Bomber Question

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules


That's not what I'm saying at all. You are just being obtuse. What I have said at least three times now is pretty clear. the word WHEN keeps getting mentioned, but you're ignoring it because you are deliberately pointing out the flaws in my argument without acknowledging my point.

As I've said before, go do some reading.
 
Well I tried reading your post which defined strategic and tactical bombing, your argument doesnt support that in any way and doesnt even state what you are saying. Strategic bombing was not based on bombers attacking airfields from 25,000 ft and the US strategic campaign wasn't based on that either, The Do17 was not used to degrade French industry or the morale of the French living in big cities. The Allied strategic bombing campaign didnt attack targets that the Do17 did but would have no use for the Do17 because it was too light and too short ranged.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
Are you shifting the burden of evidence here?
Click to expand...

Trying to get him to think beyond using my evidence against me, after all, his argument is based entirely on ignoring the points I've raised in answer to his questions and attempting to derail my argument by focussing on one slightly oblique point that neither confirms nor denies my point in mine. In short, he's being obtuse.

After all, he asked me to provide evidence of the use of the Do 17 in attacking French factories etc prior to the invasion. I answered with the above, submitting the same response he did in that the capitulation of France was too rapid to be able to launch a proper strategic bombing campaign, as the Germans had used their bombers in the examples I provided.
 
pbehn said:
Well I tried reading your post which defined strategic and tactical bombing, your argument doesnt support that in any way and doesnt even state what you are saying.
Click to expand...

Yup, it does. You are focussing on derailing my argument for the sake of doing so because you are being obtuse. What I posted in support isn't even registering with you. I've suggested you go and read up on the subject, I've stated why the Do 17 and the Typhoon are different and within which scenario they would be used, I even answered your question on why the Germans didn't launch a bombing campaign against French industry in advance of their invasion, but STILL you refuse to acknowledge it. Your debate does nothing to help your own cause, because you are just being deliberately difficult.

Why don't you prove to me why the Typhoon and Do 17 are interchangeable instead of just refusing to go beyond your stumbling point.
 

I'm following the conversation, but that just jumped out at me.

My own opinion is that the Mossie filled a niche between the single-engined F-Bs of both AFs and the heavier twins favored by USAAF, and that comparisons do none of the airplanes favors, because they each excelled in particular regimes.

I think the Germans used their twins more on an ad-hoc basis, tactical here, operational there, and strategic when needed, because they had to.

All the same, I'm learning an awful lot here, and as noted above, that is definitely appreciated.
 
Let's play a game, people. let's say we have in our air force Do 17s and Typhoons. we are going to invade another country, let's say our countries share a similar border. Now, we want to attack troop concentrations, airfields, communications etc at around the same time as our armies move into the enemy country we are invading. which aircraft do we use and why?

The Typhoon? Could do, but perhaps it doesn't have the range to reach the targets on the other side of the country, and it only has a small bomb load, so to drop a given bomb load it has to fly more sorties, which could result in a greater than necessary accident rate (during the Battle of Britain, the Germans and British suffered accordingly due to accidents and operations were scrubbed because squadrons had too few operational aircraft).

The answer in this scenario is the Dornier because it has a larger bomb load and greater range. This is a first strike after all.

So, our invasion is going well, our troops are moving rapidly through the country, but are being held up by enemy armour at a crucial choke point and we need to clear that in a hurry. So, what do we use?

Now we could use the Dornier because it has a bigger bomb load than the Typhoon, but we want precision and a rapid response. The Dornier is slow, also at altitude, it is less accurate than a low-level high-speed attack and although attacking tanks from high altitude can be done through saturation bombing (it was done following Overlord), but we want accuracy, and speed to evade enemy fighters because we've kicked a hornet's nest by invading.

In this scenario, we use the Typhoon.
 
Last edited:

Yup, the Mosquito (thread cross over here) was used both as a tactical strike and strategic bomber, but not both at the same time or the same model type. The Mossie bomber squadrons were equipped with a different variant of the Mosquito compared to the fighter-bomber units. The bomber variants needed altitude and a big bomb bay, with a glased nose section for bomb aiming. The fighter bombers had a small bomb bay, with half of the bay occupied by 20 mm cannon and the engines were optimised for low altitude and had solid noses with machine guns in them. There is a distinct difference between them.

As for the Germans, the means of defining their role, or intent is in their designation, as I pointed out earlier, the bomber squadrons were Kampfgeschwader. Sure, attacking airfields in the van of an invading force sure looks like tactical bombing, but consider how it's done and the aim of doing so, not to mention the scenarios in the previous post. The attack on the airfield is done to prevent enemy fighters from attacking both aerial assets and the invading force. The Dorniers did it from medium altitude, where accuracy is not such an issue, also it is being used as a first-strike weapon. It's launching in support of the forthcoming invading army, granted, but the army hasn't reached the airfield. It might not go anywhere near the airfield. It's still battling the enemy tanks. The aim of the Dornier attack is to prevent the enemy air support from getting airborne. That's a strategic objective. Shooting down the enemy fighters as they attack your armies is a tactical one.

