Best US escort fighter in ETO during 1943? (1 Viewer)

Best US escort fighter in ETO during 1943?

  • P-39

  • P-38

  • P-47

  • other (explain)

  • P-51A

  • F6F-3

  • F4U-1A

  • Spitfire


Results are only viewable after voting.

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I would say Supermarine Spitfires of the RAF.

On August 17, 1942, the 97th Bomb Group began the opening attack of the U.S. Army Air Forces' (USAAF) strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The mission was a strike by 12 B-17s against the railroad marshaling yards at Rouen, 40 miles into France from the English Channel.

The 12 bombers were escorted by four squadrons of RAF Spitfires. The first plane off the ground was flown by Major Paul Tibbetts, of the Enola Gay fame on its historic mission against Hiroshima. Sitting across from Tibbets was Colonel Frank Armstrong, the 97th commander. Armstrong was to serve as the model for Colonel Frank Savage, the lead character played by Gregory Peck in the famous World War II film Twelve o'clock high.

On hand for the launch of the mission was Maj. Gen. Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, the commander of the USAAF Eighth Air Force, the primary organizational element that would carry the air war to Germany. Riding along in one of the strike aircraft was Brig. Gen. Ira Eaker, commander of the 8th bomber command, the bomber component of the Eighth Air Force bomber and fighter forces. Eaker had spent most of his career as a fighter pilot not as a bomber disciple. However, he was convinced that daylight strategic bombing could inflict catastrophic damage on the fighting capability and military production capacity of an enemy.

Conspicuously absent from all this was any US fighter escort. None of the types then in service were considered suitable or of adequate performance or range to do the job at hand. This was a situation that was to remain more or less unchanged until after Schweinfurt, when finally the message was driven home that US bomber formations were vulnerable. Until that realisation was made, it was an anathema to refer to US fighter groups as "the best', or "effective". They were so few as to be discounted from either category. Their best defences were woeful because of range issues, but at least there was some protection offered for returning bombers or outbound strikes for part way of the missions. That protection was provided principally by RAF FC.

This first raid was about as successful as the 8th was to deliver in its first year, whilst admittedly pitifully small. About half the bombs fell within the target area; some rolling stock was destroyed, about one third of the track lines were damaged, and there were no bomber losses. After the raid Spaatz wrote to General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces, "It is my opinion and conviction that the B-17 is suitable as to speed, armament, armor, and bomb load." Eaker was more questioning. He wrote, "It is too early in our experiments in actual operations to say that it can definitely make deep penetrations without fighter escort and without excessive losses." These were prophetic words.

The buildup of the aircraft and trained crews in southern England for Eighth had been slow. There were fewer than 100 B-17s in England at the time of this August 1942 mission. Far less than 100 aircraft were mission capable. Under increasing pressure from top U.S. political and military leaders to take the war to Germany, to do something with all the men and machines allocated to it, it was inevitable that Eighth Air Force missions would start as soon as possible.

The form of warfare embodied in this first mission was the air strategy that Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker had helped develop—unescorted daylight precision bombing of enemy industrial and military targets. In writing to Arnold before this first mission, Eaker said, "The theory that daylight bombardment is feasible is about to be tested when men's lives are put at stake."

And tested it would be. As missions were pushed beyond the range of protecting British and a slowly increasing American fighter force, LW fighters and air defense artillery destroyed American bombers at a great rate. By August 1943, a year after that initial raid, five times as many American bombers and airmen would be lost in attacks on two German industrial centers as had flown on that first mission. In the August 1943 dual raid on Regensburg and schweinfurt, Colonel Curtis LeMay led 146 bombers against Regensburg while Brig. Gen. Robert Williams led 230 bombers against Schweinfurt. For the first time the bombers were escorted for parts of the missions mostly by USAAC fighters, mostly P-47st fighters, but because of their limited range they could only go as far the western German border. They proved incapable of defending the returning heavily damaged bomber streams from repeated LW attacks on them. These failures demonstrate in spades the inadequacy of the US fighter forces at this time.

