Vultee Vengeance operational procedures used by 82 Squadron RAF in British India 1943

[MorrisOxford]

The following is a transcript of a very interesting (to me) report which describes in some detail the operational procedures used by 82 Squadron RAF for their Vultee Vengeance aircraft in British India during June 1943. [My comments are inside square brackets].

Source: The National Archives of the UK document AIR 27/685 Appendices pages 191 to 197.

MOST SECRET

REPORT ON OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY 82 SQUADRON DETACHMENT AT CHITTAGONG 31.5.43 to 25.6.43 by S/Ldr. D.R.GIBBS, OFFICER COMMANDING,
No.82 SQUADRON , R.A.F.

SYNOPSIS

Number of aircraft used 6
Number of crews 12
Number of ground personnel 59
Bombs used 500's
Front guns 4 x .300 Colts
Rear guns 2 x .303 Brownings
Equipment used see Appendix A [missing]
Ground crews by trades see Appendix B [missing]
Number of operations 15
Number of sorties 90
One aircraft also carried out supply dropping for the Army.
The aircraft were scrambled once.

Crews used …. No of sorties per crew
[I have not included crew names here but the "scores" recorded were:
1 crew x 11 sorties, 3 crews x 10 sorties, 1 crew each x 9 and 8, 2 crews each x 7, 5 and 4 sorties]

ADMINISTRATION

The detachment was under the administrative and operational control of No. 166 Wing and No.224 group, who were most helpful at all times. There were no complaints re accommodation, M.T., rations etc. which were adequate for a short detachment and satisfactory.

ORGANISATION

Standing By - it was necessary to have the aircrews and ground crews at readiness from just after dawn until dusk every day in case of 'scrambles'. This means that meals have to be cooked at dispersal; it is a good idea to make the dispersal hut as comfortable as possible, as there is a lot of time to while away, especially in bad weather. When the weather was really bad the Squadron stood down. Two extra flying crews make it possible to stand down two crews each day. It is thought that in this connection that the Controller should control vengeance squadrons on exactly the same system as the fighter squadrons; in other words the Squadron should have a Fight or the whole Squadron at readiness- 30 minutes, 60 minutes etc.

Briefing- the leader of the Vengeance formations at the beginning of the day or as soon as the squadrons came on "30 minutes" went across to the fighter Squadron which was escorting and fixed up details of the operations with the leader of the escort. Briefing was a fairly easy matter as the targets were so limited that all available "gen" was hanging up on the walls. Navigation and wireless briefing were more or less non-existing after an original briefing owing to the fact that tracks, courses etc. were invariably the same. The gunners and pilots were given call signs, colours of the day, order of take off and any new "gen" at the beginning of the day. It is a good idea in this connection to have a blackboard with all the information on. When it was decided to take off on an operation, the fighter squadron which was escorting was informed of approximate time of take off, which runway we would be using, and any alterations in the operational plan. Take off invariably in about 30 minutes time after ringing up escort, but could be much quicker if necessary (5-10 minutes). Briefing of our crews was carried out, watches synchronized, and a time of start given out (this was normally 10 minutes after briefing, allowing plenty of time for crews to get settled in their aircraft). The 2 A.L.O.'s attached to No. 166 Wing were most helpful at all times, and kept a situation map from day to day showing enemy and friendly dispositions, lines of supply etc. They often had some extra information concerning our targets.

Interrogation- this was carried out as soon as the crews got back to the dispersal hut, and reports were written up. Some of the pilots to then go across to the escorting fighter squadron to find out how things went with them, and get what results had been observed. They also discussed any change in tactics which might help clear up any snags which had cropped up. It is considered that the more liaison carried out between fighter and bomber pilots the greater will be the understanding of each other's jobs which helps no end in the resultant efficiency and confidence of both.

Met. Reports - the weather was the Detachment's biggest bugbear, and consequently met reports were most important for anywhere South of our base (This was the direction in which we always operated). There were two sources of information both of which worked fairly well:
a) -Reports from the Army H.Q. at Ramu received on the 'link', and
b) – reports from P.R.U. aircraft and any other formation or aircraft which had gone South. Although this system worked fairly well there was certainly room for improvement; if all pilots were told to render weather reports to their respective Controllers immediately they landed, and the latter could then pass on the reports to group Ops., who in turn could pass the information to all Controllers who would then pass to Squadrons standing by for a strike. In this connection the Controllers at Chittagong were most helpful, and did all they could to get the Detachment up to date weather reports.


