Bomber escort logistics?

Shortround6 said:

It is not any of the first 3 and even the 4th isn't right.

It isn't that P-51 has it's maximum range at high speed. It doesn't. It is just that it is low enough in drag that it CAN cruise at those speeds AND cover the required distance with the available fuel.

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Thanks for the info. This makes much more sense than my silly-assed theories.

To be honest, I was grabbing at straws because something had to be really bizzare with the P-51 if it was more efficient at higher speeds. The only thing that made sense to me was some very strange artifact from the engine or propeller.

I am new to this forum, so I do not know yet where to find the references to check on something that doesn't seem right to me. As you can tell, when something does not make sense to me, I am very good at coming up with half-baked theories.

Well Drgondog, as unbelievable as it may sound, we have different opinions. But since you aren't willing to even try it, we wouldn't know unless I was commanding. Unlikely since I'm not old enough, and I would not care to continue the argument, if you can let it go. I can, and I still think it could be done, like some current Hellcat pilots do. I understand that you and other don't, but it won't be settled in here by words ... just with an aircraft flying the distance and profile that was required.

I don't own one and that isn't likely, so we left with letting it go, OK?

Cheers. If you won't let it go, I decline to participate further in that argument, but understand quite well where you are coming from. It might well go either way but, if all you had were Hellcats, you might have to try.

It is my understanding that for long range missions and before escorting Mustangs, Spitfires would take the bombers across the channel, to be relieved by P-47's that were then relieved by P-38's. A second group of P-38's would be waiting for the bombers to come off target and into P-38 range to be then relieved by yet another group of P-47's and finally by Spitfires. So, with the murky weather over Europe it is easy to see how this could go wrong.

With Mustang escort a single group of Mustangs still didn't escort the bombers all the way to Berlin. The weaving patten they flew over bombers used too much fuel. Also, I think one of the reasons for the weaving was that the fighters had trouble flying at bomber speed at high altitude.

nincomp said:

Thanks for the info. This makes much more sense than my silly-assed theories.

To be honest, I was grabbing at straws because something had to be really bizzare with the P-51 if it was more efficient at higher speeds. The only thing that made sense to me was some very strange artifact from the engine or propeller.

I am new to this forum, so I do not know yet where to find the references to check on something that doesn't seem right to me. As you can tell, when something does not make sense to me, I am very good at coming up with half-baked theories.

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There are no dumb questions, only dumb answers. Stay and learn, sometimes a "half-baked theory" makes some of the "experts" here dig a little to find the right answer.

barney said:

It is my understanding that for long range missions and before escorting Mustangs, Spitfires would take the bombers across the channel, to be relieved by P-47's that were then relieved by P-38's. A second group of P-38's would be waiting for the bombers to come off target and into P-38 range to be then relieved by yet another group of P-47's and finally by Spitfires. So, with the murky weather over Europe it is easy to see how this could go wrong.

The 55th FG first flew combat in ETO on October 15, 1943. The second P-38 FG, the 20th FG first flew combat op on 28 December, 1943. The first P-51B FG, the 354th flew first combat op four weeks earlier. No more long range escorts until Feb 11 when second P-51FG, 357th, flew ops on Feb 11, 1944.

Spits were used in 1942 through mid 1943 to augment the new and underequipped 8th FC (4th, 56th, 78th and 353rd) but the last reference to Spit escort across the Channel was August 1943. Perhaps the RAF experts can comment further on this. By mid September six P47 FG's were fully operational, then between mid october and late December - four more 8th AF and one 9th AF P-47 Group was added.

With Mustang escort a single group of Mustangs still didn't escort the bombers all the way to Berlin. The weaving patten they flew over bombers used too much fuel. Also, I think one of the reasons for the weaving was that the fighters had trouble flying at bomber speed at high altitude.

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The first belly tank mission and range to Holland/German border was July 28, 1943. The first P38 group (55th) would pick up the lead box of one bomb division near the German border and escort it to target and back to Holland area wher P-47s would provide Withdrawal.. because of the losses and subsequent rebuilding of crew strength the 8th didn't make penetrations deep into Germany - only a few as far as Brunswick and Halberstadt - until Big week.

Net - there was a span of six weeks in which the only long range fighter escort was P-38..in mid February there were two P-38 and two Mustang groups just in time for Big Week. All four could provide target support to Berlin but only the Mustang could go to Munich, for example.

