- Thread starter
- #21
Why would anyone 'vilify' Napoleon?
1935: you run (only) the army
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Why would anyone 'vilify' Napoleon?
- Thread starter
- #22
I agree davebender. And the UGLY airplanes .... France and Russia both .... ugly of the proletariat.
Still a good reason not to buy a communist-built Renault.
MM
Wasn't mr. Renault sentenced for being Nazi collaborator?
michaelmaltby
Colonel
".... to go any further, one would have to argue the french were in the grips of civil war. clearly they were not."
I think the civil war was in the hearts, minds and soul of the French people. I am NOT claiming French units didn't fight well. I am NOT claiming all German units were great performers on the battlefield. What I am getting at is that there was an overwhelming malaise - and not just just France - Britain was undone. The 1st WW had destroyed people's beliefs (in Christianity) and their place in society and the world. Versailles only made things worse. The League of Nations only made things worse.
Now in France's case - the country had gone from Master of Europe - to humiliation (Sudan, Franco Prussian war) to WWI bloodletting - all in less than 100 years.
France needed to re-evaluate itself and its place in Europe and the world - and instead it was overrun by the Nazis and settled into the uneasy, often morally ambiguous years of occupation.
Frankly - I think we are seeing a repeat of sorts in the UK, Europe and the US - where our values are being eroded from within society and we refuse to accept the reality of the world around us. (Pleasing your enemies does not make them your friends.)
As to why anyone would vilify Napoleon .... he may have been the right man at the right time ... and he certainly kick-started modern Europe .... but .... his "secret police" like any dictator's secret police ... were everywhere. There was a nasty side to The Emperor ... and that for the most part is overlooked (or forgiven).
Renault may well have been tried as a collaborator - but the workers on his assembly lines vote(d) "red".
MM
I think the civil war was in the hearts, minds and soul of the French people. I am NOT claiming French units didn't fight well. I am NOT claiming all German units were great performers on the battlefield. What I am getting at is that there was an overwhelming malaise - and not just just France - Britain was undone. The 1st WW had destroyed people's beliefs (in Christianity) and their place in society and the world. Versailles only made things worse. The League of Nations only made things worse.
Now in France's case - the country had gone from Master of Europe - to humiliation (Sudan, Franco Prussian war) to WWI bloodletting - all in less than 100 years.
France needed to re-evaluate itself and its place in Europe and the world - and instead it was overrun by the Nazis and settled into the uneasy, often morally ambiguous years of occupation.
Frankly - I think we are seeing a repeat of sorts in the UK, Europe and the US - where our values are being eroded from within society and we refuse to accept the reality of the world around us. (Pleasing your enemies does not make them your friends.)
As to why anyone would vilify Napoleon .... he may have been the right man at the right time ... and he certainly kick-started modern Europe .... but .... his "secret police" like any dictator's secret police ... were everywhere. There was a nasty side to The Emperor ... and that for the most part is overlooked (or forgiven).
Renault may well have been tried as a collaborator - but the workers on his assembly lines vote(d) "red".
MM
parsifal
Colonel
it seems then, that we are assessing two different things. i am trying to assess the military potential of the french , and what could have been done to improve that performance. your assessment seems to be about the social disintegration of the country....its descent into moral and political bankruptcy. that is a whole different debate, and a whole different issue. And somewhat off target as far as assessing the capabilities of its army are concerned. sure, the moral decay of Europe is an issue, but it didnt really affect the effectiveness of the various military forces involved. There were other more significant factors at work.
What makes for an effective military? Motivation is one of them, but the biggest single determinant for motivation is well proven to be the belief in survival and not much else. if you can get soldiers to believe they can survive, they will fight.
What makes motivated men fight well. thats a whole different question. as I alluded to earlier education is a big determinant in what makes men good soldiers. The italians were not good soldiers, partly because they were not well educated. the majority of the educated manpower went to the Navy and the airforce, or the technical branches of the army. Most of the Infantry were poor southern uneducated peasants, and this was reflected in their combat performance.....
Of course education is not everything. Your men need an effective structure, a good command structure, the weapons to do the job, an effective doctrine to use the resources. The french in 1940, more than anything lacked a good command structure, this had numerous flow on effects....their doctrine was poor, their proficierncy and tactics were poor their TO&Es were not good....most as a result, one way or another because of poor leadership. Solve the leadership issue, and you have the opportunity to greatly increase the combat capability of her army in 1940. You would need time to bring that change about, but I think starting in 1935 would be long enough to do that by 1940.