Intelligence.- three signals received from number 224 group read as follows:

1) AC311 18/6 Site rep 2000 hours.
V Force reports RAF bombing Buthidaung 10/6 and 12/6 killed 40 Japs.

2)AC338 19/6 site rep 2000 hours 18/6
Villagers state bombing Letwedet 15/6 killed 16 japs in H.Q. and W/T station.
bombing Maungdaw 15/6 killed 4 Japs and 100 Mughs just arrived from Teknaf.

3) AC375 24/6 V Force report 80 Japs killed and wounded RAF raid Buthidaung 3 June.

These three reports show most encouraging results. We received no reports from any of the Akyab strikes, but the damage there must have been great. On a low level getaway pilots reported that Gaol and Courthouse severely damaged and Wireless Station also gutted.


Intelligence continued.

Rathedaung and Buthidaung on have no undamaged buildings left and can be of little use to the Japanese.
The SITREP and other intelligence matter which was available was very good and most helpful.
It was not until the end of the detachment that we got any appreciable number of maps and photographs, but the ones we had were very good.
The photographs come maps of certain strips of country were very good, one inch to the mile e.g. the area around the among Maungdaw to Buthidaung Road.
The best type of target map is not the standard RAF one, but a quarter inch or one inch to the mile map supplemented by photographs.
It was often found that if a good study of the map was made before take off, the mental picture formed was all that was necessary to find the target (pilots did all the navigation).


Walking back:
It is thought by this squadron, and the views of various fighter pilots appeared to be the same, that more might be done in getting aircrew back who bailed out or forced landed in enemy occupied territory. It is fully realised that lack of equipment is the main trouble. Various theories were advanced which are briefly summarized below:


Jungle kits are too bulky even in the new harness and it is suggested that most of the necessary items can be sewn into overalls and the back of the parachute leaving just a belt with revolver and knife around one's middle - this leaves one fairly free to fly.
Most of the beach back from Akyab is firm and straight enough for a Tiger Moth to land on.
Positions and times (according to tides etc.) could be decided upon. When aircrews forced landed or bailed out they could make for the selected spots and the Tiger Moth escorted by fighters could go and pick the pilot up. It is thought that a Walrus would be the best possible aircraft as it could land on many of the rivers.
Another alternative is that a launch could go down at night to selected positions and times on the coast, and aircrews could swim or paddle out in their dinghies to the launch. It is realised that this is touching on a large subject which would need a lot of organization, but it is thought that the whole subject could well be reviewed; it appeared to the aircrew of this Squadron that very little organization existed, and if they came down on the other side of the lines, it was just up to them to use their own initiative and walk.
Perhaps an organization exists, if it does it should be advertised - many aircrews at home owe their lives to A.S.R.S. and it is felt a similar organization should exist out here.

 

[MorrisOxford]

TACTICAL:

To render this report so that it presents constructive criticism, it is proposed to outline first, briefly, an operation as carried about out on this Detachment, and then to enlarge on each phase of the operation.
It is hoped by this means to provide detailed information which will be of help in future operations carried out by Vengeance dive bombers.
It is impossible therefore to eliminate technical points such as throttle settings etc. as they have a direct bearing on the tactical limitations of the aircraft.
It is also pointed out that the views expressed in this report are not those of a single individual (the Squadron Commander) but of all the flying crews in this Squadron.

Short summary of a typical dive bombing operation.
After startup, aircraft taxied out in order to take off, forming a semi-circle on the apron of the runway.
The leader then took off on the left-hand side of the runway, and as soon as he was airborne No.2 took off on the right, and so on.


Close formation was gained in about half a circuit and the formation set course after completing a circuit; this enabled the fighters, who took off in pairs as soon as the last Vengeance was airborne, to get somewhere near the bomber formation when it set course.
Climb was maintained all the way out at 145 I.A.S. and rate of climb approximately 300 ft per minute. The aircraft flew in a tight box of six all the time, at 10,000 feet to 12,000 feet the formation flew straight and level to the target. If the target was Akyab evasive action was taken by the box as a whole. The gunners kept up a sky search the whole time from take off to landing and were not responsible for navigation at all. This was done by the leader, and a check navigator in one of the aircraft was fixed for each operation, although he was never used.


