1935: you run (only) the army

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Engines, transmission/steering gear, suspension/running gear all needed development. what works fairly well on small/light tanks doesn't work so well on larger medium tanks and tends not work at all on really heavy tanks.

Why did the Americans build the M3 medium tank? Engine, running gear, transmissions were all set, hull size was all set. It took over eight months to design, build and test the turret for the M-4 medium tank over the time needed to design build and test the sponson mount 75mm gun. And this was with the gun and ammo already developed.

Did the Germans make mistakes in tank design? sure.


Building tanks with sloped front ends and sloped sponson sides like adopted for the later jagdpanzer IV:

http://cdn.wn.com/pd/9a/63/f62f08531efff0d6f6d5db25e445_grande.jpg

Might have helped protection some without screwing up production too badly. It doesn't require an changes to the mechanical bits anyway and might have provided for a larger turret ring diameter.

Skipping the 50/L60 and going to an anti tank/tank version of the 7,5cm FK 16nA doesn't buy a whole lot. I don't think it's penetration was any better at practical ranges (under 1000 yds) it had a shorter point blank range by almost 200 meters, the ammo was heavier, the gun was heavier, not a big deal in a tank but for the towed anti-tank gunners who had to manhandle the gun, dig it in/hide it and get it back out of the firering positions it might mean a big deal. Granted the HE shell was much better but the German idea was that the MK IVs were supposed to supply the HE and smoke support and for that there is little to chose between the 75/24 and a 75/36 gun.
 

Perhaps developing one design of 25 tons, (featuring cannon, engine, transimision, radio, sights -just like any decent tank) would be less a task, than to develop two 20 ton types, plus the Nbfw?


30tons?
Since the 24 cal barrel of early Pz-IV was still cca 1m short to protrude, just how much the 36 cal barrel would? A foot?

development of an effective 75mm ATG took three years historically, so you can add a year approximately to get that design into a turret.

We know in 1935 that 7,5cm of 45-50 cals is needed to supplant the 36 cal one, so we develop it.


What feature makes 25 ton a fantasy design for 1939?

buts lets just ssay they do proceed down that pathway....that means that the mkIII, mk38 and MkIV are bypassed, and germany is forced to fight 1939-42 with only light types.

1942??


The thread says 'You run the army'


Every what-if is pure speculation, since a single thing is not likely to be proved. So we disagree.
 

Thanks for the link
The point in choosing 7,5cm L36 was to have a gun that would've performed decently in AT role, plus to have good HE punch. Having it in small numbers in 1939, with decent numbers in 1940 as tank armament would've been better for German army, than to have 3,7 7,5cm combo. 5cm was too late for 1940 campaigns anyway.
As for numbers of rounds carried, the 1/4 'bigger' tank would've carried more 7,5cm rounds than Pz-IV.
 
Hi Tomo

Perhaps developing one design of 25 tons, (featuring cannon, engine, transimision, radio, sights -just like any decent tank) would be less a task, than to develop two 20 ton types, plus the Nbfw?
Well, not really
.

Firstly, the designs you are referring to were not begun in 1935, it was sometime after that. Cutting edge technology for the germans in 1935 was the MkI and MkII, which they were both inadequate, and tried to compensate for with their brekthrough and multi-turretted jobs. However these were recognized as probable failures and pretty much abandoned, because they would not fulfil the mobility requirements that would be required in the Guderian style of warfare. There were reasons why nations messed about with cavalry tanks and infantry support tanks and the like in the 1930s, and that in part was because of the limitations on the technology. The other great limitation, was in the area of technique.

In the case of the germans, in the mid '30s, they had the technique, but they lagged in the design area. You cannot just wave a magic wand, and will this issue to go away. Granted, if the germans had been able to step up to the plate in 1935 and produce a world beating battle tank in 1935-7 they would have been pretty formidable, but the weak link here is their technology. Granted the germans made very impressive strides in a small space of time, but in 1935 that technological edge just wasn't there.


30tons?
Since the 24 cal barrel of early Pz-IV was still cca 1m short to protrude, just how much the 36 cal barrel would? A foot?



I thought your original supposition said 25-30 tons, but in any event the heavy tanks of the era, being produced just after1935 were all in the category of 30 tons. But if you want to narrow your type down to just 25 tons, that's fine.