Very little target coverage for 700 bombers over a 60-80 mile stream and always 'branching' to attack different targets.

Lot of gaps in target coverage and even gaps between Penetration support by P-47s, which then turn back near German border leaving the bombers alone until near the target when the P-38 or P-51 Group would pick up a box or two short of the target and return about 100-150miles if it was a deep target - then leave for home (no fuselage tank in Mustang until mid March 1944) leaving the bombers unprotected again until R/V with Withdrawal Support near German/Holland border.

GregP said:

Well Drgondog, as unbelievable as it may sound, we have different opinions. But since you aren't willing to even try it, we wouldn't know unless I was commanding. Unlikely since I'm not old enough, and I would not care to continue the argument, if you can let it go. I can, and I still think it could be done, like some current Hellcat pilots do. I understand that you and other don't, but it won't be settled in here by words ... just with an aircraft flying the distance and profile that was required.

Actually - it could be reasonably settled with a.) fuel consumption at 60% power while climbing to 26000 feet, then b.)fuel consumption for cruise power to achieve >250KTS at 26000 feet.

IF you do not have that, or cannot get that, then you are just plain silly when you claim (or 'think it can be done') the F6F could escort 8th AF bombers for target escort to Berlin - when a better high altitude performer like the P-47D series through the -23 couldn't get close.

I don't own one and that isn't likely, so we left with letting it go, OK?

Cheers. If you won't let it go, I decline to participate further in that argument, but understand quite well where you are coming from. It might well go either way but, if all you had were Hellcats, you might have to try.

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Greg - Shortround nailed your 'beliefs' and assumptions to the barn door. I provided a mission profile which was standard ETO method for escorts and invited you to provide fuel consumption for the Hellcat to demonstrate that your assumptions for escort distances were reasonable.

Your only response seemed to be ad hominem flailing regarding our 'inability' to 'think out of the box'.

It is a simple math problem Greg and one every pilot knows by heart if planning a long IFR flight - which BTW is the Easiest of flight planning when compared to the escort problem.

So man up - dive into your references on R-2800-10W cruise speed fuel consumption with minimum 250KTS at 26000 feet. You can't use the Navy Flight Handbook simply because they didn't 'do' 26000 and probably would wonder why anybody would fly that profile in a Hellcat. Further, as it has been pointed out, the optimal cruise for the F6F was around 170kts for long range... at 12000 feet. You can't use that data or profile for this comparison against P-47 ops in ETO.

I would be delighted if you could just show near partity with P-47D prior to the -25.

As Tomo Pauk pointed out, you have a distinct tendency to shy away from solid sources for your imaginative assumptions.

Believe it or not, one of the reasons that I started this thread was to get info and avoid the F6F debate going on elsewhere on this site.
Oh well, another half-baked idea.

nincomp said:

Believe it or not, one of the reasons that I started this thread was to get info and avoid the F6F debate going on elsewhere on this site.

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I wouldn't have guessed.

nincomp said:

Believe it or not, one of the reasons that I started this thread was to get info and avoid the F6F debate going on elsewhere on this site.
Oh well, another half-baked idea.

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Sometimes you do have sort the wheat from the chaff

Drgondog is very knowledgeable about the 8th Air Force Missions. If he can't tell you how it was done (tactics, groups, spacing of flights) and when (dates tactics/procedures changed or specific missions) I am not sure who can. I would certainly not argue with him on those subjects.

Just for interest here's an interesting article comparing "Big Week" and the Battle of Britain:

View attachment Battle of Britain and Big Week Comparison.pdf

During five days of attacks on German aircraft factories, the American Eighth Air Force flew 3,300 bomber and 2,548 fighter escort sorties, supplemented by 712 escort sorties by the Ninth Air Force. In the same period, the Fifteenth Air Force, based in Italy, flew just over 500 four-engine bomber sorties over Germany and 413 fighter escort sorties.10

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Before "Big Week," Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, the Eighth Air Force's commander, had informed his subordinates that the mission of the fighters was not to bring the bombers back safely, as had been official U. S. Army Air Forces doctrine since before Pearl Harbor, but simply to shoot down Germans.21 In a sense bombers served accompanying fighters as bait: and the more bait there was, the more the defending fighters exposed themselves to counter-attacks by fighter escorts. It also seems that the more bombers there were, the more frustrated, and eventually demoralized, the defending fighter pilots felt if the escorts made it impossible to get at them.22

21. Lowell Thomas and Edward Jablonski, Bomber Commander: the Life of James Doolittle (London, 1977) p. 267. See also Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz: and the Air War in Europe (Washington, 1993) p. 359-60.

