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The RN expected their carriers to operate within range of land based air attack, and thus mandated armoured flight decks.
It was likely a result of the RN designing the ships and the RAF-focused Air Ministry specifying and procuring the aircraft. The Air Ministry returned aviation decisions to the FAA in only May 1939, but which time the damage was done. In 1939 the FAA was saddled with obsolete Gladiator fighters and obsolete Swordfish TSRs. And considering that the RN had seven carriers in service, a direly insufficient quantity of both aircraft, for example by Sept 1939 only fifty-four Sea Gladiators were procured. Assuming spares, maintenance and shore based aircraft, that leaves about three to six fighters per each of the seven carriers. I suppose the Skua was intended to fill the fighter gap. When the Air Ministry decided that the Gladiator and Skua would replace the Nimrod (itself kept on strength to 1938! Way past obsolescence) what fighter were they intended to counter? The likely enemies were flying or testing the likes of the Bf 109, Ki 43, A5M and Macchi C.200. Neither the Gladiator or Skua stood a chance. Meanwhile the same Air Ministry that saddled the FAA with these dogs was procuring Spitfires, Hurricanes and Whirlwinds for the RAF.Exactly, the entire premise of operations was that these were carriers operating against land-based air. They were expected to operate in close waters. It follows, then, that the aircraft should be able to do so.
It looks like a disjoint in RN/FAA thinking to me.
That HMS Hermes, one of the RN's most active carriers had lifts that would not fit any of the FAA's monoplane fighters until the Seafire Mk.III does demonstrate such thinking.It sounds like you've worked in a bureaucracy before
Add to your points, the RN's carriers were of different sizes (thinking mainly hangar and elevator capabilities), and someone in the AM trying to economize on outlay may well have decided that the specs should keep the smaller flattops in mind as well, resulting in a variation on "a convoy is only as fast as its slowest ship" thinking.
I don't know that that's the case, it's just a guess on my part, but I've worked in a bureaucratic system too, and that sort of thing happens often enough.
That HMS Hermes, one of the RN's most active carriers had lifts that would not fit any of the FAA's monoplane fighters until the Seafire Mk.III does demonstrate such thinking.
British elevators got smaller as the aircraft got larger. The Courageous class had 46ft wide lifts, Ark Royal's widest lift was 25ft wide, and the Illustrious lifts were 22ft wide before the Brits came to their senses and widened the lifts on the Implacable, Majestics/Colossus, Centaurs and Audacious classes.It baffles me why a navy would not standardize its elevators....
British elevators got smaller as the aircraft got larger. The Courageous class had 46ft wide lifts, Ark Royal's widest lift was 25ft wide, and the Illustrious lifts were 22ft wide before the Brits came to their senses and widened the lifts on the Implacable, Majestics/Colossus, Centaurs and Audacious classes.
Mind you, Ark Royal's single 25ft wide lifts can take every single-engined propeller aircraft right up to the A1 Skyraider, Spearfish and Gannet. So kudos to her designers in the 1930s.
View attachment 619605
The specifically designed British carrier aircraft is a rare thing. For fighters you have the Flycatcher, Fulmar, Firefly, Attacker, Sea Hawk, Scimitar and Vixen. Everything else, from the Nightjar, Nimrod, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Sea Fury, Sea Harrier, etc. etc. was either a rehash of a RAF design or like the Martlet, Hellcat, Corsair, Phantom II and F-35, procured from the US.In reference to #1 above, beginning with the Shark and Swordfish, all aircraft specifically designed for use on the British carriers had folding wings. It was only when the RN had to use modified land based aircraft that the elevator size became a problem.
It's April 1937, and our AM man asks the RN
The RN man calls in his FAA lead, who says "well, old chap it's that we expect them to operate within range of first rate, fighter-escorted, land-based strike aircraft."
In April of 1937 who had long range fighter escorted strike aircraft?
Who had any prospects of long range escorted strike aircraft?
Even in April of 1938 who had such aircraft?
In fact who had such aircraft in April of 1939?
Looking back we KNOW the capabilities of the different aircraft and when they were produced and in what numbers. This was something that military staffs at the time did not know and had to make guesses at. Fighters capable of escorting strike aircraft more than 120-150 miles from shore and retaining first rate performance simply didn't exist in 1937 or 38 or even most of 1939 and into 1940.
1/4 or 1/3 of the 110a used in Poland had Jump 210 engines.
British didn't believe long range single engine escorts were possible, since nobody had really demonstrated such a capability at the time means too much blame is hard to support.