I don't know the difference or any details about this 75/36 gun you are referring to and the standard PAK 75/40. I am guessing it was a non-existent, fictional gun (but I will check later at home) However, at only 4 calibres short of the 75/40, which was eventually fitted to the Mk IV, with a pronounced overhang (more than 1 foot judging from photographic evidence). Moreover with the fitting of the 74/40 L-43 on the F2 subtype, the weight of the mkIV had increased to 23.6 tons, and eventually increased to 26 tons. So essentially what you are saying is that you want to produce a MkIV f2 in 1935. Quite apart from the fact that in 1935 this was quite beyond the germans even conceptually, the F2 was never invulnerable. It was a much feared tank in the desert, but it was defeatable by the 2pdr and 6 pdr ATGs. Given that there would many fewer F2s than the smaller, earlier tanks, it follows that these fewer tanks are going to end up more vulnerable than the historical tanks that were fielded. We are back to where we started, producing heavier tanks means fewer tanks, fewer tanks means a more vulnerable formation.

We know in 1935 that 7,5cm of 45-50 cals is needed to supplant the 36 cal one, so we develop it.

The trouble is, that in 1935, it was not known that the 37mm and 50mm weapons would prove to be insufficient. Where would the germans deduce that these weapons were inadequate. The tanks that defeated these wepons…the matildas, the t-34s, the Somuas and Char Bs were not even in service. As far as I know the germans did not anticipate these heavier types. Its possible that they may have, but then simply saying, "we will develop it" fails to take into account the costs of such development. And increased cost means decreased numbers, and decreased numbers means less tanks. If we abandon development of the 37mm and the 50mm weapons, this means Germany fights the first two years of her war with nothing bigger than a 200mm tank mounted weapon

What feature makes 25 ton a fantasy design for 1939?

Nothing, except that the germans did not possess a design, a philosophy even for a mobile battle tank to suit that bill. The nearest thing they had was the mk IV which did not enter service in any great numbers until after 1939. The reasons for the concept being a fantasy design are not because it was technically infeasible, clearly it was, but rather because the technology at that strategic moment, along with the foresight to do it simply did not exist. Moreover, when the germans did eventually get around to organizing a design brief for something similar, it still took them the best part of four years to refine the design. So yes, it is something of a fantasy design I am afraid

1942??


This comment was made in the context of building a cut down 45 ton Tiger. Given that the initial design studies for the real Tiger began in 1937, and the tiger did not enter operational service until the latter part of 1942, yes, it is reasonable to assume a 4-5 year lead time for your 45 ton mini Tiger. For your 25 ton tank, there are still going to be delays, because many of the technologies you are looking either don't exist or are otherwise inadequate. My guess is that to develop a 25 ton tank with along barrelled 75mm weapon is going to take rather longer than the historical short barrelled MkIV. It took the MkIV about 3 years to iron out all its kinks, so a long barrelled version of the same thing is going to take at least as long, coupled with the fact that the MkiV was started in 1936, and you want to start in 1935. So again we are back to the problem of inadequate training and equipment. You will not receive the "wonder tan" until 1939-40, even under the most optimistic estimates. This means you will go to war with just the MkI and MkII, and less of them

The thread says 'You run the army'

So, that means what, you are going to teach the lions to eat grass, or the leopard to lose its spots? come on, whilst you could be in charge of the army, it is hardly feasible or reasonable to argue that everything about the german army is going to change at your behest. Even Adolph himself would not attempt that

Every what-if is pure speculation, since a single thing is not likely to be proved. So we disagree.

This is the answer to give, when one doesn't have an answer to give. It can be approached from the point of referenc of a pure daydream, but in reality the excercise can be undertaken as an extrapolation of the possibilities, based on the known historical outcome. In miltary think tanks across the world, participate in this sort of navel gazing all the time. this kind of speculation and testing goes on ad infinitum, but one simply does not say, well we disagree and that's okay. Are you refuting these numbers, If not, what impact would increasing the size and complexity of german tanks have on the numbers available
 
Hi, parsifal,

I'll try to cover some points; for some of other ones we both will remain in our corners, I'm afraid.

The 7,5cm L36 was ordnance of 7,5cm FK 16nA, standard field gun of Heer before 10,5cm howitzer was produced in quantity. MV just under 700 m/s for 6kg shell.

