B-17 Bomb Run Procedures

During B-17 daylight missions over Europe in 1943 and early 44 , B-17 Group lead aircraft and Group lead aircrews were equipped with Norden Bomb sights. The other aircraft in the group toggled their bomb loads when the lead aircraft dropped their bombs. The Lead Group bombardier and Lead Group navigator were generally the most experienced bombardier and navigator's in the organization. Upon entering the Initial Point (IP) of the bomb run, the pilot turned control of the aircraft over to the bombardier. Navigational errors and incorrect calculations for the bomb sight sometimes caused the entire Group of aircraft to be so far off course that the entire group could not drop their bombs on the target. Did the 8th Air Force have Missed Bomb Run Procedures or was the decision to attempt a 2nd bomb run on the same target left up to the Lead Group Commander in the Lead Group aircraft? I have heard B-17 pilots say that aircrews were not very happy about making a 360 degree turn and attempting a 2nd run through the same flak. The Group Commander would know and likely make the decision based on factors such as target values, risk assessment and concentrated flak encountered on the first run.
The strike photos would clearly show they were off course. Seems to me the Group Commander would have a hard time explaining to Command HQ why no bombs were dropped on the target on the 1st run.. This actually happened in the 100th Bomb Group in 1944 and is mentioned in Capt. Harry Crosby's book "A Wing and a Prayer".

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Zipper730 said:

P pbehn S Shortround6 S stona

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wot?

Dave Kelly said:

During B-17 daylight missions over Europe in 1943 and early 44 , B-17 Group lead aircraft and Group lead aircrews were equipped with Norden Bomb sights. The other aircraft in the group toggled their bomb loads when the lead aircraft dropped their bombs. The Lead Group bombardier and Lead Group navigator were generally the most experienced bombardier and navigator's in the organization. Upon entering the Initial Point (IP) of the bomb run, the pilot turned control of the aircraft over to the bombardier. Navigational errors and incorrect calculations for the bomb sight sometimes caused the entire Group of aircraft to be so far off course that the entire group could not drop their bombs on the target. Did the 8th Air Force have Missed Bomb Run Procedures or was the decision to attempt a 2nd bomb run on the same target left up to the Lead Group Commander in the Lead Group aircraft? I have heard B-17 pilots say that aircrews were not very happy about making a 360 degree turn and attempting a 2nd run through the same flak. The Group Commander would know and likely make the decision based on factors such as target values, risk assessment and concentrated flak encountered on the first run.
The strike photos would clearly show they were off course. Seems to me the Group Commander would have a hard time explaining to Command HQ why no bombs were dropped on the target on the 1st run.. This actually happened in the 100th Bomb Group in 1944 and is mentioned in Capt. Harry Crosby's book "A Wing and a Prayer".

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I don't know anything about it in detail but the route of the mission was planned, the path taken to avoid flak could mean the group was headed back to UK when the bombs were dropped, turning a bomb group around far enough away to make another run and then turn again for home would screw up all schedules for changing escorts. Turning a group of 600 -1000 planes around in formation has a huge radius.

pbehn said:

wot?

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I tagged you because I figured one of you would probably have the knowledge the OP asked for, it was kind of a hunch based on past experience.

Zipper730 said:

I tagged you because I figured one of you would probably have the knowledge the OP asked for, it was kind of a hunch based on past experience.

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There are a lot of people here with much more knowledge than me. There are many reasons you may completely miss the target. Europe is frequently cloud covered all over, I regularly flew Amsterdam Hanover with cloud from take off to landing. Breaks in cloud make mistaking the target easy to do. Even in good visibility industrial has AKA pollution meant you just couldn't see the ground well enough to pick out the target. There was a huge amount of resources put into solving this with weather and target recon, alternative targets etc. Where I live in Teesside didn't really have many successful raids simply because the Germans couldn't find the target, at times the RAF couldn't find their own airfields because of pollution.

pbehn said:

I don't know anything about it in detail but the route of the mission was planned, the path taken to avoid flak could mean the group was headed back to UK when the bombs were dropped, turning a bomb group around far enough away to make another run and then turn again for home would screw up all schedules for changing escorts. Turning a group of 600 -1000 planes around in formation has a huge radius.

