Boeing 737Max

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I agree - tantalizingly similar is a good description. The fact that problems unrelated to the MCAS were reported on other a/c confirms the need for not jumping to conclusions
 
I agree - tantalizingly similar is a good description. The fact that problems unrelated to the MCAS were reported on other a/c confirms the need for not jumping to conclusions

I think it is pretty clear the MCAS was a factor, and there were clear issues in the certification and documentation of the aircraft.
 
I am surprised no one has started a topic on this a/c. Two fatal crashes in the last 5 months.
Why is no one asking the obvious question: This being the 2nd incident, why didn't the FAA immediately ground the world fleet after the 1st? I remember when the landing gear on the left wing of a Twin Beech at Burlington Airport in 1990 had collapsed, but the pilot retained enough wits(what would you d if the plane your flying, collapses on one main when you are just touching down?) to firewall it and circle around the cabbage patch to call the boss. I saw that as it happened. The UPS van that was waiting to pick the freight had to leave, because 45 Delta(the Twin Beech) had to go back to Paine Field. What happened was the retraction strut on the left main broke off on one end.

I used to work for Methow, and I knew the pilot, Shawn, and knew he was a good pilot. He might've left a pile of manure on the seat, but still a good pilot, because at Paine, Crash and Smash asked the owner, Hugh Glassburn, if he wanted foam on the runway, no was the reply, and the Beech greased in, pranging the hell out of the left prop and scraping the wingtip and belly a bit, but no fatalities, no injuries.

But a very good pilot just doing his job, like Captain Sullenberger.
 
Wow, that's just idiotic. Did the FAA ever audit them???

Once upon a time, it may have. But, we've got to get rid of those pesky regulators, don't we?

The FAA has relied on the honesty of manufacturers for decades, but between globalization, MBAs whose imagination ends with the bottom line, and shoving responsibility for quality control onto vendors, it's working less well than it once did.
 

Blood priority fellas. These situations remind me of the old MU-2 A/P related events.

Noted the horizontal jack-screw was mentioned once or twice early on and then seems to have been ignored. It showed a hefty down trim position. Now, what drives that when the pilots are not hand flying? The A/P. What drives the A/P in these new machines? A computer system and. of course, the pilot can influence it a bit, yes. Question is- After the pilots presumably disconnected the A/P, and the trim was still causing them fits, why couldn't it be re-trimmed? Was there a connection between the computer system and A/P that the pilots were unaware of and/or did not know how to disconnect OR did not have the capability to disconnect it so the airplane could be hand-flown? IF any of the foregoing has validity then it's time to look at the folks who, 1. Designed the computer-linked flight control system. and, 2. The FAA who certified the airplane as fit for commercial service. If none of the foregoing is valid, sorry to have chimed in and had you waste time reading this post.
 
Why is no one asking the obvious question: This being the 2nd incident, why didn't the FAA immediately ground the world fleet after the 1st?
Because there just wan't enough data to substantiate a fleet grounding. Right/ wrong or indifferent, the feds aren't going to ground a fleet of aircraft unless there is an obvious "smoking gun," and at that point they'll issue at least an Airworthiness Directive to address the problem.

Case in point:

The Rudder Story
 

Joe, I normally would agree with you, but I think in this instance there was enough data to warrant a grounding. Especially with the latest info coming out about the FAA.
 

But, as Qantas proved several years back, if one of those three boxes has a different software revision the three boxes will fight each other and cause erratic flight tossing pax around, with injuries, and an emergency landing
 
But, as Qantas proved several years back, if one of those three boxes has a different software revision the three boxes will fight each other and cause erratic flight tossing pax around, with injuries, and an emergency landing
But no smoking hole in the ground.
 
Additionally the FAA was allowing Boeing (and all other manufacturers too), to certify their aircraft themselves. That is a big conflict of interest, and should not be allowed.

This applies to not just Boeing and US manufacturers (or even aviation) but to every form of industry since the late 90s and applies to any company with an aerospace ISO9000 accreditation since 1999, including Airbus and other European aircraft and component manufacturers.

