The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now.

[NeilStirling]

Go on Bill!

Neil

 

[GregP]

Got about halfway through it before I got interrupted.

Interesting debate. Greg is a pretty good speaker and Bill is, as always and as expected, prepared.

Looking forward to the rest of it.

 

[BiffF15]

Link?

 

[Snautzer01]

Following.

 

[tomo pauk]

This?

 

[GregP]

Here:
View: https://youtu.be/qzrg-u-MYdc

 

[drgondog]

My biggest regret was the frequent disconnect when Greg was speaking as I was effing around with my iphone - and also not having access to my notes. I mssed several key statements that just weren't challenged.

On that topic, did Greg EVER cite facts regarding Arnold's acts of 'deceipt and treachery' to prevent LR tanks from ETO? Did he do so with Kenney when Kenney went to Ford in June 43, or when Eaker went to Bowater-Loyd in March 1943? Did he prevent Lockheed and NAA and Curtiss and Bell from subcontracting steel tanks after the famous quoted telex which paraphrased, said 'don't deliver aircraft with auxiliary tanks at gov't expense, but do what you want with your own nickel"?

Did Arnold block dispatch of four P-38FGs to 8th AF in spring 1942, and again in July 1943 when he re-routed 20th and 55th FG to 8th AF (BEFORE Schweinfurt-Regensburg).

Greg got away with misstating the particulars of the Kearby Wewak MOH mission and hung his P-47 Range/200 gal Brisbane tank by claiming the mission was from Port Moresby. It was in fact from Lae (200mi from Port Moresby), where his flight landed and refueled - then flew 300mifor the 20min fight (not for one hour), returned to Lae to refuel again. That 200gal belly tank range was ~ same as the single 108gal tank used by 56th FG 309mi over Bremen October 13th (2 days after Kearby mission).

John Bruning's Ace Race, page 240-250'ish

Nor did he quote the Kenney Report correctly by stating that P-39 tanks were sent. There was no item identified on pg 264- only that it took too much effort to modify. That would have been another reason to point at lack of common (B-7/B-10) bomb rack that already existed on the other fighters (P-38, P-39, P-40) in 1942.

Nor was he held to answer why Arnold picked Chennault, Bereton, Kenney to run 14th, 10th&9th, and 5th AF - no bomber mafioso in that group, nor was Doolittle for that matter.

The attached spreadsheet highlights longest combat engagements flown for 56FG with each of the tank combinations. Missions identified with 8th AF Victory Credits Board June 1945 but Kent Miller's Pilots and Units of 8th AF Fighter command pretty well matches the VC Board data.

 

[GregP]

One of the difficult things about arguing with you, Bill, is that you generally cite references for your assertions that back up what you say with some decently-documented facts. Sometimes it is rather infuriating, unless you are actually LOOKING for facts instead of your own opinion.

Greg said a lot of things that he did not mention references for, and expected them to be taken at face value just because he said them. Mostly, it seemed as if he got what he expected on that score since the moderator didn't object much to what either of you said. Sorry you had technical difficulties, but you generally don't get to try out the Zoom connections (or whatever system you were using) before you do the meeting. It sort of is what you get when you get it.

I thought you did well despite the technical issues. You could be heard talking, but you seemingly could not here the moderator.

Greg also posted a summary of your debate from his perspective and showed content from live chat at:


View: https://youtu.be/6pV8G42FxTI

Maybe you should summarize them from YOUR perspective, either on YouTube or at least in here. A lot of his comments in the summary were about the users who participated and not about their comments. I noted Chris Fahey (a Planes of Fame pilot from here at the museum) was one, but I was listening and didn't actually see Chris' comment(s) on the screen. I'll have to go back on and look. I KNOW he knows the fuel burn well enough to project range quite well. Among others, Chris flies our P-38 too, and was an F-16 pilot in his military days. Not too sure what other military aircraft he flew, but he has a lot of time in piston warbirds of various types. Our P-47 is P-47G (a Curtiss-built P-47B). Actually, ours has a P-47G fuselage and left wing and the right wing is from a P-47B. So, maybe it is a P-47B/G? Or Bee Gee? We are not running the turbocharger, though I hear there is one that does run it on the east coast.