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There were also secondary targets if, for some reason, the primary target was obscured.

If the secondary target was also obscured, the leader of the formation may have also been able to choose targets of opportunity.

Thanks for the responding to my questions guys.
In the book "A Wing and a Prayer" by Capt. Harry Crosby, (a lead 100th Bomb Group navigator), the incident he was talking about did not indicate weather conditions contributed to the missed bomb run. All he said was that the lead aircraft was so far off course that the entire group could not drop on the target. This to me, would indicate that either the mission lead group navigator did not make the IP on time to start the run or the lead group bombardier did not enter data correctly into the Norden bomb sight. 2 aircraft were lost due to flak on the attempted 2nd bomb run including the Group Commander's B-17. The book seems to indicate that the Group Commander decided on his own to make another bomb run on the target which bears the question,- " Just what was the official 8th Air Force policy for 2nd bomb runs on a target"? Was the Bomb Group Commander correct in ordering the 2nd run because of what the strike photos would show or was he dead wrong. Seems to me he made the call based on the information he had at the moment and it was a tough call. All of the aircraft came out of the 1st bomb run with no damage. If errors by the aircrew had not occurred, there would have been no need for a 2nd bomb run attempt. There are always contributing factors and very few golden bullets in mishaps like this or any aircraft mishap. I do not feel that the Group Commander was entirely wrong in attempting a 2nd run. Since reading the book " A Wing and a prayer" this question has bothered me. What were the " Standard Operating Procedures" and what was acceptable risk for missed bomb runs?

I don't know of a standard procedure.

In the case you give I presume that the group concerned missed their approach by a significant distance and did not make a run over the target at all. Making a 360 turn and lining up for another more accurate run would be a decision fraught with problems. It would take considerable time and use considerable fuel for starters. There is also the issue of conflict with other formations in the attack.

The US follow up attacks on Dresden after the British raids of the night of the 13/14 February were a comedy of errors, and illustrate the options.

The two squadrons of the 305th Bombardment Group which had managed to stay together started their bomb runs, only to find themselves on a collision course with the three squadrons of the 379th.
The 305th's high squadron bombed on the smoke of the 379th BG.
Five aircraft of the lead squadron re-assembled and, on the commander's initiative, flew to and bombed the Brux synthetic oil plant.
The third (low) squadron eventually turned up at Dresden after everyone else had bombed. The squadron missed its aiming point, flew on for thirty miles, turned near Bischofswerda and made a new approach, finally bombing Dresden after all the other bombers had left the area.

Finally, there was the entire First Bombardment Wing, three groups amounting to 137 aircraft, almost a third of the First Air Division, which got lost. These aircraft finally saw a city, on a river, which looked a lot like Dresden and bombed it. They bombed Prague.

One rather badly executed raid illustrates the options.

One squadron did go around and make a second run, but it was late and all the others had already bombed.

The 457th BG over shot the target, but bombed the suburbs anyway.

Elements of the 305th BG bombed a target of last resort, the Brux refinery. The briefing for the raid gave the definition of such a target as "Any military target positively identified as being in Germany and east of the current bomb line". Brux was technically across the border in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, but nobody seems to have cared, it was a reasonable and valid target.

A substantial force bombed a city more than 100 Km away and in the wrong country.

Nobody bombed the secondary target, which was Chemnitz.

A lot is written about WW2 bombing with little idea of how difficult it was (the 'why didn't they bomb the railway lines leading to Auschwitz' idiocy). The raid I have chosen for illustration here happens to have been a US raid, but it could as easily have been an RAF raid or that of any other combatant air force. I chose it because it is so well documented. The very next night Bomber Command sent a huge raid against the aforementioned Chemnitz which failed utterly to achieve its objectives. Bombing photographs showed that though bombs were scattered across the city, many had fallen in open countryside.