The German defenders had great advantages. The Luftwaffe fighter force was up in strength and could fly multiple sorties from its nearby bases. Twenty-four bombers of the 146 dispatched, carrying 240 crew members, were lost from the Regensburg force. From the 230 dispatched to Schweinfurt, 36 failed to return to bases in England. Combined, the two forces lost 60 of 376 bombers for a loss rate of 16 percent. But this number only told part of the story. In fact, an additional 20 percent of the attacking bombers were permanently lost to operations as a result of battle damage. In all, the raids cost the Eighth Air Force 40 percent of the bomber force dispatched from England.

Why were loss rates so high? Some historians have argued that the losses experienced on raids like Regensburg-Schweinfurt demonstrated clearly and unequivocally that the concept of unescorted daylight precision bombing was a failed strategy. Could Army Air Forces' planners and leaders not have foreseen that German fighters would inflict unacceptable and unsustainable losses to the bombers unless they were escorted by protecting fighters? Why wasn't an effective escort fighter available before late 1943? Were Army Air Forces leaders blinded to the flaws in the bombing strategy they had developed?

A close look at the historical facts demonstrates that it was not ignorance, hubris, or a misplaced commitment to their own thinking that led them to conclude that in 1942 and through the fall of 1943 the concept of unescorted daylight precision bombing was sound. Rather, it was a cold logic based on what was known and knowable at the time. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to understand the context of the times in which the planners and leaders worked.

The U.S. concept of strategic bombardment derived from the theories of airpower thinkers like Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell, who saw what even the primitive airpower of World War I could do. The resulting concepts were developed and refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field in Alabama from 1926 until the beginning of the war in Europe. Although the ACTS taught these concepts to many airpower advocates, its doctrine lacked formal War Department approval. Accordingly, the spread of the doctrine was initially limited. The ACTS strategic bombing doctrine included the following components:

• The national objective of war is to break the enemy's will to resist and force the enemy to submit to our will.

• The accomplishment of this goal requires offensive warfare.

• The special mission of air is the attack on the entire enemy national structure to dislocate its military, political, economic, and social activities.

• The disruption of the enemy's industrial network is the real target because such a disruption might produce a collapse sufficient to induce surrender.

The state of prewar fighter and air defense technology supported these views. When strategic bombing theory was being developed at the ACTS, the leading edge fighter aircraft of the time had an externally braced single wing, a fixed landing gear, an open cockpit, short range, and light armament. These fighters could hardly keep up with a high-flying B-17 bomber in speed and took a long time to get to a bomber's altitude. In fact, early versions of the Hawker Hurricane, the RAF's first mono-winged fighter, were not fielded even in small numbers until mid-1938. To think in the early 1930s that the United States or any nation could within a few years develop a short-range, 380 mile-per-hour pursuit fighter with a closed cockpit, retractable landing gear, a cantilever wing, and internally mounted machine guns or cannons would have been extraordinary.
 
According to the pilot handbooks of the two airplanes, the Hellcat had better fuel economy than the Thunderbolt. Carrying the standard 150 gallon drop tank, the Hellcat burned about 100gph at 25,000 feet while flying at 283 mph TAS, and had a radius of 467 miles. At this same height the Thunderbolt, while carrying the earlier 200 gallon external tank, guzzled about 145gph at 225 mph IAS and had a theoretical flight radius of about 505 miles. The marginally greater range of the Thunderbolt was due to it's greater fuel capacity (although these early ferry tanks often carried only 100 gallons so the radius was more like 400 miles).

How would two airplanes of roughly the same size and equipped with basically the same engine burn fuel at such different rates? Was it the turbo-supercharger of the Thunderbolt that made all the difference?
 
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According to the pilot handbooks of the two airplanes, the Hellcat had better fuel economy than the Thunderbolt. Carrying the standard 150 gallon drop tank, the Hellcat burned about 100gph at 25,000 feet while flying at 283 mph TAS, and had a radius of 467 miles. At this same height the Thunderbolt, while carrying the earlier 200 gallon external tank, guzzled about 145gph at 225 mph TAS and had a theoretical flight radius of about 505 miles. The marginally greater range of the Thunderbolt was due to it's greater fuel capacity (although these early ferry tanks often carried only 100 gallons so the radius was more like 400 miles).

How would two airplanes of roughly the same size and equipped with basically the same engine burn fuel at such different rates? Was it the turbo-supercharger of the Thunderbolt that made all the difference?

