Boeing 737Max

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DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
Boeing issued a software update to fix the problem after the Lion Air crash. Unfortunately it does not seem to have fixed the problem.
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From what I have seen the Boeing software update has still not been issued - FAA approval was held up due to the government shutdown and FAA could not process all of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting Database reports immediately for the same reason.

One worrying thing is that the 11 ASRD reports linked at least two US incidents to the autopilot so now Boeing & FAA will have to determine which system actually caused the problems. Hopefully there is one feature common to both systems that can be identified and a permanent fix implemented.

Another factor in this MAY be the operators desire to have a single rating for all 737 models starting with the -300. Maybe the Max series need a separate rating and less software that makes the 900, 8Max and 9Max crews "interchangeable" with the 300. Only time will tell and hopefully the Ethiopian CVR transcript will shed some light on what really happened.
 
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DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
It would not be the first time...

Read up on American Airlines Flight 96, and how the FAA did not issue a Mandatory AD for DC-10 cargo door design flaws, because of a handshake agreement between the FAA and McDonald Douglas.

It took the crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 981, killing almost 350 people, a year and half later to get changes made to cargo door.
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During the 1980s, GE was found to have fudged the birdshot tests on the CF6, after a DC-10 lost all engines on takeoff from LGA, at least one of which didn't meet the "orderly shutdown" criterion. I was working at Lycoming-Stratford, and the more experienced engineers were convinced Lycoming or Pratt would have had their engine's type certificate revoked for similar shenanigans.
 
Al of the above is truly sad but SOP for corporate America. Recall the exploding Ford Pintos, corporate bean-counters weighed the odds of a fatal explosion-fire-death and the death benefits they's have to pay out vs. the cost of a complete fix of the problem and determined it was far cheaper to pay the occasional wrongful death lawsuit.
The 1960-64 Corvairs whose rear tires had to be over-inflated beyond Mfg specs to keep the rear tires from tucking-under producing a sudden deadly over-steer in a hard turn. With two adults on beard the tires were severely overloaded. Chevy knew about the problem but the fix added extra cost to the car. Chevy did offer an unadvertised at-cost option that included upgraded springs and dampers, front anti-roll bars and rear-axle-rebound straps to prevent tuck-under. Think that for one second that Chevy warned buyers of the problem
 
The basic 737 airframe is a design dating back to the 1960's. Its hardly a new aircraft. Whats changed are it onboard flight management systems. Some of the press is running stories that airlines have omitted to train their aircrews on these automated flight systems and the procedures needed to override them.


I don't know how true or reliable those reports are. What concerns me is the reticence of the US to ground the aircraft after two crashes of new aircraft. Whatever or whoever is to blame, people are at risk. Safety should be paramount, and those aircraft should be grounded until the reasons for the crashes are known.


President Trump got this one right, or at least it looks like that to me as an outsider.
 
FLYBOYJ said:
Not really, IIRC it only shares about 20% common structure with the original 737. Much of the structure is composite and many of the systems are very different from the "classic" 737 series (-100 to -500) No, its a very different aircraft.
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AND certification procedures have changed significantly over the years. Originally an aircraft could be stretched, wings significantly redesigned and have unlimited power increases with only the directly effected components requiring a fresh structural analysis. For the last 30 years or so changing primary structure, or power, or systems, by more than a relatively small amount requires a total reanalysis and re-certification. This kept the 747-400 out of Europe for several months while Boeing ticked all the JAA boxes back around 1990.

What surprised me was Boeing's hesitation on grounding the 737MAX aircraft. They grounded the 787 much faster for what was at that stage an equally vague root cause and zero fatalities. In my dealings with them over the years Boeing has always been very responsible and helpful.

Airbus on the other hand often refused to admit that a problem even existed. One operator I worked for had almost daily problems on long A310 flights with pitot head icing that required dropping from cruise altitude to warmer air for half an hour or so. A potentially dangerous situation as well as requiring the loading of extra fuel (and less cargo) to ensure the crew could still arrive at the scheduled arrival airport with at least the legal diversion reserves. All faxes to Airbus had the same reply - no other operator has this problem. After several years at the operators conference our Engineering Manager threw the question to other operators to find if any others had the problem but were not reporting it. Dozens had the problem and all got the same no other operator has this problem reply from Airbus. Both JAA and FAA had a presence at the conference and things moved very quickly after that. We had new pitot heads soon after and upgraded to 767-300's within a couple of years. Incidentally this is the exact same problem that was later the root cause of the Air France A330 accident in the Atlantic.

ATR were also difficult to deal with and refused to supply FCOM supplements for kits they installed at the factory until I sent them a draft of the official complaint I was preparing for DGAC and FAA over fraudulent factory log book certifications. Those certifications stated the modifications had been completed but the Service Bulletins required the FCOM supplements be inserted before making the logbook certifications. Funny thing happened - the supplements arrived by email overnight and by DHL a couple of days later.
 
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Curious if 'Skyfleet' had any operatives in Africa last Sunday???
 
fubar57 said:
Good to know about that aircraft safety stuff Mike
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Geo, examples of Corporate Think. Not a aircraft Guy but have seen enough examples of the way major corporations operate to have a very strong suspicion that Boeing, et al, aren't much different and ruled by the god of the "bottom line" just like the major automakers. Foreign corporations aren't much different as the massive Takata airbag recall clearly demonstrates.

parsifal said:
people are at risk. Safety should be paramount,
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Yea Michael and I should be young, rich, and handsome. P.S. The Check is in the mail!
 
There was a real good documentary on the Airbus test pilot that could not pull the nose up of an A320, Airbus accused him of pilot error and his career was destroyed, spent his life clearing his name. Turns out it was a computer glitch. The company did everything to smear his name but at the end he had vindication. Can't find the documentary but this is the video of the crash.
 
In all the hurry to pick a side of the fence to sit on, one little tidbit was over looked, the Lion aircraft had a AOA system squawk that had not been repaired. Given that and the initial reports of debris and smoke streaming from the Ethiopian aircraft while in-flight, its easy to see why the FAA was reticent to ground the aircraft.

Now it appears that around the time the grounding was announced that trim components from Ethiopian crash were found in a similar condition to those of the Lion Aircraft.

I can understand why the waited, but.....two crashes of a new aircraft less than 6 months apart is now unheard of. This isn't the 1950's anymore.
 
Its not a lack of training in being a pilot, but rather a lack of training of the installed system, and what to do when it is not working properly because the airlines were not aware the system was installed, because the manuals made no real reference of it. So yeah, training does have a bit to do with it.
 
Joe and Chris, I would very much like to hear from both of you about the degree of computer control/automation in aircraft like the 737. I realize that it is a complicated question with no simple answer but IMHO we seem to be headed down the A.I. knows best path. Is that because planes like the Airbus/737/etc. are so complicated that only a very few highly skilled pilots could actually fly them without help and as a result more and more A.I. systems are in place so that the lesser skilled and even minimally skilled can fly them?
 
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