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US strategic bombers in Europe (8th and 15th AF) during WW2 had to follow bombing policy of satellite and occupied states which was more or less adopted from the similar British document. Aim of that policy was lowering number of collateral victims in occupied countries by allowing only visual bombing of positively identified military targets, no bombing of the targets of opportunity and no jettisoning over occupied countries. For small targets as synthetic oil plants and refineries which were to small for H2S or H2X sighting only allowed sighting method was visual and as far as I know bomber crews had an order to put every reasonable effort to drop bombs on target. I suppose that "every reasonable effort" means a second bomb run among other things as visual sighting possibility was limited by number of clear days.

First - the Wing CO in the lead for a particular Box had the authority to order a repeat run. That said, everything that could go wrong cited above were exacerbated by bad weather and overcast. Before July 1944 with the introduction of the Scout Force (Exp) Mustangs based at Steeple Morden, attached to 355th FG, there were no systematic processes to check weather en route or actual target conditions.

Overcast conditions were the single most important factors leading to a.) off course issues, b.) missing waypoints and IP.

Lead crews were selected based on evaluated performance. When LeMay instituted the practice late 1942/early 1943, the crews were nominated and Lead Navigators and Bombardiers were teamed up - then assigned a portfolio of targets for which they would be chartered to study and know both waypoints and IP for each in the package. For example, one Lead Crew might be assigned the Ruhr, another specialized in SE corner of Germany for Augsburg, Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Landsberg.

Although it seemed like many routes were taken for inbound headings and track, there were three primary routes with multiple target groupings available from say Marburg-Geissen or Paris or Hamburg headings. The 'Trolley' was the track for which Berlin, Stettin, Magdeburg but deviations including heading SE from Brunswick area to head for Erfurt, Lepzig and Mersburg, while the rest of the bomber force headed for Berlin and Magdeburg before turning south to RV with the Leipzig/Merseburg strike forces. The Marburg-Geissen waypoint might be the central point for branched attacks on Ruhland, Merseburg or Schweinfurt. Paris might be the branch to head for Stuttgart, Augsberg, Freidrichshafen, Munch, etc... or break northeast for Mulhausen and Schweinfurt.

The primary reason for reduced overall accuracy of the B-17/B-24 was overcast. In late Fall and Winter a lot of beet fields were torn up because primary and Secondary targets were shut down

alsaad said:

US strategic bombers in Europe (8th and 15th AF) during WW2 had to follow bombing policy of satellite and occupied states which was more or less adopted from the similar British document. Aim of that policy was lowering number of collateral victims in occupied countries by allowing only visual bombing of positively identified military targets, no bombing of the targets of opportunity and no jettisoning over occupied countries. For small targets as synthetic oil plants and refineries which were to small for H2S or H2X sighting only allowed sighting method was visual and as far as I know bomber crews had an order to put every reasonable effort to drop bombs on target. I suppose that "every reasonable effort" means a second bomb run among other things as visual sighting possibility was limited by number of clear days.

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Jettisoning occurred all the time. Bombardiers and Navigators tried to dump in farm/forest areas but dump they did. Nobody was bring a full load of bombs back. If practical, the Channel was the preferred dumping ground - fuel status and enemy opposition permitting

15AF crews had exact orders not to jettison over land in Yugoslavia and Albania but exclusively in Adriatic. Although I managed to locate three jettisoning sites and find one jettisoned bomb in central part of Yugoslavia.

Thanks again for your thoughts on this incident. I felt the Wing or Group Commander had the authority to order a 2nd run and make all possible effort to destroy the target. This was a " NO BALL" mission. The target was the V-1, V-2 rocket sites and the submarine pens in Sottevast, France. Given the fact that V-1 and V-2 rockets were smashing London, and killing thousands of civilians at the time, I would think justification for a 2nd run may well have been warranted. The Group Commander may have felt the risks were worth taking regardless of what the aircrew thought about the 2nd attempt on the target. The after action report seemed to indicate that the new Group Commander did not have the combat experience to lead and make such a decision. I disagree with that assumption.