Echelon starboard or port was given about one minute from the target, and pilots automatically carried out their vital actions, at the same time keeping up their evasive action.
The formation followed number one down in his dive, and pull out was completed at about 1000 feet. Front and rear guns were used in the low-level getaway.


Formation adopted for the return was two Vics of three, right down on the deck to start with, and then easing up to 100 feet or so. Vics usually formed into a box for this last quarter[?] of an hour or so of the return trip. On reaching the aerodrome, echelon starboard was given and the formation landed one after the other in quick succession; the aircraft then taxied back as quickly as possible to dispersal points.

Take off.
This detachment never carried more than 1,000 pounds of bombs.
These were stowed internally, and take off on the long runway at Chittagong (1500 yards) was by no means good. In this connection it can be stated that there was never a favourable wind, there was either no wind at all or a cross wind.
The alternative loads are 4x250's ( two of which are stowed externally), and 2x500's stowed internally with 2x250's externally.
As regards the latter it is thought that the aircraft would not get off on this runway; the former would be possible but it cuts down performance to very little advantage - speeds are reduced roughly by 20[?] miles per hour with external bombs.
(In a dive bombing attack, bombs are released in salvo as the angle of dive is constant and if the bombs were released in a stick they would still land in the same place).
It is therefore thought that 2x500's will [cause] more damage than 4x250's.
The obvious bomb load for a dive bomber of this sort is 1x1000 pounds but unfortunately it is impossible to carry this load in this aircraft.


The climate whilst this detachment was at Chittagong was cooler than had previously been experienced in India. The performance on take off was consequently much better.
The engine ratings were 42" at 2,500 revs.
This cooler climate experienced was very noticeable in the general performance of this aircraft e.g. cruising speed 10 miles per hour faster.

Forming up.
(Leader flies at 27" 2100 revs until close formation is gained).
The leader flew straight after take off for about 45 seconds and then commenced [a] gradual left-hand circuit. It should not take more than 3 - 4 minutes. When the leader is satisfied that all aircraft are practically in formation, he should steepen his turn and set course as soon as possible.
The escorting fighters prefer this, as they then take off and form up on the formation straight away without having to carry out useless circuits.
Approximately 5 minutes after the first Vengeance has taken off should be the lapse of time before the formation sets course.
When the formation is proceeding over the sea, the two rear Vics of the box should drop to echelon starboard while the gunners test their guns. This is done because the links from the rear guns of the first Vic are thrown back and are apt to crack the windscreen of aircraft in the second Vic.

Climb and flying at heights above 8,000 feet.
We heard from 67 and 136 squadrons on arrival that 110 Squadron had been flying at speeds round about 120 I.A.S.
This was too slow for the fighters, and they experienced overheating trouble and had to carry out large S-turns to prevent themselves from getting in front.
This Detachment climbed at 145 I.A.S., which is the recommended climbing speed of the Vengeance and the escort found this very comfortable.
The leader flew at 30-35" 2100 revs. for the first 4000 then at 30" 2100 revs to 9,000 and then at 27" 2100 revs.
Keeping an indicated speed of 145 all the time the rate of climb was approximately 300 feet per minute, which enabled the formation to be at 10,000 feet or more in 30 minutes.
If external bombs are carried much higher boosts would be needed to fly at this speed and the rate of climb would be less, formation would also be much harder to maintain.
Most of the formation had to engage high blower at heights varying from 7,000 to 11,000 feet but some aircraft still managed to keep formation in low blower, although the leader would be flying at full throttle in low blower at 10,000 feet and above.


Three points of interest should be noted here:
(a) that aircraft altered a great deal in their ability to keep up with the leader, and some aircraft were invariably the slow ones whoever flew them.
(b) that cylinder head temperatures varied a great deal with different aircraft, and those which were forced to open their cooling gills to cool the engine, had to fly at greater boosts to keep up in formation – thus putting up petrol consumption and cutting down endurance.
(c) that closing the hood added 10 m.p.h. on the aircraft's speed, and made all the difference in keeping formation.


Straight and level at 10-12,000 feet the formation flew at 160-165 I.A.S.
If the formation were attacked by enemy fighters at this height it would be most vulnerable, as it would be impossible to turn the formation very steeply owing to the very small amount of extra throttle play by the formating aircraft.



