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The F4F was a monoplane version of the F3F, basically, and together with the F4U, those were the only two monoplane fighters the Navy had approved before the F6F.
I hate to break this to you but Roosevelt wasn't playing hypothetical games as you are here when he made the decision to go with the F6F over the F4U. The F4U had big problems in adapting to carrier-duty that still had to be worked out. While it was certainly designed as an Essex-class carrier-fighter, it was a complicated machine, and very difficult to manage, in combat, on a carrier, operating under those constraints. Grumman, on the other hand, had the F6F in concept well before Pearl, and, simply put, considering everything, was hands-down the right manufacturer for the job. I went over those reasons, therefore, in another thread, and I'm not going to repeat them, here, and throw off this technical discussion. But, that's the short of it, right there.
OK, that's better. Now I understand what your beef is. Again, I don't want to take this hypothetical discussion off track and come under fire from you for that like others here have.
But to address your issue on my sourcing, let me put it this way. Your sources are published materials, my sources are unpublished materials.
Your sources are persons with primary and secondary knowledge,
my sources are persons with primary and secondary knowledge.
Your knowledge is based on what you read from said sources, my knowledge is based on what I discussed with said sources. Let me ask you something, and think about this hard. What makes your sources more creditable than mine? What makes your knowledge taken from said sources better than mine? Please don't tell me it's because your sources are published and mine aren't, because I'm just not going to swallow that.
I'm out of the office right now and on an iPhone and this is a pain in the ass typing on one of these things so you'll excuse me for being brief, but I'll just say this. The F4F was a monoplane version of the F3F, basically, and together with the F4U, those were the only two monoplane fighters the Navy had approved before the F6F. On the F4U, specifically, it was on the drawing board for a very long time, and it had problems, especially in terms of fitting it to carrier-operations under combat conditions. I'll go over those apprehensions relative to the F4U and why Roosevelt went with the F6F in more detail when I get to a computer, if you think it's necessary, and you want it in this thread, no problem. For now, however, this will just have to hold you.
Without the turbos it won't do the P-38s job. Yes you save 900-1000lbs which is about 6-7% of the loaded weight of P-38 (using 16,000lbs). but at 25,000ft you have about 600hp per engine on a -39 Allison (no RAM) so you have about 54% of the power of a P-38 with even 1125hp engines. And the six machine guns have to go out in the wings.
Roosevelt was more personally involved in that decision than you may know. Everybody at the time knew it. Are you that unfamiliar with his background? Look it up. He was a Navy boy. Look up what he did in the Navy. Look up what his personal responsibilities and personal experiences were. There's your rationale for his personal involvement as Commander-in-Chief on this key question relative to the outcome of that War. This was the fundamental question in the Pacific. And the F4U, it was a complicated aircraft, it was still on the drawing board, it still had its problems, and it still wasn't ready to commit to carrier-operations under combat exigencies. If it was, why do you think the Navy didn't go with it? I'll give you some reasons. How many Navy pilots do you think had training much less experience on the F4U in 1941? How many carrier-mechanics do you think had training much less experience on it? But all those had the requisite training and experience on the Grumman fighter, the F4F, didn't they? And when Grumman promised to let go of everything in his plant for the production and delivery within a year's time of the F6F, it was a no-brainer, I say, giving him the green light on that.You got my attention regarding your sources.
Who says Roosevelt made the decision regarding the F6F? And why would he intervene personally on a technical decision and over-ride his CNO, Adm King? If he in fact did so, was it because he owed favors to Grumman and not Vought, rather than spend the necessary time to ignore WWII for awhile and dive into F6F vs F4U?
It is an astonishing claim but I wouldn't dismiss as impossible - just no rational reason on the surface for Roosevelt to engage on a DoD domain on which weapons to fight a war.
Roosevelt was more personally involved in that decision than you may know. Everybody at the time knew it. Are you that unfamiliar with his background?
Yes that he was a 'Navy man in WWI. No with respect to being personally invloved in 'that decision' and who is 'everybody'. Are they part of the 'all of them thar folk clan'.??
Look it up. He was a Navy boy. Look up what he did in the Navy. Look up what his personal responsibilities and personal experiences were. There's your rationale for his personal involvement as Commander-in-Chief on this key question relative to the outcome of that War.