There is an interesting study by Frank Banner and Alan Chadwick, that looks at the combat performaces of the French and German Infantry formations. German formations greatly benefitted in their combat capability from the stosstruppen tactics they adopted , but even that up by the overhaul of the french command structure, and you end up with a very interesting comparison. Chadwick and Banner rate the Infantry as 1st, 2nd 3rd or 4th rate, with 1st rate considered the best, and assault capable and the 4th rate, virtually only good for garrison and not really combat ready.
The germans fielded the following:
119 Infantry Divs in total
45x1st Rate, 29x 2nd Rate, 41x 3rd rate and 4 x 4th rate
The french only fielded 72 Inf Divs rated as follows
33 x 1st rate, 21 x 2nd rate, 14 x 3rd rate and 4x4th rate
As percentages of their totals, the ratio of the 1st to 4th rates for the respective armies are
38/24/34/3 for the german army
46/29/19/6 for the french army
this kind of puts paid to the myth that the german army was uniformaly superior to the french. Whilst in absolute terms the germans fielded a large number of assault capable Infantry formations, as a proportion of their total Infantry force in 1940, it is actually less as a proportion of their total force pool than the french. What stopped the french army from being effective was firstly that it was badly outnumbered, and secondly its underlying command structures and doctrine prevented this potential from ever being exploited. Such outnumbering forces the french 3rd and 4th rate divisions into the front line, whilst the german chaff formations were kept in relatively safe positions on quiet sectors of the front. this goes a long way toward explaing the collapse at sedan and elsewhere
What makes for an effective military? Motivation is one of them, but the biggest single determinant for motivation is well proven to be the belief in survival and not much else. if you can get soldiers to believe they can survive, they will fight.
What makes motivated men fight well. thats a whole different question. as I alluded to earlier education is a big determinant in what makes men good soldiers. The italians were not good soldiers, partly because they were not well educated. the majority of the educated manpower went to the Navy and the airforce, or the technical branches of the army. Most of the Infantry were poor southern uneducated peasants, and this was reflected in their combat performance.....
Of course education is not everything. Your men need an effective structure, a good command structure, the weapons to do the job, an effective doctrine to use the resources. The french in 1940, more than anything lacked a good command structure, this had numerous flow on effects....their doctrine was poor, their proficierncy and tactics were poor their TO&Es were not good....most as a result, one way or another because of poor leadership. Solve the leadership issue, and you have the opportunity to greatly increase the combat capability of her army in 1940. You would need time to bring that change about, but I think starting in 1935 would be long enough to do that by 1940.
There is an interesting study by Frank Banner and Alan Chadwick, that looks at the combat performaces of the French and German Infantry formations. German formations greatly benefitted in their combat capability from the stosstruppen tactics they adopted , but even that up by the overhaul of the french command structure, and you end up with a very interesting comparison. Chadwick and Banner rate the Infantry as 1st, 2nd 3rd or 4th rate, with 1st rate considered the best, and assault capable and the 4th rate, virtually only good for garrison and not really combat ready.
The germans fielded the following:
119 Infantry Divs in total
45x1st Rate, 29x 2nd Rate, 41x 3rd rate and 4 x 4th rate
The french only fielded 72 Inf Divs rated as follows
33 x 1st rate, 21 x 2nd rate, 14 x 3rd rate and 4x4th rate
As percentages of their totals, the ratio of the 1st to 4th rates for the respective armies are
38/24/34/3 for the german army
46/29/19/6 for the french army
this kind of puts paid to the myth that the german army was uniformaly superior to the french. Whilst in absolute terms the germans fielded a large number of assault capable Infantry formations, as a proportion of their total Infantry force in 1940, it is actually less as a proportion of their total force pool than the french. What stopped the french army from being effective was firstly that it was badly outnumbered, and secondly its underlying command structures and doctrine prevented this potential from ever being exploited. Such outnumbering forces the french 3rd and 4th rate divisions into the front line, whilst the german chaff formations were kept in relatively safe positions on quiet sectors of the front. this goes a long way toward explaing the collapse at sedan and elsewhere
michaelmaltby
Colonel
I agree that we're at cross-purposes, parsifal. We got on the 'other' track when someone posted that the french army was full of "Marxists" in 1939. You refuted that statement - and noted that why would being a Marxist detract from fighting ability. To which I agreed but noted that in the political realm France was conflicted after September 1939 due to Molotov-Ribbentrop.