During the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe began operations with Erpobungsgruppe 210, so named in advance of the Me 210 entering service, but devoid of those aircraft was equipped with Bf 110s. It was extraordinarily effective at disabling airfields and other targets. These attacks usually were sent simultaneously to the long-range bomber raids and, achieved what the bomber squadrons had been attempting to do more effectively and with fewer resources. Now, you could argue they were strategic in that they were disabling radar sites, airfields etc, but they were tactical attacks in disabling the targets in conjunction with the bomber raids (but not always). They were conducted at low level and high speed and were often unstoppable. The Brits had little counter to them because they were launched simultaneously to the bombers so the defences would head for the bombers and not worry too much about the small force that broke off and proceeded at high speed to put a hole in the radar screen.

Now, operationally the definition between strategic and tactical aims gets blurred here, but common sense has to enter the debate. The Dornier was too slow and unmanoeuvrable for the kind of work that EkGr 210 carried out, so the fighters were used, the Bf 109 and Bf 110. Conversely, you wouldn't use the Bf 110 as a high altitude bomber, even though it can carry a useful bomb load.
 
Last edited:
Which brings us conveniently to the original premise, whether the Typhoon and Do 17 did comparable jobs, so could the Typhoon be considered a medium bomber and the Dornier a ground attack aircraft?

Well, you wouldn't nominally use a Typhoon as a medium bomber and the Dornier as a ground attack aircraft. It's situational based on what you are trying to achieve and when you are trying to achieve it. Yes, the lines between strategic and tactical objectives get blurred but the intent behind each aircraft and its usage is obvious and planners would take that into consideration.

The war changed previously perceived ideas behind how aircraft were to be used. Before WW2 a heavy bomber was a heavy bomber, there wasn't really a category of low altitude high-speed strike aircraft in support of armies. It didn't exist. Air forces around the world were equipped with single or twin-engined 'light' bombers, which flew at medium to low altitude to drop bombs on bridges and stuff like the RAF Fairey Battle units in France. They were used in direct support of the army but in hindsight was a foolish way of doing so. The British called tactical air support Army Co-operation and used these:

Lysander-1

The use of the Stuka in direct support of the invading army was groundbreaking; that wasn't how other air forces did bombers in support of their armies. Conditions dictated that things changed and the Germans, wanting to avoid the stalemates of the Western Front in the Great War saw the practical application of airpower in support of a rapidly advancing mechanised army and practised it in Spain. This didn't mean the Germans didn't need strategic bombers, but because they had chosen smaller, easier to build twin-engined bombers they could also be used in direct support of an invasion. Their offensive role was obvious though, terror raids on cities, attacking airfields to stop enemy fighters and ground attack aircraft, attacking shipping, all strategic objectives. Let's not forget the He 177 was designed to replace the He 111 and Do 17 as Germany's frontline bomber. Despite the dive-bombing requirement, meant for accuracy, not specifically as direct army support, the He 177 was a strategic bomber, like its predecessor.

Gatow 164

In WW2, co-operation between armies and air forces grew in a fashion that had not existed before, thus the likes of the Tactical Air Forces were born. Guys like Coningham (RAF) and Quesada (USAAF) were advocates for effective close support and it became a totally different and new way of providing support to an advancing army, beyond what the Germans were doing, but building on their ideas. We look at this as normal, but it wasn't before that. Before the war, air forces devoted hardly any resources to direct army support, but it changed due to necessity and co-operation between the branches of the forces was key to its success. It's interesting to note that at the outbreak of WW2 (for the Americans, i.e. 1941) the USAAF didn't have a dedicated close support/tactical strike aircraft (the Navy did). There was the Vultee Vengeance but these were being built for British requirements. Following Pearl, the USAAF became interested in their use and the primary close support aircraft were converted bombers and fighters (the A-36 included, converted from an RAF fighter, no less!).

P-47-3
 
Last edited:

Hi

The Air-Britain book has the specifications for military aircraft for February 1914, so pre-war:



In the documentation of the WW 1 period they also mention the terms 'working' and 'fighting' aircraft, the former generally the 'Corps' types.

Types of aircraft became more specialised as the war progressed, however, the tasks performed by different types did overlap (as they did in WW2), note the air plan for the 1915 Battle of Loos (from OH):


Also from the OH, are the orders (25th July, 1917) for the use of the air weapon during the start of the Battles of Ypres. Note the different types attacking the same type of targets:







By the Battle of Cambrai later in 1917, the 'fighters' are dropping bombs as well so become 'Fighter-Bombers' using more modern terminology.