Preparation for dive and dive.
One minute before reaching the target the leader gives echelon starboard, either by R/T or by rocking of wings, second Vic moves across followed by Vics [?] in echelon. This order is not given until the last moment as the formation strung out in echelon is most vulnerable to fighter attack.
Vital actions by pilots are carried out as soon as the order for echelon is given.
The formation now follows No.2, who carries on weaving if flak is expected.
The leader, meanwhile, relieved of leading the formation, can by dipping his wing and doing turns, put himself in the optimum position for a dive.
As soon as this is reached he carries out a wing over, No.2 leeds the rest by a quick turn to where the leader wings over, and the formation go over one after the other; it should be possible all six aircraft in a dive together.
The dive should be in the final stages before release of bombs - approximately 80 degrees.
Many pilots found after the wing over that it was advantageous to go down, for the first 1000 feet or so, over the vertical; they then get a very good view of the target area, and can single out their target, then bringing the nose gradually further up on to the target.
Most of the misses were caused by pilots not selecting a particular building to aim at, rather aiming in the middle of the target area; on the way down they were apt to forget just what the target area was, and the results was rather similar to a man aiming at a covey of partridges rather than at a selected bird.
Bombs were released at between 1,500 and 3,000 feet, pull out was accomplished usually by 1,000 feet, the aircraft coming down for the last 1000 feet with dive brakes and bomb doors shut, shooting at anything worthwhile with front and rear guns.
Pilots should be discouraged from too much strafing unless especially ordered, as this is apt to delay the forming up after the attack.

Getaway and form up
Speed in the getaway was usually fairly high, and this should be put to the best advantage, pilots should keep turning all the time over expected defended localities; form up of Vics of three should not take more than three minutes, leader should throttle back to allow his No.2 and No.3 to close in.
A definite landmark to make for, for reforming, should be decided upon before the operation, and crews should also know which way the formation is going back.
Getaway and most of the return trip was done at zero feet flying, at 30" 2100 revs. which gave a speed of approximately 190 I.A.S. which is very reasonable and keeps the nose of the aircraft depressed[?] giving pilots a good view.
The two Vics were independent on the return journey, as it was found that six aircraft are too unwieldy at 0 feet to carry out evasive action.

Evasive action from (a) enemy fighters and (b) flack
At high altitudes enemy fighters are by far the most dangerous, and this Squadron therefore feels that formation should always be kept so that the fire power is concentrated, and evasive action should be taken by the formation as a whole.
This system appeared to work very well as the flak at Akyab never managed to hit one aircraft - like the Germans they were accurate for height but behind and to port and starboard. It is thought that the heavy flak at Akyab does not present a serious menace.
Evasive action for flak therefore at high altitudes was diving and climbing turns in close formation. If enemy fighters were encountered, evasive action would be turns into the attack, again keeping in formation - gunnery control would be given by the leading air gunner; if the attack was not severe e.g. one or two enemy aircraft the bombers' return fire plus the fighter escort should be able to deal with the attack. If however the formation was badly jumped, and the strike was not considered of paramount importance, it is thought that to run for home would be the best policy - the strike could always be done a few hours later.
The decision to beat it would be given by the formation leader, and he would inform the fighter escort by firing off red Very lights or some other pre-arranged signal.
Two Vics would split by carrying out steep turns in opposite directions, put dive breaks out, and go straight down at an angle of 90 degrees in formation, and return low level making full use of topographical features.
It is thought that it would be impossible for an aircraft not fitted with dive breaks to attempt to follow down a formation like this, and the chances of picking up the formation after a dive to continue their attacks would be by no means easy for the enemy, as our own escorting fighters, knowing the target and track of the getaway very often lost sight of the formation after a dive; this is especially noticeable overland where the camouflage blends extremely well with the surrounding country.
Evasive action low down against light flak is the same as carried out by any aircraft - keep as low as possible and don't fly straight and level.
Evasive action low down against fighters should be turns into attack but not making the turns too steep, relying more on the slipstreams, the gunner's return fire, and the enemy fighter pilot continually having to take his eyes off his sights to look at the ground.
Good use should be made of various valleys on the Arakan Front and if the formation flies close-in to one side of the valley, theoretically the fighters could only attack from one quarter.
The Vengeance [can]? fly when low down at fast speeds so that a good view is obtained forward. It is considered that the aircraft should give a good account for itself low down. The gunners kept up a sky search, each being allotted a definite area to watch, but to relieve the eye strain they should keep on looking all around coming back always to watch their appointed sector. The gunners, all except a check navigator, must at all times faced backwards and forget their navigational training, have become pure A.G.s. Their navigational training will be invaluable in bad weather but normally navigation is the pilot's responsibility.