While military and political environments should not be confused ... and I am guilty to a degree
, any society that loses confidence in itself, or operates outside the gravity of reality .... will suffer militarily over time. (Viet Nam was a political loss on the home front, not on the battlefield, for example. Regimes that lose the 'vigor' [Rome - both east and western empires - and resort to "buying off" the barabarians, is another example].
Political will is very important to the success of the military, as is public confidence. When these fail, the doors open to greater events.
I am not being hyper critical of the French in these comments - the opening Act of "Inglorious Bastards" well-depicted the dilema honest Frenchmen faced when trying to survive the Nazis - and everytime I see gun camera footage of Spitfires blowing up French railway locomotives I feel sad for the poor bastards in the cab just doing their job .... but all that aside, in 1939 France was divided, tired, and perhaps dillusional. While individual German units may have faltered ... there were still Rommels and Guederians.
Now ... I want out of this hole so I'm going to STOP digging.
Chairs,
MM
While military and political environments should not be confused ... and I am guilty to a degree
, any society that loses confidence in itself, or operates outside the gravity of reality .... will suffer militarily over time. (Viet Nam was a political loss on the home front, not on the battlefield, for example. Regimes that lose the 'vigor' [Rome - both east and western empires - and resort to "buying off" the barabarians, is another example].Political will is very important to the success of the military, as is public confidence. When these fail, the doors open to greater events.
I am not being hyper critical of the French in these comments - the opening Act of "Inglorious Bastards" well-depicted the dilema honest Frenchmen faced when trying to survive the Nazis - and everytime I see gun camera footage of Spitfires blowing up French railway locomotives I feel sad for the poor bastards in the cab just doing their job .... but all that aside, in 1939 France was divided, tired, and perhaps dillusional. While individual German units may have faltered ... there were still Rommels and Guederians.
Now ... I want out of this hole
so I'm going to STOP digging.Chairs,
MM
michaelmaltby
Colonel
parsifal
Colonel
Ive seen that article and read it with interest. I agree with it substantially, but i cannot help but suspect it is somewhat biased in its analysis. The it doesnt seem to acknowledge the realities of needing to maintain a proper reserve, or the other shortages that affected the french air force. But this is a whole diffrent ballgame, one i have not researched properly, and one that will need to wait.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
Parsifal - ".... it doesnt seem to acknowledge the realities of needing to maintain a proper reserve ..." blah, blah, technicalities, . It may be suspect - but it speaks clearly to the presence of "eroded will" in the Air Force -- and THAT to me speaks volumes about much more.
I read the 2-3 pages of the analysis of military "cohesion and morale" that you recommended. I won't bother buying the book.
MM
. It may be suspect - but it speaks clearly to the presence of "eroded will" in the Air Force -- and THAT to me speaks volumes about much more. I read the 2-3 pages of the analysis of military "cohesion and morale" that you recommended. I won't bother buying the book.
MM
parsifal
Colonel
its always delight debating with you mm....hope you enjoyed the experience as well
michaelmaltby
Colonel
I'm not an academic, parsifal, so I'm not much of a debater - more of a free-wheeling, discussion-over-a-beer, by a fire kinda guy.
But I always enjoy and appreciate the knowledge and well-rounded judgement you bring to these threads.
Chairs,
MM
But I always enjoy and appreciate the knowledge and well-rounded judgement you bring to these threads.
Chairs,
MM
parsifal
Colonel
well, interst seems to have waned after our incursion into the frankish arena. guess its time to move on. What would i do if I were in charge of the german army???
far from being the perfect instrument of war, the wehrmacht suffered many weaknesses. Again working on the assumption that I have no greater resources than was historically available, what would I do that was different.
The wehrmacht suffered three fatal weaknesses IMO. the first was that its high command structure was emasculated by Goring and himmler, mostly out of sheer jealousy. Hitler acquiesced and used the opportunity to re-organize the command, to make it more servile to him, but the structure was basically illogical and innefficient.