Anyway, the debate was a good video to watch and pay attention to. Generally, I like the fact that you both got some time without interruption on separate channels as happens when you sit next to one another instead. That way, we aren't listening to an argument with continuous interruptions.

All the best, - Greg Pascal (not of Greg's video)

 

[FALC0N]

My biggest regret was the frequent disconnect when Greg was speaking as I was effing around with my iphone - and also not having access to my notes. I mssed several key statements that just weren't challenged.

On that topic, did Greg EVER cite facts regarding Arnold's acts of 'deceipt and treachery' to prevent LR tanks from ETO? Did he do so with Kenney when Kenney went to Ford in June 43, or when Eaker went to Bowater-Loyd in March 1943? Did he prevent Lockheed and NAA and Curtiss and Bell from subcontracting steel tanks after the famous quoted telex which paraphrased, said 'don't deliver aircraft with auxiliary tanks at gov't expense, but do what you want with your own nickel"?

Did Arnold block dispatch of four P-38FGs to 8th AF in spring 1942, and again in July 1943 when he re-routed 20th and 55th FG to 8th AF (BEFORE Schweinfurt-Regensburg).

Greg got away with misstating the particulars of the Kearby Wewak MOH mission and hung his P-47 Range/200 gal Brisbane tank by claiming the mission was from Port Moresby. It was in fact from Lae (200mi from Port Moresby), where his flight landed and refueled - then flew 300mifor the 20min fight (not for one hour), returned to Lae to refuel again. That 200gal belly tank range was ~ same as the single 108gal tank used by 56th FG 309mi over Bremen October 13th (2 days after Kearby mission).

John Bruning's Ace Race, page 240-250'ish

Nor did he quote the Kenney Report correctly by stating that P-39 tanks were sent. There was no item identified on pg 264- only that it took too much effort to modify. That would have been another reason to point at lack of common (B-7/B-10) bomb rack that already existed on the other fighters (P-38, P-39, P-40) in 1942.

Nor was he held to answer why Arnold picked Chennault, Bereton, Kenney to run 14th, 10th&9th, and 5th AF - no bomber mafioso in that group, nor was Doolittle for that matter.

The attached spreadsheet highlights longest combat engagements flown for 56FG with each of the tank combinations. Missions identified with 8th AF Victory Credits Board June 1945 but Kent Miller's Pilots and Units of 8th AF Fighter command pretty well matches the VC Board data.

He is working on a video which will cover the sources he referenced. If you think he made a few mistakes, pass it along to him. I'm sure he will clarify. Such errors in a live debate aren't unusual.

The technical issues were a headache for everyone, but it did seem like you got the brunt of it.

I think you should consider taking him up on his offer to do a video about your dad. I would love to see that story told live.

 

[FALC0N]

One of the difficult things about arguing with you, Bill, is that you generally cite references for your assertions that back up what you say with some decently-documented facts. Sometimes it is rather infuriating, unless you are actually LOOKING for facts instead of your own opinion.

Greg said a lot of things that he did not mention references for, and expected them to be taken at face value just because he said them.

It's fairly standard in verbal debates to simply make your case without extensive citations. Greg said from the beginning that he would handle references with a followup video, which I think is a great way to do it. Unfortunately, it does leave everyone waiting a bit.

 

[GregP]

I heard that and look forward to his response. Watching the debate made me think that both people were somehow right, but the basic question doesn't HAVE two answers.

I KNOW P-47s have decent range since it is well-documented. What I am not sure about is exactly WHY they didn't take advantage of it sooner then they did. MANY real decisions are more about politics than about what NEEDS to get done. Just look at the country and the world right now or, really, at any point in time. The things that get done around the world are much more about politics than needs, morals, or what is right or wrong.

Or maybe I just see it that way ...

 

[FALC0N]

I heard that and look forward to his response. Watching the debate made me think that both people were somehow right, but the basic question doesn't HAVE two answers.

I KNOW P-47s have decent range since it is well-documented. What I am not sure about is exactly WHY they didn't take advantage of it sooner then they did. MANY real decisions are more about politics than about what NEEDS to get done. Just look at the country and the world right now or, really, at any point in time. The things that get done around the world are much more about politics than needs, morals, or what is right or wrong.

