Allied Bomber Targets

[Milosh]

There was a thread awhile back where what targets the Allies should attack (can't find).

One of the targets mentioned was the Electric Utilities. This is the USSBS report on that industry, 205 - German Electric Utilities Industry Report.pdf - Google Drive

 

[SaparotRob]

Is it true that U.S. bombers weren't to bomb Ford factories in Germany or was that a myth?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Is it true that U.S. bombers weren't to bomb Ford factories in Germany or was that a myth?

According to The Nation:

Ford vehicles were crucial to the revolutionary Nazi military strategy of blitzkrieg. Of the 350,000 trucks used by the motorized German Army as of 1942, roughly one-third were Ford-made. The Schneider report states that when American troops reached the European theater, "Ford trucks prominently present in the supply lines of the Wehrmacht were understandably an unpleasant sight to men in our Army." Indeed, the Cologne plant proved to be so important to the Reich's war effort that the Allies bombed it on several occasions. A secret 1944 US Air Force "Target Information Sheet" on the factory said that for the previous five years it had been "geared for war production on a high level."

Ford and the Führer

 

[Redfellow]

Essential reading:

• Richard Overy: The Bombing War (2013) — not least because of the 160 pages of bibliography and citations. Absenteeism at the Cologne Ford factory gets a passing mention on pp 462-3
• James Holland: Big Week (2018)—specific to "Operation Argument" of February 1994, but a small mountain of other information.

But you all knew those!

 

[stona]

There was a thread awhile back where what targets the Allies should attack (can't find).

One of the targets mentioned was the Electric Utilities. This is the USSBS report on that industry, 205 - German Electric Utilities Industry Report.pdf - Google Drive

That report confirms what we already knew. The USSBS and the derivative report of the BBSU were both written by what Harris would have called 'panacea merchants'.

 

[GrauGeist]

Is it true that U.S. bombers weren't to bomb Ford factories in Germany or was that a myth?

Nothing in Cologne was spared (including Ford's plant), same goes for GM's Opel plant in Brandenburg, which was partially damaged by RAF raids.

 

[Crimea_River]

When the RAF was lucky to get bombs within a 5 mile radius it's pretty hard to exclude a target.

 

[SaparotRob]

Nothing in Cologne was spared (including Ford's plant), same goes for GM's Opel plant in Brandenburg, which was partially damaged by RAF raids.

Myth busted.

 

[33k in the air]

When the RAF was lucky to get bombs within a 5 mile radius it's pretty hard to exclude a target.

That was certainly the case early in the war. By the end of the war, however, Bomber Command was putting over 90% of the bombs dropped within three miles of the aiming point, and a good proportion within one mile.

 

[33k in the air]

Essential reading:

• Richard Overy: The Bombing War (2013) — not least because of the 160 pages of bibliography and citations. Absenteeism at the Cologne Ford factory gets a passing mention on pp 462-3
• James Holland: Big Week (2018)—specific to "Operation Argument" of February 1994, but a small mountain of other information.

But you all knew those!

I would add Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. It is an in-depth examination of the German economy prior to and during the war. It has an interesting section concerning Bomber Command's attack on the Ruhr from March-July 1943, which, according to German records, had a significant impact on German war production which lasted for months after the campaign ceased.

 

[Redfellow]

That was certainly the case early in the war. By the end of the war, however, Bomber Command was putting over 90% of the bombs dropped within three miles of the aiming point, and a good proportion within one mile.

Indeed. See here: https://www.ww2-weapons.com/bombing-accuracy/

 

[Crimea_River]

I said RAF not USAAF. And my comment still stands. Area bombing by the RAF was still the policy up until the last few months of the war and the exclusion of a target at night within a city under this policy would have been impossible.

 

[33k in the air]

I said RAF not USAAF. And my comment still stands. Area bombing by the RAF was still the policy up until the last few months of the war and the exclusion of a target at night within a city under this policy would have been impossible.

Interestingly, however, in terms of tonnage of bombs dropped, only about half was against urban area targets. The other half was against a variety of military or industrial targets. Bomber Command actually dropped more tons of bombs against oil targets in 1945 than did the 8th and 15th Air Forces combined. Also, the peak year for incendiary bomb usage by Bomber Command both in terms of numerical tons dropped and percentage of total tonnage effort was 1943.

 

[pbehn]

I said RAF not USAAF. And my comment still stands. Area bombing by the RAF was still the policy up until the last few months of the war and the exclusion of a target at night within a city under this policy would have been impossible.