If Hitler had been able to get over himself, and retained an autonomous command structure, seeing off the petulant attacks by himmler and goring, the german army would have entered the war with a much better command structure, more clear headed and professional than it actually was. i think germany would have done better with an independant high command, though the risks to hitler were fairly high.
Secondly i would reinstate retreats as a subject in their defensive tactics training for officers and NCOs training courses. in 1935 hitler had ordered they be removed from the training manuals, which remained the case until after 1945. He did this because he thought studying retreats was a defeatist concept. he argued that retreats would never be needed in the new victorious wehrmacht. Though the germans displayed a stubborn doggedness in their defensive operations, they never undertook retreats very well. their retreats tended to turn into routs partly because officers werre not trained in how to deal with them. if retreats had been practised, the germans may have saved enough men and materials to blunt and then defeat the russian steamroller offensives
lastly I would have carried through the motorization rationalisation plan to a much greater extent. the schell plan. this would have introduced a standardized motor vehicle park for the german army, which would have greatly assisted its maintenence and vehicle serviceability rates. in 1939, just prior to the outbreak of the war, germany had a staggering 131 different modls of trucks in its inventory, 55 motor car types and 150 motor cycles. The schell plan called for rationalization of this program, to just 23 trucks, 26 cars and 26 motor cycle types.
The schell program was only partially implemented before the war. thereafter it really slid from view until 1944, when in a panic, and far too late the germans tried to impl emt an even more draconian standardisation program with only two motorcycle types, one car and 9 truck types included in the plan.
If germany had introduced something like the Schell plan in 1935, instead of going to war with amenagerie of vehicles which were hopeless to maintain, they would have gone to war with just a few standard types. this would have greatly reduced maintenance problems and greatly increased serviceability. This was one of the major factors that contributed to the german defeat
far from being the perfect instrument of war, the wehrmacht suffered many weaknesses. Again working on the assumption that I have no greater resources than was historically available, what would I do that was different.
The wehrmacht suffered three fatal weaknesses IMO. the first was that its high command structure was emasculated by Goring and himmler, mostly out of sheer jealousy. Hitler acquiesced and used the opportunity to re-organize the command, to make it more servile to him, but the structure was basically illogical and innefficient.
If Hitler had been able to get over himself, and retained an autonomous command structure, seeing off the petulant attacks by himmler and goring, the german army would have entered the war with a much better command structure, more clear headed and professional than it actually was. i think germany would have done better with an independant high command, though the risks to hitler were fairly high.
Secondly i would reinstate retreats as a subject in their defensive tactics training for officers and NCOs training courses. in 1935 hitler had ordered they be removed from the training manuals, which remained the case until after 1945. He did this because he thought studying retreats was a defeatist concept. he argued that retreats would never be needed in the new victorious wehrmacht. Though the germans displayed a stubborn doggedness in their defensive operations, they never undertook retreats very well. their retreats tended to turn into routs partly because officers werre not trained in how to deal with them. if retreats had been practised, the germans may have saved enough men and materials to blunt and then defeat the russian steamroller offensives
lastly I would have carried through the motorization rationalisation plan to a much greater extent. the schell plan. this would have introduced a standardized motor vehicle park for the german army, which would have greatly assisted its maintenence and vehicle serviceability rates. in 1939, just prior to the outbreak of the war, germany had a staggering 131 different modls of trucks in its inventory, 55 motor car types and 150 motor cycles. The schell plan called for rationalization of this program, to just 23 trucks, 26 cars and 26 motor cycle types.
The schell program was only partially implemented before the war. thereafter it really slid from view until 1944, when in a panic, and far too late the germans tried to impl emt an even more draconian standardisation program with only two motorcycle types, one car and 9 truck types included in the plan.