Or maybe I just see it that way ...

It doesn't have two answers, but I suspect the correct answer might well end up meeting them half way. I think there is a lot merit to Greg's position. These types of mistakes happen in the fog of war. History is replete with them.

It's easy to say that they should have learned the lessons of German and British experience, but those lessons didn't necessarily apply to the USAAF. The B-17 and B-24 were generally faster, could fly higher, and were much better defended than German or British bombers up to that point. And they did last a lot longer in an unescorted role than their predecessors. So it was effective. Just not as effective as they had hoped.

Plus you have the scarcity of resources. Putting resources into escorts takes resources from other priories. And if you don't think you need escorts, you wouldn't dedicate resources towards them. Especially if they developed tunnel vision on the issue. We know in hindsight that this wouldn't have been much of a resource problem in the long run, but they didn't necessarily know that.

Then at the end, you make a few select omissions on a few reports. Maybe a white lie or two. The deed is done at that point. Nobody is hurt by fudging a few reports. They might have even been lying to themselves. People are really good at that too.

So it wouldn't require a conspiracy, evil, or even incompetence. Just a few mistakes combined with normal human frailty.

 

[drgondog]

One of the difficult things about arguing with you, Bill, is that you generally cite references for your assertions that back up what you say with some decently-documented facts. Sometimes it is rather infuriating, unless you are actually LOOKING for facts instead of your own opinion.

Greg said a lot of things that he did not mention references for, and expected them to be taken at face value just because he said them. Mostly, it seemed as if he got what he expected on that score since the moderator didn't object much to what either of you said. Sorry you had technical difficulties, but you generally don't get to try out the Zoom connections (or whatever system you were using) before you do the meeting. It sort of is what you get when you get it.

I thought you did well despite the technical issues. You could be heard talking, but you seemingly could not here the moderator.

Greg also posted a summary of your debate from his perspective and showed content from live chat at:


View: https://youtu.be/6pV8G42FxTI

Maybe you should summarize them from YOUR perspective, either on YouTube or at least in here. A lot of his comments in the summary were about the users who participated and not about their comments. I noted Chris Fahey (a Planes of Fame pilot from here at the museum) was one, but I was listening and didn't actually see Chris' comment(s) on the screen. I'll have to go back on and look. I KNOW he knows the fuel burn well enough to project range quite well. Among others, Chris flies our P-38 too, and was an F-16 pilot in his military days. Not too sure what other military aircraft he flew, but he has a lot of time in piston warbirds of various types. Our P-47 is P-47G (a Curtiss-built P-47B). Actually, ours has a P-47G fuselage and left wing and the right wing is from a P-47B. So, maybe it is a P-47B/G? Or Bee Gee? We are not running the turbocharger, though I hear there is one that does run it on the east coast.

Anyway, the debate was a good video to watch and pay attention to. Generally, I like the fact that you both got some time without interruption on separate channels as happens when you sit next to one another instead. That way, we aren't listening to an argument with continuous interruptions.

All the best, - Greg Pascal (not of Greg's video)

I will summarize on Youtube in future, but will also do so here.
First - the Debate was about "P-47 was prevented from bomber escort by Deceipt and Treachery in 1943"

The subtopic was that with the Brisbane 200gal tank the P-47 would have been entirely adequate and The P-51 was not only unnecessary, but it was introduced to cover up the mistakes/ill intentions of the bomber mafia.
I disagreed, pointing out that a succession P-47 range extension features were required before the P-47D-25 emerged as the first model capable of escorting 8th AF to all targets. I needed, in order:

1. B-7 centerline bomb/drop tank rack
2. Wing Pylons with bomb/drop tank rack along with plumbing to engine
3. Dependable sway braces to stabilize drop tanks larger than 75gal/108gal drop tanks
4. Increased internal fuel from 305gal to 370gal

Greg built his case on the 200gal Brisbane tank made by Ford on orders issued by Gen Kenney CO 5th AF to be made to fit the P-47C Ferry Mount scheme. That it was ordered nd delivered in a very short time is Proof that Arnold was the problem as head Capo of Bmber Mafia.

