might well be viable, as would breaking up the Soviet counterattacks and breakout attempts, which would have pretty nasty consequences for the Soviets. Potentially even moreso if having sufficient air support let them hold the Yelnya bridgehead by knocking out Soviet artillery.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Not necessarily as the fighting in Ukraine shows. They can be used with caution. Also slow fixed wing CAS was used extensively in WW2 outside of the west/Italy from 1943. The Eastern Front was so large that even the Ju87 and He111 were able to operate to the bitter end there despite the massive advantage in fighters the Soviets had by 1944-45. So clearly the Soviets weren't necessarily up to the task in all situations.

No, they can be used either with very effective fighter support, and/or a willingness to take heavy losses. Weren't the Sturmoviks the most shot-down aircraft of WWII?

 

[Shortround6]

No, they can be used either with very effective fighter support, and/or a willingness to take heavy losses. Weren't the Sturmoviks the most shot-down aircraft of WWII?

Maybe, might be in the running with the 109.
When ever they build over 30,000 of something it tends to get shot at lot and thus it gets shot down a lot.

Now what was the the skill level of the Il-2 pilots, the skill level of the commanders/tacticians and so on.
Experienced gunners in IL-2s seem to have been in short supply, many didn't live long enough to get much experience.

Early combat use of the IL-2 varies a great deal, the rear gunner isn't there, The early engines were lower power. Bomb loads are all over the place. Pilot/squadron commander knowledge? a plain shortage of bombs? Many flew with 1/3-2/3rds the max load.

Using four I-153s to deliver 1/4 the bomb load of a IL-2 (at 2/3rds the IL-2s limit) seems a little wasteful.

 

[wiking85]

No, they can be used either with very effective fighter support, and/or a willingness to take heavy losses.

From what I've seen with good tactics they need neither. Though good AAA support is helpful.

Weren't the Sturmoviks the most shot-down aircraft of WWII?

Yes, but that shows that the concept of a heavy armored (although partially wooden, which was a major vulnerability for the tail that saw it lost due to tail loss quite often), slow ground support aircraft didn't work out well in practice, same with the Hs129 with it's unarmored engines. Still it was a major problem for the Germans especially later in the war.
But then even the Wallies lost a massive number of fighters and fighter-bombers in Italy and France to AAA, though fighter-bombers were more survivable. For some reason the Germans did not have the same problem in the East even with obsolete aircraft. In certain spots of concentration they did, like in Belarus in 1944, but in general their older models were able to function even as late as 1945.

 

[Shortround6]

I am not saying that AA guns were the best answer but in the west the British in 1940 in France were using some 3in AA guns and then were using .303 Bren guns, and not a lot them.
In 1944 they were using more 3.7in AA guns and most divisions were supposed to have 72 40mm Bofors guns and some armored divisions started with tanks with 2-3 20mm and with 40mm Bofors guns. The amount of German CAS attacks, or lack thereof, lead to the early retirement of the AA tanks in the fall of 1944.
US had thousands of .50 cals other light AA.

From Amsterdam to the Swiss border it is just under 350 miles. A lot the air attacks on both sides are going to be over a narrow area.

 

[wiking85]

I am not saying that AA guns were the best answer but in the west the British in 1940 in France were using some 3in AA guns and then were using .303 Bren guns, and not a lot them.
In 1944 they were using more 3.7in AA guns and most divisions were supposed to have 72 40mm Bofors guns and some armored divisions started with tanks with 2-3 20mm and with 40mm Bofors guns. The amount of German CAS attacks, or lack thereof, lead to the early retirement of the AA tanks in the fall of 1944.
US had thousands of .50 cals other light AA.

From Amsterdam to the Swiss border it is just under 350 miles. A lot the air attacks on both sides are going to be over a narrow area.

And?