If germany had introduced something like the Schell plan in 1935, instead of going to war with amenagerie of vehicles which were hopeless to maintain, they would have gone to war with just a few standard types. this would have greatly reduced maintenance problems and greatly increased serviceability. This was one of the major factors that contributed to the german defeat
- Thread starter
- #32
Tony Williams gives his 'what if' in the book 'Foresight war', and I like it. Here's what he talks about 'new' German tanks/AFV:
-after Pz-I -II, the 25-ton tank would've entered production (Pz-III in his book). IIRC power pack was 'all rear', armament featuring long 5cm gun at 1st (I'd change that for 7,5cm gun, with ballistics close to US 75mm from M4, or from T-34-76)
-'Marder' available in 1939 (Me: Maybe used 1st time in 1940 to surprise the French Brits? Adding Wespe circa 1940/41, plus twin 2cm/single 3cm AAA on Pz-II chassis. Czech tanks would've been canceled, their chassis used for Marder/Wespe/SP AAA systems)
-In 1940/41 Pz-III receives longer barreled 7,5cm wepon
-88mm is mounted in second half of 1941 to the Pz-III hull to create something akin to SU-85
-Pz-IV enters production (88mm, 45 tons) in late 1941
-twin 3cm AAA mounted on Pz-III hull, in 1942
-Pz-IV receives 88mmL71 ordnace ticker armour, late 1942
-after Pz-I -II, the 25-ton tank would've entered production (Pz-III in his book). IIRC power pack was 'all rear', armament featuring long 5cm gun at 1st (I'd change that for 7,5cm gun, with ballistics close to US 75mm from M4, or from T-34-76)
-'Marder' available in 1939 (Me: Maybe used 1st time in 1940 to surprise the French Brits? Adding Wespe circa 1940/41, plus twin 2cm/single 3cm AAA on Pz-II chassis. Czech tanks would've been canceled, their chassis used for Marder/Wespe/SP AAA systems)
-In 1940/41 Pz-III receives longer barreled 7,5cm wepon
-88mm is mounted in second half of 1941 to the Pz-III hull to create something akin to SU-85
-Pz-IV enters production (88mm, 45 tons) in late 1941
-twin 3cm AAA mounted on Pz-III hull, in 1942
-Pz-IV receives 88mmL71 ordnace ticker armour, late 1942
michaelmaltby
Colonel
".... far from being the perfect instrument of war, the wehrmacht suffered many weaknesses. Again working on the assumption that I have no greater resources than was historically available, what would I do that was different."
Successfully assassinate Hitler.
MM
Successfully assassinate Hitler.
MM
imalko
Chief Master Sergeant
Interesting... One point though, historically Pz III was unable to receive high velocity main gun above 50mm caliber because of inadequate turret ring diameter. Maybe if it was designed differently from the outset...?
Personally I think that main weakness of the Wehrmacht when hardware is concerned is that they used too many different types of armored vehicles. Understand the reasoning behind it (to boost the numerical strength of panzer arm), but it was a logistical nightmare.
- Thread starter
- #35
parsifal
Colonel
Quid pro quo....if the germans began development of a heavy 25 ton tank in 1935, would not the allies also start work on either a heavy tank, or a hevier ATG. Marder was a pretty desperate expedient, that just happened to work....not outstandingly, but it worked. Matildas could have engaged it at more or less equal terms notwithstanding the superior firepower of the type. This is because of the very weak levels of protection offorded to the conversion.
If the germans stated work on a big tank that increased all three criteria of successful tank design ie, the armour, the armament and the mobility, they would invariably have a lot less tanks to use. this is the Tiger argument, allover again, dressed up in different clothes. And the tiger concept, sexy as it seems, was a failure, precisely because it reduced the numbers, put the german armoured assets eggs into less baskets, and thereby increased the vulnerability of the arm as a whole. And in 1935, a 25 ton tank was an enormous tank, given that most tanks being roduced were about 10 tons at that time.
Germany in fact did start a project of this type, with about those dimensions (ie 25tons). it did not reach fruition until 1942, as a tiger tank. at that time tigers dwarfed all other tanks, and yet were still largely a failure for the reasons previously alluded to
If the germans stated work on a big tank that increased all three criteria of successful tank design ie, the armour, the armament and the mobility, they would invariably have a lot less tanks to use. this is the Tiger argument, allover again, dressed up in different clothes. And the tiger concept, sexy as it seems, was a failure, precisely because it reduced the numbers, put the german armoured assets eggs into less baskets, and thereby increased the vulnerability of the arm as a whole. And in 1935, a 25 ton tank was an enormous tank, given that most tanks being roduced were about 10 tons at that time.
Germany in fact did start a project of this type, with about those dimensions (ie 25tons). it did not reach fruition until 1942, as a tiger tank. at that time tigers dwarfed all other tanks, and yet were still largely a failure for the reasons previously alluded to
- Thread starter
- #37
The main German 'enemies' in late '30s (SU, France) have already fielded much heavier tanks than 25 tons, so 25-ton tank was already falling at medium class in these countries. It's unlikely that clear specifications would've been published before the new tank is in combat units - so in 1938/39. Therefore, I can't see any impetus they would've reacted differently than they did in mid-30s.
