A6M and Ki-43 vs early war Allied fighters with energy tactics

The issue is not getting the fighter aircraft airborne, it's getting it to a sufficient altitude to make a viable intercept on the incoming enemy. That's the key challenge facing early fighters in the Far East in late 1941/early 1942. The only documented scramble time we have from the Malayan campaign relates to 453 Sqn when tasked with providing air support for Force Z. In that instance, it took "less than 5 mins" for a full squadron to get airborne from notification (source "Battleship" by Middlebrook and Mahoney). Now the climb performance of the Buffalo was by no means satisfactory, taking approximately 15 mins to reach 20,000ft. I don't know what the climb performance of the early P-40s was, but a Google search revealed 8.8 mins for the P-40N so it's reasonable to assume the earlier variants had poorer performance. The Spitfire MkII had a claimed time-to-20,000ft of 7.7 mins which undoubtedly would have made a difference in the Far East, although it probably wouldn't have changed history - without a proper ground-to-air control system, interceptions were still largely based on luck.

Lack of sufficient warning was the key problem for the Allies. Without sufficient time to reach altitude, the defensive fighters were always meeting the Japanese at a tactical disadvantage because they were at lower altitude and lower speed (because they were climbing to attempt an intercept).

Perhaps it was a better bet to fly the planes off the airbase, out of harm's way, than to try to conceal them all? A plane that can fly for 5 minutes in one way (away from the incoming enemy), then turn back and fly another 5 mins can use total of 10 mins to climb, and then to attack some of the attackers. If the enemy fighter escort is loitering over the air base at 10-15 kft, without seeing the defenders trying to take off, a nasty surprise could've hit them from 15+ kft.
Not saying that really happened, but maybe someone could share some good data about AVG's defending their bases?

The problem is most of the real damage in late-41/early-42 was done by Japanese fighter strafes of allied airfields. It wasn't a case of IJAAF or IJN fighters loitering at 10-15,000ft - they were at much lower altitudes and would have picked off any aircraft that attempted to take off. Sgt Eric Peterson was killed attempting just that on 22 Dec 41 from his airfield near Kuala Lumpur.

Also, one plane might have evaded the Japanese fighters but trying to launch an entire squadron (which is what was needed when the IJAAF and IJN outnumbered the Allied defenders) was far less likely to succeed.

Gentlemen,

while not an expert, I am inclined to think that the so-called Bushido code is not the main reason of the lack of armor on Japanese planes. IMHO, the Japanese didn't put armor because they had not the engines powerfull enough to allow their planes performances, range, firepower and armor. They had to give up armor to save weight and keep the performances good enough.

Best regards,

Francis

Cripes, OP, some other fellers, no offence you need some serious schooling.

Okay first point. Japs didn't give two hoots about samurai or king and country or anything but now you're in the military so do your damn job. The field commanders cared about samurai and king and country and they sent their troops out to the slaughter no differently to the trench horror of WW1. They basically functioned on that mentality, so let's not turn it into a cultural war yeah? They're just fellers.

Secondly, same deal with Army/Navy/Ministry specifications for defence contractors/subsidised-departments. They did it just the same as the yanks or anyone else. The Zero was no different to any other fighter plane of the late 30s. It's just that Europe was moving quickly towards 40s technology because it was in high stress. The USN was the only US air arm that specified protected fuel tanks and a large swathe of safety gear as mandatory installations. Army Air was fine with no self sealing tanks or pilot armour, just like the Zero. The first P-40 and P-39 were made like this, you know who made the American manufacturer's install this equipment? Not the US military, the British. From early 1940 it was standard RAF equipment on all fighters, and the US just adopted the new model, which is smart.

This situation never happened for the Japanese, so it is perfectly reasonable to see that they were still following perfectly contemporary protocols in fighter design with the Zero and early Oscars (later ones got self sealing tanks and pilot armour, from about March 42, and so did all further JA aircraft, the IJN didn't do this until Feb44 and they'd already lost their core air group by then so that was decisive).