22. See for example Heinz Knoke's diary entry for 22 February 1944 in Heinz Knoke, I Flew For the Führer: the Story of a German Airman (London, 1953) p. 143.

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Interesting file you found there. Thanks!

Here is a quote directly from my fathers memoirs which is in the process of being turned into a book for publication early next year, it explains the 56th's escort method from may 1944:
"the manner of providing the necessary cover for bombers was as follows:- The route of the bombers flight path was sectioned off into blocks. separate fighter groups covered the bombers through their particular block (approx. 45mins flight time for each block). Each fighter group knew from whom they were taking over and who was to take over from them. Only the group commander and his deputy had a channel to confer directly with the bomber commander in the air. each separate days cover meant a different sector from the last to provide escort, this meant that each group in turn had the opportunity to escort the bombers right to the target itself. in their particular sector the fighter escorts diverted the flak from the bombers where possible by flying a few seconds ahead, weaving to and fro (to avoid being hit) attracting the flak towards them enabling the bombers to take their straight course over the target as untroubled as possible.
I always looked forward to covering the last sector for it gave the opportunity to see the actual results of the bombing raid. The bombers were able to bomb through the clouds using the latest radar bomb site but this was dreary for us fighter pilots as the jerries would never attempt to intercept us in the air in bad weather and it was too dangerous and difficult for us to go hunting in such conditions.
The normal operational height of the bombers was around 24-25,000 feet so we flew between 27 - 32,000 feet. after providing our block of cover we were free (weather permitting) to either return to base or go hunting which most of the time we did..!"
As quoted by Witold `Lanny' Lanowski, I hope this helps as it is straight from the horses mouth (so to speak!!)
remember also , that the 56th had been experimenting with the `Zemke fan' from 1943 to fly ahead of the bomber stream to intercept the fighter as they rose to attack, this was done with the other squadrons not involved in the fan providing top cover against the main fan fighters being bounced.

I hope this helps and shed some light..

Krys

Un fortunately for the 56th, they were denied the opportunity to make the very deep penetrations so the only target busting the 56th saw was within 400 miles of Haleworth.

The 355th had a slightly different doctrine. The Gp leader and each of the other two squadron leaders had a crystal tuned to "C" channel - connected to the bombers, and depending on location in the escort stream, had the latitude to take his squadron to Help.

One other note. During the Briefing, the Division and Tail symbols for each Bomb Group that the fighters were assigned to were in order of position in that Division. Thus if the CO made R/V point and the first batch of bombers were identified as in the 'middle' but the fighters were assigned the Trailing boxes, then they would peel back along the stream until they found 'their' bombers.

When the 56th moved to Boxted in 1944 from Halesworth and were subsequently given drop tanks, the range of the thunderbolt greatly increased giving them deeper range into Germany. Attached is a paper cutting from February 1945 when the 61st were over Berlin!!!

By that time Tempests and Jugs and Typhoons were deep into Germany.

BTW, the 56th FG started flying with drop tanks late July 1943/early August 1943. They got P-47D-25's with 370 gallons of internal fuel and 2x150 gallons external fuel in August 1944 - and still couldn't get to Berlin until February 1945.

The 56th was flying the P-47M then and having serious problems with the engine electrical harness - with many aborts - which didn't get fixed until April, 1945.

Basically as some have said here it was layered.

The composition of the layers changed over time. At the beginning the RAF did the short range protection (there and back). The P-47s and P-38s rendezvoused at different points and escorted to the limits of their range.
Later on the US had enough fighters to handle all the layers themselves (most of the time, sometimes they did call in the RAF).

As numbers built up the Mustangs took over more and more of all the layers (rather, than at first only the furthest ones) and the P-47s and P-38s moved to ground support.

The planning and logistics were complicated indeed, there could be 3 or 4 rendezvous points in a mission, sometimes more for very long range missions.

Price has some good examples in some of his books (forgot the ones right now but a google search will bring them up).

For a particular escort phase there usually was a group of fighters for top cover, to prevent bounces, a forward cover sweeping ahead and others pacing the bomber formation (at a distance). The idea being that they could intercept whatever direction the Germans came from.

At the beginning fighter cover tended to be too close, as time went on and hard experience taught lessons, it was loosened. Naturally the further away from the bombers the fighters engage the better.

