The cross over between roles in Bomber Command was very limited. Officially only flight engineers had any flying training. The others were not officially trained at all in each others roles, apart from a brief air gunnery course for the bomb aimer. Of all, the air gunners would be least likely to have any other skill.
Here is not the place for a discussion on the crewing of British bombers, but two factors in its development stand out.
During the mid 1930s the Air Ministry felt that the pilot should also be the principle navigator. It soon became apparent that one pilot/navigator could not fulfill all the tasks demanded of him. This led to the addition of a second pilot/navigator. In 1937 it was decided that all medium and heavy bombers should have a second pilot.
Some machines, such as the Hampden, had no place for a second pilot. To ease the pilots work load it was decided to train an observer to navigate, though he would still be trained in bomb aiming and gunnery. By 1938 it was obvious that the navigation was a task in itself and a separate role as navigator was recognised.
There was some confused thinking. As the second pilot/navigator was added to aircraft which could carry him, the separate role of navigator, which rendered the second pilot superfluous, was emerging. Nonetheless, the standard for RAF medium and heavy bombers from 1937 until 1941 was that these aircraft be supplied with two pilots. Look at the cockpit of a Stirling, Wellington, or Manchester of the period and they retain controls for two pilots, I think the Halifax was the first 'heavy' to have single controls, but I'm not sure about the earliest versions, B.12/36 certainly specified two pilots 'one to act as navigator'.
The two pilots were only reduced to one in late 1941 as Bomber Command started to expand. By reducing the requirement to one pilot per aircraft the ratio of available pilots to aircraft was doubled at the stroke of a pen. It was also recognised that accurate navigation was a full time job, the old overland "by guess and by God" method was not going to get anyone to a target in the Ruhr. On 17th May 1939 the Air Officer Commanding 3 Group reported that Dead Reckoning navigation, by day, over cloud, could be expected to bring an aircraft only within about 50 miles of a target. The navigator's training course became as long as the pilot's.
Cheers
Steve