Not my rationale - why is it yours??
Why do you think that the F4U as a replacement for the F6F was a lesser choice regadring the 'outcome' of the war' and why would Roosevelt make a decision about an aircraft Not in production over one that was in production - and deem one a war saver far better than the one in hand?
This was the fundamental question in the Pacific. And the F4U, it was a complicated aircraft, it was still on the drawing board, it still had its problems, and it still wasn't ready to commit to carrier-operations under combat exigencies. If it was, why do you think the Navy didn't go with it?
The F6F flew for first time around the Battle of Midaway while the F4U flew first in May, 1940 and was in production a year before the first F6F test flight and Operational in Dec 1942. The Hellcat did not see combat until September 1943.. Somehow the USN and USMC managed to survive until the F6F made it to the Pacific. Was the F4U more complicated than the P-47 or P-51 and why do you think so?
I'll give you some reasons. How many Navy pilots do you think had training much less experience on the F4U in 1941?
Not many but a lot more (2-3?) than F6F. Or by May 1942 when the F4U was operational and the F6F has not flown yet. What is your point?
How many carrier-mechanics do you think had training much less experience on it? But all those had the requisite training and experience on the Grumman fighter, the F4F, didn't they? And when Grumman promised to let go of everything in its plant for the production and delivery within a year's time of the F6F, it was a no-brainer, I say, giving him the green light on that.
How is the F4U more complicated than the F6F? It can't be the engine, as that is essentially the same (downdraft vs updraf carby).
More complicated to land on a CV?
And the F4U, it was a complicated aircraft, it was still on the drawing board, it still had its problems, and it still wasn't ready to commit to carrier-operations under combat exigencies.
Wuzak - I had actually the same question..
So you looked it up, huh? Good. Where did you find it, anyway, Wikipedia? Yeah, if you did, that's a great source.Roosevelt was more personally involved in that decision than you may know. Everybody at the time knew it. Are you that unfamiliar with his background?
Yes that he was a 'Navy man in WWI. No with respect to being personally invloved in 'that decision' and who is 'everybody'. Are they part of the 'all of them thar folk clan'.??
Can I be frank? You don't put an aircraft on a carrier just because it has a tail-hook. There's a lot more that goes into that consideration than that. Grumman was greased into those carrier crews. Chance-Vought was, well, chancy. Grumman delivered on a carrier-ready fighter. Chance-Vought was, well, still dragging its ass on one. Sure, the F4U was a great fighter. There were several pilots in the club who had hundreds of hours on them. That wasn't the question.Look it up. He was a Navy boy. Look up what he did in the Navy. Look up what his personal responsibilities and personal experiences were. There's your rationale for his personal involvement as Commander-in-Chief on this key question relative to the outcome of that War.
Not my rationale - why is it yours??
Why do you think that the F4U as a replacement for the F6F was a lesser choice regadring the 'outcome' of the war' and why would Roosevelt make a decision about an aircraft Not in production over one that was in production - and deem one a war saver far better than the one in hand?
Oh, now you're being full of news. I knew that. On the P-47 and P-51, those were legendary aircraft, that's how good they were. What, it's a big engineering achievement to stick a hook in the tail of those aircraft? In other words, why did the Navy bypass those, as well as their F4U? There's a lot that goes into carrier-readiness, isn't there? I'll just let that go at that. I said enough in this thread on it, already.This was the fundamental question in the Pacific. And the F4U, it was a complicated aircraft, it was still on the drawing board, it still had its problems, and it still wasn't ready to commit to carrier-operations under combat exigencies. If it was, why do you think the Navy didn't go with it?
The F6F flew for first time around the Battle of Midaway while the F4U flew first in May, 1940 and was in production a year before the first F6F test flight and Operational in Dec 1942. The Hellcat did not see combat until September 1943.. Somehow the USN and USMC managed to survive until the F6F made it to the Pacific. Was the F4U more complicated than the P-47 or P-51 and why do you think so?