Further, the IJN requirement for the Zero was range. Given that nobody at the time, specifically the Americans considered protective armouring mandatory equipment among land based aircraft, which Zeros would be tasked primarily with combating, the strategy they used, which worked tremendously was a range specification that left Carrier task forces virtually untouchable if on the attack and so long as they hold and maintain combat initiative.

Now this actually worked. When they attacked Darwin, P-40E interceptors had a window of minutes or else you just had to let them go, because they can range four or five times your distance at a high throttle and still happily make it home to base. They also used the tactic for bomber interception. In New Guinea what the Japanese did was follow the bomber group back home at a leisurely pace unnoticed, climbing high above the enemy group until they got to the last waypoint, all the way back to base. That was when they bounced them, when the escort couldn't run up their engines quick enough to do anything about it and had their guard down. Got some great accounts of this.

The problem was the Japanese suffered gross mismanagement at the top. Militarily they were run very much like Poland. And the Allies were already learning well from Hitler.

Great post! Now lets put the "Bushido Code" Bull Sh!t to bed and talk airplanes.

Absolutely! IMHO the Zero was a great standalone design for a late thirties/coming into the forties fighter plane. Given let's think of it as if it were peacetime and just put the war aside for a moment. Nobody at the start of 1940 except the Germans were armouring their fighters (and they only did because of Spain). Nobody really expected a land based fighter arm to be heavily armoured, there's no need for interceptors to be this way, they should be light, with lots of lift, tons of power and lots of offensive punch. That's what you expect to fight in a Zero.

So given that nobody was expected to be any better armoured, the Zero was a fantastic piece of foresight and technology. It was very modern. The duralumin used virtually defined postwar standards all the way to the 80s. Its range capabilities were not only superb but were strategically decisive. Its combat capabilities were superb. Its engine was a jewel, utterly reliable at all power settings and could be safely overboosted at low altitudes in low gear. Most reporting of output ratings are for maximum continuous, so you should add about 310hp on maximum take off/emergency ratings. They're perfectly competitive with anything in the skies all the way to 1943 which isn't bad for what amounts to the Japanese Me-109.

vanir said:

Absolutely! IMHO the Zero was a great standalone design for a late thirties/coming into the forties fighter plane. Given let's think of it as if it were peacetime and just put the war aside for a moment. Nobody at the start of 1940 except the Germans were armouring their fighters (and they only did because of Spain). Nobody really expected a land based fighter arm to be heavily armoured, there's no need for interceptors to be this way, they should be light, with lots of lift, tons of power and lots of offensive punch. That's what you expect to fight in a Zero.

So given that nobody was expected to be any better armoured, the Zero was a fantastic piece of foresight and technology. It was very modern. The duralumin used virtually defined postwar standards all the way to the 80s. Its range capabilities were not only superb but were strategically decisive. Its combat capabilities were superb. Its engine was a jewel, utterly reliable at all power settings and could be safely overboosted at low altitudes in low gear. Most reporting of output ratings are for maximum continuous, so you should add about 310hp on maximum take off/emergency ratings. They're perfectly competitive with anything in the skies all the way to 1943 which isn't bad for what amounts to the Japanese Me-109.

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Agree on all points - with that said, unless you had an aircraft that would offer similar performance, the only way you're going to be able to compete with it in combat is through superior tactics. The classic dogfight was still the norm for many combatants during the period including the Japanese. Aside from the political rhetoric mentioned earlier, it was well documented for the most part that in the air the Japanese did not work well as a "team" for a number of reasons. This too would play into the allies achieving successes with seemingly inferior aircraft during the earlier stages of the war.

davebender said:

Energy tactics require speed, climb and firepower. Prior to mid 1943 most Allied fighter aircraft in the Pacific were inferior in all three characteristics. After mid 1943 it hardly mattered as the USA had such a large numerical advantage.

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The two primary fighters through 1942, the P-39 and P-40 had enough speed, at least up to 15,000 feet. They both lacked acceration which put them at a disadvantage against opposition that has a slower max speed but much better acceration.
Climb rate certainly was a problem. But, excluding the P-36A which doesn't really count, what fighter was deficient in armament compared to Japanese fighters? Even the P-35A, which probably shouldn't count either, was better armed than the Ki-27 and Ki-43.