It depends much more on whether the pilot uses auto-lean mixture vs. auto-rich. Eg. the P-47 (early) with 200 gal drop tank attached will do almost 300 mph TAS (190-200 mph IAS per manual) while using 105 US gals if the mixture is at auto-lean. Hellcat's 100 gph figure is also on auto-lean mixture setting.
 
Ah so there's the difference. Thanks Tomo. I noticed that the rpm settings and manifold pressures were roughly the same but didn't catch the fuel/air mixture setting difference. Why did the Thunderbolt operate in rich mixture, was it for added speed?
 
Everybody operated with mixture in rich (or whatever it was called in different countries) when more power was needed, and fuel consumption went up by ~50% when switch was made from lean to rich.
 
The two big problems with using the Navy planes as escorts in Europe vs the P-47 are
1. what happens AFTER you drop the external tanks. P-47 Has 50-55 gallons more fuel than the Hellcat and 65-70 gallons more than the F4U.
2. That turbo in the P-47 was worth several hundred extra HP at altitude. Over 350 in combat mode and still worth a fair percentage in cruise mode. The Navy planes didn't do as good a job with exhaust thrust as the V-12 engines and in cruise mode you get a LOT less help from exhaust thrust.
I would double check that F6F fuel consumption figure too.
 
The two big problems with using the Navy planes as escorts in Europe vs the P-47 are
1. what happens AFTER you drop the external tanks. P-47 Has 50-55 gallons more fuel than the Hellcat and 65-70 gallons more than the F4U.

There was a small series of the F4Us with wing tanks (not self-sealing) AND drop tanks - that is 237 gals of protected fuel, 114 gals of unprotected internal fuel, and 150-175 gals in drop tank. I know that those don't solve the really long range escort problem, but do offer some advantage.

2. That turbo in the P-47 was worth several hundred extra HP at altitude. Over 350 in combat mode and still worth a fair percentage in cruise mode. The Navy planes didn't do as good a job with exhaust thrust as the V-12 engines and in cruise mode you get a LOT less help from exhaust thrust.
I would double check that F6F fuel consumption figure too.

Agreed.
The F4U offered parity vs. Fw 190 at 25000 ft and above, the P-47 offered superiority.
 
Everybody operated with mixture in rich (or whatever it was called in different countries) when more power was needed, and fuel consumption went up by ~50% when switch was made from lean to rich.

Thanks. Do you happen to have a copy of the P-47 manual that you are referring to? When I took a second look at my copies I don't see that kind of fuel consumption at that speed and altitude, even in AL settings.
 
Hi shortround6. Your point regarding the fuel remaining after dropping the 150 gallon tank is well taken.

Here is an excerpt from the Hellcat pilot manual that I was referring to. Do you have different figures for the F6F?
2018-04-03 16_07_44-Grumman F6F (3-5) Pilot's Manual and 22 more pages ‎- Microsoft Edge.png
 
And just to make it clear, I'm not trying to say that the Hellcat would be the better choice over the Thunderbolt in the long haul (especially after the addition of extra internal fuel and wing tanks). It would be an interim stand-in until the Thunderbolt's problems with external tanks were addressed.
 
Thing is by the time you get any real number of F6Fs to Europe the problems with the P-47 drop tanks are fixed.

They Built 10 F6Fs in 1942 compared to 532 P-47s. The first 3 months of 1943 see under 130 F6Fs built compared to over 450 P-47s.
 
Thanks. Do you happen to have a copy of the P-47 manual that you are referring to? When I took a second look at my copies I don't see that kind of fuel consumption at that speed and altitude, even in AL settings.

Page from a manual:

CR322102.jpg

Here is an excerpt from the Hellcat pilot manual that I was referring to. Do you have different figures for the

Do you have a whole table to post perhaps?

And just to make it clear, I'm not trying to say that the Hellcat would be the better choice over the Thunderbolt in the long haul (especially after the addition of extra internal fuel and wing tanks). It would be an interim stand-in until the Thunderbolt's problems with external tanks were addressed.