Mike
 
We often forget that every doctrinal role for air power was developed during the First World War: offensive/defensive counter-air; suppression of enemy air defences; close air support (including a rudimentary forward air control capability with ground personnel talking direct to a formation lead via radio); strategic bombing; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (including photographic reconnaissance); anti-shipping (including air-launched torpedoes)...the list goes on and on.

For all the "stick and string" nature of those early aerial fighting machines, the men who flew them proved a foresighted and adaptive bunch.
 
I originally said this "There were always twin engined bombers from WW1 era. When you stop counting just engines, a Typhoon with either rockets or bombs could carry more offensive fire power than a Do-17, but it had more horsepower and less crew too."
I didnt call it a medium bomber, the consensus of history calls the Do-17 a medium bomber and the Blenheim a light bomber. But in terms of your game lets go. The LW stopped using the Do-17 and others attacking London in daylight, they switched to strapping bombs on Bf109s and tossing them out on London, would they have used a Typhoon for that? In my opinion Yes. The LW then started tip and run raids with Fw190s, would they have used a Typhoon for that? Again the answer in my opinion is yes. After D-Day what use would a Do17 be, it is just too slow and light and every German in Normandy has a rifle or machine gun at least as powerful as it has. Within days of the D-Day landings airstrips were being constructed there, because even that 100 miles across the channel seriously affects what you ca do i a day.


By the time the Typhoon was being introduced as a fighter bomber, the B-25 and B-26 were what medium bombers had moved on to. On the British side the Lancaster and Halifax should have been twin engined medium bombers. They were (or would have been) heavier bomb load, more defensive and offensive firepower and were faster than a Do-17.

That was my point.
 
Hi

The Battle of Cambrai saw a major use of the 'Fighter Bomber' concept, Orders for I Brigade and Ninth Wing. It mentions at '4 (c)' that two scouts would be 'bombed up' ready to attack when called for throughout the day as would 12 Corps aircraft '4 (d)'. The airfields would be connected to the front telephone network as well as the RFC wireless, Corps aircraft on Counter Attack Patrols could wireless in reports of enemy troops.



The III Brigade Orders have Camels attacking airfields, RE.8 and AW FK.8s attacking HQs, also DH.4 aircraft attacking railway stations.




Mike
 
nuuumannn said:
The war changed previously perceived ideas behind how aircraft were to be used. Before WW2 a heavy bomber was a heavy bomber, there wasn't really a category of low altitude high-speed strike aircraft in support of armies. It didn't exist.
Click to expand...
That's not entirely true, in WWI, most air-to-ground operations were in support of ground forces, then interdiction, and some behind the line raids aimed at populations, hubs of transport and production, and airfields.

In the post-war period, the army-support/CAS role was filled either by some light-bombers (RAF: Fairey Battle; USAAF: A-20 & A-26; Soviet Air Force: Il-2), occasionally some mediums (Luftwaffe: Ju-88; Soviet Air Force: Pe-2 & Tu-2), and specialized dive-bombers (RAF: Vultee Vengeance; Luftwaffe: Ju-87; USN: SBD & SB2C; USAAF: A-24 & A-36); The USAAF had an attack category, which included the A-20 & A-26, which were level bombers with a little extra agility, and the A-24 & A-36, which were dive-bombers.
Following Pearl, the USAAF became interested in their use and the primary close support aircraft were converted bombers and fighters (the A-36 included, converted from an RAF fighter, no less!).
Click to expand...
Technically, there was an interest in dive-bombers starting in 1939 with the USAAC because they saw how effectively the Luftwaffe was able to blast and pave it's way across Europe. Once they saw that, and realized that they couldn't do that with their current front-line attack planes (A-20): They started buying SBD's and SB2C's. Around 1943, they started to have less concerns about that because they figured fighters could carry out the shorter range tactical missions that required greater agility and speed, and the A-26 would carry out the longer range missions that required heavier loads.

The fact is the USAAF loved payload & range over maneuverability even in their tactical aircraft, so it didn't take much to get them to give up the single-engined planes in favor of fighters.
 
Zipper730 said:
That's not entirely true, in WWI, most air-to-ground operations were in support of ground forces, then interdiction, and some behind the line raids aimed at populations, hubs of transport and production, and airfields.
Click to expand...

Actually it is true, re-read my post, it specifically references heavy bombers. As you already know since it was me who pointed out the use of bombers over the front during the Great War, but before World War Two the role of heavy bomber was well defined, even during the Great War the strategic bomber, whilst not specifically referred to as such was employed for raids against strategic targets, such as railway yards, factories, cities etc. Between the wars, theorists such as Trenchard, Douhet and Mitchell defined ideas behind aerial warfare and the use of bombers, which became hard and fast, but the role of interdiction went largely forgotten after the Great War despite its use during it, even if it wasn't correctly understood that that was indeed what these aircraft were doing, it was forsaken for single-engined level bombers, such as the DH.9A, Westland Wapiti etc in RAF service and employed for 'Army Co-operation'.