Fighter Escort.
Fighter escort is considered essential when the aircraft are flying at [?? height] as they would be easy prey to enemy fighters from astern and below. The rear guns in a Vengeance are not as good for instance as a Blenheim turret and do not command nearly such a big field of fire.

Two systems of escorting were used by the fighters (a) visual control by all the fighters (b) visual control by only one section, the rest of the formation being top cover (above 20,000 feet) the section as close cover informing the top cover where the bombers were by a system of riddle cards (e.g. now in F.4).
It is thought from the bombers point of view that the first is the best system - on one return trip the bombers fired off reds as if they were being attacked but did not attract the attention of the fighters, and on another occasion the section in visual contact brought the fighters down as if the bombers were being attacked, but it was found that it was most difficult to get the top cover down at the desired point.


It would be extremely beneficial if the whole escorting problem of Vengeance aircraft was gone into, and then a practice carried out to try it's efficiency on the following lines:
A Vengeance formation is escorted by one squadron of hurricanes and another Squadron could attempt to attack the bombers.
Identification of the two lots of hurricanes might be an insurmountable problem but some sort of practice along these lines would be a very good thing. Again, the fitting of VHF in Vengeance aircraft is going to alter the problem of escorting.

Low level and shallow dive attacks.
This aircraft, contrary to some opinions, makes a good aircraft for low-level attacks, having advantages over a Blenheim for instance in being better armed, and capable of strafing target when going into attack; greater manoeuvrability and superior low formation flying. The only disadvantage is the poor forward visibility.
It is not however proposed that the attack should be similar to low level attacks as carried out by Blenheims, but the same as carried out by Hurribombers – in other words a very shallow dive from 600 feet, using the front guns all the time on the way in; (This immediately effects the one disadvantage).
It is not proposed to enlarge on low level attacks, as the facts are already known only let it be said that the low-level attack by this Detachment was successful.
Shallow dive attacks would normally only be carried out when it was impossible to get enough height to carry out a proper dive bombing attack.
Pilots should know how to carry out this alternative attack with or without dive brakes.
It is a fairly accurate form of attack but it is considered it should only be used when weather does not permit die bombing.

The Vengeance Mark IA and II (Tactical). Considered peculiarities and uses.
Technical peculiarities that affect the tactical use of the Vengeance are as follows:
Dive brakes.
Very high wing loading.
0° angle of incidence and consequent nose up attitude of flight.
No automatic boost.
No oxygen.

It is therefore considered that this bomber would not make a good "Jack of all Trades" like the Blenheim and Hurricane, but should only be used for the job it was built for, ie. short range dive bombing on strategical targets within a radius of action of 200 miles, and as an attack bomber (either dive or low-level attack), and for close support work. Fighter escort and air superiority are [an] essential to its success.
The fitting of long range tanks or the hanging on of external bombs is going to put the aircraft in the Stuka class.
Performance, it is thought, would be cut down greatly to not much advantage.
One other point of importance is that Vengeance aircraft, for some reason unknown, vary considerably in their performance; one slow aircraft is a liability to the formation, and may jeopardise the success of an operation.
This detachment only took on operations aircraft that it considered operationally fit. The majority of aircraft received are quite alright, but the odd slow aircraft is no good on a Squadron, but perfectly alright for an O.T.U., calibration work etc.
Could some "operationally fit" check be made at Karachi before the Vengeances are dispatched to Squadrons? The Squadrons could give minimum performance figures which they considered necessary for an operational aircraft.
Squadron Leader,
Commanding,
No.82 Squadron,
Royal Air Force.
[Notes: I have not been able to find in the AIR 27/685 document Appendices "A" and "B" referred to at the beginning of this report, however further study of two other documents (AIR 27/682-30 and 31 viz. the ORB Summary and Record of Events respectively for this Detachment) do reveal aircraft serials and a few individual aircraft letter codes for the 8 aircraft taken (6 operational plus 2 spares), as follows:
Vultee-built Vengeance II - AN615
Vultee-built Vengeance II - AN645 returned to main base before end of detachment.
Vultee-built Vengeance II - AN720
Northrop-built Vengeance I - AN957
Northrop-built Vengeance I - AN859 ? "X" [AN859 or EZ859 ??ORB typo??]
Northrop-built Vengeance I - AN929 returned to main base before end of detachment.
Northrop-built Vengeance I - AN960 replacement for AN645
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ810 "A" Squadron Leader's aircraft
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ845 replaced by AN645
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ855
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ859 "X" [AN859 or EZ859 ??ORB typo??]
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ872
Northrop-built Vengeance IA - EZ877
Individual aircraft letter codes referred to in AIR/27/682-30 are A,J,X,Y,D, P and S.