As for developing more potent 7,5cm, again, the thread is that someone with knowledge of what is going to be in WW2 runs the army. So he can order, for example 76,2mm AA cannon, sold to the Russkies according to navweaps.com, to be used as a basis for AFV gun.

F2 subtype had something in common with F1 subtype - increased armor vs. AusF D earlier - that was leading to increased weight. I'm aware that every increase in combat capabilities increases weight, but 25 ton tank can easier withstand increase of 3-4 tons, than an 18 ton type. Ditto for vulnerability vs. 2 6pdr, 25mm, and, more important, vs. russian 45mm. So 10-20% less tanks of better quality on May 10th 1940 would've yielded more tanks in late 1941, since it would be less losses.


This is not fair. I've wrote about the stuff, but since it boiled down to me sitting in my corner, and you in yours, I thought that ending the discussion in a polite manner would be better than continuing it. Sorry if you disagree.
 
IF our hypothetical General is in charge of the army he can certainly change some of the decisions that were made.
MK III was intended to have a 50mm gun and was down gunned to maintain ammo compatibility with the infantry AT gun. This is why it was no great trick to stick 50mm guns later. Make MK IIIs with 50mm guns from the start and put a pointy nose on them. Start 50mm towed AT gun production sooner. It was about 2/3 the weight of the 75mm guns. Skip the 50/L42.
Need an AT gun that can be dragged by 4-6 men on foot? Make more Czech 47mm guns.
Start work on the MK IV IMPROVED a bit sooner. Pointy nose and 75mm/L43. Skipping the 75/24 might not be good idea. It did provide good service in a number of other applications even if they did keep it in production too long in tanks.
A bit wider tracks for both.
With early series tanks you had a 5 ton, a 10 ton, a 15 ton and a 20 ton. The 15 ton grew to 20 tons fairly quickly and then beyond. the 20 ton wound up close to 25 ton. You need a new engine for a "25 ton" class tank that will wind up at 30 tons or better when it is done. Probably a new transmission too. Later MK IVs were getting a bit under powered. Shoe horning a 75mm/L60 gun into a true "25 ton" tank may take some doing. The US managed it post war with the M-41 but you need much thicker armor than it had. The other example is the Comet but it hit 33 tons. Granted both had bigger power packs but your tank is going to come in at 30 tons or better in the field.

BTW a 1/4 bigger tank will only carry more rounds if the 1/4 bigger is in volume. More volume means taller, longer sides or taller, longer front rear which means more weight unless armor is thinner than than 20 ton tank.
Tanks are very volume sensitive.

Other things the Germans could have done?
Like just about everybody else they could have adopted the 120mm mortar much sooner. It was on commercial offer from the French company Brandt in mid 30s (that is where the Russians got it from). A quick and easy way to upgrade the punch of infantry units, especially those with transport problems.
As has been said, standardize vehicle production sooner.
Forget the "gold plate" designs. Build low powered, slow (15-20kph) tractors to pull artillery and wagons instead of horses. They will still be faster and need less fodder and care (won't provide food if surrounded but you can't have everything
 
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Fair comment about tanks being volume susceptible (in lack of better words). It can be noted that I'd mentioned the 'all rear' powerpack - the volume needed would've been less than for 'distributed' powerpack (engine at back, gearbox final drive at front, plus the axle it's tunnel to connect those two).
 
Need to espouse some of the theory behind change management in the military. When you have an organization that "aint broke" like the heer pre-war. the changes are not about revolutionary change. You don't want to upend the apple cart and start again, so to speek. What you are after are evolutionary changes that enhance the combat effectiveness of an already successful force. The buzz word is force multipliers. how do you make a successful combination even better. The best way of doing this is to look for the the weakest link in the chain and take steps to lessen that weakness. Enhancing what is the best parts of the organization is generally of no help, because those weak links usually prevent the better parts from functioning to their full potential.

So, the question you need to ask, in the case of the heer.....were the quality of their tanks the weakest link in the machine. Would they have gained full benefit by spending more of their scarce resources making their tanks better, or were there other constraints that needed to be addressed with a higher priority?

My opinion is that whilst t might be a "nice to have" alternative to have the biggest and meanest tanks on the block, this was not the major constraint that affected the wehrmachts combat performance. My opinion is rooted in the poor transport they possessed, and the ability to react to enemy initiatives, their ability to retreat, if you like.
 

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