The Aviation version of the ISO is Aviation Standard AS 9000 and contains some 50% more requirements than the ISO and also requires compliance with certain supplementary documents.

If you work for an organization where there are no dedicated independent inspectors who physically check each critical stage of your work you are working for a company that has, or is regulated under a quality management system which is derived from AS9000. For maintenance staff and pilots the requirement to have any flight control work inspected by at least one other person (two in many countries) who were not physically involved in the original maintenance is just one small example of where AS9000 is reflected in your work.

See AS 9000 - the Aerospace Quality Management System — Quality Management System for a brief overview.
 

Believe me, I know that. I am ISO9100 and AS9000 Lead Auditor Certified. I've got the standard on my bookshelf in my office at work.

The problem here is the relationship with the FAA and Boeing. What kind of oversight if any was taking place. After 9/11 congress approved further measures which gave the manufacturers even further leeway.
 
Question is- After the pilots presumably disconnected the A/P, and the trim was still causing them fits, why couldn't it be re-trimmed?
Because the MCAS system has more trim authority than the pilot's yoke mounted trim switches. When MCAS commands nose down, the electric trim operates at high speed in a series of bursts punctuated by pauses. Pilots can countermand that with their rocker switches, but those default to low speed trim, so it's "three steps forward and two steps back", a losing proposition in the long run. The 737 pilots I've talked with (none of them MAX) all said in their experience a trim system that behaved like that would have been identified as "runaway" or "uncontrollable" and immediately cut out, and hand cranked manual trim would become the order of the day.
This is the product of rigorous worst-case scenario training that is the norm in the modern world. Whether that level of training is upheld in the "economy class" training peddled by Boeing to third world airlines is open to question.
Cheers,
Wes
 
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Joe, I normally would agree with you, but I think in this instance there was enough data to warrant a grounding. Especially with the latest info coming out about the FAA.
I don't know Chris - there seemed to be a lot of chatter but nothing solid. It seems that after the second crash a flurry of reports came out about issues encountered about the time of the first one. I haven't had a chance but I'm going to look through SAIBs and SDRs to see if there was anything reported through FAA channels at the time before and after the first crash.
 
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I think it was an executive at GM who said something like "if they built cars like they built computers, you'd turn them off by pressing 'Start', they'd need a software upgrade if they restriped the roads, they'd ask for confirmation when you put on the brakes, and they'd shutdown when you turned on the windshield wipers."
 
This is the only FAA SAIB I could find related to later model 737s with regards to flight control issues. Not to say there weren't any reported between operators and Boeing, this reporting system brings the FAA into the reporting system and is disseminated so other operators could compare issues. This one is interesting.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_G...42ca92fb5286258009005723f7/$FILE/NM-16-21.pdf

This is where you can find FAA SAIBs by manufacturer:

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameSet

There are hundreds of SDRs written against later model 737s. I went through a few, like looking for a needle in a haystack.

FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page]
 
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A Boeing 737 Max flown by Southwest makes emergency landing at Orlando airport

A Boeing 737 Max 8 plane — the same model that the Federal Aviation Administration grounded after two recent crashes — made an emergency landing at Orlando International Airport on Tuesday afternoon.

No passengers were on the jet, only two pilots for the plane's owner, Southwest Airlines. The pilots were flying the jet to California for storage when an engine overheated just before 3 p.m., a spokesman for the airline told NBC News. The plane was in the air about 11 minutes, the spokesman said.

The flight was scheduled to fly to Southern California Logistics Airport in Victorville, California, for short-term storage, according to the spokesman.

"The pilots reported a performance issue with one of the engines shortly after takeoff," the spokesman said.

The pilots landed safely at the airport. The plane will be moved to the airline's Orlando maintenance facility for review and will be taken to Victorville once it's safe to do so.
 
I read stuff about the 737 Max.
I'm like nah. Journalist nonsense overhyping the pudding.

Not sure what the game is but really? I'm no expert, but really? If what I read is true then it's very scary.
 

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