Regarding the Philippines, there were a number of factors that contributed to the poor performance of the 24th Pursuit that had nothing to do with the performance of the P-40. In fact most of the fighter vs. fighter combat occured at altitudes that favored the perfomance of the P-40B and P-40E. After December 8th, they were vastly ounumbered. Operations had to be conducted from poor airfields with next to no anti aircraft protection, under constant observation by the Japanese with little or no warning of attack. The majority of the American pilots were fresh out of flight school and were up against highly experienced opposition in both the Ki-27 and A6M. During the early part of the campaign at least, the guns on the P-P-40Es frequently jammed and could not be cleared in flight. Lack of spare parts and poor maintence facilities reduced performance of the aircraft on hand. None of this takes away from the fact the the Japanese had excellent aircraft, especially the A6M. But the experiences of the AVG againts the Ki-27 shows that it was no world beater against the P-40.

Duane

FLYBOYJ said:

Agree on all points - with that said, unless you had an aircraft that would offer similar performance, the only way you're going to be able to compete with it in combat is through superior tactics. The classic dogfight was still the norm for many combatants during the period including the Japanese. Aside from the political rhetoric mentioned earlier, it was well documented for the most part that in the air the Japanese did not work well as a "team" for a number of reasons. This too would play into the allies achieving successes with seemingly inferior aircraft during the earlier stages of the war.

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It always impressed me that Allied pilots took to the skies from the very beginning with an attitude of teamwork as priority over anything else, even skill. And this worked so well in practise, despite initial attrition rates as tactics are developed to suit a/c and doctrine of the day. Even in the early stages of the South Pacific, when the Zero/Oscar had clear dominance in contended airspace the Allied air forces tactical emphasis was teamwork and persistance. At that stage they didn't know if these Japanese fighters were technologically superior in some way, everyone was dying to get their hands on one to examine.

The Lae fighter group, a decorated Zero wing used to overfly Port Moresby taunting Allied pilots (there were Oscar wings near there too and RAAF reports them as easily comparable to Zero pilot skill/performance, but the navy was assigned as it was élite). I've watched war footage of them doing aerobatics over the airfield, no kidding they're literally thumbing their noses and all the allied pilots can do is duck for cover and wonder what happened to the CAP. It looks really scary, the Pacific war looks much more desperate for the Allies this way, than in books where it actually looks more desperate for the Japanese.

varsity078740 said:

The two primary fighters through 1942, the P-39 and P-40 had enough speed, at least up to 15,000 feet. They both lacked acceration which put them at a disadvantage against opposition that has a slower max speed but much better acceration.
Climb rate certainly was a problem. But, excluding the P-36A which doesn't really count, what fighter was deficient in armament compared to Japanese fighters? Even the P-35A, which probably shouldn't count either, was better armed than the Ki-27 and Ki-43.

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To be fair, and I understand the impression of our retrospect as this reflects my opinion too, however that is not what is reported in the wartime documents. RAAF reports no armament disadvantages with the Oscar, it's two Italian-based fifty cals. were perfectly adequate for taking down fighters and medium bombers according to them. Tony Williams told me the Japanese did better with experimental "explosive rounds" for the fifties than the Italians did, so their guns performed a little better in the field. A Boston bomber won't stand up to a pair. A Kittyhawk only needs a little handful of their lead-throw to down it, but it will take half a second longer than the reverse. With 4-6 fifties the RAAF fighter pilots probably weren't even aware that Oscars had self sealing tanks and pilot armour from mid-42, they would've gone down just as easily to that kind of firepower.

But it was a fairly recent thing. The P-36 (proposed armament) started off with 1 fifty and 1 thirty, which increased to 3 thirties and 1 fifty and that was the listed standard in 1938 for a fighter/interceptor armament, in fact the British Ministry called it heavily armed and when 2 fifties and 4 thirties were fitted they called it overkill. But this was at the time when they were switching the underwing Lewis machine guns of the Gauntlet, over to the great new Browning thirties chambered for the .303 on the Gladiator. And the Hurricane was being designed for the same armament, 4x .303 in the wings (changed at the last minute because the Spit was always getting 8x .303 from the start and Hawker wanted to compete). Let's keep in mind the BF-109 was armed with four thirties at this stage.