As for historical 25 ton tank mutating into Tiger, it was 30-35 ton project actually
As for historical 25 ton tank mutating into Tiger, it was 30-35 ton project actually
parsifal
Colonel
The main German 'enemies' in late '30s (SU, France) have already fielded much heavier tanks than 25 tons, so 25-ton tank was already falling at medium class in these countries. It's unlikely that clear specifications would've been published before the new tank is in combat units - so in 1938/39. Therefore, I can't see any impetus they would've reacted differently than they did in mid-30s.
As for historical 25 ton tank mutating into Tiger, it was 30-35 ton project actually
Actually, with the exception of the soviets (and their heavy tanks that dated back to 1935 were unsuccessful), germany's enemies were not producing any 25 ton tanks. This deserves a brief overview.
The british in 1934 were producing matilda Is, 11 tons, armed with two HMGs, max speed 7.5 mph. That was the heaviest tank in their inventory at that time. matilda II did not enter service until mid 1939. The French somua was under development, but did not enter production until late 1936, and was, in any case only 19 tonnes. The char b1 was 30 tons, but did not enter service until 1937. The french did, however have some predecessors to the char b, the so-called char Ds, but these were very unsatisfactory, lacking mobility and power, even by french standards.
The soviets had their t-28s and T-35s, which entered service in 1933. these were certainly more than 25 tons, but as designs they were extremely poor.
thats the thing...all of the pre-war heavy tanks built by the allies and the soviets were not really offensive tanks.....they invariably sacrificed mobility, sometimes also armament, and occasionaly protection as well, simply to be big. The most successful heavy tank best suited to german needs of the time was the mk IV at 19 tons, which entered service in 1937, in extremely limited numbers, and with a gun not suited to ATG work. There were not even 50mm ATGs at that time, so its entry as a dedicated ATG platform would have required further developm,ent of a gun of appropriate size. no-ne in germany was working on a 75mm gun, so the most likley gun would be a 50mm gun, that began to be mounted on mkIIIs in 1940.
In 1935, the germans had no tanks, and very little experience designing them. They designed the mkI in hurry, as a training tank, then rapidly moved onto the mkII before finally developing the MkIII, which entered service in 1939.
one starts to see the difficulties faced by the germans. if they had abandoned their mkI/II tank park and waited or accelarated mkIV production, to amodified design, on a simple weight exchange (which isnt very accurate, or helpful, they would exchange their roughly 2500 tanks in 1939, for say 1000 mkIVs. thats bad enough, but the formations would have been far less well trained than they were, because they would not have had tanks in 1935-6 to practice tactics with. instead of an army of absolute professionals, that trounced everybody that eyeballed them, we would have seen flounder around the battlefield just as spectacularly as the alliesand Just for the record, the tiger began as a Durchbruchwagen (breakthrough) tank design in 1937, as a 30 ton design. In 1941 it was redesigned as the VK4501 project, and emergerged as a 55ton leviathon.
german heavy tank development as it existed in 1935, can be best illustrated by their experimental Neubaufahrzeug tanks, which were multi-turreted affairs similar to the t-35.
I think it unrealistic that the germans coiuld all of a sudden like magic produce a heavy tank ion the 30 ton range, and have it available in numbers with properly trained crews and formations. This is simply an unrealistic supposition in my opinion
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #39
Coupe of things that might've caused misunderstanding:
-I'm not advocating that Germans would totally dump Pz-II, not even Pz-I - those two are badly needed to train massively expanding number of tank crews upper command layer.
-Nor I'm pushing for a 30 ton tank in late 30's - it's 25 ton all the time. Not Neubaufahrzeug, not Durchbruchwagen, but some kind of German T-34/M4 counterpart.
-One thing is making a request and sticking to it, the other is to start at 30 tons, than request 35 ton tank, then a 45 ton one, and finally arrive at 58 tons.
-As for tank/AT armament, think it's easier to produce more ordnances from 7,5cm FK 16nA as tank cannons, then to develop 2 x 5cm cannons.