Darn, don't you get it, yet? Ask yourself why only two or three F4Us were flown. Maybe we'll be fortunate enough to have those two or three pilots on these carriers? Why wasn't that aircraft a regular part of Naval aviation training by then? How long were they going to take? How much time did they think we had? Maybe we could call a time-out from the hostilities until they get their act together? I'm being unduly harsh, and I know it. But those aircraft should have been on those carriers by the Coral Sea. Why weren't they? They weren't ready. After all that time, they weren't ready, they still had issues.I'll give you some reasons. How many Navy pilots do you think had training much less experience on the F4U in 1941?
Not many but a lot more (2-3?) than F6F. Or by May 1942 when the F4U was operational and the F6F has not flown yet. What is your point?
Now you know I can't do that, so what do you propose I do? Do you want me to go build model airplanes and leave you boys and girls alone? If you question what I say, shoot it down, what's the big deal? I will offer this to you, though. Was Kennedy hands-on on the Cuban Missile Crisis? And what experience did he have, an officer on a PT boat, in comparison to Roosevelt, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy? But there are times when our Commanders-in-Chief take command, aren't there? And, don't underestimate the imperatives confronting us in the Pacific, at that time. Everything had to be right. We're talking everything from the retractable wing designs, to the ease on the carrier maintenance crews, to the organization, capacity, efficiency and track-record of the manufacturing plant, itself, to everything else in between. And Grumman had that. Why is that so difficult to accept? I don't know.How many carrier-mechanics do you think had training much less experience on it? But all those had the requisite training and experience on the Grumman fighter, the F4F, didn't they? And when Grumman promised to let go of everything in its plant for the production and delivery within a year's time of the F6F, it was a no-brainer, I say, giving him the green light on that.
So You say. Great!
Now document Roosevelt's personal intervention into the Procurement process of Naval aviation aircraft....?
Ask yourself why only two or three F4Us were flown. Maybe we'll be fortunate enough to have those two or three pilots on these carriers? Why wasn't that aircraft a regular part of Naval aviation training by then? How long were they going to take? How much time did they think we had? Maybe we could call a time-out from the hostilities until they get their act together? I'm being unduly harsh, and I know it. But those aircraft should have been on those carriers by the Coral Sea. Why weren't they? They weren't ready. After all that time, they weren't ready, they still had issues.
Wuzak, I can't answer on any of those technicalities, I'm sorry. I wish I could. There are reasons that aircraft was held up, though. That's all I know.Perhaps the #1 issue the F4U had was that the production of 2 stage R-2800s was still in its infancy. ie, there weren't very many engines available to put into prototype aircraft, let alone production aircraft.
Oh yeah, the Corsair and Hellcat also used the same propeller (same federal part number) in addition to the same engine, armament, etc. I'm not sure about the radio gear ... all our warbirds have modern radios in them.
All the real, live WWII pilots have told us MANY reasons why the Corsair was not accepted for carrier service earlier. They are pretty well-known reasons and were NOT political, they were operational. In fact, one of the reasons, but not the only one, we DID accept the Corsair for Naval service is that the British were have success with it and we were pretty embarrassed about it since we needed Naval fighters as badly as they did.
By the way, the Hellcat has some of the best manners in and around a carrier of ANY Naval aircraft in existence during WWII. The visibility over the nose is fantastic, the low-speed handling is impeccable, the stall is gentle with plenty of warning, and it is a stable gun platform with the biggest wing area of any Naval single-seat fighter, which makes it turn well. Since the Hellcat met the specifications, it is hard to see why it would NOT be accepted into Naval service during wartime, especially since it was the first US Navy plane in carrier service that could outclimb a Zero, was faster than a Zero, and came within a small amount of being able to turn with a Zero.
Sorry, I missed that.
Lol - I meant I had the same question in my mind as you proceeded to document my thought..
So, to summarise:
- Same engine (F6F has downdraft carby, F4U has updraft carby)
- Both needed and used intercoolers - engine was 2 stage unit
- They used the same guns - Browning 0.5" - and the same number of guns - 6
- I would imagine they used the same radio gear, IFF, and other electronic equipment
- Both were aluminium semi-monocoque airframes
- Both had wing folding mechanisms - both manual folding (?)
So what exactly is the difference that makes the F4U more complicated than the F6F?