Some accounts claim the Admiralty requested a 4 hour endurance for the Fulmar in 1937/38. If so then simple conversions of existing single engine single seat fighters isn't going to work.
Does that mean that we are supposed to exclude Bf 110C in 1939 from discussion?
In fact who had such aircraft in April of 1939
I'm flabbergasted that the AM made a judgement mistake.
Earlier investment in drop tanks would've been prudent. Hopefully we should not wait for a foreign precedent for that idea.
we need a fighter that is equal in performance to anything the Europeans, Soviets, Americans or Japanese are currently flying, plus whatever we know about what they're designing for tomorrow. This fighter must also be robust, easily maintained, with easy-to-fold wings (no origami please), with good landing characteristics and forward visibility for carrier ops. We must have long endurance and a heavy armament to kill the strike aircraft and their escorts well away from our carriers. And with seven current carriers and six of the new armoured deck carriers under construction or planned, with likely two or three of the smaller, older carriers removed from service, we'll need at least two hundred to two hundred and fifty of these fighters, plus trainers and spares.
"I see, thanks for stating your points so clearly. Well how about this? The RAF will be switching over to the new Hurricane and Spitfire, so why don't you take their obsolete Gladiators? Plus [snark], how about a twin-seat bomber-derived design that doesn't meet any of your requirements for close shore combat; here's our idea (presents sketch of the failed Fairey P.4/34 that first flew in Jan 1937).
While the 110 first flew in may of 1936 (almost a year before the hypothetical conversation in post #82) there was no photo of it available to the British in early 1938, The 1938 Janes has a two sentence description and no photo or drawing.
So when did the British have any real idea of it's capabilities?
Drop tanks in peacetime may not have been a good idea. The idea of landing aircraft on carriers with partially filled detachable tanks wasn't likely to find favor
For the aircraft operating from shore looking for carriers using drop tanks, a bit safer. But where in the mission does the engagement take place?
And can the fighter with drop tank keep up with the bombers without them?
The last certainly depends on which aircraft and what year.
Views on drop tanks certainly changed and the hardware (racks, fittings, mechanisms) undoubtedly got better.
For hypotheticals, the Luftwaffe could have been a much more effective force if the supply of DB 601 engines had been much greater in 1939/40.
The Do 17V-8 flew with DB 600 engines.
Bolded parts seem to be in disagreement.
The "failed Fairey P.4/34" suggestion had 4 hours of endurance (or about twice the range of a Hurricane or Spitfire) and twice the ammo of either the Hurricane or Spitfire at the time.
Part in Italics is what is in question.
And ignore the contrarians, those whose sole joy here is to tell you the trio of why something wouldn't, couldn't or shouldn't have occurred.
With the world's carrier and land based air forces developing and/or fielding high performance single-seat fighters it was ridiculous for the FAA to spend 1938-40 developing a slow and heavy twin-seater to counter them. The RN expected their carriers to operate within range of land based air attack, and thus mandated armoured flight decks. If so, it would seem prudent to have a FAA fighter that could deal with land based fighters.
I think the criticism is founded on the second seat being unnecessary. I tend to agree with it myself. I don't think the second crewman was worth the tradeoffs in performance.
It's also worth remembering that at the time, the Germans and the Italians, the perceived enemy in the 1930s didn't have long-range modern single-seat fighters that could tackle even the Fulmar. There was no way the Bf 109 had the range to reach a British carrier at sea from Germany, except from the likes of the island of Sylt if the carrier was in the Channel and very lower reaches of the North Sea, and even then the carrier would have been in range of British land-based fighters. In the mid to late 1930s the frontline Italian fighter was this:
View attachment 620338CR.32
...to be replaced by this in 1939 - 1940.
View attachment 620339CR.42
Thinking was never so prescient back then as we like to imagine, with our access to oodles of hindsight.
That the Air Ministry didn't instigate a single-seater is always blamed on the navy, but it wanted them. There was definitely a disconnect between operational experience and what was being decided in the Air Ministry for the FAA in the 1930s, but there was a reason for it. Carrier deck space was limited and in the early 30s, fearing a size and weight increase in modern aircraft decisions were made that meant that dual role aircraft were gonna be incorporated on carriers, so the likes of the Skua and Fulmar were ordered. The other issue was cost versus predicting where the next threat might come from, the former being an ever-present issue in peacetime and the latter in that the British didn't anticipate the Germans would invade Europe again so soon after the Great War. Even before the Skua entered service it was criticised by senior admirals as being inadequate for their needs. The Hurricane was of interest and by the mid-1930s was being discussed as a future carrier single-seat fighter.
Forgive what might seem dumb questions.