And this is the kind of headspace the Japanese were in with aircraft design through to 1941. Europe kept moving in leaps and bounds because it was at war with serious competitors all that time, the Japanese were consistently facing obsolete materiél until 1942. In a world where four rifle calibre machine guns in a fighter, and one or two fifties in an interceptor was quite adequate armament, the Oscar is quite heavily armed.
In 1942 you'd think it wouldn't be, but again the RAAF reported no such deficiencies. What they did write was that it was extremely difficult trying to combat the Oscar in air combat until one was finally captured and comparatively flown in late 43 but its speed performance was already disadvantaging it by then, so it went from dominant to obsolete overnight. No mention of inadquate armament, apparently they took down US and RAAF aircraft just fine right through to 43.

Page 487, "The First Team" by John Lundstrom.

" Like their counterparts in the US Navy, they relied mostly on hit and run tactics, predicated around deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent's tails in a dogfight.'

The above is in appendix 15, Japanese Combat Methods, of Lundstrom's book which, IMO, is the best researched and written book about the Pacific War which I have ever read. It explodes the myth that the Japanese, or at least the IJN pilots relied mostly on dogfighting tactics. Lundstrom goes on to explain the typical attack by a shotai of three planes. In the book it goes into great detail about the fight that Thach and his wing men had at Midway with the IJN Zekes. No dogfighting!

Very interesting piece on the effectiveness of the Italian and Japanese army fighters. If I can add a bit. There s a general misconception that the early Ki43's were armed with 2 x LMG then 1 x HMG and 1 x LMG and finally moved to 2 x HMG. All Ki43 could be armed with any combination of the two weapons, however in the first moths of the war the HMG was initially in short supply and then unreliable. That said once the reliability aspects had been resolved the 2 x HMG became the norm. The progression was the norm but it had nothing to do with the marks of aircraft, just the availability of reliable weapons.

vanir said:

Absolutely! IMHO the Zero was a great standalone design for a late thirties/coming into the forties fighter plane. Given let's think of it as if it were peacetime and just put the war aside for a moment. Nobody at the start of 1940 except the Germans were armouring their fighters (and they only did because of Spain). Nobody really expected a land based fighter arm to be heavily armoured, there's no need for interceptors to be this way, they should be light, with lots of lift, tons of power and lots of offensive punch. That's what you expect to fight in a Zero.

So given that nobody was expected to be any better armoured, the Zero was a fantastic piece of foresight and technology. It was very modern. The duralumin used virtually defined postwar standards all the way to the 80s. Its range capabilities were not only superb but were strategically decisive. Its combat capabilities were superb. Its engine was a jewel, utterly reliable at all power settings and could be safely overboosted at low altitudes in low gear. Most reporting of output ratings are for maximum continuous, so you should add about 310hp on maximum take off/emergency ratings. They're perfectly competitive with anything in the skies all the way to 1943 which isn't bad for what amounts to the Japanese Me-109.

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I think the greatest problems of the Zero were two: light airframe, poor performance at high speed. Those were signficant factors once the Allies started to explore them. On the other hand, as you stated, it had a fantastic range which provided a lot of flexibility. This very range I think it was the answer for the light airframe at least (to save weight). A Ki-43 pilot mentions this about his quiet similar machine in this interview: View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-eBmnpCO18

If I'm not wrong, Jiro Horikoshi (the A6M chief designer) wanted a more powerful engine for the Zero, which unfornately for it was unavaliable at the time of the design. I think such an engine perhaps would be capable of provide the freedom to strengthen the airframe and/or provide armor protection earlier or even from the start of the production.

I'm inclined to think the Japanese were not so bad as sometimes mentioned in their aircraft concepts and development. Even because they were fighting a war in China, and other in the Pacific, and the last one also meant they need to build a Navy to fight nothing less than the USN and RN. While they surely made several mistakes, obviously they could not develop and produce aircraft as faster as their enemies, specially after they have gained the iniciative. The Luftwaffe, which have a much larger number of modern aircraft during the war, met the same fate after the strategic ground was lost.