Greg further built his case on the basis of Neal Kearby mission of 11 October, 1943 foor which he received MOH. The mission was flown from Lae to Wewak as cited in Brunng's Race of Aces (IIRC circa page 245ish). However Greg claimed the range from Port Moresby to Wewak - direct, over 450mi. The actual combat radius was 326 mi staight line from Lae, was not an escort mission but a Fighter sweep to the target designed to arrive after the B-25s had bombed. He further claimed 'one hour' of combat, Bruning cites 20min with 50 gal remaining when he landed at Lae on the way home.

My rebuttal was killed by the tech issues I was having but I have attached the several docs that I itended to introduce and explain in rebuttal.

Further -

I stated that the P-47Cs delivered to ETO were not equipped with the centerline bomb rack delivered with P-39 and P-40, or the similar rack B-10 with wing pylons and plumbing to the engine for P-38 and the wing racks of the P-51. Those (B-7) were installed by Republic via kits beginning one week after the first Schweinfurt mission. Those racks were required to mount all standard bombs and combat tanks per Army specifications. Beginning September 1st, the -47s could accept the 'standard' 52, 60, 75 steel tanks and the new Bowater 108gal re-inforced impregnated paper drop tank. By January the new 150 gal flat tanks (P-47 could not carry Lockheed 165/150 drop tank - too large) but pylon sway braces prevented operations until Feb 20th Big Week. The first use of wing pylons was March 18th. The longest combat encounter by 56th FG was Hagenow and Halberstadt (~405mi from Boxted) in May, 1944. All dates documented anecdotally by Zemke in Zemke's Wolfpack as told to Roger Freeman.

All my 'longest range' data for 56th FG were extracted fom 8th AF Victory Credits Board June 1945, but I pointed Greg to Miller's "Fighter Pilots and Units of 8th AF" as using the same data and available easily.

There were no barriers placed by AAF leadership to 'prevent' drop tanks from being contracted in parallel in different theatres, with evidence that Arnold was increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of tank development by Materiel Command. He approved Kenney's contract with Ford Brisbane and Eaker's contract of March 1943 with Bowater-Lloyd 108gallon tank in March 1943. Further, 5th, 7th, 8th AF, 9th, 10th, 12th, 14th CO's had full latitude to get the job done wrt local contractors to bypass Wright Field - and did so with no interference from Arnold.

Both FAREP and the Self Sealing combat tank initiatives were ordered by Arnold in Feb 1942. FAREP was Not directed at Ferry Tanks - but increasing both internal and external fuel options.
No, I stated that the P-47Cs delivered to ETO were not equipped with the centerline bomb rack delivered with P-39 and P-40, or the similar rack B-10 with wing pylons and plumbing to the engine for P-38 and the wing racks of the P-51. Those were installed by Republic via kits beginning one week after the first Schweinfurt mission. Those racks were required to mount all standard bombs and combat tanks per Army specifications. Beginning September 1st, the -47s could accept the 'standard' 52, 60, 75 steel tanks and the new Bowater 108gal re-inforced impregnated paper drop tank. By January the new 150 gal flat tanks (P-47 could not carry Lockheed 165/150 drop tank - too large).

There were no barriers placed by AAF leadership to 'prevent' drop tanks from being contracted in parallel in different theatres, with evidence that Arnold was increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of tank development by Materiel Command. He approved Kenney's contract with Ford Brisbane and Eaker's contract of March 1943 with Bowater-Lloyd 108gallon tank in March 1943.

There were no barriers placed on Lockheed, North American, Republic to act in accordance with 1942 project Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program FAREP, which tasked the aircraft companies to initiate design changes to increase Fighter Range byenhancing drop tank features, and increasing internal fuel.

To Greg's point that 'we could have had LR escort in 1943" ------> P-38s tasked for Fighter Escort of 8th AF operations were SENT by Arnold to ETO with 165/150gal drop tanks, and carried them in fighter escort missions of 8th AF from August thru November to participate in Torch. When that happened only RAF Spitfires were availabe to ecort. The P-47C was not the first choice, but no more P-38Fs were available. and the XP-51B and Mustang X were in flight testing, so Arnold hadno choice but to send the P-47C, which had only the 200gal Ferry Tank - not designed for high altitude or combat operations.. BTW General Marshall and Eisenhower ordered the P-38s reassigned.

