Allied Bomber Targets

SaparotRob said:

33k in the air brought up a point I never thought about. I've read about disruptions to industry even though precision bombing wasn't. It never occurred to me to consider downtime due to running for shelter, waiting for the "all clear" and getting back to the factories.

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And applying for relief if bombed out or having ones home damaged. This usually took two to three days and almost all employers allowed compassionate leave for this..

The British were interested in estimating the effects of the nuisance raids by the Light Night Striking Force. which flew nightly or twice nightly to targets in Germany, triggering air raid alarms and dropping relatively light loads, up to and including 4,000 lb HC bombs (cookies).

In post war interrogations the directors of the Siemens Schukert and Halske factories said that the raids caused a constant drain on the production of both concerns. Workers were sent to shelters each time an attack developed. Those on night shifts were kept awake, and they were often those sent home early to avoid travelling during the bombing.

Siemens Schukert estimated that they lost 1.5 MILLION working hours in the last few months of the war. Halske reckoned their loss at 2 MILLION hours.

These are not figures you will find in the highly biased reports of the USSBS or BBSU.

Redfellow said:

Indeed. See here: https://www.ww2-weapons.com/bombing-accuracy/

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Hardly an authoritative source, IMO.

Jim

JDCAVE said:

Hardly an authoritative source, IMO.

Jim

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The figures for the USAAFs seem to be taken generally from the September-December 1944 'Report on Bombing Accuracy' by the Operational Analysis Section of the Eighth Air Force, which is THE definitive source.

To put things into perspective, only 14% of the 8th AF's total effort was made in good visual conditions, 55% was done in 6-7/10 cloud or heavier, when the bombers, using an optical sight, could either not see the ground or only see it occasionally. 57% of the total effort was 'radar bombing' using H2X.

Bombing through cloud cover the average range error was 1.74 miles, deflection error 1.40 miles and circular error 2.48 miles. More than half the bombs, 58.5%, fell within five miles of the aiming point. The rest were not recorded, so who knows where they ended up. This was not precision bombing, despite the pretence maintained by some senior US airmen, even after the war. The figures were better for 4-5/10 cloud, being 1.08 miles, 1.08 miles, 1.77 miles respectively.

Notice that the errors are measured in miles, not yards.

Through 10/10 cloud just 0.2% of bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point. That's ONE in FIVE HUNDRED. Unfortunately, such conditions are common over NW Europe for much of the year.

Again, it was better as the cloud thinned, through 4-5/10 cloud 4.4% fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and almost all (96%) fell within five miles, so at least they would hit a reasonably sized city.

All figures taken from the report referenced in the first sentence.