Curtiss had been a main supplier of Army fighters since the late 20s, if it wanted to remain in that position it could not offer fighters almost as good as the other companies, they had to better, more innovative.
The P-40Q was not a change in design in direction... Cutting a few feet of wing tip off the old P-36 wing was not an example of innovation or modern thinking.
Unfortunately for Curtiss the basic design talent seemed to be lacking, the P-60 series dropped to six guns and then to four guns in an attempt to get the planes lighter to keep the performance up even as they got the more powerful engine (the R-2800).
Thanks, you articulated exactly the point I've been making about US weapon procurement for years. But I would rephrase your statement above slightly.
They didn't want an incremental improvement, they wanted a quantum leap.
This is a frequent pattern, the desire to make a quantum leap past what was already available and into something truly new and innovative. Like the B-70 Valkyrie, or the F-102, or the P-55 Acender (another zany project that Curtiss wasted time with) it could easily become a costly failure. Or like the ultimately successful P-38 and P-47, it might struggle through years of teething problems and issues with over-ambitious systems (turbo comes to mind).
Sometimes all the ambition for greatness builds up pressure that dooms a new design. A lot of times the best new designs started out as cheap alternatives mean to buy time until the next great idea came along. The Mosquito was made mainly to save on strategic materials. The F-16 was supposed to be a cheap stop gap. Yet these were some of the best new designs of their eras.
Any real quantum leap to make in 1944 or even 1943 was obviously going to be jet powered. So any more or less conventional pro driven fighter design
was incremental, the only question was how far of an improvement would it be - two steps, three or four? And if Allison really couldn't get the two stage supercharger working then P-40Q was dead in the water regardless. That is probably what in fact happened.
However,
if they could, perhaps with a bit more effort (putting a few more engineers on the project, whatever) have gotten the V-1710-101 working reliably by some time in 1942, I think that aircraft would have been more viable than the P-46, P-53, and P-60 series among other wasted efforts.
The P-40 itself was just a simple incremental upgrade over the P-36, as you have pointed out, basically just adding a better engine. And yet it proved to be vastly more capable and useful, extending the operational use of the P-36 to the end of the war. The P-51B was, similarly, an incremental update of a promising but not really viable fighter in the P-51A. The B model basically just put in a new, much better engine and fixed a problem with the ailerons. The Tempest was originally just an incremental improvement of the Typhoon, and yet it turned out to be
vastly more useful.
Of the aircraft available in 1943 or 1944, the Mustang to me is the one that clearly was far above and beyond the P-40. It was the ideal escort fighter. It could contend with the Bf 109 at altitude and Fw 190 in terms of speed. But the Mustang wasn't great at everything. It's closest competitors, the P-38 and P-47, having lost out in the prestige battle for the escort role, were often used as low altitude fighters and fighter-bombers. But neither was ideal for that.
The P-38 was a very innovative design (certainly a quantum leap) but did not come into it's own until the late J and L models in 1944 when the dive flaps fixed the compressibility problems, boosted ailerons improved maneuverability, they had a second generator, cockpit heating, and most of the turbo issues were resolved. But even then it wasn't an ideal low altitude fighter or fighter bomber, size alone made it vulnerable to ground fire. The earlier P-38s were still very useful in the Pacific, and the P-38L could have rivaled the P-51 as an escort but that decision had already been made. The P-47 went through similar teething problems though for not quite as long. It's main issue was ultimately just range, due largely to the thirsty engine with the huge turbo (which was a circular problem in that the big turbo contributed to the huge overall size of the plane which meant it needed more power to drag it through the sky drinking more fuel etc.). It too got relegated largely to ground attack, and while it is celebrated in that role and the radial engine helped it survive being hit, it's large size and the fact that it was generally speaking, draggy down low and designed to be a high altitude fighter meant that it really wasn't ideal for that role.
The reality is that the P-40 soldiered on longer than it should have of course. To wit:
You do know that P-51s were being licence built in Australia from 1943 or 1944?
Be that as it may, if you look at the
Australian victory claims for 1944, you'll notice that the majority of their victory claims were still by P-40s. I don't see any by Mustangs. By my count it's 17 from P-40s, 4 from Beaufighters, and 9 from Spitfires. So clearly there was still a need and a role for the P-40s.
If you accept the idea however that the Mustang should have been the
only American made fighter in use after Jan 43, which I could agree with provisionally except for the problem of production, then the notion that there is no need for a P-40Q is valid. But since the production capacity for P-51s and their engines was limited, and other fighter types could compliment the mission, the P-40Q seems viable. P-40s were more maneuverable than Mustangs and seemed to hold up better to battle damage. The P-40Q was just a P-40 that had less drag, a much higher operational ceiling (39,000 ft vs. 31,000 for the P-40N) was 44 mph faster and had 300 miles more range. Four guns to me is also not a problem, does anyone doubt that a P-51B with four .50 cal guns was a better fighter than a Hurricane IIC with four 20mm cannon?