May,3 1943 No. 487 Squadron RNZAF wiped out in daylight raid on Dutch power station

London Gazette March 1, 1946-

In 1943 daylight bombing raids on Germany and occupied Europe were mostly left to the USAAF. However the RAF mounted smaller attacks using their medium aircraft. The Mosquito was well suited to this role, given its speed. Less suitable were Ventura aircraft, which were heavily dependent on a fighter escort to give them protection. They did not last long in RAF frontline service and this raid was one of the reasons why.

On the 3rd May, 1943, Squadron Leader Trent No. 487 Squadron RNZAF, was detailed to lead a formation of Ventura aircraft in a daylight attack on the power station at Amsterdam.

This operation was intended to encourage the Dutch workmen in their resistance to enemy pressure. The target was known to be heavily defended. The importance of bombing it, regardless of enemy fighters or anti-aircraft fire, was strongly impressed on-the air crews taking part in the operation.

Before taking off, Squadron Leader Trent told the deputy leader that he was going over the target, whatever 'happened.

2. All went well until the Venturas and their fighter escort were nearing the Dutch coast. Then one bomber was hit and had to turn back. Suddenly large numbers of enemy fighters appeared. Our escorting fighters were hotly engaged and lost touch with the bombing force. The Venturas closed up for mutual protection and commenced their run up to the target. Unfortunately, the fighters detailed to support them over the target had reached the area too early and had been recalled.

3. Soon the bombers were attacked. They were at the mercy of 15 to 20 Messerschmitts which dived on them incessantly. Within four minutes six Venturas were destroyed. Squadron Leader Trent continued on his course with the 3 remaining aircraft.

4. In a short time 2 more Venturas went down in flames. Heedless of the murderous attacks and of the heavy anti-aircraft fire which was now encountered, Squadron Leader Trent completed an accurate bombing run and even shot down a Messerschmitt at point-blank range. Dropping his bombs in the target area, he turned away.

The aircraft following him was shot down on reaching the target. Immediately afterwards his own aircraft was hit, went into a spin and broke up. Squadron Leader Trent and his navigator were thrown clear and became prisoners of war. The other two members of the crew perished.


No. 487 Squadron RNZAF grouped in front of a Lockheed Ventura Mark II at Methwold, Norfolk



Armourers load 250-lb GP bombs into a Lockheed Ventura Mark II of No. 487 Squadron RNZAF at Methwold, Norfolk

From Heinz Knoke: I flew for the Fuhrer: Story of a German Airman

Heinz Knoke was already an accomplished Luftwaffe pilot by 1943, well on his way to his final tally of 52 aircraft. He and his flight had mastered the right approach to taking on the B-17s. Today, however, there was a surprise:

27th September, 1943.

Enemy concentrations in map reference sector Dora-Dora. Once again the time has come. . . . 1030 hours: stand by. 1045 hours : all set.

I have a new aircraft. Arndt has been polishing it until it shines like a new mirror: no doubt that will add another ten miles per hour to the speed.

1055 hours: the call to action blares as usual from the loudspeakers round the field: " All Flights take off! All Flights take off! "

The sky is completely overcast. We come out above the clouds at 10,000 feet, and at the same moment sight our Fortresses directly overhead. We climb on a parallel course, heading east up to 20,000 feet. That is as high as they are flying today.

The reserve tanks are still almost full when I order my Flight to jettison them. We swing quickly in to attack with our rockets. As we get into position, the Fortresses split up into separate groups of some thirty or forty aircraft each, and keep on constantly altering course. The moisture-trails above the cloudbank leave a zigzag pattern in the blue sky.

I order all our rockets to be discharged when we are in formation at a range of 2,000 feet. The next moment a simply fantastic scene unfolds before my eyes. My own two rockets both register a perfect bull's-eye on a Fortress. Thereupon I am confronted with an enormous solid ball of fire. The bomber has blown up in mid-air with its entire load of bombs. The blazing, smoking fragments come fluttering down.

Wenneckers also scores a direct hit. His victim goes down in flames. My wingman, Sergeant Reinhard, has discharged his rockets to explode beside another Fortress.

The fuselage appears to be damaged, too, and it swerves away off to the left. I observe how Reinhard chases off merrily after it, blazing away with his guns. He fastens on to the tail of the American.

My attention just then is attracted by the rather peculiar appearance overhead of double moisture trails, apparently emanating from very fast aircraft.

Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs, as far as I know, have been sent into action from our side. The peculiar-looking planes keep circling above the bombers. If they are German why do they not attack? I climb up alone for a closer look at them. Lightnings! Twelve or fourteen aircraft: the Yank has brought a fighter escort. I radio the warning to my comrades. Since I cannot undertake operations against them by myself alone, I decide to swoop down once more upon the Fortresses.

Then suddenly four other peculiar-looking single-engine aircraft dive past. They have the white star and broad white stripes as wing markings. Blast! They are Thunderbolts. I have not seen them before.

I immediately dive down after them. They swing round in a steep spiral to the left, heading for a lone Flying Fortress whose two outside engines have stopped. There is a Messerschmitt on its tail: it is Reinhard. The bloody fool has eyes only for his fat bomber, and is unaware of the enemy fighters coming up behind. keeps on firing at his victim.

But now the leading Thunderbolt is a perfect target in my sights. A single burst of fire from my guns is all that is needed. It bursts into flames and goes down spinning like a dead leaf into the depths below. It is my second kill today.

Then there is a sudden hammering noise in my crate. I turn round. There is a Thunderbolt hard on my tail, and two others are coming down to join it. I push the stick right forward with both hands, diving for cover in the clouds.

Too late: my engine is on fire. I can feel the heat: it quickly becomes unbearable.

Knoke survived by parachuting out and was uninjured. Many of the fellow pilots in his Squadron were less fortunate. In one flight of twelve aircraft nine pilots were killed and the three other planes crashed or the pilot had to bale out.


Knoke was flying the Messerschmitt Me 109 G or 'Gustav'. Seen here in 1944 equipped with cannon.



Luftwaffe ground-crew ("black men") positioning a Bf 109 G-6 "Kanonenvogel" equipped with the Rüstsatz VI underwing gondola cannon kit. Note the slats on the leading edge of the port wing. JG 2, France, autumn of 1943.



P-38F-1-LO over California during factory test flights (U.S. Air Force)



The Republic P-47 Thunderbolt which was now reaching the USAAF in England in numbers.

davebender said:

P-51s didn't arrive until spring 1944 and P-51D didn't arrive until summer 1944.

Dave - you have been corrected on this numerous times and references have been provided. In the ETO, discounting the RAF Mustang I and II, the first Combat operations for the P-51B was December 1, 1943. By March 21 (spring), 1944 there were four more P-51B groups operational. Total = 354, 357, 363, 4 and 355 before March 8, 1944. The 352nd was in transition before 'Spring 1944'. The P-51A and A-36 were flying combat Ops in April through June 1943. A-36 and P-51A in CBI in July 1943.

The first P-51B's arrived in UK in September 1943, the first P-51D's arrived in the UK in March 1944. The first combat mission of the P-51D-5NA was in the 4th and 354th FG on or about May 30, 1944..

By summer 1944 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Korps were holding by their fingernails just south of Caen and Army Group Center was fighting for it's life (and losing) in Belarus. Under such circumstances sending intruder missions over England or English Channel was a low priority. Small scale intruder operations over England April to June 1944 came to a screeching halt after June 1944.

Perhaps things would have been different if P-51 bomber escorts had shown up a year sooner.

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P-51A's were flying relatively long range escort to MTO bombers in July, 1943 - combined with the P-38 - but only escorting medium bombers at medium altitudes. Essentially the same range as the P-51B-1 and P-51B-5 before the fuselage tank additions.

Just got back to this after a long time and noticed Bill's post #26. You sure drip friendliness when you're on, Bill. On the surface, you're a typical nay-sayer. It was already obvious that the standard profile wasn't going to work. How many other profiles did you try to see if it could be done before you started the sarcasm? None?

Maybe you wouldn't have planned the Yamamoto mission either since it was "out of normal range?"

The Hellcats wouldn't have to cruise at 250 knots and they don't have to match your profile or any profile. My "what if" was to find a profile to make it work because that's all you had to do it with at the time ... and you still don't seem to get that part. We already know it wasn't the case, but that's the way it is with all "what ifs," not just this one.

The challenge is to find a profile by which the F6F could provide escort there and back. If you can't, then you can't. Obviously you and Shortround can't think of a way to make it work, so we'll just say you both decline the mission and we proceed on that basis.

The bombers are on their own. All those Hellcats and nobody can figure out a way to make them useful. Seems like waste of Hellcats to me. Ah well, war is hell.