-Methinks it's realistic to have a 45 ton tank, wit 8,8cm in rotating turret, for Germans, in late 1941. If you don't than we disagree
-I'm not advocating that Germans would totally dump Pz-II, not even Pz-I - those two are badly needed to train massively expanding number of tank crews upper command layer.
-Nor I'm pushing for a 30 ton tank in late 30's - it's 25 ton all the time. Not Neubaufahrzeug, not Durchbruchwagen, but some kind of German T-34/M4 counterpart.
-One thing is making a request and sticking to it, the other is to start at 30 tons, than request 35 ton tank, then a 45 ton one, and finally arrive at 58 tons.
-As for tank/AT armament, think it's easier to produce more ordnances from 7,5cm FK 16nA as tank cannons, then to develop 2 x 5cm cannons.
-Methinks it's realistic to have a 45 ton tank, wit 8,8cm in rotating turret, for Germans, in late 1941. If you don't than we disagree
parsifal
Colonel
I think your on the right track to advocate a T-34 style answer for the Germans, But the problem is that technologically this was not possible or even being contemplated in germany at that time. As head of the German army, you are not in a position to undertake actual research, you can issue design specs and then ask designers to go away and meet that specification. Because what you are asking for represents a quantum leap for geran designers, in terms of what they could do in 1935, its going to take a lot longer to deploy the new type you are describing. Just to hold up an issue as an example. If the design called for a weight of 30tons, and an armament of 75mm or larger, the thinking of 1935 was that armament overhanging the bow was a poor design. The germans would have spent a lot of time and effort working the 75mm design into some weird shaped hull design.
development of an effective 75mm ATG took three years historically, so you can add a year approximately to get that design into a turret.
Trying to circumvent the natural design progression, because you know with the beenfit of hindsight what germany "needs" is to deny some cold hard realities. German designers were just not at the point you want them to be at that time. There were some intermediate steps needed to be trodden before germany could get to that point. There was nothing in the design pipeline that could even come close to what you are describing. its a total fantasy design. buts lets just ssay they do proceed down that pathway....that means that the mkIII, mk38 and MkIV are bypassed, and germany is forced to fight 1939-42 with only light types. They will have a hard time in the west and in Russia in 1941. Good luck. Then in the latter part of 1941 they start their deployment of the new heavy tank. Unless this tank of yours is a total fabrication and product of fancy, it should be assumed that the type is so typically german....large, complex and expensive. A panther for example took something like 10 times the man hours to build compared to a t-34. Ther has never been agreement on the cost of german AFVs but I have found figures that tend to reinforce the man hours argument ....about 3 or four times the cost per unit. We can get into a discussion about that, but my opinion is that making the tanks larger and more complex will reduce the numbers, and thereby increase the vulnerbaility of the arm as a whole. This is not speculation, its a fact that reduced numbers of individually superior types does nothing to increase survivability and effectiveness. Your plan in other words, has serious questions hanging over it as to timing and effectiveness. I believe it possible as well, but i think it would have been a nett negative, rather than a net positive for the germans
development of an effective 75mm ATG took three years historically, so you can add a year approximately to get that design into a turret.
Trying to circumvent the natural design progression, because you know with the beenfit of hindsight what germany "needs" is to deny some cold hard realities. German designers were just not at the point you want them to be at that time. There were some intermediate steps needed to be trodden before germany could get to that point. There was nothing in the design pipeline that could even come close to what you are describing. its a total fantasy design. buts lets just ssay they do proceed down that pathway....that means that the mkIII, mk38 and MkIV are bypassed, and germany is forced to fight 1939-42 with only light types. They will have a hard time in the west and in Russia in 1941. Good luck. Then in the latter part of 1941 they start their deployment of the new heavy tank. Unless this tank of yours is a total fabrication and product of fancy, it should be assumed that the type is so typically german....large, complex and expensive. A panther for example took something like 10 times the man hours to build compared to a t-34. Ther has never been agreement on the cost of german AFVs but I have found figures that tend to reinforce the man hours argument ....about 3 or four times the cost per unit. We can get into a discussion about that, but my opinion is that making the tanks larger and more complex will reduce the numbers, and thereby increase the vulnerbaility of the arm as a whole. This is not speculation, its a fact that reduced numbers of individually superior types does nothing to increase survivability and effectiveness. Your plan in other words, has serious questions hanging over it as to timing and effectiveness. I believe it possible as well, but i think it would have been a nett negative, rather than a net positive for the germans