Greg's point that the Brisbane tank could have/should have been developed by 8th AF was impossible - because the British War Ministry denied Bowater from priority of rolled steel for development. His arguement that Mat.Cmd. could have developed and produced a similar tank as Ford Brisbane IS valid - but even then it would only have been developed at Republic managed contract, because the P-47 did not have the AAF required 2 point attach hardware (Republic designed proprietary four point system not compatible as noted above.)

There were no barriers placed on Lockheed, North American, Republic to act in accordance with 1942 project Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program FAREP, which tasked the aircraft companies to initiate design changes to increase Fighter Range byenhancing drop tank features, and increasing internal fuel.

P-38s tasked for Fighter Escort of 8th AF operations were SENT to ETO with 165/150gal drop tanks, and carried them in fighter escort missions of 8th AF from August thru November to participate in Torch. When that happened only RAF Spitfires were availabe to ecort. The P-47 was not the first choice, and the XP-51B and Mustang X were in flight testing, so Arnold hadno choice but to send the P-47C, which had only the 200gal Ferry Tank - not designed for high altitude or combat operations..

 

[GregP]

Not too sure anything about this question happened "in the fog of war," since the decisions were made an ocean away by people who hadn't been fighting in Europe in modern (at the time) airplanes.

My problem with it is that unless I look up every reference, I can't tell if the references are correct and, even if I DO look up every reference, if there really was a "Bomber Mafia," and if they DID make these decisions and implement them, why would they commit anything to writing for historical perspective?

All things like that in writing do is make you an easy target for later prosecution. They knew things like that WAY before WWII, so if wasn't exactly as if they were operating without knowledge of reprisal for seeming misdeeds later. Intrigue and "behind the scenes maneuvering" weren't "new things" in 1940; they had been well know for thousands of years.

Same when John Boyd was espousing energy maneuvering. I'm not so sure anyone was actively opposing him as much as simply failing to adopt his theory. There IS a difference between the two.

With regard to the P-47, perhaps it was more of WHO was going to cause the drop tanks to be made and fitted. Everyone might have been waiting for it to happen, but nobody was pushing for it. Squadron leaders might have been requesting it, but nobody up the chain was getting it DONE. Might NOT have been that way, true. But it might have been. Tough to investigate behind-the-scenes decisions 80 years later with any real degree of certainty.

 

[drgondog]

Not too sure anything about this question happened "in the fog of war," since the decisions were made an ocean away by people who hadn't been fighting in Europe in modern (at the time) airplanes.

Mistakes were made. Errors in judgment were made. Lives were lost.

My problem with it is that unless I look up every reference, I can't tell if the references are correct and, even if I DO look up every reference, if there really was a "Bomber Mafia," and if they DID make these decisions and implement them, why would they commit anything to writing for historical perspective?

There really was a core cadre that believed the bomber (B-17) would get through - when budgets were tight and the dream of strategic bomardment was worthy of a place at the Joint Chief's independent of the Army. Pre-Spanish Civil War and BoB when realities set in that Pursuit aviationwas evolving faster than bombardment. Arnold changed the #4 1500mi range fighter to #1 in May 1940 Emmons Board recommendation for future development priorities.

There WERE prohibitions against pressurized drop tanks, pre-December 7, 1941

But the Fghter Conference of February 1942 emerged with commitment to extend fighter range for escort - even though nobody believed escorting B-17s to targets with s/e fighter was possibe - anywhere. Not AAF, USN, RAF, LW.

I tend to point finger at Wright Field/Echols as stolid and unimaginative and the wrong guy for new initiatives. XP-75 is a classic example- not for original idea, but not recognizing the failures of frankenstein piecing of existin assemblies kept failing - andthe plug wasn't pulled.

With regard to the P-47, perhaps it was more of WHO was going to cause the drop tanks to be made and fitted. Everyone might have been waiting for it to happen, but nobody was pushing for it. Squadron leaders might have been requesting it, but nobody up the chain was getting it DONE. Might NOT have been that way, true. But it might have been. Tough to investigate behind-the-scenes decisions 80 years later with any real degree of certainty.