There was always a massive difference between best and worst. if a bomber box releases all bombs on a signal then the factory target has to be the size of a city. In the raid on Dresden 14 Feb 1945 wiki says "316 B-17 Flying Fortresses bombed Dresden, dropping 771 tons of bombs.[66][67] The remaining 115 bombers from the stream of 431 misidentified their targets. Sixty bombed Prague, dropping 153 tons of bombs, while others bombed Brux and Pilsen.[" So 115 bombers didn't aim precisely at any factory or marshalling yard Some didn't bomb Germany.

 

[SaparotRob]

Some USAAF bombers even bombed "targets" in Switzerland.

 

[stona]

Everyone did area bombing. The US 8th Air Force referred to such raids as 'area like', which is barely even a euphemism.

Marshalling yards were often used as an official aiming point for US area raids, but in the case of Dresden the 8th Air Force didn't even bother with this platitude. The definitive report from the commander of the 1st Division, Brigadier General Turner, to Headquarters Eighth Air Force on the Dresden raid, dated 25 February states quite baldly:

"Primary target - Visual - Centre of built up area Dresden"

5 Groups targeting for the first wave on the previous night before was more precise than that.

 

[33k in the air]

There was always a massive difference between best and worst. if a bomber box releases all bombs on a signal then the factory target has to be the size of a city. In the raid on Dresden 14 Feb 1945 wiki says "316 B-17 Flying Fortresses bombed Dresden, dropping 771 tons of bombs.[66][67] The remaining 115 bombers from the stream of 431 misidentified their targets. Sixty bombed Prague, dropping 153 tons of bombs, while others bombed Brux and Pilsen.[" So 115 bombers didn't aim precisely at any factory or marshalling yard Some didn't bomb Germany.

Weather was always a major factor in USAAF daylight bombing (with smoke screens and decoys playing a smaller role). Excerpt from Target: Berlin regarding the 6 March 1944 attack on that city and the results obtained:

As an attempt to curtail production at the three primary targets the attack was a failure. None was hit effectively. Only the Genshagen aero engine plant was attacked at all, by 50 bombers or less than a quarter of the aircraft assigned to it and most of their bombs fell outside the target area. The Erkner and Klein Machnow plants escaped damage altogether.

Had there been either clear skies over Berlin, or else complete cloud cover, the attack would have been more effective. As it was each bomb division leader committed himself to a visual bomb run on his primary target then, when it was too late to revert to a radar bomb run on the center of Berlin, cloud drifted in to conceal the aiming point. Bomb groups were left to select whatever targets they could find in the city. In practice this meant formation leaders bombed 'holes in the clouds' and hit whatever part of Berlin happened to be underneath. It was an indiscriminate form of attack which hit military targets only by chance. Altogether 379 crews reported they had dropped bombs on Berlin itself. The main damage on targets that could be called 'military' was that at the Falkenhagener Army depot, the Telefunken radar factory and the scattered damage to the city's road and rail network. There were very few service casualties, probably less than ten killed or wounded. The most serous effect on production was the two working hours lost at all plants while the workforce went to and returned from shelter. A further 228 crews bombed targets outside the immediate area of Berlin. Most of the damage caused in and around the capital was to private and civic property. A total of 345 civilians were killed or missing and 363 wounded in Berlin and the surrounding administrative district; the latter included Templin but not Wittenberge nor Verden which were attacked as 'targets of opportunity.'

 

[SaparotRob]

33k in the air brought up a point I never thought about. I've read about disruptions to industry even though precision bombing wasn't. It never occurred to me to consider downtime due to running for shelter, waiting for the "all clear" and getting back to the factories.

 

[pbehn]

33k in the air brought up a point I never thought about. I've read about disruptions to industry even though precision bombing wasn't. It never occurred to me to consider downtime due to running for shelter, waiting for the "all clear" and getting back to the factories.

That is basically why Mosquitos dropped a cookie on Berlin and other cities night after night. It was also a factor in UK production during the Blitz.

 

[33k in the air]

33k in the air brought up a point I never thought about. I've read about disruptions to industry even though precision bombing wasn't. It never occurred to me to consider downtime due to running for shelter, waiting for the "all clear" and getting back to the factories.

Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction has a table on German steel production and the amount of production lost to various causes. For 1943, of estimated total lost production, air raid alarms were responsible for 23.2% of the loss; air raid damage, 31.6%; shortages of gas, power, raw material, and labor, 24.4%; other reasons, 20.8%. For 1944, of total lost production, air raid alarms were responsible for 18.3%; air raid damage, 46.9%; shortages of gas, power, raw material, and labor, 17.2%; other reasons, 17.5%.