As far as I know about the way the Norden sight worked if you were on the wrong heading and off course you could have overshot the target as far as dropping with the Norden is concerned long before you reached it.

Dave Kelly said:

Thanks again for your thoughts on this incident. I felt the Wing or Group Commander had the authority to order a 2nd run and make all possible effort to destroy the target. This was a " NO BALL" mission. The target was the V-1, V-2 rocket sites and the submarine pens in Sottevast, France. Given the fact that V-1 and V-2 rockets were smashing London, and killing thousands of civilians at the time, I would think justification for a 2nd run may well have been warranted. The Group Commander may have felt the risks were worth taking regardless of what the aircrew thought about the 2nd attempt on the target. The after action report seemed to indicate that the new Group Commander did not have the combat experience to lead and make such a decision. I disagree with that assumption.

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From wiki April 28, 1944 Mission 325: 18 of 106 B-17s bomb the Sottevast, France V-weapon site and targets of opportunity; clouds prevent most B-17s from bombing; 2 B-17s are lost (1 has 6 KIA and 5 POW)[1] and 47 damaged; 3 airmen are WIA and 21 MIA. Escort is provided by 46 P-47s without loss.[5]

pbehn said:

As far as I know about the way the Norden sight worked if you were on the wrong heading and off course you could have overshot the target as far as dropping with the Norden is concerned long before you reached it.

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The bombardier was supposed to start the setting up of the sight 30-45 minutes before the aircraft reached the target area. It was a long and fiddly process.

The bombing run itself started when the aircraft reached an initial point which would have been determined in the mission briefing. If this was not reached or identified then there was no bomb run. Once the run was started the aircraft was controlled by the bombardier. He could disengage the autopilot clutch to enable him to take evasive action (gentle 5-15 degree turns with 10-20 second legs) using his aptly named 'turn knob'.

Eventually he would place the cross hairs of his telescope on the target and make fine adjustments as the system flew the aircraft to the target. Toggling on the leader applied to all the bombardiers manually releasing their loads when they saw the leader's drop. The leader's bombs were released automatically by the system.

The only reasons for aborting the drop once the initial point had been reached and the bomb run instigated is human error or failure to identify the aiming point.

The manual notes that once the sight has been correctly set up on the bomb run.

"Extreme caution must be taken not to over control at this point. If the preceding operations have been carefully performed, a good course and a good rate have been established. Any adjustment made at this point should only be for the purpose of removing any very small errors still present. The gear ratios are such that any major adjustments at this time in course and/or rate may well result in much larger bombing errors than if the small remaining errors are accepted and the cross hairs moved back on target by means of the turn and displacement knobs."

What isn't written is that if the initial set up has not been carefully or accurately performed then there may be large remaining errors. If these are corrected by means of the turn and displacement knobs, the bombing will be inaccurate, it might be better to abort the run and have another go. It would really depend on the individual bombardier and his aircraft commander.

The Norden sight was an optical sight which worked best when the operator could see the aiming point. Radar bombing (H2X) was always a more miss than hit affair.

In my Air Force career, we always had clearly defined Operating Instructions that covered just about everything. In the early days of the Air Force this was not the case and a lot must have been left up to the Commanders. Things were not always clean and much went wrong, errors were made and lives were lost. The Lessons Learned from the early days was a prime factor in establishing all the necessary Operating Instructions and Procedures that we normally, today, take for granted.

Dave Kelly said:

In my Air Force career, we always had clearly defined Operating Instructions that covered just about everything. In the early days of the Air Force this was not the case and a lot must have been left up to the Commanders. Things were not always clean and much went wrong, errors were made and lives were lost. The Lessons Learned from the early days was a prime factor in establishing all the necessary Operating Instructions and Procedures that we normally, today, take for granted.

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But your original post isn't backed up by what happened on that mission or the account in the book.