Somewhat true. The notion of bomber mafia still dictating thatfighter escort was not needed was gone. The Hope that with enough inventory as demanded by Eaker to maintain a 300 bomber per mission effort would keep losses to 4% was in effect through May 1943, but major shakeup began with Blitz Week, then Tidal Wave, then Schweinfurt-Regensburg occurred in a three week span.

The losses resulted in Arnold prioritizing ALL LR fighter Group deliveries scheduled to other theatres cease, and be directed to ETO. That is why the 20th and 55th FG arrived in August, all P-47Cs in ETO were ordered to install B-7 racks ahead of P-47D-5 production arrval. That is why the P-51Bs destined for 9th AF TAC were re-assigned TDY to 8th AF.

 

[CurlyWurly]

I watched the whole debate, not live but same day.

What I don't understand is how a fighter escort can get the maximum fuel use out of a drop tank to achieve the range needed for deep penetration escort, given the tank would have to be dropped when contact with enemy fighters were incurred.

This would usually happen on the Enemy coast, after a mere 150 miles if flying over the Netherlands for more southerly targets, but more useful if flying over Hamburg or Denmark for more Northern targets.

I can see the tank(s) being dropped with a lot of fuel still in them or the poor P-47 / P-51 has to run the danger of being jumped by an enemy fighter while carry this extra weight and drag.

 

[FALC0N]

Not too sure anything about this question happened "in the fog of war," since the decisions were made an ocean away by people who hadn't been fighting in Europe in modern (at the time) airplanes.

Fog of war tends to be used to describe tactical situations, but it applies just fine to strategic planning too. Unknowns are everywhere in war. Even for leaders stuck across the ocean.

All things like that in writing do is make you an easy target for later prosecution. They knew things like that WAY before WWII, so if wasn't exactly as if they were operating without knowledge of reprisal for seeming misdeeds later. Intrigue and "behind the scenes maneuvering" weren't "new things" in 1940; they had been well know for thousands of years.

I don't think that concern over prosecution was a motive for them at any point. None of this was criminal. These types of mistakes would be par the course in warfare. If anything, self blame or, if it was a conscious decision, concerns over post war budget battles would be the most likely culprit.

Imagine how it would feel when you realize that your mistake cost thousands of lives. You would feel pretty crappy. And saying that it's a normal part of warfare isn't going to make you feel a whole lot better. I can easily see them telling themselves a little white lie or two so that they can sleep a little better. And that narrative works it's way into the reports later.

At least, that is how I see it playing out.

Same when John Boyd was espousing energy maneuvering. I'm not so sure anyone was actively opposing him as much as simply failing to adopt his theory. There IS a difference between the two.

There is a difference, but I'm not all that sure it matters here. It would be like if your kid says he will clean his room, and it's still untouched 6 months later, how much does it really matter if he was just being lazy or just doesn't want to clean his room? The outcome is the same.

It would matter if the questions were criminal, but I just don't see that here. Not even close.

 

[FALC0N]

First - the Debate was about "P-47 was prevented from bomber escort by Deceipt and Treachery in 1943"

You might be placing a little too much emphasis on something that was meant as a click bait title. I have learned to not pay much attention to what a video is titled on youtube, other than to get a general idea of the topic. Greg is no exception in this case.

The subtopic was that with the Brisbane 200gal tank the P-47 would have been entirely adequate and The P-51 was not only unnecessary, but it was introduced to cover up the mistakes/ill intentions of the bomber mafia.

You misunderstood his argument here. He argues that the P-47 and/or P-38 could have escorted earlier. He never argued that the 200 gallon tank was adequate or that the P-51 was introduced to cover up their earlier mistakes. Rather he argues that the USAAF leadership used the P-51's range as an explanation, ex post facto, to justify why they hadn't been escorting sooner. In fact, he has specifically said on a couple of occasions, including once in this debate as I recall, that he would have made the transition to the P-51 also, due to it's lower cost, easier pilot training, and lower resource usage. The examples of the 200 gallon tank was mostly meant to illustrate what might have been in 1943 if leadership hadn't been dragging their feet on the issue.