Not before WW2 however. Of the aircraft mentioned here, only the Fairey Battle and Ju 87 were in service before World War Two and, as mentioned in my post, the former represented the above and the latter was singular in its use. You've just assisted in answering my statement in attempting to counter it.


That the USAAC was interested in dive bombers from 1939 did not translate to the acquisition of hardware until mid to late 1940 of the A-24 in paltry numbers, that were, in effect conversions of navy bombers, just as I mentioned, but the Vengeance was the first attack aircraft the USAAF acquired that was purpose-built as a land-based dive bomber, not a conversion of anything else. Let's also not forget that the A-20 first entered service as the DB-7 with the Armee de L'Air before it entered USAAF service, and consequently saw action in Europe before it did in USAAF service.
 
pbehn said:
That was my point.
Click to expand...

I got ya, in fact, if you put it like that I kinda agree with you to a point, but there is no way the Typhoon could have replaced the Do 17 in its role as it was employed during the Battle of Britain, which brings me to this...


Actually no. As you know the Germans did carry out low-level strike raids using ground attack aircraft, during the Battle of Britain Erpobungsgruppe 210 employed Bf 110s and the various Jagdgruppen used Bf 109s for the task, but these were for striking specific targets, such as radar installations and airfields - Manston was hit a few times by Ebg 210 because of its location, but let's be clear, "London" was not the target these aircraft were used against. RAF Kenley and RAF Croydon just down the road from each other in London were attacked by this unit, successfully knocking out the former for the day one afternoon, but not the City of London. Why waste low-level fast strike aircraft against a large ill-defined area when you have big bombers carrying a larger load per aircraft to do that? Your small strike aircraft are there to enable the big bombers to do exactly that. Sorry, but I just can't agree with you on this point.
 
In saying that however, Ebg 210 was extremely effective and the Germans were, typically, often unaware of just how much damage the unit's aircraft actually achieved. On one afternoon, the unit struck a radar site (can't remember off the top of my head which one) but the attack severed the main power lines from the adjacent sector control station to the radar sites, which meant that for a period, a whole sector of the British defences was completely blind (but for the Observer Corps, a vital but unsung link in the chain), but the Germans didn't know about it and therefore couldn't take advantage of the massive hole they had just created in the radar chain! It took a day or two to fix if memory serves.

The unit, as effective as it was suffered high losses when mixed in with other operations however, during the raids against Kenley and Croydon, the Bf 110s were unfortunate enough to stumble across Spitfires that were vectored toward an attacking bomber force and the unit was almost wiped out, the stragglers returning to France missing their commanding officer.
 
I was purely talking of horsepower and weights. As far as the BoB goes as the day time attacks turned into the night time Blitz in October the LW used Bf 109s to make high altitude attacks, they caused little damage but were hard to stop, it was already established that medium bombers suffered too many losses doing the same. You could make the same point about any of the twin engine designs, to stay in the game the Me110 had to have the same engine development as the 109 did.
 

Hi

This appears to describe the 12 August, 1940 raid on RDF stations at Dover, Pevensey and Rye, which took place between 0930 and 1000 hours. Pevensey was the worst damaged, Martin Lutz hit the power supply cables with 500-kilo bombs, it was out of action the rest of the day. The other stations began to operate not long after the attack, probably at reduced effectiveness, but appear to have been all in operation the following day. More effective was the attack on Ventnor RDF station by 15 of KG.51 JU88s, this was put out of action for three days. This did cause a gap but it was at least partially filled by the Naval air search radars, Type 79, near Portsmouth, one at Fort Wallington on Portsdown Hill, used mainly for training but connected to the RAF RDF system. Another was at Eastney Fort East used usually for development but also could provide information.
Another attack on RDF stations by Erpr. Gr 210 took place on the afternoon of the 31st August, with attacks on the stations in Kent and Sussex, however, they were all back on the air by the end of the day.

Certainly they made some effective strikes but also suffering a quite high casualty rate, for example on Bristol aircraft factories on 27th September when they lost four aircraft (20% of the formation) including Martin Lutz. This was a raid in conjunction with other German formations.

Mike
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

N
WWI BOmbers and the relief tube
Replies
2
Views
797
herman1rg
T
Gunner's security question
2 3
Replies
56
Views
11K
tyrodtom
T
WW1 Bomber Wings Found in Garage
Replies
12
Views
5K
T Bolt
J
WWI warbird wargaming scenarios question
Replies
0
Views
2K
Jonesy1760
J
J
Balloon busting Frank Luke question
Replies
6
Views
3K
norab
Menu
Log in
Register