here was a whole article in a magazine describing how poor a fighter bomber the Spitfire was. With two 500 lb bombs it had a combat radius of 90 miles. And the four .303guns were judged inadequate as well and had to be replaced by .50 cal. No wonder the RAF pushed to build airstrips in Normandy so quickly! They needed a base close enough to get the Spits in the war and also a place for the Tiffies' emergency landings.
The problem is you've not posted anything except your opinion of an article and even then the article snippet you posted did nothing to reinforce anything you said!

Yes, the Spitfire was not the greatest dive bomber, but then the Stuka was not a great fighter. As a ground attack aircraft with 2 TAF it proved useful. Here is a brief summary in Wikipedia, something that I'm sure even you could find out from, rather than just going along with a crappy stereotype.
"The bulk of the Spitfire squadrons, which by D-Day were incorporated into the
Second Tactical Air Force, were progressively moved across the Channel, operating from
advanced landing grounds in
Normandy, close behind the front-lines. From late August 1944, as the Allied ground forces overran German forces in France and moved forward into
Belgium and parts of the
Netherlands, the Spitfire units of 2 TAF moved to new airfields in support.
[96] By this time, as
air supremacy (as opposed to
air superiority) had been achieved, and in line with 2 TAF's doctrine on the use of fighter-bombers most of the Merlin engined Mk IX and XVI units were used in the
fighter-bomber role.
[69] This meant that these units concentrated on roaming over German territory, attacking ground targets of opportunity and providing tactical ground support to the army units. In this role there were fewer opportunities to engage Luftwaffe fighters.
[97] A notable incident occurred on 17 July 1944, when a Spitfire of 602 Squadron attacked the staff car of
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, wounding him and removing him from command of
Army Group B.
[98]
One tactical innovation adopted by 2nd TAF Spitfires was the "Fluid Six"' formation, which had been developed through combat experience in Europe and North Africa. The first use of the tactic dated back to at least November 1941. It is known that
No. 112 Squadron RAF used this in the
North African campaign.
[99] This formation "was considered the best fighter formation of the war".
[100] It abandoned the leader-wingman combination that had existed before. Instead, it was based on three pairs of Spitfires which could provide mutual cover and support: the pairs were 'stacked' in altitude so that the pair (e.g.: 5 & 6) flying up-sun, and covering the tails of the leaders (1 & 2), flew higher, while the other pair (e.g.: 3 & 4) flew lower. Any attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between two pairs of Spitfires, no matter the direction or altitude of the attack. Another advantage of this formation was that when operating at squadron strength a flight commander was able to lead six aircraft of his own flight, "whereas, with formations of four there would more likely be one formation from each flight with the third consisting of aircraft from another flight."
[100]
Fluid Six formation as flown by Spitfires of 2nd TAF 1944–1945
The Merlin's water and glycol cooling system, as with all liquid-cooled aero-engines, proved vulnerable to small arms fire, with one hit in the radiator or coolant pipes often being enough to drain the system, eventually causing the engine to seize or catch fire. Although some pilots were able to gain enough altitude to glide back to a forward airfield, the low altitudes normally flown during ground attack missions meant that light (up to 30 mm) flak claimed most of the Spitfire IXs and XVIs lost while operating as fighter-bombers.
[101][102] Just 21 of the 152 Spitfires that were destroyed or damaged from all causes from 1–30 June 1944 were shot down by German fighters.
[103]
Flight Lieutenant Raymond Baxter, who had flown Spitfires almost continually since 1941, flew Mk XVIs on fighter-bomber operations while commanding 'A' Flight of
602 Squadron attacking
V-2 rocket launching sites in the
Netherlands:
The usual force to attack these small targets was four to six Spitfires, each with either one 500 and two 250 pound bombs or two 250 pounders and a long range tanks... As we crossed into enemy territory we were liable to be engaged with predicted fire from heavy 88mm guns. But in a Spitfire this was no great danger, provided one continually changed one's direction and altitude in a series of long climbing or diving turns... the V-2 targets were defended with light flak so when we reached the target area our approach tactics would vary...Accurate bombing was dependant on accurate flying during the dive...the speed would build up quite rapidly, to a maximum of about 360 mph before the release. When he judged the altitude to be about 3,000 ft each pilot let go of his bombs in a salvo, then did a 5G pull-up to bring the nose up to horizontal... the drill was to make a high-speed getaway using the ground for cover.
[104]
As for the Typhoon, no one's questioning that it was a dog's breakfast, but that you underestimate the number of aircraft available to the RAF in 1944 and their sortie rate. 2 TAF had no less than 23 squadrons equipped with the Typhoon, and that's not mentioning Fighter Command's examples. Here are some statistics. The air effort surrounding Overlord was a total of 195,200 sorties by aircraft of all types, of which 2 TAF contributed 28,600 sorties. Of interest is that the total RAF sorties was 71,800, which offers the 2 TAF contribution some perspective. The rest was US units, but it is worth noting that while the RAF flew substantially fewer sorties, the tonnage of bombs dropped by the RAF was on average considerably greater per sortie than the US effort. While the 8th and 9th AFs dropped 101,200, the RAF dropped 94,200 over a much lower number of sorties.
Fewer aircraft operated, fewer aircraft exposed to danger for a greater average tonnage per sortie. More done with less, that's efficiency for ya. (Information from Terraine, The Right of the Line, The RAF in the European War 1939-1945, Hodder & Stoughton, 1985)