 

[NeilStirling]

I found the video very frustrating to watch,.Bills points seemed to get lost with his connection problems.The format! and why was he at the bottom of the screen? He should have been at the top equal with Greg. First Impressions count. None off this helped I gave up half way through. It would be great to have another try.

Neil

 

[drgondog]

You might be placing a little too much emphasis on something that was meant as a click bait title. I have learned to not pay much attention to what a video is titled on youtube, other than to get a general idea of the topic. Greg is no exception in this case.



You misunderstood his argument here. He argues that the P-47 and/or P-38 could have escorted earlier. He never argued that the 200 gallon tank was adequate or that the P-51 was introduced to cover up their earlier mistakes. Rather he argues that the USAAF leadership used the P-51's range as an explanation, ex post facto, to justify why they hadn't been escorting sooner. In fact, he has specifically said on a couple of occasions, including once in this debate as I recall, that he would have made the transition to the P-51 also, due to it's lower cost, easier pilot training, and lower resource usage. The examples of the 200 gallon tank was mostly meant to illustrate what might have been in 1943 if leadership hadn't been dragging their feet on the issue.

Clickbait or not, that was the explicit title and subject for debate, as submitted to me in writing by Greg.

On the second point - He did say the 200gal Brisbane tank was adequate and cited the 5th AF as the example. Further, Greg maintained that the Republic 200gal Ferry Tank was adequate for a 'near Schweinfurt' escort mission.That said, the LONGEST recorded combat encounter from airfield to the fight as 259 mi (Debden to Emmrich GY on the border) on July 28, 1943.

Greg also was mistaken about the mission profile of the Kearby MOH mission on 10-11-1943. He cited base as Port Moresby for the leg to Wewak as well as 'one hour' of combat. My sources state Lae and John Brunning corrobrates Lae to Wewak/20 min combat. No escort, straight fighter mission (326mi) for Kirby's 4-man flight. No essing, 50gal remaining when landing at Lae.

The P-38s and Spits Did escort 8th AF in 1942. When the P-38s were pulled, only the Spits of RAF and 4th FG escorted in Dec-early April1943. The P-47C escorted 8th AF from then exclusively, until the 55th FG P-38s initiated escort operations and until the 354FG P-51Bs began operations

My sole focus in parsing Combat Victory credits from 8th AF Victory Credits Board was to locate the farthest location for 56th FG as a function of the type drop tank hung on the centerline - through March 18th, 1944 when P-47 missions were flown with wing pylons and two (and sometimes 3) drop tanks. A 400mi and 403mi fight was achieved at Hagenow, west of Berlin and Halberstadt northwest of Schweifurt - May 1944.

The reason I belabored the point that the B-7 bomb shackle was ESSENTIAL addition to P-47 was because ALL designed tanks for AAF in ETO and MTO and CBI and SWP were for 14" on-center fuel tank (ad bomb) lugs. In the SWP ONLY the P-47C and D-2, D-4 could mount either the 200gal Brisbane tank. It could not attach the 52, 60, 75 (P-39/P-40/P-38) and 165/330 (P-38). ALL available and in-theatre in early to mid 1943.

As slow to deliver drop tanks as Mat.Cmd was, that didn't hinder 5AF, 8thAF, 9AF, 10AF, 14th AF from seeking and contracting local sources like the Bowater-Lloyd 108gal tank or the Melbourne 200gal tank. No restrictions were placed on Arnold's directs to act (Chennault, Kenney, Brereton, Doolittle, etc)

The POINT is that the P-47 didn't achieve LR escort status until the D-15 added wing pylons, the D-25 was pried apart to add 65 more gallons internally, and a new WING was added to make the P-47N store wing fuel (approx sameas P-51B/D) to compliment more fuselage fuel and add enormous drop tank load capability. THAT is the point I was tring to make

If the bomber mafia delivered the 150gal flat tank or the 215gal belly tank used by P-47M, the P-47 would STILL not be relied on for mre than middle Germany targets (Halberstadt, Brunswick, Schweinfurt) as Escort... and only after B-7 rack was installed.