People were using 75-110 gal tanks on the P-47, or the half-filled ferry tank very soon after it flew 1st combat sorties. The 250+150 gal on the Hellcat offers no advantage vs. 305+75 or +100 or +110 gals on the P-47, while not being able to replicate the P-47's performance over 20000 ft.
Gen Kenney in Australia was managing to have the 200 gal 'flat' drop tanks manufactured by Ford there, made the P-47 much more useful A/C, while the P-47s were flying from the USA via Iceland to the UK due to use of wing drop tanks, already by August 1943.
 
Hi Tomo, I will have to wait until I get home because the only version I have access to here at work is an on-line copy which doesn't have the clarity if you are viewing the entire page.

And I will have to take a second look at all of this because I thought I had it all figured out and then you guys have to muck it all up for me lol! :p
 
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Oh, and how about the Hellcat carrying three external tanks? It was engineered to carrying that many but I don't have any flight operation charts that have range calculations with those in place.
 
p4059thFS33FG.jpg


P-40F / L ... they did well particularly in escort missions for B-25's in Tunisia and Italy and the German pilots noted that they were particularly dangerous opponents when flying escort.

From reading Shores Mediterranean Air War I'm pretty sure they had a better kill to loss ratio (in Europe) than P-38's.

And unlike Hellcats or Corsairs, they saw a lot of action in the Theater (well, in the MTO but Italy is part of Europe).

I think P-51A / A-36 were mostly used for recon and dive bombing, and P-47's arrived pretty late in 1943 if I remember right.
 
Oh, and how about the Hellcat carrying three external tanks? It was engineered to carrying that many but I don't have any flight operation charts that have range calculations with those in place.


The problem isn't getting into Germany, it is getting out.
Drop your tanks, fight for 20 minutes, allow for 30 minutes reserve (flying at around 180 mph at low altitude looking for home airfields shrouded in clouds) and figure you exit speed over Germany and France or the low countries at about 300mph true in order to keep from being bounced, you are no longer escorting bombers, just running for home.

I don't have the chart for the F6F. Chart for the engine in the F4U says about 4.5 gallons per minute at military power so 90 gallons combat allowance, 21 gallons for the reserve (42 gallons an hour at 1300rpm 30in 570hp) so 111 gallons out of 250 (or a few less) gives you about 135 gallons for the trip out. Or about 1 1/2 hours at 90 gallons a minute (max lean ?) 2150rpm and 34 in ?
 
And I think I will have to eat crow here. Tomo is absolutely right. It does seem that the Thunderbolt and Hellcat have similar fuel consumption rates under similar engine settings. What gives the Thunderbolt the edge in overall range it's greater fuel capacity (both internal and external).

Advantage: Thunderbolt

And I was referring to charts for late-built P-47Ds with two 165 gallon drop tanks, and the fuel-use figures at 25,000ft are much higher than those for the single 200 gallon tank, even with auto-lean settings:

AN 01-65BC-1A Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions for P-47D-25,-26,-27,-28 -30 and -35 airplanes

I assume it is due to the extra drag of two tanks as opposed to just one but I'm not really sure if that's all there is to it. By the way, wasn't the ferry tank recessed under the fuselage? (earlier P-47s that had flat keels). This would undoubtedly cause less drag than having two tanks mounted on wing hard-points.

upload_2018-4-3_19-41-16.png
 
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The problem isn't getting into Germany, it is getting out.
Drop your tanks, fight for 20 minutes, allow for 30 minutes reserve (flying at around 180 mph at low altitude looking for home airfields shrouded in clouds) and figure you exit speed over Germany and France or the low countries at about 300mph true in order to keep from being bounced, you are no longer escorting bombers, just running for home.

I don't have the chart for the F6F. Chart for the engine in the F4U says about 4.5 gallons per minute at military power so 90 gallons combat allowance, 21 gallons for the reserve (42 gallons an hour at 1300rpm 30in 570hp) so 111 gallons out of 250 (or a few less) gives you about 135 gallons for the trip out. Or about 1 1/2 hours at 90 gallons a minute (max lean ?) 2150rpm and 34 in ?

Yes, and figuring all this in makes my head hurt. But it's fun to learn about all the variables to consider when deciding which aircraft would be best for the job at hand. The straight range figures quoted in books obviously don't tell us the true capability of an aircraft for a particular mission profile.
 

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