Hurricane escorts during Detachment operations were provided by 136 Squadron RAF and 67 Squadron RAF, each fielding either 8, 10 or 12 individual aircraft in their escort duty].

Sources: The National Archives of the UK document AIR 27/685 Appendices pages 191 to 197.
Sources: The National Archives of the UK document AIR 27/682-30 Summary of Events, and AIR 27/682-31 Record of Events.

 

[MorrisOxford]

[A further note of interest about 82 Squadron Vengeance operations written by Squadron Leader D R Gibbs appears in AIR 27/683-11 Summary of Events 1944 July to December [pages stamped 192-193], at the end of his command shortly before the squadron was to cease Vengeance operations and be re-equipped with Mosquito FBVI's].

ORDER OF THE DAY by Squadron Leader D R Gibbs
It is for nearly 2 years now that I have been privileged to command Number 82 Squadron and today these are the last orders that I shall give as your commanding officer.
I must then thank you all for the splendid support that I have received from one and all whilst I have been in command.
Perhaps some of you have regarded me as a hard taskmaster.
That I am convinced was necessary for our success - of that success all of you who were on 82 squadron in the Arakan should be justly proud.
We were the best squadron in India without a doubt. During that time we carried out approximately 2,500 sorties, dropping 1,500 tons of bombs. Our bomb release failures were the lowest in the command. Our serviceability was the best - 95% throughout the year. We could bomb-up 12 aircraft in half an hour, we did our minor inspections within a day, we could even have our lunch in a few minutes on the Strip. Our bombing was most accurate, and in a report I have received from 15 Corps they say that the two big factors in the beating of the Jap was "the supply dropping by the Dakotas and the dive bombing by the Vengeances especially that of 82 Squadron which was always most accurate". The C.C.R A. himself, when observing the bombing on point 1301 sent a signal that "the bombing was more accurate than gunfire, also what other Squadron could be given as a target Two Telegraph Poles?." As regards our flying we took off in two minutes, formed up in box of 12 in another five minutes, and usually bombed the target one hour after the forward troops had requested support. No other Squadron could touch our formation flying.
Let's not forget the other sections which went to make that efficiency. The cooks who had a meal ready anytime of the day and night, the M.T. section who would work all night to keep the Squadron stocked with bombs and petrol, the Orderly Room which kept pounding out the returns and all those little sections which kept the Squadron going. Do you remember seeing the S.W.O. and the Followers toiling away making a bund so that the tide would not flood the strip, and the Fire Section pumping away all night so that the tide would not encroach. They all did their bit to keep the Squadron flying.
That might sound like a "line shoot" if it were not true. Perhaps some will remember a talk I gave before we went on Ops. I reminded the squadron of our record and traditions in 2 Group and said that we must live up to that tradition, equal it, if possible surpass it. I honestly think we did surpass it – not by the spectacularity of our results, or the notoriety gained by our losses, but by unceasing hard and methodical work and the determination to be accurate and thorough in all we did. Perhaps the fact that we were often bombing Japanese positions only 200 yards from our forward troops, and throughout these 2,500 sorties never killed a single one of our own soldiers is proof of this assertion.
Today the Squadron is confronted with many changes and it is going to be difficult to get back that efficiency and happiness that 82 Squadron has always had. Many who served the Squadron faithfully and many who put all their energy and time into their job have gone. But remember twice before the Squadron has lost 11 aircraft out of 12 and both times they were operating again the next day. So, all those who are staying on must see to it that the Squadron again adds to its laurels. I hope you will all give your new commanding officer and flight commanders that loyal support that I have always had and work hard with them in putting the Squadron back again as cock of the walk. Super Omnia Ubique. 29th of July 1944.

[Squadron Leader D R Gibbs received the DSO in August 1944 and was promoted to Wing Commander].

Source: The National Archives of the UK document AIR 27/683-11 Summary of Events 1944 July to December